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1 Introduction
Working out a way from East to West:
EU enlargement and labour migration from
Central and Eastern Europe
Godfried Engbersen, Marek Okólski, Richard Black
and Cristina Panţîru
After the fall of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe
(CEE), the expectation arose in Western Europe that differences in afflu-
ence between East and West would make enormous migration flows in-
evitable. This expectation was strengthened by political and ethnic ten-
sions in Central and Eastern Europe. At the beginning of the 1990s,
the Financial Times predicted that 7 million people may leave the former
Soviet Union (see Codagnone 1998). Another British newspaper, The
Guardian, referred to a meeting of former Russian politicians where a
figure of as high as 25 million emigrants from the former Soviet Union
to the West was mentioned (see Tränhardt 1996). Academic voices were
more mixed. Some, such as Van de Kaa, concluded that there was
indeed a huge migration potential in the former USSR and its satellites
following the fall of communism, and formed the view that ‘the main
direction streams in Europe during the next decade or so [would] be
from East to West’ (Van de Kaa 1993: 91). In contrast, others predicted
much lower numbers (see Fassmann & Munz 1994: 534; also Heisler
1992: 611).
Initially, it was the latter view that proved to be correct. The millions
of migrants expected to arrive from the former USSR never arrived.
Migration from the former Yugoslavia to the countries of the European
Union was more substantial, much of it in the form of forced popula-
tion movements, but these still represented only a small proportion of
the many millions of people driven to flight by the conflict in their
country. According to Sassen (1997: 150), the question is not why so
many people came to the West from countries that were once part of
the USSR or the Yugoslavian Federation. Rather, the question is why –
given the poverty and the unstable political situation in much of the re-
gion – so many more people did not take the step of emigrating to the
EU. One answer lies in the restrictive immigration policies pursued by
Western European countries since 1989. Fassmann and Munz (1994:
535) spoke of a cordon sanitaire erected to protect Western Europe from
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries and the Balkans.
Indeed, although some Western European countries had a relatively
open asylum policy, this became more restrictive as time passed, whilst
the opportunities for regular labour migration remained very limited in
the 1990s. Another plausible answer is that it was less political change
that was to promote migration than economic collapse, which in much
of the region came later in the decade.
Nonetheless, there was considerable irregular migration in the early
1990s from countries such as Poland, Romania, Ukraine, Albania and
Bulgaria to Western and Southern Europe (especially Germany, Italy
and Spain). In turn, countries such as Germany, France, Britain,
Belgium and Switzerland, and later also Spain, Greece, Norway and the
Netherlands introduced specific programmes to facilitate temporary la-
bour migration, often for the purposes of seasonal work (Martin 1994;
Pijpers & Van der Velde 2007). A series of bilateral agreements con-
cerning various forms of employment, including seasonal work, were
also implemented in Germany, in an effort to legalise the previously il-
legal seasonal employment of East Europeans in the country that had
grown significantly in the early 1990s (Okólski 2004a).
Another factor that contributed to stemming the migration ‘flood’, so
fearfully predicted by many in Western Europe, was the intra-regional
division of Central and Eastern Europe. Indeed, perceiving the region
as homogeneous with regard to migration would be a misleading sim-
plification (Okólski 1992), since for a long time, it has been divided be-
tween predominantly migrant-sending and predominantly migrant-
receiving areas. The former included above all Poland, but also
Romania, Ukraine and Bulgaria, as well as, after 1990, Albania,
Moldova and a few other countries. In these countries, a strong propen-
sity of the population to move abroad was observed from as early as the
1970s onwards. In contrast, the Czech Republic (formerly
Czechoslovakia), Hungary and East Germany (formerly the German
Democratic Republic) were mainly receiving areas before the lifting of
the Iron Curtain in 1989. In this respect, a major change in the period
of the post-communist transition was not so much the drawing of a
new dividing line between CEE countries on the basis of migration sta-
tus. Rather, it was the increased intensity and continuity of population
movements, accompanied by increasing diversity of the form of these
movements and their geographical directions, as well as a greater com-
plexity of factors underlying migration.
In addition, the transition and activation of market forces in the re-
gion gave rise to the emergence of various regional ‘growth poles’ of
the economy. These economic differences were amplified by diversity
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in the pace and course of transition strategies adopted by individual
CEE countries and the accompanying political conditions. All this
strongly influenced the movements of CEE populations and ultimately
led to a new migration space in the region. This space played the role
of a filter, which kept within the region’s boundaries a substantial part
of the migration that might otherwise have occurred. Instead of moving
to the West, many migrants from the former USSR changed their resi-
dence by moving to another CIS country. As a result, in the 1990s,
Russia came to rank as one of top migrant-receiving countries in the
world. A quite different mechanism of this new migration space also
brought hundreds of thousands of people from the former USSR
(mainly Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Russia), as well as Romania
and Bulgaria, to growth poles in the Czech Republic and Hungary. At
the time, such migration was much less risky or costly than looking for
opportunities in the West (Okólski 2004b).
Throughout the 1990s, however, migrants originating from CEE
countries started to become more and more experienced in terms of
finding opportunities in overseas labour markets. As their networks
grew and transnational communities expanded, migrants increasingly
started to take risks, undertaking trips to countries that were remote in
terms of physical distance, institutions, language and culture. This de-
velopment coincided with certain Western EU states’ relaxing of restric-
tive admission rules, such as granting people from CEE countries ac-
cess to travel in the Schengen Area, the introduction or extension of
special employment programmes and a tacit tolerance of irregular resi-
dence or clandestine work by Eastern Europeans. Tolerance of irregular
residence and clandestine work was especially relevant in the case of
the four southernmost countries of the EU – Italy, Spain, Greece and
Portugal.
How many migrants?
Providing an overall estimate of the volume of migration from and be-
tween CEE countries from 1989 to 2004 is not easy. Estimates based
on total net population change, accounting for natural increase or de-
crease, suggest a net migration outflow of around 3.2 million over this
period from the A8 and A2 countries,1 with some 60 per cent of this
flow accounted for by emigration from Romania and Bulgaria alone
(Table 1.1), two countries where emigration pressure had built up under
communism due to strict controls on exit. However, this estimate does
not account for the fact that a significant proportion of migration from
and within the region is in the form of circulation; this has the effect of
inflating net migration figures, as those only temporarily absent from
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their country of origin are counted as migrants. Indeed, as
Kaczmarczyk and Okólski (2005) note, there are at least seven distinct
types of movement from CEE countries that are potentially counted in
different kinds of censuses and surveys, which, in reality, should be dis-
aggregated for a clear understanding of migration processes. In addi-
tion, figures of net outflows for each country in the region do not tell
us anything about destinations, or whether these destinations were
within or outside the region.
With the May 2004 accession of the new CEE member states (A8),
the defensive attitude of Western European countries towards East
European labour migrants changed further. As a consequence, migra-
tion from East to West also rose. Three EU countries – Ireland, Sweden
and the United Kingdom – and non-EU Norway immediately opened
their labour markets to migrants from the new member states, while
others opted for a transition period and/or imposed conditions on la-
bour migration. Since then, a large number of countries have opened
their labour markets wholly or in part to A8 citizens.
Interestingly, whereas after 1989 the volume of potential East to West
migration was first overestimated, this new labour migration was initially
underestimated, particularly migration to certain countries. For example,
projections of migration to the UK on the eve of EU enlargement sug-
gested that between 5,000 and 13,000 new migrants would come from
CEE countries each year (e.g. Dustmann, Casanova, Fertig, Preston &
Schmidt 2003), whilst projections for the EU-15 as a whole suggested
180,000 migrants in the first year, rising to around 220,000 per year
over time (Alvarez-Plata, Brücker & Siliverstovs 2003). In practice, it is
estimated that as many as half a million Polish citizens had moved to
the UK, alone, by 2007 (see Kaczmarczyk in this volume).
Table 1.1 Net migration flows from A8 and A2 countries, 1989-2004
Country Net migration,
1989-2004 (000s)
Romania -1,245
Bulgaria -688
Poland -667
Lithuania -235
Latvia -199
Estonia -153
Slovakia -53
Slovenia -5
Czech Republic +19
Hungary +26
Total, A8/A2 -3,200
Source: Mansoor and Quillin, 2004: Appendix 1
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One reason why estimates were low was the assumption – not unrea-
sonable at the time – that all EU-15 labour markets would be on the
same footing (i.e. there would be no restrictions against A8 citizens), a
result being that Germany would receive the most of the new migrants
from accession countries. In practice, however, Germany did not open
its labour market to A8 workers. As a consequence, countries such as
the UK, Ireland and Norway have experienced large-scale labour immi-
gration, mainly from Poland, but also from other countries like
Lithuania, Slovakia and Latvia. As other countries opened their labour
markets, they, too, have come to receive large groups of labour mi-
grants, again especially from Poland.
Demographic analysis is also hampered by the lack of reliable figures
on migration in the EU-15 member states. For example, in the UK, data
from the Worker Registration Scheme provides useful, regionally disag-
gregated data on the registration of workers from A8 countries. But this
does not tell us the whole story of migration, since they include regis-
trations of workers who were already in the country, and do not account
for circulation or return. In addition, the accession of Bulgaria and
Romania on 1 January 2007 is too recent to allow for reliable figures.
Still, it is clear that large groups of Romanians have moved to Spain,
Italy, Greece and Portugal, even though, unlike migrants from the A8
countries, Bulgarians and Romanians have met greater obstacles to free
movement.
Another aspect of these new migration patterns is that small numbers
of new immigrants have started to arrive in Poland, Romania and
Bulgaria, partly in order to cope with the local demand for cheap labour.
Up until the late 1980s, there was almost no migration into Poland.
Thereafter, and particularly after EU enlargement, the number of foreign
migrants entering the country increased rapidly (Wallace 2002; Kicinger
& Weinar 2007). A much more prominent example, meanwhile, is the
Czech Republic where, between 1993 (when the state was established)
and 2002, some 145,000 foreigners officially immigrated, and the net
migration was positive at some 75,000 (Drbohlav 2004). By 2002, the
number of (legal) foreign residents in the country was 232,000, repre-
senting approximately 2.3 per cent of the total resident population.
‘Incomplete’ or ‘liquid’ migration
It is in this context that our book seeks to analyse contemporary pat-
terns of labour migration in Europe, as influenced by the accession of
CEE countries to the EU. We look in particular at the impact on the la-
bour market, both in destination and origin countries. As noted above,
the lack of reliable data and the contemporary nature of existent data
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make it difficult to gain a clear insight into these consequences. In ad-
dition, the nature of migration processes further complicates matters.
Many contemporary labour migration patterns are temporary, circular
and seasonal. Many of these migrants are employed in secondary, infor-
mal labour markets. And many of these mobility patterns and labour
practices are not registered, due to their temporary and illegal nature.
To describe these patterns, Okólski (2001a, 2001b) introduced the
concept of ‘incomplete migration’. By this he means temporary migra-
tion abroad, of varying degrees of legality, without any settlement that is
mostly connected to work in a secondary segment of the labour market
in a foreign country. The concept of incomplete migration returns, al-
beit differently formulated, in the work of Wallace who prefers to use
the word ‘mobility’ rather than ‘migration’. She points out that CEE
countries have themselves become the targets of migratory flows and
that previously dominant patterns of one-way migration are becoming
less significant:
an important aspect of this migration, both into and out of the
country, has been the fact that rather than permanent one-way
migration (the dominant pattern until recently) there has been a
predominance of short-term, circulatory movements backwards
and forwards across borders. This would be better termed mobi-
lity than migration. (Wallace 2002: 604)
Engbersen, Snel and De Boom (in this volume) use the concept of ‘li-
quid migration’ to describe the complex, transitory and temporary pat-
terns of transnational work and settlement. However, this liquid migra-
tion is not a temporary phenomenon, nor necessarily a modern one.
Thus, Grzymala-Kazlowska (2005) speaks in this respect of ‘lasting tem-
porariness’, whilst even historic transatlantic migrations assumed by
many to be permanent in practice included patterns of temporary stay
and multiple return (Wyman 1993). The fluid nature of short-term, cir-
culatory migration makes many forecasts of East-West migration unreli-
able (Kupiszewiski 2002: 628).
The aim of this book is to try to gain insight into contemporary ‘li-
quid’ migration processes following EU enlargement and their impact
on national and local labour markets, and on labour migrants them-
selves. It also focuses on the role of immigration policies. The various
chapters represent a range of approaches to the study of the impact of
EU enlargement on the labour market. Different methods and data are
used to clarify contemporary migration processes. Some authors base
their work on official figures, others on surveys they have conducted
themselves or on small-scale qualitative and ethnographic research.
Some have carried out studies at a single research site, while others
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have performed multi-sited research. Taken together, the chapters pro-
vide a clearer picture of the ‘super-diversity’ of contemporary East-West
migration (see Vertovec 2007).
The book is divided into four parts. Part I focuses on the economic
aspects of the new labour migration to the UK, Norway and the
Netherlands. These countries are illustrative of the three transitional re-
gimes in the EU-15 before and after 1 May 2006 (see Friberg in this vo-
lume). The UK is an example of a ‘free access regime’, while Norway of
a regime characterised by ‘general access’ subject to the conditions that
migrants receive host country wages and are in full-time employment.
The Netherlands is an example of a regime based on ‘restricted access’,
at least up to May 2007. In Part II we turn to Poland. Because of the vo-
lume of emigration to Western Europe of both low-skilled and highly
skilled emigrants, Poland occupies a key position in the debate on the
economic impact of EU enlargement. In Part III the spotlight falls on
the most recent countries to accede to the EU: Bulgaria and Romania.
Both have become typical immigration countries, characterised by tem-
porary and partly irregular flows. Part IV concentrates not on the conse-
quences for the labour market, but on the question of the extent to
which EU enlargement encourages ‘welfare migration’. By this we
mean migrants in search not so much of a job, but of an income guar-
anteed by national systems of social security and social assistance.
Post-accession migration to the UK, Norway and the Netherlands
Part I opens with a chapter by Friberg on the working conditions of
Polish migrants in the Norwegian capital Oslo, with a particular look at
male construction workers and female service workers. Norway intro-
duced transitional restrictions designed to ensure a national wage stan-
dard for labour migrants from the new EU member states (A8).
Combined with the introduction of new statutory wage regulations in
the certain sectors, these regulations have been partially successful in
protecting the basic rights of migrant workers in the Norwegian labour
market. But difficulties in enforcing regulations governing different ca-
tegories of labour and service migrants have helped create a gendered
and differentiated labour market for migrants. Some are included in
the regulated sector and enjoy corresponding basic social rights (mainly
men), while others are working in a poorly regulated, semi-legal market
for ‘posted’ and self-employed workers, where low wages, limited job
security and few social rights are the norm (mainly women).
In the following chapter, Napierała and Trevena describe how the
migration of Polish construction workers to Norway is primarily a ‘sub-
regionalised’ phenomenon. The majority of Polish migrants in Oslo
comes from only four Polish regions. Many of these migrants have
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previously worked in Germany. The authors show that the popularity of
Oslo is the consequence of specific pull factors (such as reliable employ-
ers and relatively high wages) and push factors (mainly high regional
unemployment), as well as of the existence of specific migration chains.
Turning to the UK, the chapter by Drinkwater, Eade and Garapich uses
data from the government’s Worker Registration Scheme (WRS), the da-
tabase on National Insurance Numbers (NINo) and the Labour Force
Survey (LFS) to examine flows of labour migrants from Poland and other
A8 countries since 2002. They show how this migration appears to have
had a highly seasonal element, with many migrants being young and
well-educated, but intending to come for relatively short periods. Polish
migrants, in particular, are found to have very high rates of employment,
although data challenge the common view that they are primarily em-
ployed in construction, with rather larger numbers proportionally in rela-
tively low-wage employment in the manufacturing and transport sectors.
In turn, Csedő’s contribution deals with the primary labour market
in the UK for the highly skilled. Her chapter focuses on highly skilled
Romanian and Hungarian migrants and how they find jobs in London.
She analyses the key components of their labour market incorporation
practices: how professionals and graduates signal their availability and
find out about job openings on the destination labour market, and how
employers notify jobseekers about vacancies and requirements. The key
question here is whether the so-called signalling stage of the labour
market incorporation process is a network-dependent phenomenon
and, if so, how. Csedő argues that the process of signalling is not de-
pendent on, but only facilitated by, social networks. While some profes-
sional and graduate migrants do find employment on the primary la-
bour market with virtually zero social capital conversion, if they rely on
their social capital they may end up in different types of employment
rather than being exclusively reliant on labour supply and demand
forces. Social capital acts like a ‘centrifugal force’: professional ties sort
the highly skilled ‘upwards’ while ethnic ties sort them ‘downwards’ on
the labour market.
The final chapter in this section discusses the sharp rise in labour
migration from the A8 countries to the Netherlands. Engbersen et al.
argue that these migration movements are of a temporary, fluid and un-
certain nature. As in the UK and Norway, most of these migrants are
not expected to settle in the Netherlands. They also argue that there is
little evidence of a significant drop in wages for low-skilled work in the
Netherlands. There is also little evidence that CEE migrants are compet-
ing with many native Dutch workers. Engbersen et al. also discuss
some of the social consequences of contemporary CEE migration, such
as bad housing conditions and only partial integration into Dutch so-
ciety. These problems are experienced – and expressed – particularly by
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policymakers and the residents of certain urban areas who have to deal
with a large influx of CEE migrants into their neighbourhoods. Because
of the ‘liquid’ nature of migration, it is very difficult to develop a suffi-
ciently flexible infrastructure for temporary labour migration.
The Polish experience: Impact of new migration on Polish labour markets
and on the composition of the Polish population
In the public debate on the consequences of Poland’s accession to the
EU, many assumptions have been made about the volume, duration
and nature of the emigration of Polish workers. A clear picture of actual
movements and their – national and international – consequences so
far is, however, lacking. Due to the short time span since Poland be-
came an EU member and the unreliability of official statistics, it is no
easy task to provide adequate figures. Part II gives an overview of the
characteristics and consequences of recent migration patterns from and
into Poland. It shows how migration patterns have changed over time
and it discusses some of the current and potential economic conse-
quences for Poland, such as brain drain and skill shortages.
Anacka and Okólski report on the selectivity of migration from
Poland after the country joined the EU. Given the fact that post-
accession migration is different from earlier movements in its volume,
structure and social impact, the authors wanted to learn more about the
nature and effects of these current migration flows. Their main ques-
tion was: who decides to leave? Using a Migration Selectivity Index,
they show that factors such as region of origin, sex, age and educational
level play an important role in the selectivity of movement. Migrants
are generally young (of ‘mobile age’) and males are overrepresented,
though differences exist between regions. A striking trend is the rise of
the UK as a major country of destination. While Germany – as before –
attracts many Polish migrants with a vocational education, highly skilled
migrants have found their way to the UK since the opening up of the
British labour market (see also the contribution of Csedő). Anacka and
Okólski conclude that the losses of specific groups of Poland’s popula-
tion are remarkably high, reducing some categories by a quarter.
In line with the preceding chapter, Kaczmarczyk provides extensive
data on recent migration from Poland, with particular reference to
highly skilled migrants. Using different data sources, Kaczmarczyk
shows the dynamics of recent processes and dispels several myths. A di-
versification is taking place in length of stay and major countries of des-
tination. Another related diversification concerns differences in human
capital. Kaczmarczyk challenges the frequently made claim that Poland
has a brain drain problem. Although the migration of medical profes-
sionals, in particular, is a striking phenomenon, he does not see this as
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a threat. Besides the fact that highly skilled migration from Poland is
not as massive as the myth proclaims, Kaczmarczyk argues that the
benefits of these movements of knowledge should be recognised.
Instead of talking about the dangers posed by the brain drain, we
should see the opportunities offered by ‘brain exchange’. However, the
author concludes, the key problem will be the ability to create favour-
able conditions for return migration.
The final chapter on Poland by Grabowska-Lusinska discusses labour
migration as one of the various factors influencing skill shortages in
Poland. The collapse of communism brought about major changes in
the Polish labour market. While employment in agriculture and indus-
try declined, the service sector developed rapidly, especially in specific
regions. These developments resulted in a mismatch of supply and de-
mand caused by a shortfall of highly educated workers. Grabowska-
Lusinska shows that this mismatch has not been solved by inter-regio-
nal population flows, as many migrants prefer temporary work abroad.
The majority of employers in Poland experience problems in recruiting
new employees caused by the substantial labour outflow. The author
warns of further disharmony in the labour market and the negative ef-
fects of the brain drain.
Bulgarian and Romanian experiences: Migration, demography and local
change
Part III of the volume is concerned with the two most recent additions
to the EU: Bulgaria and Romania. Between 1989 and 2007, both coun-
tries were confronted by large-scale emigration flows, mainly of tempo-
rary workers, which are having huge economic and socio-cultural reper-
cussions on their societies.
The chapter by Mintchev and Boshnakov shows that, between 1989
and 2004, the Bulgarian population declined by about 13 per cent, or
1.2 million in absolute figures (roughly 500,000 due to natural decrease
and 700,00 due to emigration). They also show that Bulgarian return
migrants have a preference for South European destinations where
short-term and seasonal migration predominates. The vast majority of
these migrants do not enjoy legal employment status. Furthermore, mi-
grant transfers have played and are still playing an important role in
keeping households from poverty during the EU integration process. It
was also found that about 20 per cent of remittance-receiving house-
holds run their own businesses, while this proportion is only half as
much in other families. The authors believe that improvements to the
administrative and legal infrastructure for economic activity could facili-
tate additional investment and increase demand for highly skilled per-
sonnel. In addition, they argue that if local or foreign investors and
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multinational companies in Bulgaria were to offer adequate remunera-
tion and career opportunities, this would encourage the return of such
migrants.
Markova offers an historical overview of migration processes in
Bulgaria (with emphasis on the period beginning November 1989), and
shows that in recent years there has been a growing trend towards tem-
porary and seasonal migration rather than permanent settlement, the
preferred destinations being Greece, Turkey, Italy, the Netherlands,
Germany and Spain. Seasonal and circular migration is becoming more
ethnically and regionally specific. Markova shows that current emigra-
tion trends have substantial economic and demographic consequences,
both positively (the contribution to poverty reduction and increase of
small businesses through remittances) and negatively (the danger of
brain drain).
The chapter by Sandu examines the causal chain in changes to demo-
graphic behaviour at family and community level in Romania, as in-
duced by temporary emigration abroad since 1989. His paper supports
Markova’s argument that immigrants’ experience of working abroad is
one of the modernising factors in Romanian society, at community and
regional level. His data show that migration abroad has stimulated en-
hanced and diversified consumption, which is an indicator of modernity
for certain categories of people from specific communities and regions
and within certain time periods. Experience abroad and remittances
make an important contribution to the economy, but also to changes in
views and value systems, both at individual and community level.
Finally, in line with Sandu (2006), Potot stresses that migration is a
survival strategy that was adopted by Romanians between 1990 and
2007 to cope with the economic depression that followed the 1989 re-
volution. However, migration is not only a strategy to exit poverty; it
generates new lifestyles and new attitudes towards consumption. Both
Sandu and Potot also argue, using different methodologies and data,
that Romanian migrants contribute in several ways to local transforma-
tions through their experiences abroad – through developing new work
ethics, knowledge and skills, which are then employed in their home
villages or hometowns.
Effects on welfare systems
The final part of the book discusses the effects of EU enlargement on
Western European welfare states. In advanced welfare states, the para-
dox of solidarity and exclusion plays a key role. Maintaining national,
comprehensive forms of internal solidarity (in the fields of health care,
social security, education and public housing) for the benefit of citizens
and permanent residents implies at the same time the exclusion of
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outsiders from the welfare state’s social entitlements (i.e. no external so-
lidarity). If too many immigrants too easily gain access to welfare enti-
tlements, the continuation and legitimacy of those entitlements might
become endangered should such groups become unemployed.
This is related to what is known as the ‘welfare magnet’ theory.
However, having analysed the situation in the UK, Ireland and Sweden,
Nowaczek shows that the welfare magnet theory is untenable. For immi-
grants from new EU member states, it was work itself – rather than the
possibility of social assistance – that motivated the decision to migrate.
And in all three countries the amount of benefit received by immigrants
from the new member states is relatively small. An important reason for
this is the temporary nature of labour migration. EU migration has not
proved to be a major challenge for the ‘liberal welfare regimes’ in the
UK and Ireland or the ‘social-democratic regime’ in Sweden. It is
worthy of note that intra-EU migration, too, has had no negative impact
on public spending and social policy in the UK, Ireland and Sweden.
Ochel sees greater risks than Nowaczek. He points out that the EU
Free Movement Directive has extended the right of free movement to
non-gainfully employed (inactive) EU citizens. At the same time, this
group of persons has been given access to the welfare benefits of host
countries. Ochel argues that in the near future, especially in the period
following the current transitional period, welfare migration may emerge
between Poland and Germany. However, it will be a number of years
before the practical effects of the Directive on migration into the welfare
systems of individual EU member countries are fully charted. Ochel
takes the view that in enacting the Directive, European legislators have
taken considerable risks. Access to welfare systems has not been
blocked, merely made more difficult through the imposition of certain
conditions. In view of the still rudimentary nature of the financial com-
pensation framework within the EU, it is entirely possible that the free-
dom of movement accorded by the Directive will impose excessive de-
mands on the solidarity of EU citizens in host countries.
Understanding East-West migration
Taken together, the chapters in this volume seek to contribute to a great-
er understanding of the phenomenon of East-West migration from CEE
countries since the accession of A8 countries in 2004, and A2 countries
in 2007. They provide an overview of data where these are available, as
well as a selection of case studies on what this migration has meant in
practice for those involved in it, or affected by it at either origin or desti-
nation. Some of the case studies are unusual in the context of the grow-
ing literature on East-West migration. For example, whilst Polish
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migration to the UK has been the subject of numerous reports and arti-
cles, movement proportionally of a similar scale to Norway has received
little attention outside Norway itself. Yet it is only by attention to this di-
versity of flows that we can come to a rounded understanding of a com-
plex and multifaceted socio-economic process.
East-West migration flows are intrinsically linked with the post-com-
munist political and economic transformations in the new member
states from Eastern Europe. Once these countries embarked on a pro-
cess of democratisation, economic reforms and European integration,
the economic ‘earthquakes’ determined by declining state subsidies and
inflation ultimately led to the impoverishment of large cohorts of the
population. Against this background, migration was a non-violent re-
sponse to sudden economic collapse and unsuccessful attempts to pro-
mote economic recovery in the 1990s. It was also often a successful re-
sponse, given the substantial remittances that have resulted. In this con-
text, even as the A8 and A2 member states experience rapid economic
growth, determined mainly by their political stability and commitment
to European integration, labour migration is still an important coping
strategy for low skilled workers, as the growing post-accession tempor-
ary migration to some of the EU-15 member states shows.
As some of the chapters of this volume suggest, labour migration be-
tween East and West was a ‘pre-accession’ economic and cultural ‘inte-
gration’ or harmonisation of the would-be member states with the ‘old’
member states. The harmonisation happened on several levels, involving
exchanges of experience and knowledge, the spread of consumerism and
its consequences, the emergence of new markets for Western companies
and sustained economic growth in both ‘East’ and ‘West’. Thus, labour
migration from Eastern to Western Europe – in spite of its impediments
in various forms – proved to be part of the process of the EU’s extension.
For this reason, it should be explored in more depth to draw lessons for
future EU enlargements and for the European Neighbourhood Policy. In
addition, it would be interesting to compare and contrast the dynamics
of East-West migration before and after early 2008’s worsening of eco-
nomic conditions in some of the EU-15 member states.
As with all edited collections, much remains beyond the scope of this
book. First, it is impossible to encompass in one volume all aspects of
the sheer diversity of flows from CEE countries that have occurred since
2004, which has seen migrants move not only to ‘traditional’ destina-
tions in Western Europe, but also increasingly to Southern Europe, to
the Atlantic ‘fringes’ of Ireland and Norway and further afield. Similarly,
migration has been both ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’, ‘documented’ and ‘undocu-
mented’ as well as ‘skilled’ and ‘less skilled’ or ‘unskilled’. Across the
various chapters of the volume, we have tried to encompass examples of
these different types of flows, but many remain explored only briefly.
INTRODUCTION 19
One critical problem here is that whilst official data on migrant flows
remains limited, the empirical study of these new population move-
ments is still very much in its infancy. Prior to the post-communist
transition, there was virtually no research within CEE countries on mi-
gration, and little attention to migration from these countries in the
West either, beyond analysis of ‘refugee’ flows. Nearly twenty years later,
significant research effort in the region on the costs and benefits of mi-
gration is still largely limited to Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic (Okólski 2006). Moreover, despite investment in ethnosurveys
in Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine in the 1990s (Frejka, Okólski,
Pyrozhkov & Sipaviciene 1998), and in Armenia, Belarus, Georgia,
Moldova and Ukraine in 2005-2007 (Wallace & Vincent 2007), there re-
mains no comprehensive, European-wide survey of East-West migration
from which valid comparative conclusions could be derived.
What is clear, however, both from the contributions to this volume
and from emerging literature elsewhere, is that conventional notions of
migration as a one-way, permanent or long-term process are increas-
ingly of the mark. Rather, East-West labour migration in Europe – simi-
lar perhaps to other flows in and from other parts of the world – is be-
coming increasingly diverse, fluid and sub-regionalised in nature, as
well as gendered and differentiated in its consequences for individuals,
labour markets and the wider society.
The chapters of this book seek to enrich the study of mobility of work
and skills within the EU-27 and its economic and social impact at na-
tional and regional levels. The goal is to illuminate – and critically as-
sess – the ongoing ‘making’ of the EU as an economic and social space.
However, East-West labour migration is often overemphasised. To coun-
teract this bias, academics and policymakers need to keep in mind that
the average rate of mobility within the EU-27 remains at only 2 per cent
– i.e. around 2 per cent of working-age citizens from one of the 27 EU
member states currently live and work in another member state. Of
course, in some of the A8 and A2 member states the mobility rate may
be higher. However, the share of third-country citizens residing in the
EU-27 is almost double that of the rate of EU-27 citizens living in an-
other member state (European Commission 2007b).
Labour market mobility, either between jobs or between member
states or regions, is an essential part of the Lisbon objectives. This has
led the European Commission to stress the interdependence between
promoting ‘more and better jobs’ within the EU and ‘flexibility and se-
curity’ (i.e. ‘flexicurity’) (European Commission 2007a). Moreover, the
Commission has committed to two action plans for promoting jobs and
mobility, first in 2002 (Action Plan for Skills and Mobility) and then in
2007 (Job Mobility Action Plan for 2007-2010). However, these objec-
tives are considerably altered by the interplay between national
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sovereignty, labour market protectionism within the member states and
the EU’s ideal of freedom of movement for its citizens, as one of the
determinants of economic growth. Against this background, research
regarding the post-accession labour migration from EU-10 member
states – as internal mobility of EU citizens – contributes to understand-
ing the challenges raised by the Lisbon objectives in the member states.
Note
1 A8 comprises eight of the ten countries that joined the EU in 2004: the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. A2 com-
prises the two countries that joined the EU in 2007: Bulgaria and Romania.
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2 Working conditions for Polish construction
workers and domestic cleaners in Oslo:
Segmentation, inclusion and the role of policy
Jon Horgen Friberg
Introduction1
After the European Union enlargement in 2004, migration from new
member states in Eastern and Central Europe to old member states in
Western Europe became one of the most conspicuous population move-
ments in Europe, affecting the demographic, social and economical si-
tuation in both countries of origin and destination. Poland is the domi-
nant origin country, and the United Kingdom, Germany and Ireland
are the main destinations (Kaczmarczyk & Okólski 2008). But Polish
migrants have also entered the labour markets of Spain, Italy and the
Nordic countries in substantial numbers. In Norway,2 almost 134,000
original work permits have been granted to workers from the new EU
member states in the first four years since the enlargement – a substan-
tial addition to the existing work force of approximately 2.1 million peo-
ple. Almost 114,000 of these permits have been renewed after the initial
permits expired. On top of the registered applications, an unknown
number of posted, self-employed and other unregistered workers have
entered the Norwegian labour market. Concentrated in a few sectors,
these labour migrants have made a significant impact in construction,
shipyards, manufacturing industries, agriculture and household service
provision, and Polish workers now make up the single largest group of
immigrants in Norway (Statistics Norway).
With a relatively high wage level, a strong trade union movement and
ambitious policies regarding welfare and social inclusion, Norway intro-
duced a series of new policy measures aiming to protect the working
conditions of labour migrants. These measures included transitional
regulations of wages for migrants,3 new statutory wage regulations in
the construction sector and new measures for control and enforcement
of labour standards. This chapter addresses the ways in which these
new policy measures have affected processes of segmentation and inclu-
sion among labour migrants in the capital city of Oslo, using survey
data from a representative sample of Polish migrants. By comparing
legal status, wages and access to social benefits for Polish migrants
working in construction and domestic cleaning in Oslo, the analysis fo-
cuses especially on whether general measures aimed at improving con-
ditions for migrants may have unintended and biased effects for male
and female migrants, as well as migrants coming through different
channels (labour or mobility of services), due to gendered opportunity
structures and differences in labour market functioning and institu-
tional contexts.
Data and methodology
The analysis is based on a representative survey of 510 Polish migrants
staying in the Oslo region in autumn and winter 2006, which will be
referred to here as the PMO Survey.4 The huge majority of these mi-
grants work either as construction workers (men) or domestic cleaners
(women), and these two groups form the basis of two sector-based case
studies. The study employed respondent-driven sampling (RDS)5 – a
sampling and estimation technique especially designed to target hidden
and hard-to-reach populations where no sampling frame exists. RDS
combines elements of ‘snowball sampling’ (asking individuals to recruit
other people they know, with these individuals being, in turn, asked to
Figure 2.1 Number of valid residence permits held by A8 citizens in Norway,
January 2003-May 2008 (in thousands)
Source: Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (UDI)
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recruit people they know, and so on) with economic incentives for parti-
cipation and recruiting. RDS also uses statistical software to produce
estimates that adjust network effects in the sampling procedure, such
as the recruitment patterns of people with different characteristics and
the network size of each respondent (Heckathorn 1997). This was done
in order to obtain a representative sample of all Polish migrants in the
region at the time, irrespective of their registration and legal status. The
survey focused on questions about migration experience, employment
situation, legal status, working conditions and access to social benefits.
Migration, working conditions and labour market segmentation
The impact of migration on labour markets, wages and social standards
of destination countries has become a major concern of policymakers
and social partners in the old member states (Wolfson 2007). This re-
flects large wage differentials between new and old member states and
the assumption that an increased supply of workers willing to work for
low pay may lead to wage depression and eroding of collectively bar-
gained social standards. Although often blurred in the political debate,
it is useful to distinguish between concerns about the impact of migra-
tion on the working conditions of native workers and about the working
conditions of the migrants themselves. Much empirical literature on
the effects of labour migration on wages is concerned with the effects
of migration on native wages. While conclusions on the overall effect
on wages are ambiguous,6 theory suggests that labour migration may
have a negative impact on the wages of native workers who have the
same kind of skills and jobs as the migrants. But if migrants have skills
that are complementary to native workers, or if the labour markets in
destination countries respond to immigration by increased specialisa-
tion – for example, if migrants are employed to do different jobs than
those undertaken by natives – the result will be increased productivity
and outcomes for native workers (Dustmann, Frattini & Preston 2007).
These jobs are usually lower paid and less desirable, and studies that fo-
cus on the working conditions of migrants usually refer to this process
of specialisation as segmentation. Theories of segmented labour markets
were first developed by Doringer and Piore (1971), and later applied to
the study of migrants by Piore (1979). They sought to expand the nar-
row economic focus on markets, by directing attention to institutional
features of labour markets and to jobs as markers of social status as
well as sources of income. According to segmented labour market theo-
ry, an intrinsic feature of modern capitalist economies is that of bifur-
cated labour markets divided into a core capital-intensive primary sector
and a labour-intensive secondary sector in the periphery. The theory
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further suggests that native workers’ unwillingness to take low-status
jobs (due to hierarchical constraints on motivation) and employers’ un-
willingness to raise wages – as this may trigger claims by higher-status
groups who wish to maintain wage differentials with those of perceived
lower status (resulting in structural inflation) – creates demand for mi-
grants who see work mainly as a source of income and are willing to
take low-paid, low-status jobs in the periphery. As labour standards dete-
riorate in these sectors, those who can seek employment elsewhere do
so, increasing demand for new migrants willing to work for low pay.
Such processes of segmentation have been documented in a wide range
of low-skilled manufacturing and service-sector jobs throughout the in-
dustrial world, where immigrant workers are concentrated in jobs and
sectors with low wages, poor working conditions and few possibilities
for upwards mobility (Piore 1979; Castles & Miller 2003; Massey,
Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino & Taylor 2005). Migrants working
illegally without residential rights are often worst off, as they are cut off
from legal protection and welfare entitlements.
Identifying long-term processes of labour segmentation in markets
where Polish labour migrants work is beyond the scope of this chapter.
However, by looking at migrants’ legal status, wages, job security and
access to social benefits, the chapter tries to distinguish workers who
are included into the core from those who remain at the periphery of
the Norwegian labour market. In addition, the chapter investigates the
mechanisms by which Norwegian regulation policies have affected the
situation of new migrant workers.
New labour market regulation policies in Norway
In the years after the EU enlargement in 2004, stories of exploitative
working conditions for Eastern European labour migrants were routi-
nely reported in the Norwegian media. Moreover, the issue of social
dumping was placed high on the political agenda of trade unions and
the government.7 Despite initial enthusiasm about the prospect of
cheap labour, a relatively broad consensus that Norwegian social and la-
bour market standards should apply equally for migrants was estab-
lished across the political spectrum. But the political tools for regulating
migrant working conditions were not in place at the time of A8 acces-
sion. Unlike most Continental European countries, the Scandinavian
countries do not have any tradition of statutory minimum wage regula-
tion, leaving wages to be regulated by collective agreements negotiated
between the social partners. Norway has relatively low collective agree-
ment coverage,8 leaving large parts of the labour market without any
minimum wage regulation (Cremers, Dølvik & Bosch 2007). Being
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particularly vulnerable to wage dumping, Norway introduced several
new statutory measures aimed at protecting basic rights and ensuring
equal treatment of migrant workers from the new EU member states.
The three most important of these will be considered in turn.
Transitional Restrictions
The accession treaty allowed for transitional arrangements postponing
full opening of the labour markets for citizens of A8 countries for a per-
iod of two to seven years. While the majority of the old EU countries
(i.e. EU-15) maintained pre-accession restrictions based on quotas or la-
bour market demands testing, Norway – like Denmark – imposed new
restrictions designed to secure proper wages and working conditions
for labour migrants rather than restricting their numbers. A8 nationals
are allowed to search for jobs for six months in Norway and receive re-
sidence permits if they can document full-time employment in a
Norwegian-based firm, having wages in accordance with national collec-
tive agreements, regulations or customs in the same occupation or area.
While several countries lifted restrictions after the first two-year period,
Norway chose to prolong the transitional arrangements at least until
2009.
Generalised collective agreements in the construction sector
While mobility of individual labour migrants hired by Norwegian com-
panies is subject to transitional restrictions, the ‘mobility of services’ is
not. The so-called Posting of Workers Directive (Directive 96/71/EC)
states that host country regulations regarding wages and working condi-
tions should apply to posted workers on service assignments abroad.
But as Norway does not have a statutory minimum wage, posted work-
ers employed in foreign companies on service assignments in Norway
could until recently be legally paid according to their home country’s
terms and conditions of employment. This discrepancy between regula-
tion of individual labour migration and the mobility of services created
incentives for employers to use posted or self-employed workers instead
of hiring migrants directly (Dølvik & Eldring 2006). As a response to
these challenges, new measures for wage regulations were introduced.
The legal mechanism for generalising collective agreements in Norway
was established in 1993 with the explicit purpose of preventing social
dumping, but was not used until the 2004 accession. A general applica-
tion of collective agreements means that they are legally binding for
everyone in the affected area and sector, including non-unionised for-
eign companies and employees. In December 2004, collective agree-
ments were extended to generally apply in seven petrochemical onshore
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sites. In September 2005, a general application of the collective agree-
ments was imposed in the construction sector in the Oslo fiord area
and, four months later, in the county of Hordaland. From January
2007, the collective agreement in the construction sector was generally
applied throughout the country. In other sectors, there are no corre-
sponding regulatory measures that apply to the wage of employees
posted from abroad. Self-employed workers are not covered by either
the transitional arrangements or generally applied collective
agreements.
New measures of control and enforcement
Parallel with the introduction of generalised collective agreements, new
regulatory measures for control and enforcement were introduced by
the government’s 2006 Action Plan Against Social Dumping, increas-
ing the Labour Inspectorate’s resources substantially and giving them
greater authority to impose sanctions. The Norwegian Labour
Inspection Authority and the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway were,
amongst other things, given powers to issue orders, to make use of
coercive fines and to stop operations when they make their inspection
according to the Norwegian Act relating to general application of wage
agreements and the Norwegian Immigration Act. In addition to these
new measures, the Working Environment Act applies to all workers in
Norway including migrants. Although it does not regulate wages, it
does prohibit wage discrimination and ensures rights to sick leave with
pay, overtime payment, holiday pay and pension rights.
Comparing different categories of Polish migrants
The rules regulating residence and wages in Norway do not apply
equally to all migrants from new EU member states. Rules differ, de-
pending on whether individuals come as regular labour migrants or
through channels that permit the mobility of services, and depending
on their sector of employment. Also, migrants may be working and
staying in Norway on legal or illegal terms with regard to taxes and resi-
dence. Before turning to the actual situation of migrants, the following
section identifies these different categories of workers in our sample.
Mobility of labour vs. mobility of services
Different EU regulations concerning the mobility of labour and the mo-
bility of services, in conjunction with national responses to labour mar-
ket challenges in the wake of increased mobility overall, have given rise
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to different legal categories of migrant workers. Depending on what
kind of affiliation the workers have to their employers and clients, the
categories are subject to different rules concerning entry and residence,
wages and taxation (Table 2.1).
According to the transitional restrictions, individual labour migrants
who are employed in Norwegian firms must have a residence permit be-
fore they can start work in Norway. In order to get a residence permit,
they need a contract for full-time work with a Norwegian company of-
fering the same wages as stated in collective agreement, or whatever is
normal pay in this occupation and sector. Individual labour migrants
must pay taxes in Norway. After the transitional restrictions are lifted,
no wage requirements will be needed to obtain a work permit. In con-
trast, posted workers employed in Polish companies subcontracting in
Norway do not need a residence permit until they have worked in
Norway for three months. No wage regulations apply unless there is a
Table 2.1 Regulation of residence, tax and wages for different categories of migrant
workers from A8 countries
Channel of migration Residence Taxes Wages
Individual labour
migrants employed
in Norwegian firm
Residence permit
required before
starting work (no
restrictions after
end of transitional
arrangements)
Paid in Norway Transitional period:
based on minimum
Norwegian wage
level in all sectors
After the
transitional period:
based on minimum
Norwegian wage
level where
generalised
collective
agreement exists
Posted workers
employed in Polish
firms
subcontracting in
Norway
Residence permit
required after 3
months of work
Paid in Poland for
first 6-12 months
Paid in Norway
after first year
Based on minimum
Norwegian wage
level where
generalised
collective
agreement exists
Self-employed
workers
No residence
permit required
Must join
government register
of enterprises
Paid in country
where enterprise
established
Market price
Source: Dølvik and Eldring 2008
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generalised collective agreement in the sector and area where they
work. So far, collective agreements have only been generalised in the
construction sector. Posted workers pay taxes in their country of origin
for the first six to twelve months. Meanwhile, self-employed workers selling
their services to clients in Norway can establish their company and pay
taxes in Norway. Self-employed workers with a company established in
Poland must register their firm with a government register of enter-
prises in Norway, but pay taxes in their home country. Self-employed
workers are not subject to any wage regulations, irrespective of transi-
tional restrictions or generalised collective agreements.
Different kinds of migration vs. alternative channels of migration
Approximately half of the workers in the sample for this study were
employed by Norwegian companies, either directly or through a
Norwegian manpower firm. The rest were either self-employed or
posted workers on service assignments in Norway. The different rules
regarding labour migration and the mobility of services rest on a per-
ception that there is a clear distinction based on duration of stay. Whilst
mobility of services, according to the Posting of Workers Directive, in-
volves limited short-term assignments, and posted workers should have
their main employment in their home countries, individual labour mi-
grants are expected to form a more integral part of the labour markets
of destination countries for a longer period of time. However, data from
the survey suggest that there is no such clear distinction between indivi-
dual labour migrants and posted workers in Oslo regarding their own
plans for their stay in Norway (Table 2.2).
These results show two things. First, it appears that the migrants’ in-
tended duration of stay is not as limited as previously expected. Only
one in four plan to return home within a year, and the huge majority of
these migrants expect to come back to work in Norway on a later occa-
sion.9 Seven per cent expected to return within five years. The majority
expected to move back home one day, but did not know when. One out
of five said that they most likely, or certainly will never, move back to
Poland and that they planned to settle permanently. Also, 40 per cent of
the male migrants who had partners living in Poland said they expected
their spouses to join them in Norway in the near future. Registered ap-
plications for family reunification suggest that an increasing number of
Polish migrants will settle with their families in Norway, with Polish ci-
tizens now the largest group applying for family reunification in the
country. A recent survey among registered settled Polish migrants in
Norway confirms this impression, as almost 80 per cent responded that
they definitely or most likely will be living in Norway five years from
now (IMDI 2008).
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Second, the survey data shows that there is no clear distinction between
mobility of labour and that of services when it comes to migrants’ own
plans for the duration of their stay. The share of migrants who plan to go
back to Poland within a year is a little higher among posted workers, but
the majority even among this group said they did not know when they
will return, and some plan to settle permanently. Intention to stay in
Norway is even greater among the self-employed. That only 15 per cent of
posted workers worked for the same company in Poland before coming
to Norway and that the majority was hired after arrival in Norway both
suggest that much of the observed mobility of service workers from
Poland in the Oslo area is an alternative channel for migration rather
than a distinct form of mobility different from ordinary labour migration.
A gendered labour market
The labour market for Polish migrants in Oslo is extremely gendered.
Women make up 26 per cent of the Polish migrants staying in the Oslo
area, and almost three-quarters of these women work as cleaners. In
contrast, some 92 per cent of Polish men interviewed work in the con-
struction sector (Table 2.3). The survey data can thus be used as a basis
for two separate case studies that serve as examples of specific local la-
bour markets for Polish migrants in Norway, as well as reflect differ-
ences in opportunity structures and working conditions for male and fe-
male migrants. Amongst the small number of women who do not work
as cleaners, there is some employment in the state health service and in
children’s day care centres; men not working in construction are em-
ployed in various service occupations (transport, mechanics, etc.).10
Although in a sample based on RDS, it is important to account for a
slightly larger error than in an ordinary random sample, it is assumed
that the sample of construction workers is large enough to give reliable
data on the distribution of wages and working conditions among
Table 2.2 Intention to return to Poland (%)
Polish respondents in Oslo
who said they ‘will most likely...’
Individual
labour migrants
(n=217)
Posted
workers
(n=84)
Self-employed
workers
(n=100)
Total
(n=401)
Return within one year 18 35 34 25
Return within five years 10 5 5 7
Return some day, but don’t
know when
50 47 36 53
Not return 23 14 25 21
Total 101 100 100 100
Source: PMO Survey
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different groups of workers with different affiliations to their employers
and different legal status. Because of the relatively small sample size –
as well as the fact that the women display much less variation in em-
ployer affiliation and legal status – only single variable estimates of
working conditions are presented for this group. Caution is required in
claiming that these estimates are accurate and representative for all fe-
male Polish domestic cleaners in Oslo, but they do give a general pic-
ture of their labour market situation and working conditions.
Migrants in the illegal and semi-legal labour market
Data on illegal migrants in Norway have so far been scarce or non-exis-
tent. Yet it has traditionally been assumed that the market for illegal mi-
grant workers has been relatively limited in the Nordic countries com-
pared with Continental Europe and the United States. This has in part
been attributed to the Nordic social model with a relatively high level of
organisation in the labour market and a certain degree of internal disci-
pline and self-regulation by trade unions and employers’ associations
(Hjarnø 2003). However, this study suggests that there is a substantial
illegal market for migrant labour from Poland. Illegality may be related
to illegal residence or it may be related to illegal work (Brochmann &
Hammar 1999). For labour migrants these two are closely related, as
having a legal taxpaying job is the entrance ticket to a residence permit
and associated rights. It may, however, be difficult to determine who is
in compliance and who is not. As noted earlier, individual labour mi-
grants, posted workers and self-employed workers are subject to differ-
ent rules concerning residence and taxation – the two main indicators
of illegality. In order to determine the legal status of respondents, it was
therefore necessary to use slightly different indicators depending on the
type of affiliation individuals have to their employers in Norway.
While paying tax – either to Norwegian or Polish authorities – is a
central indicator of legality for all categories of migrant workers, the
rules regarding residence permits are not the same for everyone. As
Table 2.3 Sector of employment by gender (%)
Sector Men
(n=306)
Women
(n=144)
Cleaning 1 72
Construction 92 3
Other 7 24
Total 100 100
Source: PMO Survey
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noted above, while individual labour migrants need a residency permit
before they can start working, posted workers only need a residence per-
mit after three months. Self-employed workers do not need a residence
permit at all, but must be entered on a government register of enter-
prises. To supplement information about who pays tax and has legal re-
sidence, respondents were asked about other aspects that can be used
as indicators for legal employment, such as whether they were paid in
cash and if they had an employment contract with their employer or –
if they were self-employed – whether they had a company that was re-
gistered in Norway or Poland. Based on six indicators,11 jobs were clas-
sified as being legal, illegal or within a ‘grey area’ (Table 2.4).
Within the sample, 57 per cent were classified as having a legal job,
25 per cent as having an illegal job and 19 per cent as working within
the ‘grey area’. Working in the ‘grey area’ may entail having a job that
has some features of a legal job and others that are illegal, or in some
cases it may mean that the respondent gave contradictory information.
For the sake of simplicity, the following sections do not distinguish be-
tween illegal work and work in the ‘grey’ area.
Male migrants in the construction sector
The construction sector has attracted the largest share of A8 migrant
workers. This is also the sector where issues of social dumping and ex-
ploitative working conditions for migrants have received the most politi-
cal attention. The Norwegian government, in close cooperation with the
trade union movement, has developed a wide range of policies to com-
bat exploitation and social dumping, especially designed to fit the con-
struction sector. So far, this sector is the only one where collective
agreements have been extended to cover unorganised and posted work-
ers, and a recent government action plan against social dumping has fo-
cused most of its recourses here, in close cooperation with the social
Table 2.4 Legal status by sector (%)
Sector Migration channel
Cleaning
(n=94)
Construction
(n=260)
Other
(n=41)
Individual
migrants
(n=226)
Posted
workers
(n=90)
Self-Employed
(n=105)
Total
(n=421)
Legal 17 66 65 83 33 12 57
Grey area 14 19 20 12 29 13 19
Illegal 69 15 15 5 38 74 25
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: PMO Survey
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partners. Local trade unions in Oslo have also made substantial efforts
to recruit and organise labour migrants; 14 per cent of the Polish con-
struction workers in Oslo in autumn 2006 reported that they were
members of a Norwegian trade union.
Employment relations, illegality and working conditions
Polish migrants in the Oslo construction sector have a multitude of dif-
ferent relations to their employers. A little more than half of them are
employed directly by Norwegian companies. Some are employed directly
by Norwegian production companies, but most by Norwegian temp
agencies that send them to work for different clients. Nevertheless,
being employees in a Norwegian company, they are subject to transi-
tional regulations on residency and wages. But there is also a consider-
able share who serve as posted workers employed by Polish companies
or as self-employed workers subcontracted to Norwegian clients. These
workers are not necessarily covered by the transitional regulations since
their work is regulatied as mobility of services rather than mobility of
labour.
There is a substantial illegal and semi-illegal segment, and there is a
strong connection between migration channel and legal status. Illegal
work is especially widespread among those working as posted and self-
employed workers. Neither subcontracting nor illegality is a new phe-
nomenon in Norwegian construction (Dølvik, Eldring & Ødegård
Figure 2.2 Employer affiliation and legal status (%, n=289)
48%
14%
4%
8%
18%
9%
Norwegian company: Legal
Polish company: Legal
Self-employed: Legal
Norwegian company: 
Illegal or grey area
Polish company: 
Illegal or grey area
Self-employed:
Illegal or grey area
Source: PMO Survey
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2005), but there is much to indicate that both – and especially in com-
bination – have received a boost after EU enlargement.
The terms of employment vary significantly between the different ca-
tegories of workers. More than half of those who were legally employed
in a Norwegian company had permanent employment contracts. The
rest had time-limited contracts for a few months or one to two years.
The majority of legally posted workers had shorter time-limited con-
tracts, while illegally posted workers typically had only a limited verbal
agreement, rather than a written contract. In 2006, the average hourly
wage for all workers in the construction sector was NOK 174
(E 21.80).12 Yet almost all of the Polish construction workers inter-
viewed were paid far less (Table 2.5).
The most comprehensive breaches of the minimum wage provisions
in this sector were found among posted workers, and especially among
those who were working illegally or in the grey area. Minimum wages
in the construction sector are NOK 132 (E 16.50) for skilled employees;
NOK 123 (E 15.40) for unskilled workers with one year’s experience;
and NOK 118 (E 14.80) for unskilled workers without experience. With
the recent generalisation of collective agreements, this is legally binding
for all workers employed in the construction sector except those who
are self-employed. Those legally employed by Norwegian companies re-
ceive an average of NOK 97 per hour in net wages. When taxes are
added we can assume that a majority receive pay close to the legal mini-
mum requirements. Wages are lower among posted workers, despite
not paying taxes; those who are working illegally or in the grey market
Table 2.5 Employment conditions, by employer affiliation and legal status
(%, n=289)
Legal status and affiliation
to employer
Average
hourly wage
(NOK)
Permanent
employment
contract (%)
Think they
can get sick
leave with
pay (%)
Think they
will lose job
if sick (%)
Legally employed by Norwegian
company
97 53 86 1
Legally employed by Polish
company
84 37 52 0
Legally self-employed - - - -
Illegally employed by Norwegian
company
100 - 67 0
Illegally employed by Polish
company
68 24 41 36
Illegally self-employed 109 - 52 48
Total 92 37 71 8
Source: PMO Survey
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receive, by far, the lowest net wages. The average net wage for those
who are working illegally or in the grey market as posted workers is
only NOK 68 (E 8.53) – just over half the minimum wage and less than
40 per cent of the industry average. Self-employed workers receive
higher hourly wages but, for them, the employer does not cover social
costs, which usually add up to 30 per cent of wages. Self-employed
workers are also more vulnerable to being cheated than individual la-
bour migrants and posted workers. While three out of ten workers em-
ployed by Norwegian companies and two out of ten posted workers re-
ported having been cheated out of pay by employers or clients, this ap-
plied to seven out of ten self-employed construction workers.
The requirement regarding pay in the construction sector is the same
for individual labour migrants as it is for posted workers employed in
foreign companies, but differences in wages may be explained by the
way in which the regulations are controlled and enforced. While those
who are employed in Norwegian companies must submit an employ-
ment contract specifying their Norwegian pay level in order to obtain a
work permit, there is no such ‘gatekeeper function’ for posted workers.
These employees do not need residence permits for the first three
months and need not document their pay level to Norwegian authori-
ties. For them, the labour inspection authorities’ sporadic checks at
building sites represent the only form of government control and
enforcement.
Posted and illegal workers are also in a weaker position when it
comes to job security and social benefits. Social insurance against los-
ing your job and/or income when you fall ill is one of the basic features
of the Norwegian model for work and social welfare. The right to ab-
sence with pay when ill is regulated by the Working Environment Act,
and is designed to make sure workers do not lose their job or income if
they become temporarily ill. The employer must pay for the first sixteen
days of absence. After the first sixteen days, the National Insurance
grants sickness benefits. The Working Environment Act includes for-
eign workers in Norway. However, not everyone is able to claim their
rights vis-à-vis their employers, Moreover, without being registered as
working legally in Norway, they cannot claim benefits from the National
Insurance. While 86 per cent of those who are legally employed by
Norwegian companies expect to be given sick leave with pay if they be-
come ill, only 41 per cent of those who are working illegally or in the
grey market as posted workers say the same. Thirty-six per cent of them
say that they most likely will lose their jobs if they become ill, while
none of those who are working legally say this.
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Balancing regulation of labour and mobility of services
The transitional restrictions were introduced with the explicit, albeit not
sole, purpose of protecting migrant workers against exploitation and
poor working conditions in the Norwegian labour market.13 According
to the findings of this study, they seem to have worked relatively well
for those Polish construction workers who are covered by them. That is
not to say that these workers receive equal treatment with their
Norwegian colleagues: there is no doubt that the huge majority of
Polish construction workers are paid less than the sector average. And
with average working weeks of more than 50 hours, many also have far
longer working hours than the Norwegian standard of 37.5 hours per
week. Nonetheless, examples of extremely poor working conditions are
few among those who are employed by Norwegian companies and have
a registered residency permit. Most of them receive wages according to
the minimum requirements in the collective agreements and most have
access to basic social rights while working in Norway. On the other
hand, workers coming to Norway through the service channel are in a
much weaker position on the labour market, and their risk of ending
up in an illegal and semi-illegal market is much greater than those who
come as individual labour migrants. Jobs in this market are usually
characterised by low pay, insecure employment, limited access to health
and welfare services and little protection against exploitation from their
clients and employers.
Though some Polish construction workers reported being given fake
contracts stating higher pay than they actually received, the Transitional
Restrictions’ obligation to register and submit working contracts with
national pay level for individual labour migrants has had a disciplining
effect for Norwegian employers. Moreover, they have set a general stan-
dard of working conditions for Polish workers hired by Norwegian com-
panies. But despite the fact that generalising collective agreements have
levelled the legal playing field regarding wage requirements for indivi-
dual labour migrants and posted workers, the asymmetric regulation of
tax, residence and employer responsibilities still incentivises employers
to use foreign subcontractors. This, in turn, boosts low wage competi-
tion and illegal working conditions among Polish subcontractors and
service providers. As such, the asymmetric regulation regime for labour
and the mobility of services has given rise to a differentiated labour
market for Polish construction workers. So far, the extended collective
agreements and associated control measures have not been effective in
securing decent working conditions for posted workers to the same ex-
tent as the transitional restrictions have been in regulating working con-
ditions for individual labour migrants in the construction sector.
However, several new control and enforcement measures have been
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implemented since this study was conducted, and recent reports from
the directorate of labour inspections may suggest a decrease in illegal
working conditions for labour migrants in the construction sector since
2006.14
Although effective in securing minimum standards, there is much to
indicate that the transitional restrictions contribute to channelling mobi-
lity into other, less controllable forms: instead of migrant workers being
employed in Norwegian companies, we see an increase in the use of
posting, self-employment and/or illegal work. The mobility of service
workers among Poles in the Oslo area is not substantially different
from ordinary labour immigration with regard to duration of stay and
time perspective. From a migrants’ perspective, it seems to be an alter-
native channel for migration, and whether they get a job in a
Norwegian or Polish company operating in Norway may be accidental.
However, for Norwegian clients and employers, this is a way of organis-
ing work that makes it easier to avoid employer liability, with low wage
competition among service providers, widespread ‘bogus posting’ and
illegal employment conditions as a result. The incentive to employ sub-
contractors instead of direct employment is not just related to differ-
ences in wages and labour costs – increasing flexibility and reducing so-
cial charges for foreign employees may also be a powerful motivator.
In 2009, Norway lifted the transitional restrictions on A8 countries,
opening up the labour market for free movement of labour without the
previous possibility of ensuring proper wages through immigration con-
trol measures. It remains to be seen whether the situation of migrants
coming as service providers was a preview of deteriorating working con-
ditions and more widespread wage-dumping for individual labour mi-
grants in the construction sector after 2009. Or, perhaps the ongoing
development of new labour market policy instruments, including gener-
alised collective agreements and associated control measures, will be
able to create a more symmetric and effective regime ensuring equal
treatment.
Female migrants working as domestic cleaners
It has been assumed that changes in economy, family and labour mar-
ket structure and gender roles led to the virtual disappearance of do-
mestic household service providers in Norway in the early and mid-
twentieth century, as both supply of workers and demand for services
dried up (Hagemann & Roll-Hansen 2005). In the early twenty-first
century, this category of workers is returning to the Norwegian labour
market. Higher demand due to increased private purchasing power, wo-
men’s participation in the labour market and a more gender-equal
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family life of Norwegian households are now combined with the in-
creased supply of potentially cheap labour in the wake of the EU enlar-
gement. This has given rise to a ‘new’ market for household service
provision. Among Polish migrants, cleaning private homes is a strictly
female job segment and one of the few labour market options for
Polish women in Norway who do not speak Norwegian. About two out
of three Polish women in Oslo are employed as cleaners, most of them
working exclusively for private households. Some of them have come
together with, or to join, husbands or boyfriends working in Norway,
but the majority have come on their own. Six out of ten are not living
with a partner in Norway, and only 12 per cent say that they came to
Norway for other reasons than work. Female Polish migrants working
as domestic service providers should therefore not be viewed as just an
appendage to migration in the construction sector, but as a separate
form of labour migration in its own right.
Privatised employment relations and illegality
Although we find a small legal segment – mostly women hired by
Norwegian cleaning agencies – the huge majority, 84 per cent, are
working in an illegal or semi-illegal labour market. Some of them have
some kind of employment relation to a Polish or Norwegian company,
but it is difficult to assess if these are regular firms or informal middle-
men and recruiters. The majority are self-employed, selling their ser-
vices to different private clients. Traditionally, cleaning work in Norway,
both in the regular and irregular labour market, has been organised as
Figure 2.3 Employer affiliation and legal status among Polish cleaners in Oslo
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part-time work (Skilbrei 2003). Unlike the male construction workers
who usually have long working hours, Polish women in the cleaning
sector are often under-employed. More than 60 per cent of the Polish
cleaners work less than 35 hours a week. Many reported that they want
to work more, but job competition is fierce. Few managed to obtain en-
ough assignments to fill a whole working week. Their average hourly
wages are similar to the construction workers (NOK 97, or around
E 12.16).15 Considering, however, that they work fewer hours per week
and often have to travel between clients during their workday, their real
wages are much lower than those of the men. Three out of ten report
that they have experienced being cheated out of pay by their clients. As
illegal workers, the majority are in a weak position to claim basic rights
from either their employers or the Norwegian welfare state, and few
have any access to social benefits as workers in Norway. Only 6 per cent
reported having access to sick pay, 29 per cent expected having access
to Norwegian public health care services, 8 per cent reported having
pension benefits and 6 per cent reported receiving holiday pay in their
present job. While there is some mobility from illegal to legal employ-
ment for Polish construction workers, Polish women working as clea-
ners have very few options on the legal labour market as long as they
do not speak Norwegian, despite the fact that approximately one third
of them have higher education from Poland. Political attention regard-
ing migrant workers in Norway has largely focused on male migrants.
As female migrants are excluded from the legal labour market, they also
become invisible in official statistics, strengthening gender bias in poli-
tical focus.16
Barriers to legalisation
In the debate on the connection between domestic work and exploita-
tion of migrant women, there are two opposing positions. While some
have argued that domestic work in itself is a site of exploitation, others
have argued that domestic work can be an ordinary job if it is ade-
quately compensated and thereby upgraded to a professional occupation
(Lutz 2008:43). Studies from Sweden and other European countries
have indicated that demand for cheap services among clients combined
with attitudes towards paid household work as belonging to the private
sphere – and being essentially different from ordinary work – contri-
bute to disqualifying household service providers from ordinary work-
ing conditions and social rights (Anderson 2004). In Norway, work in
private households has proved difficult to regulate. Usually this kind of
work falls outside both the range of negotiated requirements in collec-
tive agreements and the general norms for wage standards that these
agreements often create in unorganised parts of the labour market.
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While the Norwegian transitional restrictions imposed a legal mini-
mum wage standard that also includes Polish domestic cleaners, the
transitional restrictions’ requirement of full-time work may have be-
come a contributing factor as to why the huge majority of female Polish
cleaners are working illegally.17 Travelling between several different cli-
ents and with difficulties in getting enough assignments, few can docu-
ment full-time work in Norway, which is a requirement for obtaining a
legal residence permit. Without a legal residence permit, they do not
have access to any of the social benefits to which workers in the formal
labour market are entitled. So far, we do not know to what extent Polish
women’s illegal status on the Norwegian labour market is an unin-
tended consequence of the transitional restrictions’ requirement of full-
time work and national pay level or a result of more intrinsic features
of the labour market for household services. However, a relatively
strong correlation between having full-time work and having a legal re-
sidency permit supports the claim that the transitional restrictions
make a difference; those who work more than 35 hours a week have
twice as high a probability of having a residency permit than those who
work less than that.
Conclusions
In a context of increasing European competition to attract labour, the
discourse on labour migrants’ positions on the labour markets in
Norway has turned from fears of social tourism and mounting pressure
on welfare state services to the question of how to include migrants in
the regulated labour market with high standards of working conditions
and social rights. As both registered applications and survey results
show that increasing numbers of Polish migrants stay for longer peri-
ods of time or settle permanently in Norway, the challenge for
Norwegian policymakers have been to accommodate the free movement
of both labour and services and, at the same time, avoid the emergence
of a low-paid migrant service class that is excluded from the benefits
and protection of the welfare state and a regulated working life. The in-
troduction to this chapter asked if, and in what way, the transitional re-
strictions, generalised collective agreements and associated control mea-
sures have affected the labour market situation, wages and access to so-
cial benefits for Polish construction workers and domestic cleaners in
Oslo. On the one hand, the survey of working conditions among Polish
migrants in Oslo show that these policies do matter – to a certain extent
they have secured decent working conditions for many labour migrants.
On the other, it shows that these policies may have differentiated and
unintended consequences for different groups of migrants.
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The Transitional Restrictions, in combination with the generalisation
of collective agreements and associated control measures in the govern-
ment Action Plan Against Social Dumping, seem to have been relatively
successful in securing decent minimum standards and corresponding
basic social rights for a majority of Polish migrants in the construction
sector. However, the differentiated regulation policies for labour and
services have facilitated the development of a dual labour market for
migrant construction workers. On the one hand, there is a primary sec-
tor consisting of workers with permanent or long-term employment in
Norwegian companies and residency permits according to the transi-
tional restrictions. The majority of these workers receive wages accord-
ing to collectively bargained minimum standards and have access to the
same social benefits as other workers in Norway. This does not necessa-
rily mean that they receive equal treatment as native workers. Poles
working legally for Norwegian firms have lower wages than the industry
average, they usually do not get compensated for their skills or educa-
tion, and there is much to indicate that they are expected to work longer
hours than their native colleagues. But examples of exploitation and bad
working conditions are few in this group. On the other hand, there is a
secondary sector in the periphery of the Norwegian labour market con-
sisting of temporary posted and self-employed workers not covered by
the transitional restrictions and often working illegally without resi-
dency permits and without paying tax. Jobs in this segment are charac-
terised by low wages, short-term employment with little protection
against dismissals and limited access to welfare benefits and services.
For Polish migrant women the signs of segmentation are even more
evident. The majority work as domestic cleaners in an unregulated ille-
gal and semi-legal market for self-employed service providers in the per-
iphery of the labour market where low wages, no job security, limited
access to social benefits and few social rights are the norm. And unlike
their male counterparts, Polish women in Norway have few options in
the legal labour market as long as they do not speak Norwegian. For
them, the transitional restrictions are just one of several barriers exclud-
ing them from regularising their employment situation and accessing
social rights as members of the Norwegian workforce.
While studies of the European and Nordic social models have
stressed the role of politics and labour market regimes in shaping wage
structures and social standards in national labour markets (Jørgensen &
Madsen 2007; Dølvik et al. 2007), theories of segmented labour mar-
kets as well as neoclassical economic theory often downplay the role of
government policies and organisational structure when it comes to mi-
grant working conditions, focusing instead on economic mechanisms
within labour markets (Massey 2005; Flanagan 2006). Our study sug-
gests that regulation policies may at least interact with the internal
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dynamics of different labour markets, affecting processes of segmenta-
tion. For Polish migrants in Oslo, which set of regulation policy you are
subject to determines, to a large extent, whether they are included into
the core labour force with corresponding rights, or if they are in the
periphery – excluded from these rights.
Attempts to prevent social dumping and regime competition in dif-
ferent European countries have exposed two main strategies based on
historical traditions of industrial relations in different countries
(Cremers, Dølvik & Bosch 2007). Government imposed legal minimum
wage legislation have been widely practiced in countries with low collec-
tive agreements coverage, while strategies based on established tradi-
tions of industrial relations and collective bargaining have been preferred
in countries with high coverage.
After 2004, Norway has moved from a pure collective bargaining
model towards a middle option, as generalising collective agreements
allows for sector specific legal minimum wages based on collectively
bargained standards, enforced by cooperation between social partners
and government bodies. However, despite some success in the con-
struction sector, the question is whether generalising collective agree-
ments is an effective measure in sectors with weak trade unions and
low organisational rates, such as agriculture and service provision.
Domestic services is an extreme case in this vein, as no organisations
exist among employers or employees, and any attempts to regulate em-
ployment conditions would rest almost entirely on legal requirements
and government enforcement. Representing two very different sectors,
the challenge to protect basic rights of migrant workers in construction
and domestic cleaning illustrates the need to develop regulation strate-
gies that are adapted to the specific institutional context in each sector.
WORKING CONDITIONS 43
Appendix: Data and methodology
Challenges in studying unsettled migrant population
Labour migrants from the new EU member states in Central and
Eastern Europe have proven an elusive population for quantitative re-
search. Quantitative studies usually require a list from which to draw a
sample, but no lists of such labour migrants exist or can easily be com-
piled. Some migrants may only be in the country of destination for a
short period of time, some may not live in registered housing and most
are usually not registered as settled residents.18 Many do not even have
registered work permits because they are posted workers employed in
foreign companies or self-employed workers. Finally, an unknown num-
ber of people are working illegally, without being registered or paying
tax to either their country of origin or destination. Due to this lack of
data on the individual level, research on migration after EU expansion
has so far mostly focused on companies’ labour strategies and institu-
tional changes in the regulatory regimes in the wake of increasing
mobility.
Working and living conditions of immigrant workers, their experi-
ences and the assessments they themselves have made in connection
with their stay in Norway have thus been scarcely addressed. This is
why, in autumn and winter 2006, Fafo, in collaboration with research-
ers from the Centre for Migration Research in Warsaw, tested respon-
dent-driven sampling (RDS) as a new method for collecting representa-
tive data in a migrant population where no sample frames exist.
Respondent-driven sampling
RDS was developed by Douglas Heckathorn (1997) to study hidden and
hard-to-reach populations.19 RDS combines elements of ‘snowball sam-
pling’ (getting individuals to recruit people they know who, in turn, re-
cruit individuals they know, and so on) with economic incentives for
participation and recruiting. It also uses statistical software to produce
estimates that adjust network effects in the sampling procedure, such
as the recruitment patterns of people with different characteristics and
the network size of each respondent. The statistical software produces
variable-specific weights based on these characteristics, and makes it
possible to produce statistically unbiased estimates for such hard-to-
reach groups.
In his own research, Heckathorn has used the method in surveys of
injection drug users (2006) and jazz musicians (2003) in the US.
Others have applied it to sex workers in Eastern Europe (Simic,
Johnston, Platt, Baros, Andjelkovic, Novotny & Rhodes 2006) and
Vietnam (Johnston, Sabin, Hien & Huong 2006). As of yet, the method
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had not been used on unsettled migrant populations. Based on our ex-
perience and comparisons with available public register data, we sug-
gest that RDS is highly applicable for research on such populations, if
used in the right way and certain criteria are met. For example, in our
study women make up 26 per cent of the Poles in Oslo in the autumn
months of 2006, but among registered permits, they only make up 12
per cent. This discrepancy results from the fact that a much larger pro-
portion of the women work illegally without residency permits. When
we single out only those in our sample who state that they have a legal
residency permit, women make up 12 per cent. However, the methodol-
ogy is only useful in estimating the distribution of characteristics within
a population, not for estimating the size of a population. Although able
to produce statistically unbiased estimates, one must account for a lar-
ger standard error than in ordinary random sampling. Estimates based
on a RDS sample will usually have larger confidence intervals than sim-
ple random samples of the same size.
Fieldwork and sample
Our sample consists of 510 Polish migrants staying in the Oslo area.
The fieldwork was coordinated by Joanna Napierała and Paulina
Trevena from the Centre For Migration Research at the University of
Warsaw, and supervised by Guri Tyldum and Jon Horgen Friberg. The
interviews were carried out face-to-face by a team of ten Polish-speaking
interviewers, most of them students recruited from the University of
Oslo. In the last stages of the study, two of the interviewers, Paulina
Slabon and Alexandra Pytko, took over coordinating the fieldwork. Most
interviews were conducted at Fafo’s premises on evenings and week-
ends, since the majority of the respondents work very long hours.
Respondents were given NOK 150 for an approximately one-hour inter-
view and an additional NOK 200 if they recruited two more respon-
dents. They were given the same offer and so on. Recruitment proce-
dures were based on a system of vouchers with information about the
survey and contact information. New recruits were given these vouchers
by respondents who had already been interviewed, and would send a
text message to our coordinators, who called back and made appoint-
ments for the interview. Seventy-one per cent of the respondents re-
cruited new ones. When the main part of the fieldwork was completed,
women only comprised 100 of the 419 respondents. It was therefore
decided to extend the fieldwork with an extra female sample of 91 per-
sons. In the analysis, women have been weighted down to their original
share of 26 per cent. Therefore, the female sample size is larger than
their relative small share of the population estimate would suggest,
making the estimates for this group more robust. Our estimates are
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representative for all Polish migrants who stayed in the Oslo area in au-
tumn 2006.
Analysis and estimates
When calculating estimates based on RDS data, one takes account of: 1)
the probability of cross-recruitment between people with different char-
acteristics (e.g. the probability of a man to recruit a woman and a wo-
man recruiting a man) and 2) the personal network size of each respon-
dent, meaning the number of people the respondent knows who fit the
criteria for participation in the study. Together this information is used
to produce weighted estimates for each variable. For example, with a
two-category variable in the groups a and b, we can produce an estimate
for the share of a respondents in the population using the formula,
where Pa is the population estimate, Sba is the share of a-members re-
cruited by b members and Nb is the average network size of b
members:
Pa ¼ SbaNbSbaNb þ SabNa
Source: Salganik and Heckathorn (2004)
Variable-specific estimates can be produced using especially designed
software for RDS data (RDS-STAT). However, since it is difficult to pro-
duce multivariate estimates in RDS-STAT, we have used estimates of
central characteristics of the population to produce general sample
weights. The dataset was then exported to SPSS for analysis. The gener-
al weights were based on the three variables that proved to be the most
important ones for the probability of cross-recruitment: 1) gender –
man or woman, 2) employer affiliation – whether a posted worker or
not and 3) employer – whether working for a company or for private cli-
ents. This means that our estimates are not variable-specific and may
diverge slightly from the estimates produced in RDS-STAT. However, by
cross-checking all variables, we found the differences to be
insignificant.
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Notes
1 The analysis in this chapter is based on a study conducted in the autumn of 2006,
and was written in 2007 and 2008. It does not take into account events that happened
after June 2008, such as the financial crisis later that year or the revoking of the
Norwegian transitional restrictions in May 2009. A follow-up study was conducted in
early 2010. The results from this study will be published in 2010/2011.
2 Although not an EU member, Norway is part of the single market through the
European Economic Area (EEA) agreement.
3 While transitional restrictions in most old member states prolonged pre-accession re-
strictions based on quotas or labour market demands testing, Norway and Denmark
introduced new transitional wage requirements for individual labour migrants from
A8 countries.
4 A more thorough presentation of the data and methodology is given in the Appendix.
5 See www.respondentdrivensampling.org.
6 While Brücker, Epstein, McCormick, Saint-Paul, Venturini & Zimmerman (2002) and
Hanson & Slaughter (2002) conclude that migration has a negligible effect on native
wages, recent studies have found a much stronger negative impact (Borjas 2003;
Aydemir & Borjas 2007).
7 The notion of social dumping is problematic in research, as it is a highly politicised
and contested one. Most parties in the Norwegian debate agree that it is a problem,
but opinions differ considerably as to how it should be defined.
8 Collective agreement coverage in the private sector in Norway is 53 per cent, being
lower than both Denmark (77 per cent) and Sweden (90 per cent) (Dølvik & Eldring
2006).
9 It is likely that some respondents may have only been talking about going home for
Christmas. Interviews were conducted in late autumn and 16 per cent said that they
would return ‘within a few weeks’. Almost every one of them said they would come
back to work in Norway on a later occasion.
10 Many Polish migrants in Norway also work in agriculture, fisheries and industrial
manufacturing, though these sectors are mainly located in other parts of the country.
11 The index was created by Guri Tyldum at Fafo (Friberg & Tyldum 2007). It is based
on six indicators, concerning: 1) payment of taxes; 2) filing of a tax return; 3) posses-
sion of a ‘d-number’; 4) possession of a work contract; 5) possession of an EEA resi-
dence permit; and 6) payment of wages into a bank account (as opposed to cash pay-
ment). Those who answered ‘yes’ to five or six of these indicators were classified as
working legally; those who answered ‘yes’ to less than two of these indicators were
classified as working illegally; whilst the remainder were classified as working in the
‘grey area’. For posted workers who had stayed in Norway less than three months,
only three indicators (1, 4, 6) were used. Here the score was 3=legal, 1 or 2=grey area
and 0=illegal. Posted workers who had stayed for more than three months were as-
sessed on four indicators (1, 4, 5, 6), and needed to answer ‘no’ to all four to be classi-
fied as illegal. For self-employed workers, the index was the same as for posted work-
ers (less than three months), except that the work contract was substituted by having
a registered firm.
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12 Teknisk Beregningsutvalg (2007).
13 Protecting the wage level for native workers and safeguarding against so-called ‘social
tourism’ were also important arguments.
14 At the annual national control conducted by the Labour Inspectorate in February
2008, one out of ten inspections resulted in a decision that work must stop due to se-
vere breaches of regulations regarding wages and health and safety. In the 2007 na-
tional control, 30 per cent of inspections resulted in such a decision.
15 There are no figures for the national average pay level in the cleaning sector – nor are
there any statutory regulatory measures – but the standard pay according to collective
agreements in the formal cleaning sector ranges from NOK 122 (E 15.30) to NOK 130
(E 16.30), depending on seniority.
16 While women made up 12 per cent of registered polish migrants in Oslo in 2006,
our survey, which includes undocumented migrants, reported a female share of 26
per cent.
17 Such a possible effect of the transitional restrictions was suggested by Dølvik et al.
2006.
18 According to Transitional Regulations after the EU enlargement, migrants from new
accession countries needed a residency permit to work in Norway. To get a residency
permit, migrants needed a work contract for full-time work with a wage-level similar
to Norwegian local standards. To be registered as a settled migrant with an address in
Norway, they needed a residency permit and had to stay in Norway for more than six
months.
19 See www.respondentdrivensampling.org.
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3 Patterns and determinants of sub-regional
migration: A case study of Polish construction
workers in Norway
Joanna Napierała and Paulina Trevena
Introduction
Accession to the European Union in 2004 has had a profound impact
on patterns of Polish labour migration. Norway is a very new country to
experience inflows from Poland, with little migration taking place prior
to 2004. However, it has seen a sharp increase in the level of migration
from Poland, with a pilot study entitled ‘Polish migrants to Oslo’
(PMO, see Friberg in this volume) demonstrating that in the case of the
Oslo area, labour migration is strictly based on demand, and driven pri-
marily by the construction sector.
This chapter argues that migration of workers to the construction sec-
tor in Norway is a sub-regionalised phenomenon, with the majority of
migrants in Oslo originating from four regions in Poland:
Zachodniopomorskie, Pomorskie, Małopolskie and Śląskie. The chapter
analyses the reasons behind this trend and provides an insight into the
mechanisms that have shaped and channelled these flows. The first part
of the chapter provides a brief overview of the current conditions in the
Polish and Norwegian construction sector. An analysis of the role of mi-
gration networks in directing the current migration flow of Polish con-
struction workers to the Oslo area follows. The final part of the chapter
is devoted to an examination of the conditions on the workers’ regional
labour markets in Poland, and how these shape sub-regional patterns of
migration.
Push and pull factors at macro level
As noted in chapter 2, an overwhelming figure of 92 per cent of the
males interviewed in the PMO study was working in the construction
sector in the Oslo area. Significantly, only 45 per cent of these migrants
had completed formal training in construction or a related area in
Poland, and could thus be considered as skilled workers upon arrival.1
It is therefore clearly visible that the current migration wave of Poles to
Norway is indeed demand-driven, as the need for workers in the
Norwegian construction sector is so strong that, besides a qualified
workforce, it attracts considerable numbers of workers with no appro-
priate vocational background and/or work experience. Nevertheless, in
our analysis we would like to concentrate on the group of skilled con-
struction workers exclusively, i.e. those who had acquired appropriate
qualifications through training in the home country and, though mov-
ing abroad, remain in the same sector of employment.
Interestingly, construction has recently been in a state of boom in
both Poland and Norway. Hence, the question arises: why do Polish
construction workers decide to move to Norway if their skills are
equally in demand in Poland? Can this phenomenon be solely attribu-
ted to the wage level difference? In order to gain an understanding of
this phenomenon, we shall analyse the issue of push and pull factors at
the macro level by comparing conditions in the two countries’ construc-
tion sectors.
Push factors: Conditions in the Polish construction sector2
Conditions in the Polish construction sector have changed considerably
since the turn of the new millennium. The period of 2000-2003 was
marked by a heavy recession in construction, but was followed by a per-
iod of boom since the end of 2004. Its scale is truly remarkable. For ex-
ample, while the average growth in construction output for EU coun-
tries from the year 2005 to 2006 was 4 per cent, for Poland, it was as
high as 19.4 per cent (Eurostat 2007). Employment in the sector has
also been increasing visibly: in the first half of 2006, 11.7 per cent of all
workplaces in the Polish economy were created in construction (KPM
2007). The first three quarters of 2006 also saw an increase of 2.6 per
cent in the average employment rate for the sector, compared to 2005
(GUS 2006). As a consequence, the Polish construction sector started
to face the problem of serious labour shortages (Bolkowska 2006).
However, these highly favourable conditions in Polish construction
are not too strongly reflected in the labour market situation of construc-
tion workers. From their point of view, the sector is characterised by in-
stability and illegality of employment, bad working conditions, many
barriers to employment, and relatively low wages. Employment condi-
tions in construction have undergone a radical change since the begin-
ning of the transition period in Poland. Under the former system,
builders were typically employed by large, state-owned companies on
the basis of regular work contracts (permanent employment for an in-
definite time), and thus secured employment all year-round, regardless
of the work volume. After the introduction of the free market economy,
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the structure of the sector changed, as it became dominated by small
private companies (often family businesses). As a result, employment
conditions also changed greatly, with permanent employment contracts
being abandoned for flexible forms of employment (Bolkowska 2006).
Currently, employees in Polish construction are one of the labour
groups most prone to job insecurity, as they simultaneously fall victim
of the flexible employment system (flexible employment forms and
short-term employment) and apparent seasonality of the Polish con-
struction business.
However, another employment-related problem specific to the na-
tional construction sector is the widespread phenomenon of illegal em-
ployment. Since labour costs in Poland are particularly high, with em-
ployment-related taxes alone reaching as high as 43.6 per cent
(Kaczmarczyk & Napierała 2007), illegal employment often appears as a
beneficial solution to both employers and employees. This is especially
true for construction, within which illegal employment has become a
standard mode of managing market fluctuations. During the slump per-
iod (2000-2003), it had become almost standard practice for small com-
panies to formally de-register from economic activity but to continue
operating on the black market, thus falling back on illegal work
(Bolkowska 2006). This fact is borne out by Central Statistical Office
data (see Table 3.1), which show a radical decrease in the number of
construction companies and of employment in the sector in the period
1998-2004. Between 1998 (a very good year for construction) and 2004
(a recession year), the number of construction companies decreased by
59,400. Out of this number, 57,700 were companies employing less
than twenty persons (Bolkowska 2006).
Therefore, the earlier tendency towards undocumented employment
in the sector was reinforced and became widespread in the period of re-
cession. According to GUS estimates, in 2004, 372,000 people were
working illegally in various branches of construction: building and in-
stallation services and renovation and home repairs, including ‘neigh-
bourhood services’ (GUS 2005). Presently, the scale of this phenome-
non is such that the construction sector takes second or third place in
all branches of economy as far as the ratio of undeclared labour is con-
cerned (Kus 2006).
Table 3.1 Number of companies in the construction sector
Period 1998 2004 1998-2004
Total number of construction companies 221.4 162.0 - 59.4
Companies employing less than 20 people 216.1 158.3 - 57.8
Source: Central Statistical Office of Poland (GUS)
PATTERNS AND DETERMINANTS OF SUB-REGIONAL MIGRATION 53
This tendency towards undocumented work is additionally strength-
ened by a number of other factors connected with the generally disad-
vantageous employment conditions in the sector, such as seasonality. In
Poland, as in some other European countries, construction acknowl-
edges a ‘high’ season (roughly from spring to autumn) and a ‘low’ sea-
son (typically winter, when there are below-freezing temperatures).
While in Germany, for example, construction workers are employed for
the full year – working longer hours in the warm periods and shorter in
winter – in Poland, this problem is not legally regulated in any way.
Hence, given the employers’ general tendency towards choosing flexible
forms of employment, Polish builders are, in practice, often employed
seasonally. That is, they are employed when the work volume is higher,
only to be unemployed when it is lower. Obviously, this is a highly dis-
advantageous situation for employees, not only in terms of lacking work
continuity and regular earnings, but also when it comes to social secur-
ity fees, future pensions and health insurance entitlement.
Furthermore, bad working conditions are reported as characteristic of
the national construction sector. It is frequent that employers do not
provide the basics, such as working clothes and/or tools, for instance.
Poor quality of equipment and malfunctioning equipment are also often
reported by workers. Generally, health and safety regulations are notor-
iously breached on Polish sites, thus making them particularly danger-
ous workplaces (MPiPS 2007).
A number of factors posing barriers to employment in construction
in Poland should also be mentioned, since these result in a paradoxical
situation where, despite labour shortages, considerable unemployment
among Polish construction workers (in particular professions especially)
is still observable. Firstly, there is the question of skills. Polish employ-
ers’ requirements are generally high, and fresh building school gradu-
ates or those who have been unemployed in the longer-term are typi-
cally unable to fulfil them. For example, hands-on practice and knowl-
edge of new technologies are standard requirements, but prospective
employees often lack such traits. Moreover, as already mentioned, the
construction business is dominated by small- and medium-size compa-
nies in Poland, which typically seek to employ all-rounders, i.e. builders
with versatile skills. Hence, workers who have one particular specialisa-
tion and do not have the ability to carry out multiple tasks are in a dis-
advantaged position.
Significantly, age is a barrier on the Polish labour market, particularly
in construction. Workers over 45 are basically considered unemployable
by a large group of employers in the sector. Internal spatial mobility is
also a matter worth mentioning here. The Polish population is generally
characterised by low spatial mobility, and a strong preference towards
their hometowns, which is strengthened by the simultaneous shortage
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of housing in the areas where work is offered (Bolkowska 2006). Thus,
moving to other areas within the country is problematic. This situation
is particularly relevant to construction workers; due to the nature of
their profession, they usually must travel to work, often long distances.
Meanwhile, considering local conditions (lack of private means of trans-
port, costs of public transport or its lack thereof in less urbanised
areas), this is simply not possible for many. Paradoxically, therefore, it
is in some cases easier to travel abroad for work than to commute with-
in their home country, especially as Polish employers in construction
rarely provide accommodation or transport.3
To round up the analysis of push factors appearing in the Polish con-
struction sector, the issue of earnings should be mentioned. Though
wages in construction have been rising steadily since 2005, the increase
in real wages has not, in fact, been conspicuous. The national average
gross salary in construction in the first three quarters of 2006
amounted to PLN 2,483 (equivalent to E 646), and was 8.4 per cent
higher than in the same period in 2005.4 However, construction is a
perfect example of the great differences in regional economies: it
should be underscored that disparities between voivodships of highest
and lowest pay in construction were still as high as 65.3 per cent in
2006. Significantly, in a clear majority of Polish voivodships, salaries are
in fact lower than the national average,5 and this includes all of the re-
gions analysed in this chapter, apart from Pomorskie where the average
salary was marginally higher (by 0.6 per cent).
To summarise, we may state that, although there is currently a boom
in the sector resulting in slow yet gradual improvement in working con-
ditions and wage levels, the overall situation of Polish construction
workers on the home market is far from favourable. Although the re-
quirements of employers in construction are generally high, the sectoral
labour market is a largely seasonal one. It is characterised by flexible
rather than permanent employment and overly high labour costs, result-
ing in relatively low wages and a high rate of undocumented work, as
well as being additionally characterised by bad working conditions.
Finally, low labour mobility within the country, limited work experience
and older age are all factors that pose a problem, becoming serious bar-
riers to finding employment in Poland’s construction sector.
Pull factors: The Norwegian construction industry boom
The Norwegian construction sector has been in a state of constant
growth over the last decade, and, similar to Poland, began booming
in 2004. Norway’s growth in construction output is reflected by a
considerable increase in employment levels, with the number of em-
ployees in the sector increasing by 26,000 over the last ten years
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(Figure 3.1). At the same time, while gradual growth in employment
levels in the Norwegian construction sector can be observed as of
the late 1990s, employment in this sector in Poland has been greatly
affected by recession, only now reaching the level it was at a decade
ago.
The very dynamic growth in the Norwegian construction sector has,
as in the Polish case, resulted in severe labour shortages: the number
of unfilled vacancies in construction increased by 10 per cent in 2006.
It should be noted that such a considerable shortage appeared despite
the fact that there has been a significant upwards adjustment in the use
of foreign labour in recent years (NHO 2006). Hence, the demand for
labour in the Norwegian construction industry is indeed great.
Moreover, it covers both skilled and unskilled positions, constituting a
powerful pull factor for workers from abroad.
Unlike in the case of Poland, the Norwegian labour market currently
offers advantageous conditions for construction workers, both in terms
of wages and working conditions. The most important pull factor for
Polish construction workers is no doubt the real wage level difference
between the home and destination country. Generally, earnings in the
Norwegian construction sector, recalculated into purchasing power
Figure 3.1 Employment in the construction sector in Poland and Norway,
1998-2007 (in thousands)
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parity (PPP), have for many years been as much as three times higher
than earnings in the sector in Poland.6
An equally important factor is the lack of seasonality of employment
in the Norwegian building industry. Construction work is carried out all
year-round, regardless of the weather conditions. Hence, workers can
count on long-term, not only seasonal, employment.
Importantly, again in contrast to the Polish case, those over age 45
are not treated as inferior on the Norwegian labour market – and the
construction sector is no exception to this rule. If we consider the over-
all activity rate for the 55-64 age group in the two countries, it becomes
visible just how great the discrepancy is: in the year 2006, the rate for
Norway was as high as 74 per cent, while for Poland it was less than 43
per cent. A comparison of the employment rate for this age group for
the two countries is even more telling: 67 per cent for Norway and only
28 per cent for Poland (Eurostat 2007). It follows that the Norwegian la-
bour market offers many more (legal) employment opportunities to old-
er workers. Moreover, health and safety regulations are followed strictly
on Norwegian building sites: regular safety checks are carried out on
machinery and building equipment, and workers are not forced to un-
dertake tasks in hazardous conditions. Polish construction workers
therefore enjoy a greater feeling of safety in Norway than in their home
country. Moreover, Norwegian employers provide all necessary equip-
ment, including working clothes and tools.
Last but not least, the possibility to undertake legal work and come
under the Norwegian welfare system is a strong pull factor for Polish
construction workers, especially those having young children or nearing
retirement age. Working in Norway legally provides Polish migrants the
comfort of being insured should they have health problems. Provided
appropriate requirements are met, it simultaneously gives them the
chance to claim certain social benefits, such as child benefit or a
Norwegian pension.
Certain pull factors beyond sector conditions should also be men-
tioned here, such as geographical proximity and relative ease of travel
between the two countries. The appearance of cheap airlines offering
flights to Norway from five big Polish cities (Warsaw, Szczecin,
Wroclaw, Krakow and Gdansk) has facilitated migration decisions. The
journey from Poland to Norway lasts about two and a half hours, which
is often shorter than commuting to another city within Poland.
Summing up, the boom in the Norwegian construction industry has
resulted in highly advantageous conditions for Polish workers. Not only
is there a great demand for workers (who are paid much higher wages
than in their home country), but the general working conditions are
also better: all-year employment is guaranteed, older age is not a barrier
to employment, and health and safety regulations are followed
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rigorously. Finally, working in the Norwegian construction sector pro-
vides an opportunity for legal employment and for use of the welfare
system upon fulfilling appropriate requirements. Additionally, the geo-
graphical proximity of the two countries – and ease of travel between
them – should also be mentioned as important pull factors.
Determinants of sub-regional migration
Based on the results of the PMO Survey, it can be stated that migration
of construction workers to the Oslo area has taken a sub-regional pat-
tern (Figure 3.2), with four regions dominating as sources of this par-
ticular wave of labour migration. They are the Zachodniopomorskie voi-
vodship (34 per cent), Pomorskie (16 per cent), Małopolskie (10 per cent)
and Śląskie (less than 7 per cent).
When looking at the map of Poland, the bipolar location of the four
Figure 3.2 Regions of origin of the interviewed construction workers (in %)
Source: Authors’ own elaborations based on PMO Survey data
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regions becomes conspicuous: Zachodniopomorskie and Pomorskie are
neighbouring voivodships located on the coastline of the Baltic Sea in
the north of Poland (with Zachodniopomorskie directly on the Polish-
German border), while Śląskie and Małopolskie are both located in the
south, on the Czech and Slovakian borders. While greater migration
from the coastal voivodships appears to be more understandable – purely
in terms of geographical location – the popularity of Norway among
builders from the South is a more surprising phenomenon.
The following section attempts to pinpoint reasons for increased mi-
gration of construction workers from these four regions to Norway. We
put forward the hypothesis that it is migration networks that have pri-
marily channelled these flows of skilled labour.
The role of migration networks in shaping flows
Before we move to the role of migration networks in channelling the
migration of Polish construction workers today, let us consider the issue
of their earlier mobility patterns.
Migration histories
For Polish construction workers from the four regions, international
mobility has been a much more popular strategy than internal mobility,
i.e. within the home country.7 All of the construction workers inter-
viewed in Oslo who came from Małopolskie and Śląskie had previously
worked abroad, as had the overwhelming majority of construction work-
ers from Pomorskie (23 out of 25), and most from Zachodniopomorskie
(42 out of 54). Thus, at 87 per cent, the vast majority of the sample
group of Polish builders working in Oslo had already worked abroad.
Germany had previously been the most dominant destination country
by far, with 70 per cent of the builders from the four regions having
worked there previously (74 persons altogether, or roughly two thirds of
workers from Zachodniopomorskie and Pomorskie, and roughly four in
five workers from Małopolskie and Śląskie). The popularity of Germany
partially stems from the fact that all the regions in question have estab-
lished historical connections with the country (they were under German
rule for certain periods), with many inhabitants having networks there
(i.e. relatives, friends). Notably, a considerable number of the builders
arriving in Oslo had worked in a number of other countries, mainly
within Europe, but also in the Far East and the US. In this light, it ap-
pears that Norway is not only a new destination country for Polish con-
struction workers, but also one that seems to have changed its tradi-
tional regional migration patterns.
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Migration networks in Oslo
Undoubtedly, migration networks play a significant role in migration at
every stage: from the moment of decision-making until returning to the
home country (Guilmoto & Sandron 2001). Firstly, migration networks
facilitate the decision-making process because they provide information
to the prospective migrant that would be difficult to obtain otherwise.
Moreover, the person deciding to migrate often leaves accompanied by
somebody who had previously been to the country of migration. As
such, migration networks not only facilitate access to the migrant la-
bour market, but also intermediate in finding accommodation and accu-
mulating social capital.
Generally, Polish migration to Norway would probably not have
gained such momentum if it were not for existing migration networks.
Asylum seekers who came to Norway during the political crisis of the
1980s in Poland played an important role in their formation. Owing to
support on the part of Norwegian trade unions, persecuted members of
the Polish Solidarity Movement and their families received asylum in
Norway. However, not all families had the opportunity to emigrate at
the time. In a number of cases, this was possible only after family re-
union policies were introduced in 1989. While throughout the 1980s
the number of Poles resident in Norway was still marginal, the early
1990s brought about a more substantial growth of the Polish commu-
nity. It was only during that decade that Norway’s Polish Diaspora,
known as the Polonia, constituted itself. The Polonia would then help
compatriots to come to Norway, particularly for seasonal jobs – namely,
fruit-picking. Such seasonal migrations to the country, though not oc-
curring on a large scale, resulted in a growing number of Poles having
access to information on working and living conditions in Norway.
Migration networks indeed seem to play a significant role in channel-
ling migration between the two countries. Data from the Polish 2002
census suggests that the existence of established networks may be the
main factor determining flows from Poland to Norway, as the migratory
movement to this country could predominantly be observed from given
regions (Figure 3.3). In the case of the PMO construction workers, a
high ratio from Pomorskie (almost three quarters: eighteen out of 25)
and Zachodniopomorskie (34 out of 54) had fairly strong networks, as
they knew both someone who had been to Norway before and somebody
who was there at the time of their first arrival. In the case of the south-
ern regions, however, this was not so common: as few as five out of the
sixteen workers from Małopolskie and only one out of ten workers from
Śląskie had such strong migration networks. A further number of mi-
grants had weaker ties in Norway, again chiefly from the coastal regions:
four persons from Pomorskie and eight from Zachodniopomorskie
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either knew somebody who had been to the country before or somebody
who was in Norway at the time of their first arrival. The respective fig-
ures for Małopolskie and Śląskie were one and two.
While we can see that, in the case of the coastal regions, migration
networks in the Oslo area are indeed strong and play an important role
in shaping flows, the same cannot be said about the southern regions.
In their case, the current migration wave of construction workers re-
sults chiefly from the dynamic operation of recruitment agencies: in
both Małopolskie and Śląskie all migrants without migration networks
were brought to Norway through recruitment agencies (nine persons
from Małopolskie, and eight from Śląskie, respectively). This fact con-
firms the growing importance of agencies in channelling labour migra-
tion flows. It seems that recruitment agencies may effectively substitute
migration networks not only in terms of providing information and
Figure 3.3 Intensity of migration to Norway per 1,000 citizens in the years
1990-2002 (by poviats)
Source: Authors’ own elaborations based on PMO Survey data
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facilitating the migration decision, but also by helping in the adaptation
process, at least in its initial stages. Professional agencies typically offer
language courses prior to migration and arrange for accommodation in
the destination country.
As such, workers from Zachodniopomorskie present an interesting
case. Out of the relatively high number of 36 persons who knew some-
body in Norway at the time of their first arrival, as many as twenty had
nevertheless decided to use a recruitment agency for intermediation. In
comparison, out of the twenty persons from Pomorskie having such
ties, only two decided to opt for an agency. This phenomenon could be
explained by their respective network structures. The migrant networks
of workers from Pomorskie were relatively stronger, based on family
ties, whereas in the case of migrants from Zachodniopomorskie, the
ties were weaker – primarily based on friends and/or colleagues.
Another plausible explanation behind the phenomenon is that the head-
quarters of Adecco, one of the most dynamic agencies recruiting work-
ers to Norway, is located in Zachodniopomorskie. This fact probably in-
fluenced those workers whose networks were not strong enough to ar-
range for employment in the country of migration. Under such
circumstances, choosing an agency that assists with all necessary proce-
dures is a much more reliable option.
As follows from the above analysis, in the case of the four Polish re-
gions of higher outflow of construction workers to the Oslo area, migra-
tion networks play an important role in directing flows from two of
them – the coastal regions of Zachodniopomorskie and Pomorskie.
However, this does not hold true for the southern regions of
Małopolskie and Śląskie. In their case, it was recruitment agencies that
played a dominant role.
However, the existence of networks, on the one hand, or the opera-
tion of recruitment agencies, on the other, does not fully explain the
reasons why construction workers from the four regions have decided
to migrate. Let us now analyse the motives behind their decision and
the push and pull factors connected with their local labour markets.
Regional labour markets and sub-regional migration patterns
Motives for migration
Respondents of the PMO Survey were asked to indicate two main rea-
sons for their choice of Norway as a destination country in order of im-
portance. A variety of responses were given by construction workers
(Table 3.2).
Undoubtedly, the Norwegian wage level was the most significant fac-
tor in the decision-making process, and this holds true for workers
62 NAPIERAŁA AND TREVENA
from all four regions. In line with the argument above, in the case of
the coastal regions, having migration networks also surfaced as a crucial
motive. Workers from Zachodniopomorskie also emphasised the ease
of finding work as highly important in the decision-making process.
The last two categories in Table 3.2 – not having a choice and other
reasons than enumerated – present the most puzzling cases.
Interestingly, in both Małopolskie and Śląskie, a considerable propor-
tion of the builders interviewed (over one fifth and two fifths, respec-
tively) stated that they had no other choice than to come to work in
Norway. At the same time, however, the decision to go was their own.
Other motives for migrating to Norway than those provided in the ques-
tionnaire were also pointed to relatively often, especially by workers
from Małopolskie. Unfortunately, what is hidden behind the last two ca-
tegories in Table 3.2 cannot be explained on the basis of the data re-
ceived. However, because all the other reasons provided in the question-
naire were related to pull factors, we might presume that these two cate-
gories relate to push factors. Let us therefore turn to an analysis of
possible push factors, i.e. the situation of the construction workers on
the Polish labour market.
Structure of unemployment/employment on the regional labour markets
Unemployment is usually treated as the basic phenomenon underlying
the situation on the labour market, and the unemployment rate is the
principle measure of this situation (Grotkowska & Sztandar-Sztanderska
2005). We shall first take a closer look at Poland’s employment condi-
tions in general, and next at the selected regional markets.
Considering the general unemployment levels (December 2006),
Zachodniopomorskie is in the worst situation out of the four major re-
Table 3.2 Main reasons for coming to work in Norway in order of choice
Zachodniopomorskie
(N=54)
Pomorskie
(N=25)
Małopolskie
(N=16)
S´la˛skie
(N=10)
Choice 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
Norwegian wage level 28 15 21 1 10 4 9 1
Easy to get a job 3 19 - 4 - - - 1
Social welfare benefits - 1 - 1 - - - -
Knew someone who had
been to Norway before
11 10 1 12 - 3 - 1
Friends/relatives already in
Norway
2 - - - 1 - 1 -
Didn’t have a choice 6 2 1 3 - 6 - 4
Other 4 7 2 4 5 3 0 3
Source: Authors’ own elaborations based on PMO Survey data
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gions of migration to Oslo, having the second highest unemployment
rate in Poland at 21.2 per cent (Figure 3.4). In the other voivodships, un-
employment levels are considerably lower: 15.5 per cent in Pomorskie,
12.9 per cent in Śląskie, and 11.3 per cent in Małopolskie, which is cur-
rently the lowest in Poland. As can be seen from the above figures
alone, regional economies in Poland differ quite considerably.
As far as registered unemployment among the category of construc-
tion workers is concerned, it is fairly similar to the general unemploy-
ment rate in the regions concerned. Interestingly though, it is a few
points higher in the south, at 15.3 per cent for Małopolskie, and 14.5 per
cent for Śląskie. In Zachodniopomorskie, it is also slightly higher, at
22.1 per cent. In Pomorskie, in turn, at 14.1 per cent it is slightly lower
than the general rate. Upon analysing the situation of the construction
workers on the national labour market, it is important to underline that
in Poland the structure of employment and rates of unemployment are
also subject to regional variation, with reasons for unemployment dif-
fering considerably between the voivodships (Grotkowska & Sztandar-
Sztanderska 2006).
An aspect of great significance in this respect is the age structure of
the labour force. In Poland, the dominant group on the labour market
Figure 3.4 Rate of registered unemployment in Polish voivodships in
December 2006
Source: Central Statistical Office
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(ages 25-44) constitutes 54.4 per cent of the overall labour supply, and
unemployment rates for this group generally show little regional varia-
tion. However, considerable differences are observable in the unemploy-
ment rate of the oldest labourers, i.e. the 45-54 age group. Moreover, in
those voivodships where a high rate of short-term unemployment among
those 45 and over was observed, a high rate of long-term unemploy-
ment for this group would also occur. Such is the situation particularly
in Zachodniopomorskie. Małopolskie presents an exceptional case as
far as durability of unemployment of those 45 and over is concerned:
while the overall unemployment is relatively low in comparison to other
regions, there is an unexpected overrepresentation of long-term unem-
ployment for this group (the ratio of long- and short-term unemployed
is 3.3, while the national average is 1.5).
Age is important for our analysis, too. Looking at the age structure of
the migrant construction workers reveals that a relatively high pro-
portion are 45 and over, especially in the cases of Śląskie and
Zachodniopomorskie (Table 3.3). Considering this – along with the fact
that older age is a barrier to employment in Poland’s construction sec-
tor (though not in Norway) – we may consider this as an important
push factor for the group under analysis.
The employment situation of the construction workers in Poland
As we have already noted, a considerable number of the construction
workers arriving in Norway from the four regions of concern were 45
and over, an age group that is highly prone to unemployment on the
Polish labour market. The question thus arises whether it was unem-
ployment that had motivated them to migrate. As can be seen from
Table 3.4, the majority of the construction workers were employed full-
time in the home country prior to coming to Norway. However, workers
from Małopolskie and Zachodniopomorskie seemed to be in the least
advantageous position, with a fairly high proportion of unemployed per-
sons looking for work within the regional labour market before
migration.
Employment stability on the local labour markets appears generally
rather low, based on the type of labour contracts that many respondents
Table 3.3 Numbers of construction workers aged 45 and over in selected voivodships
Zachodniopomorskie
(n=54)
Pomorskie
(n=25)
Małopolskie
(n=16)
S´la˛skie
(n=10)
Workers aged 45 and over 27 11 3 8
Workers aged 50 and over 8 10 1 4
Source: Authors’ own elaborations based on PMO Survey data
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reported to have had (Table 3.5). Migrants from Śląskie are an exception
here, as the majority were employed full-time for an indefinite period
in the home country. Builders from Zachodniopomorskie also enjoyed
fairly stable employment, with almost two thirds of respondents em-
ployed on a full-time basis. However, time-limited contracts appeared
considerably more often in their case and, moreover, working on the ba-
sis of casual work contracts was fairly frequent. Workers from
Pomorskie and Małopolskie, in turn, were more often subject to flexible
employment forms, with a much lower proportion having full-time con-
tracts. This is especially true for Pomorskie, where almost a third of the
builders interviewed were self-employed. What is characteristic for all
regions apart from Śląskie, is the high propensity towards illegal
Table 3.4 Responses to the question ‘What were you doing a few weeks before your
first arrival in Norway?’*
Zachodniopomorskie
(n=54)
Pomorskie
(n=25)
Małopolskie
(n=16)
S´la˛skie
(n=10)
Full-time employed in Poland 28 22 9 9
Part-time employed in Poland 2 - 1 -
Worked abroad 5 1 - -
Unemployed, looking for work 15 1 5 -
Unemployed, not looking for work 1 - - -
Pupil/student - 1 - 1
Other 3 - 1 -
Source: Authors’ own elaborations based on PMO Survey data
* At the time of the survey, this was 70 per cent of the construction workers’ first stay in
Norway. As for workers from Małopolskie, it was the first stay for almost all of them
(fifteen out of sixteen persons).
Table 3.5 Responses to the question ‘On the basis of what type of contract did you
work at your last job in Poland?’
Zachodniopomorskie
(N=54)
Pomorskie
(N=25)
Małopolskie
(N=16)
S´la˛skie
(N=10)
Permanent employment for
an indefinite period
24 6 8 8
Time-limited: two years or
more
6 3 - 1
Time-limited: 1-2 years 3 - - 1
Contract for a specific task/
casual work contract
8 1 1 -
Verbal agreement 9 5 6 -
Irregular - 2 - -
Self-employed 4 8 1 -
Source: Authors’ own elaborations based on PMO Survey data
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employment. Over a third of workers from Małopolskie had been carry-
ing out undocumented work in Poland, and the same is true of almost
one third of those from Zachodniopomorskie and over one fifth from
Pomorskie. It seems therefore that, for construction workers, the feel-
ing of work stability was not high in their home country.
Still, if we consider the perceived possibility to remain in one’s job as
an indicator of the feeling of job security (Table 3.6), it seems that the
type of employment contract was not so important. Surprisingly, work-
ers from Śląskie – who enjoyed the ‘safest’ employment conditions, as
the majority had permanent contracts for an indefinite period – felt re-
latively least confident about continuing work for their Polish employer.
This would suggest that their companies faced some kind of problems
or, simply, that the work had come to an end, thus influencing their fu-
ture employment prospects. Almost one fifth of the workers from
Zachodniopomorskie and one fifth from Pomorskie also felt insecure
about their employment in Poland. Interestingly, however, builders
from Pomorskie – most of whom were working either illegally or were
self-employed – had a strong feeling of work stability, despite seemingly
being most prone to frequent disruptions in employment.
Summing up, while unemployment was a push factor in the case of
a minority of construction workers from the four regions (most acute
in the case of Zachodniopomorskie), their overall employment situation
could still have encouraged the decision to migrate. While a consider-
able proportion of builders from Zachodniopomorskie, Pomorskie and
Małopolskie, in particular, were working illegally or on the basis of
highly flexible arrangements, workers from Śląskie, despite having se-
cure contracts, felt most apprehensive about their employment
prospects.
Table 3.6 Responses to the question ‘Do you agree with the statement I could have
stayed at my job in Poland if I wanted?’
Zachodniopomorskie
(N=54)
Pomorskie
(N=25)
Małopolskie
(N=16)
S´la˛skie
(N=10)
Agree (partly agree) 37 19 15 5
Neither agree nor disagree 5 1 - -
Disagree (partly disagree) 11 5 1 4
DK/NA 1 - - 1
Source: Authors’ own elaborations based on PMO Survey data
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Financial standing
Finally, we come to the economic situation of the PMO construction
workers. As has been mentioned, the wage level difference between
Poland and Norway was the main pull factor behind their decision to
migrate. Let us thus see whether the workers were escaping hardship
or simply seeking better remuneration for their work.
As data presented in Table 3.7 shows, the overall financial situation of
the construction workers interviewed was fairly comfortable; most were
able to support their families from the salaries received in the home
country. Nevertheless, Śląskie represents an exception here, with the
majority of respondents stating they were not able to live on their
wages. Also, in the case of Zachodniopomorskie, a rather high ratio of
one third of the workers was suffering hardship. This fact exemplifies
the low wage level on certain regional markets, even in the case of pro-
fessions that are very much in demand.
The answers to a series of questions relating to everyday expenses de-
monstrate the intensity of the problem, especially in the case of workers
from Śląskie. As can be seen from Table 3.8, they suffered rather ex-
treme hardship, having to limit expenses on food and clothes and being
forced to borrow money for food or bills.
We may thus conclude that although the workers’ financial situation
was fairly comfortable overall, it was nonetheless a significant push fac-
tor for the majority of builders from Śląskie, one third from
Zachodniopomorskie and the more than one fifth from Pomorskie who
were actually living in poverty in their home country.
Conclusion
As may be concluded from the case studies drawn from the PMO
Survey results, the migration of Polish construction workers to the Oslo
area has taken on a sub-regional pattern. It is dominated by workers
Table 3.7 Responses to the question ‘Do you agree with the statement ‘I was able
to support myself and my family from my job in Poland?’
Zachodniopomorskie
(N=54)
Pomorskie
(N=25)
Małopolskie
(N=16)
S´la˛skie
(N=10)
Agree (partly agree) 34 16 14 2
Neither agree, nor disagree 1 3 - -
Disagree (partly disagree) 18 6 2 8
NA 1 - - -
Source: Authors’ own elaborations based on PMO Survey data
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from four regions of Poland: Zachodniopomorskie and Pomorskie in
the north, and Małopolskie and Śląskie in the south. But why do con-
struction workers from these particular regions migrate specifically to
Norway? There is a multitude of reasons behind this phenomenon.
Having networks in the country of migration explains the phenomenon
only partially. In the case of the coastal regions – Zachodniopomorskie
and, in particular, Pomorskie – migration networks have played an im-
portant role in directing flows of construction workers to the Oslo area.
As for Małopolskie and Śląskie, however, it was recruitment agencies
that brought the majority of workers from the regions to Norway. The
growing role of recruitment agencies is also exemplified by the case of
Zachodniopomorskie, where many workers decided to opt for such in-
termediation despite having networks in Norway. We see thus how the
role of recruitment agencies in channelling flows should not be under-
estimated in the case of skilled labour flows.
Considering the workers’ migration histories, a tendency to choose
Norway over the earlier dominant destination – Germany – is notice-
able. This may be explained by the Norwegian wage level being higher
as well as the altogether better work conditions in Norway. According to
the migrants interviewed, Norwegian employers are highly recommend-
able, seen as honest, reliable and having a good attitude towards their
Table 3.8 Respondents’ financial situation prior to their first arrival to Norway
Zachodniopomorskie
(N=54)
Pomorskie
(N=25)
Małopolskie
(N=16)
S´la˛skie
(N=10)
I had to limit expenses on food
Happened often 18 4 - 8
Happened sometimes 14 7 10 -
Never happened 21 14 5 2
NA 1 - 1 -
I had to borrow money for food
Happened often 8 3 - 8
Happened sometimes 15 9 7 -
Never happened 30 13 8 2
NA 1 - 1 -
Couldn’t afford new clothes or shoes
Happened often 10 3 - 8
Happened sometimes 14 10 3 -
Never happened 30 12 13 2
I didn’t have enough money to cover basic costs
Happened often 11 1 - 8
Happened sometimes 16 11 7 -
Happened once - 1 - -
Never happened 27 12 8 2
NA - - 1 -
Source: Authors’ own elaborations based on PMO Survey data
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staff. Moreover, they do not discriminate on the basis of age (as is often
the case in Poland). This may be particularly significant for those 45
and over from Zachodniopomorskie (and to a lesser degree those from
Pomorskie and Śląskie), where persons of this age are especially prone
to (long-term) unemployment.
Push factors connected with the local labour markets also seem to
play a significant role in shaping the sub-regional migration patterns of
Polish construction workers to the Oslo area. In Zachodniopomorskie,
unemployment, illegality of employment, older age and poor financial
standing surfaced as meaningful push factors for roughly one third of
the workers. For Pomorskie, the dominant feature of the local labour
market was also a tendency towards illegal employment (almost one
third of the respondents working on such a basis) and reliance on self-
employment (also almost a third). Again, many of the workers were
over 45, a factor making them especially prone to unemployment.
However, in the case of builders from Pomorskie, the feeling of work
stability was rather high and their financial situation fairly good, sug-
gesting it was lack of employment contract – or its unbeneficial form –
that had been the main push factor. Also, in Małopolskie a high propor-
tion of the workers interviewed (over one third) were previously carry-
ing out undocumented work. Furthermore, unemployment surfaced as
a problem here as almost a third of the workers interviewed were un-
employed and looking for work prior to migration. In the case of
Śląskie, it appears that extreme poverty suffered by the majority of the
construction workers, their older age and fears about their employment
prospects forced them to decide to migrate, almost half stating they had
no other option.
To sum up, Norway presents itself as a new ‘promised land’ to Polish
construction workers from the four voivodships, for a variety of reasons.
The sub-regional migration patterns of flows to the Oslo area appear to
be determined by migration networks, the operation of recruitment
agencies and additional region-specific conditions. Pinpointing the exact
causes of these patterns requires further research.
Notes
1 The group of ‘construction workers’ was singled out by using the variable ‘occupation
by training’ on the basis of construction and construction-related professions encom-
passing the following: steel fixer, carpenter, bricklayer, painter, plasterer, building tech-
nician, floor and wall tiler.
2 Information provided in this section is partly based on interviews conducted with ex-
perts from the Polish construction sector in three voivodships (Zachodniopomorskie,
Pomorskie and Mazowieckie) in January 2007.
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3 This state of affairs is slowly beginning to change, with a growing tendency among
employers to arrange for transport.
4 It must be noted that the national average salary is based on data for all levels of em-
ployment in construction, including managerial, and thus is often considerably higher
than the real salary of a skilled worker.
5 The Mazowieckie voivodship, where the capital city of Warsaw is located, is charac-
terised by the highest rate of average pay in construction (39.4 per cent higher than
in the national average).
6 In the third quarter of 2006, the average monthly wage in construction in Norway
was NOK 29,000 gross (SSB 2007), which equals E 3,611.
7 The highest mobility within Poland was observed for construction workers from
Śląskie: as many as eight out of the ten respondents had lived in other places than
their place of origin. Śląskie was followed by Pomorskie (almost half: thirteen out of
the 25 workers having lived in other places), Zachodniopomorskie (almost a third: sev-
enteen out of 54) and finally Małopolskie (only a quarter had such experience).
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4 What’s behind the figures? An investigation
into recent Polish migration to the UK
Stephen Drinkwater, John Eade and Michal Garapich
Introduction
Migratory movements between the EU accession states and the United
Kingdom following 2004 enlargement have been described as the
largest-ever migration wave to have arrived in the UK (Salt & Rees
2006), and have already generated an increasing diverse set of scientific
studies. It can be argued that this interest is not just attributable to the
undisputable size of these flows. Because of their legal visibility, demog-
raphers, economists and sociologists have access to an array of datasets
through which the composition of these flows can be analysed. This
scientific visibility, which has been the result of a legal change, should
not blind us from the fact that because of this, migration is part of a
longer process and therefore pre-enlargement dynamics should also be
taken into account. This relates not only to the labour market situation
in both origin and destination countries, but also to the formation of
transnational social networks, which perpetuate migration and remit-
tance flows.
In this chapter we focus particularly on recent migration flows from
Poland to the UK, exploring pre-enlargement statistics as well as cur-
rent dynamics that are sustaining migratory flows. Although conditions
in the labour market have changed recently, large numbers of Central
and Eastern European migrants are still arriving in the UK (Accession
Monitoring Report 2008). Following very high unemployment at the
time of enlargement, with a national average of around 20 per cent, un-
employment rates in Poland have dropped in some areas to UK levels.
Yet, in spite of the visible decrease in the numbers of migrants from
Poland, many still find employment in the UK an attractive opportunity
for reasons that go beyond direct differences in earnings. This reminds
us that migratory movements are not solely about levelling out wage le-
vels, but also acquire a dynamic of their own due to the other, non-fi-
nancial rewards.
Some of the other factors that impinge on such movements include
the role of traditional migration strategies developed due to the under-
urbanisation of communist states (Okólski 2001), transnational net-
works (Ryan, Sales, Tilki & Siara 2007), the role the migration industry
plays in perpetuating a culture of migration in particular origin commu-
nities (Garapich 2008a) and migrants’ attempts to offset the negative
aspects of labour market discrimination, especially in relation to the po-
sition of women positions in the labour market (Coyle 2007). The stra-
tegic importance of communication and transport connections is also of
relevance in this particular context (Vertovec 2007). The fast changing
reality of contemporary economic factors in Europe reminds us that mi-
grants – as individuals – respond and quickly adapt to changing condi-
tions in the different settings in which they operate. Nevertheless, the
passage of time since Polish accession to the EU allows us to look back,
examining in more detail the migratory movements from Poland and
answering questions regarding who, why and for how long such mi-
grants have been coming to the UK.
The enlargement process and recent migration flows from Poland
and other A8 countries
In 2003, the British government decided to effectively open up its la-
bour market to migrants from new member states in Central and
Eastern Europe (referred to here as A8 migrants). At that time, almost
all EU member states had also agreed to do so, but the closer it came to
the date of enlargement, more states decided to pull out of the agree-
ment that established specific transitory periods. When enlargement
thus took place in May 2004 only the British, Irish and Swedish gov-
ernments decided to fully open their labour markets to A8 migrants –
albeit with restrictions on access to public funds and some welfare pro-
visions in the British and Irish cases. It has become common to attri-
bute the UK’s large influx of migrants to the transitional arrangements
imposed by other states, but clearly one needs to take into account addi-
tional factors. First, migratory movements between Poland and the UK
have been long established and, although small in number during the
Cold War period, they have grown since the 1980s. This helped the for-
mation of potentially important migration networks. For instance, eth-
nographic studies of Polish migrants have shown that the existence of
the formal infrastructure of shops, churches and informal labour mar-
kets in certain areas has been a strong pull factor across generations of
migrants (Garapich 2008b).
The UK’s decision to allow more or less free entry in 2004 therefore
not only opened a new chapter in these movements, but also accepted
the reality that, by 2003, a large number of Poles had already come to
the UK for various purposes, with many working illicitly. In fact,
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avenues with which Polish migrants could access the UK labour market
were already manifold and the ease with which they could engage in
the semi-compliant practices of migrant labour (Ruhs & Anderson
2006) proves that the labour market may have actually been open for
many before 2004. The possibility of work as a self-employed person,
on a student visa, as an au-pair through various exchange programmes
and in particular sectors allowed strong networks to emerge and these
were later tapped into by post-enlargement migrants.
The specific arrangements that the UK government imposed in 2004
also consisted of creating a formal way of registering migrants taking
up employment: the Workers Registration Scheme (WRS). This was in-
troduced partly in response to public fears about the free movement of
labour from accession countries. Applicants were supposed to register
on the scheme within one month of taking up employment, must regis-
ter more than once if they have more than one employer and must also
re-register if they change employers. The cost per registration was initi-
ally set at £50 but subsequently rose to £90.
The requirement that A8 nationals wishing to work in the UK for the
first time should register on the WRS implies the existence of an ad-
ministrative database providing an indication of inflows from these
countries since 2004. Information from the database has been pub-
lished on a quarterly basis by the Home Office (UK Borders Agency) in
association with other government departments in the Accession
Monitoring Report. This not only provides details of flows, but also re-
ports some characteristics of the registrants. The questionnaire asks re-
spondents to detail some basic demographic characteristics as well as
information about the job they have taken or are about to take up.
However, this is by no means a complete record of inflows since the
self-employed are exempt from registration and it has been argued that
relatively high proportions of A8 migrant workers have failed to register
(CRONEM 2006; Anderson, Ruhs, Rogaly & Spencer 2006). It is possi-
ble to compare the WRS information with that from another adminis-
trative database, the Department of Work and Pensions’ database on
National Insurance Number (NINo) allocations to overseas nationals.
Like the WRS, this database only records migrants entering the UK for
the first time (for work-related reasons) and does not collect informa-
tion on how long migrants stay or how frequently they move between
labour markets. However, it does provide a more complete indication of
A8 migration flows than the WRS because it includes the self-employed
and non-registration is minimised since all legally employed migrants
require a NINo. The database also provides information back to 2002,
so we can examine some pre-enlargement flows. As it also records re-
gistrations from all other non-A8 countries, comparisons may be made.
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We will therefore mainly analyse recent migration flows using NINo
data, but supplement this with information from the WRS.
Figure 4.1 shows migration flows for three groups: Poles, other A8
migrants and a residual category consisting of migrants from all non-
A8 countries. Probably the most notable feature of Figure 4.1 is the ra-
pid growth in NINo registrations made by Poles in the two years imme-
diately following enlargement. Registrations by this group almost quad-
rupled in this short period of time, from 61,000 in 2004-2005 to more
than 220,000 in 2006-2007. This was followed by a relatively small
drop (of around 10,000) in registrations in 2007-2008. Another obser-
vation is that, although flows of A8 migrants were small before enlarge-
ment, a not inconsiderable number of workers from these countries en-
tered the UK prior to May 2004 – many of whom are likely to have
been self-employed. For example, almost 6,000 NINo registrations
were made by Poles in 2002-2003 and more than 11,000 in 2003-
2004. Inflows from other A8 countries also increased rapidly, immedi-
ately after enlargement since they more than doubled between 2004-
2005 and 2005-2006, to just under 100,000 in the latter year.
However, in contrast to Poles, the number of NINo registrations made
by nationals from other A8 countries fell by almost 10,000 between
2005-2006 and 2006-2007, with a further small fall in inflows ob-
served in 2007-2008. In comparison, NINo registrations from non-A8
countries rose fairly steadily over the period, from 335,000 in 2002-
2003 to almost 440,000 by 2007-2008.
Figure 4.1 NINo registrations by nationality, 2002-2003 – 2007-2008
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
2002−2003 2003−2004 2004−2005 2005−2006 2006−2007 2007−2008
R
eg
is
tr
at
io
n
s 
in
 0
0
0
s 
Poland Other A8 Non-A8
Source: Department of Work and Pensions
76 DRINKWATER, EADE AND GARAPICH
Thus, over the period covered by the NINo database for overseas na-
tionals starting work in the UK for the first time, registrations by Poles
were, by far, the highest of those from any single country. In total, more
than 681,000 Poles were allocated a NINo from the start of 2002 until
March 2008, which was almost treble the amount seen from the coun-
try with the next highest number of registrations: India (237,310). In
terms of other A8 countries, nearly 100,000 registrations were made
by Slovakians and Lithuanians and less than 10,000 by Estonians and
Slovenians. Therefore, more than two thirds of the NINo registrations
made by A8 nationals over this period were by Poles, despite Poland ac-
counting for just over 50 per cent of the population of A8 countries at
the time of enlargement. However, based on the NINo data, the country
producing the highest volume of migrants as a percentage of its popula-
tion was Lithuania (28.1 per million of the population), and was lowest
for Slovenia (1.5 per million of the population). In comparison, the fig-
ure for Poland was 17.7 migrants per million of the population.
Further information on flows from A8 countries can be obtained
from examining WRS data, as published in the Accession Monitoring
Report. Figure 4.2 reports WRS registrations made by Poles and other
A8 migrants on a quarterly basis from the time of enlargement up until
the middle of 2008. It shows some of the same features indentified in
Figure 4.1, including the fact that Polish migration to the UK rose ra-
pidly until the end of 2006. Similarly, the initial rise in migration after
enlargement from other A8 countries was followed by a relatively
Figure 4.2 WRS registrations by quarter, 2004 Q2 – 2008 Q2
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constant, albeit declining, stream of flows. The decline in migration
from Poland in the past few years is highlighted more acutely in Figure
4.2, which shows that WRS registrations fell back to their 2004 levels
in the most recent quarter. The reasons suggested for this fall include
the improved Polish labour market, the depreciating value of the pound
against the zloty and the movement of Poles to other destinations fol-
lowing the relaxation of the transitional arrangements by some other
member states (Pollard, Latorre & Sriskandarajah 2008). An advantage
of reporting flows on a quarterly basis is that it shows how the flows
vary over the course of the year. It can be seen that registrations tend to
peak in the third quarter i.e. the summer, especially for Poles, although
the highest number of registrations of all for this group occurred in the
fourth quarter of 2006. This would seem to indicate that there has been
an important seasonal element to migration flows from A8 countries to
the UK since enlargement – a point substantiated by surveys among
Polish nationals in the UK (CRONEM 2006; Pollard et al. 2008) and
entirely in tune with traditionally preferable patterns of migration from
Poland since the collapse of communism marked by short-term, seaso-
nal, ‘incomplete’ migrations (Okólski 2001, 2004).
Moreover, the nature of recent A8 migration has generally been dif-
ferent from the more permanent movements (especially from the New
Commonwealth) that occurred to the UK during the second half of the
twentieth century. In particular, a high proportion of the flows from
Poland and other A8 countries has been seen on a short-term or circu-
lar basis. Evidence of this is presented in Table 4.1, which reports the
responses to the question on the registrant’s intended duration of stay
in the UK that appears on the WRS questionnaire. The table indicates
that only a small proportion of registrants, around 15 per cent, reported
that they intended to stay in the UK for more than three months. This
has been relatively constant since May 2004, with the remainder of re-
gistrants either responding that they intended to stay less than three
months or did not know. There is, however, some variation in the
Table 4.1 Intended duration of stay of registered workers, May 2004 – June 2008
May 2004–
September 2006
October 2006–
September 2007
July 2007–
June 2008
Less than 3 months 45% 57% 61%
3-5 months 2% 2% 2%
6-11 months 3% 3% 3%
1-2 years 4% 4% 4%
More than 2 years 6% 8% 7%
Don’t know/not answered 41% 26% 24%
Source: Accession Monitoring Report
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breakdown of these categories over time, with a fairly even split in the
immediate aftermath of enlargement, but a much higher proportion
stating they intended to stay for only a short period in more recent
times. Therefore, since the percentage of A8 workers stating that they
intended to stay for two or more years has not exceeded 10 per cent at
any point in the post-enlargement period, it appears that the vast major-
ity of workers from these countries have moved to the UK on either a
very short-term or on a circular basis.
Of course, one needs to be aware of these answers’ limitations.
Firstly, individuals are being asked the question at the beginning of
their stay. Secondly, the WRS form is a government-backed question-
naire requesting personal details, thus potentially resulting in respon-
dents understating their presence in the country. And finally, peoples’
plans change. In addition, the question also relies on a rational actor
model with an assumption that individuals do plan ahead and that the
external economic conditions are constant. However, as other surveys of
Polish migrants have shown (CRONEM 2006; Garapich 2008b), there
is a stable percentage of individuals (around a third) who refuse to
frame their migratory plans within a particular time period. This strat-
egy of keeping options open – which has been labelled ‘intentional un-
predictability’ – is particularly important during times of economic un-
certainty. In summary, to contextualise Polish migration in terms of the
temporal aspect of movements, we need to acknowledge not only the
growing variety of different migratory strategies, but also the fact that
these strategies have been actively updated depending on the economic
situation in both countries.
There is also an obvious correspondence between the duration of a
migrant’s stay – either actual or intended – and the reasons why they
have migrated. There is only limited information on the motivations of
recent Polish migrants to the UK, although the available evidence
points to a variety of motives for migration rather than just economic
reasons. For example, a survey undertaken by CRONEM (2006) of
more than 500 Polish migrants across seven locations in the UK found
that, although financial reasons were selected most often (by 58 per cent
of respondents), other factors were also important. In particular, 41 per
cent of respondents said that they had moved to the UK because it was
easier to live there or because it gave them more options and 31 per
cent reported that it was for their personal or professional development.
Lower proportions stated that they had migrated to escape from the po-
litical and economic situation in Poland or to improve the future of
their children.
The information on NINo allocations and from the WRS relates to in-
flows essentially by those registering to work in the UK for the first
time. Therefore, given the short-term nature of much of the flows from
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A8 countries, these sources are not particularly useful in providing an
indication of the number of Polish and other A8 migrants residing in
the UK at any one time. To do so, one could use information from the
Labour Force Survey (LFS) to estimate how stocks of A8 migrants in
the UK have changed since enlargement. However, the LFS is likely to
underestimate the number of A8 migrants because of its sampling
frame, non-response and unsuitable sampling weights (Drinkwater,
Eade & Garapich 2009). Nevertheless, several studies emphasise the ra-
pid growth in the stock of A8 migrants residing in the UK. For exam-
ple, Pollard et al. (2008) report that the stock of Polish-born residents
in the UK rose from 84,000 in the beginning of 2004 to 458,000 less
than four years later. The Polish-born population in the 2001 census
was 58,000, which again points to fairly substantial flows prior to enlar-
gement. They also estimate that over 600,000 A8 nationals were resi-
dent in the UK at the end of 2007, an increase of more than 500,000
over its pre-enlargement figure. In terms of all A8 migrant workers,
Clancy (2008) estimates that there were 63,000 at the start of 2004,
but this had grown to 510,000 by the beginning of 2008. However, be-
cause of the short-term nature of many of the migration episodes,
Pollard et al. (2008) estimate that more than a million A8 migrant
workers have arrived in the UK since the time of enlargement.
The demographic characteristics of recent Polish migrants
Not only is it interesting to examine the demographic characteristic of
migrants in its own right, but we see how the composition of migration
flows can have important impacts on both the source and receiving
economies. For example, migrants’ characteristics can have implications
for brain drain and remittances for the origin country as well as influ-
ence economic growth rates and other macroeconomic variables in the
destination country (Drinkwater, Levine, Lotti & Pearlman 2003).
Again, because of the more comprehensive coverage of the NINo data,
we will mainly use information from this source to examine the demo-
graphic characteristics of recent migrants, where they exist. However,
because of the limited demographic information in the NINo database,
we will also examine the characteristics of migrants from the WRS and
the LFS, both of which contain a far more extensive range of socio-
economic indicators, which is particularly true of the latter database.
The NINo information is reported on a pooled basis from the start of
2002 up until the end of the first quarter of 2008 (i.e. up until the end
of the financial year 2007-2008, which are the latest available data at
the time of writing).
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We begin by examining gender and age, as presented in Table 4.2. It
can be seen that the percentage of males amongst recent Polish mi-
grants is over four percentage points higher than recent migrants from
other countries. In terms of age, around 80 per cent of recent migrants
to the UK are 18-24. However, the age distribution of recent Polish and
other A8 migrants is noticeably younger, with the 18-34 percentage being
around ten percentage points higher than it is for non-A8 migrants.
The more dispersed location patterns of recent Polish migration to
the UK in comparison to previous cohorts, and also to other groups of
recent migrants, is displayed in Table 4.3. It shows that although
London is still the most popular destination for Polish migrants, the
concentration of recent migrants in the capital is far lower than it is
from other parts of the world. In particular, around 44 per cent of non-A8
Table 4.2 NINo registrations by gender, age and nationality: 2002-2008
Polish Other A8 Non-A8
% male 57.18 51.96 51.80
% aged less than 18 0.31 0.68 1.39
% aged 18-24 41.32 41.04 31.45
% aged 25-34 41.12 38.90 48.24
% aged 35-44 10.12 11.81 13.59
% aged 45-54 6.21 6.43 4.11
% aged over 54 0.92 1.14 1.22
Total registrations 681,520 331,710 2,313,540
Source: Department of Work and Pensions
Table 4.3 Regional distribution (in %) of NINo registrations by nationality:
2002-2008
Polish Other A8 Non-A8
Scotland 9.2 6.4 5.1
North- East 1.6 1.2 1.8
North-West 8.9 7.4 6.3
Yorkshire and the Humber 6.8 7.2 4.7
Wales 3.0 2.3 2.0
West Midlands 7.7 6.7 6.0
East Midlands 7.8 7.6 4.1
East of England 9.0 10.2 6.7
South-East 11.7 12.2 11.5
London 22.9 26.8 43.8
South-West 7.1 5.8 4.4
Northern Ireland 3.4 4.8 2.3
Overseas Residents 1.0 1.5 1.3
Total registrations 681,520 331,710 2,313,540
Source: Department of Work and Pensions
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migrants registering for a NINo since 2001 were located in London com-
pared with only 23 per cent of Poles. The relative concentration in
London by Poles is also four percentage points lower than it is from other
A8 countries. Bauere, Densham, Millar & Salt. (2007) and Pollard et al.
(2008) analyse the spatial dispersion of A8 migrants in further detail by
examining the picture at the sub-regional level. They report that A8 mi-
grants have located fairly large quantities in almost every local and unitary
authority across the UK, including in some areas that had not seen any
migration of note in the past.
Compared to other recent migrants, Poles are noticeably overrepre-
sented in Scotland, the North-West and the South-West, whilst a rela-
tively high proportion of recent migrants from other A8 countries have
located in the East of England. The relatively low proportion of A8 mi-
grants in London is also borne out by WRS and LFS data, although
there are some differences between the data sources, which could be
the result of the recording of the location of the place of work/residence
as well as internal migration patterns following arrival in the UK. For
example, the WRS indicates that more A8 migrants registered for work
in Anglia and the Midlands than in London.
Table 4.4 reports a final set of demographic characteristics for recent
immigrants to the UK using information from the LFS. The sample we
use is based on pooling successive quarters of data together and is con-
structed by selecting only those migrants who entered the UK between
2004 and 2007, i.e. those arriving in the post-enlargement period. We
also restrict the sample to those interviewed in their first wave and ex-
clude full-time students (see Drinkwater et al. (2009) for reasons for
doing this). The table indicates that just over a third of recent Polish
migrants are married, which is higher than it is for other A8 migrants,
but considerably lower than the observed figure for recent non-A8 mi-
grants. Further confirmation of the fact that A8 migrants have generally
migrated without families comes from the WRS, which suggests that
less than 10 per cent of registered workers have brought dependants
with them.
The table also reports that Poles are relatively highly educated. The
measure of education is constructed using years of education and is
Table 4.4 Other demographic indicators for post-enlargement migrants
Polish Other A8 Non-A8
% married 36.1 31.3 55.8
% low education 9.1 18.8 16.3
% medium education 42.4 52.3 31.0
% high education 48.5 28.9 52.7
Source: Pooled LFS data, 2004-2007
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based on the definition used by Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2008)
because of the difficulty in translating overseas qualifications into UK
equivalents. In particular, almost a half of Poles were at least 21 years
old when they left full-time education. This is slightly lower than the
percentage of highly educated recent migrants from other countries,
but less than 10 per cent of Poles left education before the age of seven-
teen, which is the lowest of the three groups. In comparison, recent mi-
grants from other A8 countries have a much lower percentage of highly
educated individuals as well as a higher proportion with low levels of
education. However, many Poles and other A8 migrants have relatively
weak English language skills. Evidence of this is provided by Clark and
Drinkwater (2008), who use LFS data from the second quarter of
2006, which asked some limited questions on the English language to
migrants. They report that A8 migrants were least likely to speak
English at home and most likely to experience difficulties in the labour
market as a result of their language capacities – or lack thereof. Further
confirmation of this comes from Anderson et al. (2006), who find low
levels of basic English language skills amongst A8 migrants working in
low skilled sectors.
The labour market characteristics of recent Polish migrants
To analyse the position of Poles and other recent migrants in the UK la-
bour market, we will mainly be examining data from the LFS. This in-
formation relates to non-student respondents who were interviewed in
their first wave between 2004 and 2007 and who had begun arriving in
the UK since 2003. We will, however, also supplement this with some
information from the WRS. To begin with, Table 4.5 reports some basic
employment indicators. It is noticeable that Poles have, by far, the high-
est employment rate of the three groups, with more than 85 per cent of
recent migrants in work, which is also around ten percentage points
higher than the overall employment rate in the UK labour market
(Clancy 2008). The employment rate of other A8 migrants is also rela-
tively high, whilst the much lower employment rate of other recent mi-
grants not only reflects a higher unemployment rate, but also shows
Table 4.5 Employment statistics for post-enlargement migrants
Polish Other A8 Non-A8
Employment rate 85.2 76.5 63.6
Unemployment rate 6.2 11.2 11.8
Self-employment rate 4.7 5.9 6.4
Source: Pooled LFS data, 2004-2007
WHAT’S BEHIND THE FIGURES? 83
how this group displays higher levels of labour market inactivity such
as individuals engaged in domestic care. Recent migrants are overwhel-
mingly found to be employed by others rather than running their own
businesses. This is particularly the case for Poles who arrived since en-
largement, a sharp contrast with the immediate pre-enlargement period
when around a third of Poles entered as self-employed persons due to
the prevailing immigration law at the time (Drinkwater et al. 2009).
This sparked what became known as the ‘Polish builder’ or ‘Polish
plumber’ phenomenon. It also explains why workers from the construc-
tion industry feature in a relatively minor way in the WRS, as many
workers in this sector are self-employed. This may disguise some regio-
nal variation. For instance, among A8 migrants surveyed in one particu-
lar London borough, the rate of self-employment was around 25 per
cent (Garapich 2008b).
In terms of the types of jobs that recent A8 migrants have found, the
majority are in full-time employment. In particular, the WRS indicates
that 86 per cent of registered workers work more than 35 hours a week.
More detailed information on hours of work is available from the LFS.
Drinkwater et al. (2009) report that, on average, recent Polish migrants
work longer hours than other A8 migrants as well as those from other
countries. Furthermore, more than a half of registered workers stated
that their jobs were temporary, although the percentage of migrant
workers stating they had temporary jobs was far lower in the LFS (Clark
& Drinkwater 2008). Information on the industrial breakdown of those
in employment is presented in Table 4.6 from the LFS and shows that
the industrial distribution is very similar for recent Polish and other A8
migrants. For example, it indicates that almost 30 per cent of A8 mi-
grants work in manufacturing. Not only is this much higher than the
percentage of recent non-A8 migrants employed in this sector, but it
also greatly exceeds the share of workers accounted for by manufactur-
ing in the UK labour market, which has now declined to just 10 per
cent. Although there is a higher concentration of A8 migrants in
Table 4.6 Industrial distribution (in %) of post-enlargement migrants
Polish Other A8 Non-A8
Manufacturing 29.5 29.1 13.8
Construction 8.8 8.7 3.8
Wholesale/retail 13.0 12.7 10.2
Hotels/restaurants 9.8 11.8 11.6
Transport/communications 11.2 13.9 5.1
Real estate/business activities 10.3 6.5 16.5
Health and social work 6.0 5.3 16.1
Other 11.5 12.1 23.0
Source: Pooled LFS data, 2004-2007
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construction, these statistics again refute the popular view that Polish
migrant workers are overwhelmingly employed in the building trade.
A8 migrants are also overrepresented in transport and communications,
whilst migrants from other countries are more highly concentrated in
health and social work as well as real estate and business activities. The
WRS also contains a breakdown of jobs by industrial sector. Since the
sectors are not based on the standard industrial classification, however,
it is difficult to make a comparison with the data from the LFS.
Further information on the types of jobs that recent migrants have
obtained in the UK labour market can be found in Table 4.7 reporting
the occupational breakdown. Again, the types of jobs, as defined on an
occupational basis, is very similar for Poles and other A8 migrants. The
very low percentage (less than 10 per cent) of A8 workers employed in
professional and managerial positions compared to other recent mi-
grants is particularly striking, with a correspondingly much higher pro-
portion of A8 workers with routine and semi-routine jobs. In particular,
almost 45 per cent of recent Polish and 50 per cent of other A8 mi-
grants have routine occupations compared with only 15 per cent of other
recent migrants. The WRS also collects data on the occupations of regis-
tered workers but, as with the industrial information, it is not based on
standard classifications. Nevertheless, these data also indicate that the
jobs in which A8 workers are employed are overwhelmingly low-skilled.
The type of jobs that A8 workers have typically found in the UK la-
bour market, especially in terms of occupation, has resulted in relatively
low earnings for this group, as reported in Table 4.8. Possible explana-
tions for the concentration of A8 workers in low-skilled jobs include the
impact of short-term migration strategies on job choices and the restric-
tions on the types of jobs available to workers with relatively poor
English-language skills (Clark & Drinkwater 2008). This is in spite of
Poles having relatively high levels of education, as shown in Table 4.4.
Not only are average earnings much lower for A8 migrants than they
are for those originating from outside the A8, but earnings for migrants
from the new migrant states are also clustered around the bottom end
of the pay distribution, as highlighted by the very low standard devia-
tions and the relative proximity of the quartiles to the median. The
Table 4.7 Occupational distribution (in %) of post-enlargement migrants
Polish Other A8 Non-A8
Professional/managerial 7.8 7.1 45.8
Intermediate 18.4 18.3 17.8
Semi-routine 29.5 25.1 21.2
Routine 44.3 49.5 15.2
Source: Pooled LFS data, 2004-2007
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WRS also emphasises the compressed wage distribution of recent A8
migrants with 75 per cent of registered workers earning less than £6 an
hour from the time of enlargement up until the middle of 2008
(Accession Monitoring Report 2008). Despite having slightly higher
raw earnings than other A8 migrants, Poles have lower returns to their
education because of their much higher levels of education (Drinkwater
et al. 2009).
Conclusions
In the dynamic environment of both large flows of migrant labour and
changing economic conditions in migration systems, predictions may
be a risky endeavour. Nevertheless, it is clear from the size of Polish
migration that fairly large numbers of nationals from the biggest of the
accession countries are likely to become permanent settlers in the UK.
The eventual proportion that does stay will depend on how well they
progress through the British labour market, in addition to the relative
conditions in the Polish labour market. Although the vast majority of
recent Polish migrants initially found employment in low-skilled sec-
tors, they are typically highly educated so many may be expected to
move up the occupational hierarchy relatively quickly, especially with
improving English language skills.
Furthermore, ethnographic data also shows that no matter what the
proportions of long-term, short-term or seasonal migrants or those un-
dertaking the ‘intentional unpredictability’ strategy are, all these beha-
viours are functionally connected. Settlers use the services and/or re-
sources provided by short-term migrants who, in turn, get access to
jobs, information and accommodation. Also, the operations of this
large-scale ‘migration industry’ means that Polish migrants have created
a small economy of their own which will always – more or less – gener-
ate employment and access to life in certain parts of the UK. In addi-
tion, unemployment in Poland is unevenly distributed. This means that
Table 4.8 Gross hourly earnings for post-enlargement migrants*
Polish Other A8 Non-A8
Mean 6.30 6.04 10.59
Standard deviation 2.77 2.99 8.13
1st quartile 4.94 4.65 5.51
Median 5.73 5.40 8.08
3rd quartile 7.07 6.89 12.68
Source: Pooled LFS data, 2004-2007
* Earnings are reported in May 2004 prices (£ per hour).
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migration will remain an attractive alternative for those from deprived
areas who have benefited least from the so-far positive performance of
the Polish economy following enlargement.
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5 Markets and networks: Channels towards the
employment of Eastern European professionals and
graduates in London
Krisztina Csedő
Introduction1
Selective towards ‘high skills’, contemporary migration and mobility fa-
vours the well-educated, a growing share of whom move within globally
integrated and expanding labour markets. Understanding this mobility
is crucial because of its assumed impact on the global economy, politics
and society. Attracting and retaining professionals is seen as a new tool
for improving economic competitiveness and growth: young, highly
educated, professional migrants add value to the economy through their
supposedly high productivity rates. It is for this reason that countries
are in competition for human resource skills perceived as representing
national economic resources (see Salt 2005).
Yet, relatively little is known about the labour market incorporation
practices of foreign professionals and graduates. Upon arrival to their
destination they often become statistically, occupationally and socially
‘invisible’ (see Salt 1992; Findlay, Li, Jowett & Skeldon 1996; Favell
2004), making it difficult to research into the social practices of their la-
bour market incorporation. What kinds of jobs do they actually obtain?
How and why do they get those jobs? How are their credentials and
work experiences recognised? Is the cross-border transfer of their hu-
man capital a seamless market process? On the one hand, the human
capital approach assumes unproblematic labour market incorporation
of ‘highly skilled’ migrants, mostly because of the assumption on which
it operates: perfect transferability of human capital and its constant val-
ue on all markets (e.g. Sjaastad 1962; Becker 1964; Todaro 1976). If
such an assumption is made, it is difficult to explain, for instance, why
people with high human capital end up in semi-skilled or unskilled jobs
at their destination. Sociologically orientated approaches to labour mar-
ket incorporation, on the other hand, point out the existence of barriers
to the cross-border transfer of human capital. Various host institutions
such as the labour market, educational and social welfare institutions or
immigration policy may limit foreign professionals’ and graduates’
chances of gaining employment suitable to their formal education and
training (see Reitz 1998; Zulauf 2001; Reitz 2002; Waldinger & Lichter
2003; McGovern 2007). Furthermore, compared to semi-skilled and un-
skilled migrants, social networks play a different role in facilitating the
search for employment by the highly skilled. Meyer (2001) found that
professionals tend to rely more on extensive, diverse networks of collea-
gues, fellows and relatives who they can mobilise for their recruitment,
rather than addressing their own kinship networks.
In this chapter, I will analyse some components of foreign profes-
sionals’ and graduates’ labour market incorporation practices. I seek to
understand how various types of professional and graduate migrants –
both so-called ‘cosmopolitans’ and ‘home-oriented’ – signal their avail-
ability and find out about job openings on the destination labour mar-
ket. I will also investigate whether social networks facilitate their labour
market incorporation and, if so, what kind of networks and how.
Analysis in this chapter relies on data collected between January
2005 and June 2005 as part of my doctoral research on the social pro-
cess of East-West mobility of professionals and graduates. The chapter
is based on qualitative material, principally 54 semi-structured inter-
views with Hungarian and Romanian professionals and graduates in
London, as well as seven interviews with London-based employers of
Eastern Europeans with third level education.
Based on Jones’ (1996) sociological approach to labour market pro-
cesses, this chapter analyses socially constituted ‘stages’ to understand
Eastern European professionals’ and graduates’ social practices of find-
ing employment in London. The steps of socially constituted labour
markets can be split into five conventionally defined stages: accredita-
tion, signalling, screening, bargaining and secondary bargaining. Of all
five stages, signalling is the most socially grounded. It denotes the way
in which employers make job vacancies and requirements public and
how would-be employees communicate their availability and quality to
employers or agents. Signalling can occur through various channels –
market or non-market – such as kinship or friendship groups (strong
ties), acquaintances and professional groups (weak ties), as well as
through multi-functional institutions (internal labour markets).
This chapter focuses on the social organisation of the signalling stage
only: how do Eastern European professionals and graduates find out
about job openings and signal their availability and productive capaci-
ties to London-based employers? Emphasising the social aspects of mar-
ket exchanges encourages here a greater focus on individual agency, on
dynamic exchanges between labour market participants and on the so-
cial process of ascribing value to individuals’ human capital.
The chapter is organised as follows: first, I will discuss briefly the
current state of literature on professionals’ and graduates’ possible
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labour market signalling channels and their network-dependence when
looking for jobs abroad. Turning to my empirical evidence, I will differ-
entiate between Eastern Europeans with high human capital who move
through, respectively, markets and networks, and I will analyse their dif-
ferent social practices of signalling productive capacities. When discuss-
ing the role that social networks may play in facilitating the process of
getting a job in London, I will address the role of professional and eth-
nic ties separately. Finally, I will argue that social networks may have a
centrifugal role in sorting professionals and graduates into different la-
bour market positions in London: professional ties are conducive to the
achievement of higher positions; ethnic ties lead to positions that are
lower than what is achievable for market movers without professional
or ethnic social capital in London.
Labour markets and social networks
Most research suggests that non-market channels, especially weak ties,
are more successful than market channels in flows of information be-
tween labour market participants (Granovetter 1982; Waldinger 2001).
Similarly, non-market channels have long been identified as crucial to
the economic behaviour of migrants (e.g. Fawcett 1987; Massey & España
1987). Scholars have repeatedly found that migrants’ labour market in-
corporation and occupational attainment at their destination is depen-
dent on their social capital. Hence, in migratory contexts, the channels to
employment are often discussed in relation to non-market mechanisms,
i.e. social networks. While semi-skilled and unskilled migrants’ employ-
ment searches have often been found to be facilitated by strong ties
(Massey, Alarcón, Durand & González 1987; and many others), there is
little evidence for professional migrants’ network-dependence when look-
ing for jobs at their destination. If they use any networks to access the la-
bour market, professionals are found to rely on occupational or industry
ties (see Findlay & Garrick 1990; Beaverstock 1996b; Findlay & Li 1998;
Meyer 2001), rather than on relatives or friends.
Amongst the respondents interviewed for this study, some did indeed
signal their availability by using social networks; whilst others found
out about job openings in London directly from the market. The chan-
nels to employment they used were tied in with what they expected
from their mobility to London.2 I have identified four different types of
Hungarian and Romanian professionals and graduates in London,
based on their motivations to work abroad (cosmopolitans vs. ‘the
home-oriented’) and their social practices of finding out about job open-
ings and/or signalling their availability to employees (market vs. net-
work) (Table 5.1). Similar to Findlay and Li (1998), I have also found
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that migrants’ motivations influence the kinds of networks they use in
order to find employment abroad, and that these four types of movers
delineate four different social practices of labour market incorporation.
In the following sections I analyse market and network movers’ prac-
tices in turn.
Market movers: Individual ‘developers’ and ‘diversifiers’
Despite evidence for migration being dependent on social networks, a
significant part of my interviewees used market channels to find em-
ployment in London. Similar to Poros’ (2001) ‘solitaries’ or Favell’s
(2006) ‘free movers’ to London, many Hungarian and Romanian pro-
fessionals and graduates did not rely on any occupational or industry
ties to signal their availability to employers. Rather, they applied online
for various openings, uploaded their CVs on jobseekers’ websites or re-
lied on an agency to find a job. The labour market, as the dominant
channel for signalling availability and learning about job openings, was
most frequently used by graduates and young professionals who had
only a few years of work experience. Having limited access to such posi-
tions in their home labour markets or to wage levels they would expect
to be suitable for individuals with their level of education, they gravitate
towards labour markets perceived to be meritocratic and rewarding.
Since many job advertisements are published on the internet, they are
accessible from anywhere, making cross-border application for jobs easy
and virtually free of charge. Moreover, some websites allow jobseekers’
registration of interest even without suitable openings, thus enabling
employers to search within an international skills pool whenever they
look for new recruits. This particular strategy was used by one architect
who, though he could imagine working in London for a while, pre-
ferred to wait for a suitable job offer instead of searching ‘full-time’ for
employment.
I had in the back of my mind that I would like to work once in
London. So when I was fed up with my work in Budapest I
looked around on the internet at half steam, sent out a couple of
CVs and registered here and there with some agencies. I thought
if somebody is showing interest, then I will decide whether I
Table 5.1 Labour market practices
Signalling through Cosmopolitans Home-oriented
Market/non-network channels Individual developers Individual diversifiers
Non-market/network channels Elite movers Traditional migrants
92 CSEDŐ
really want to work in London or not. (Ferenc, Hungarian archi-
tect in London, 2004)
Young professionals such as Ferenc, looking for new challenges
abroad, ultimately sought to develop their human capital at a global,
cosmopolitan level within their specific profession, industry or both.
They learned about open positions in employers’ advertisements and
they completed online forms, often while still studying or working in a
different job. They lacked the social ties needed to find out about open-
ings of their interest, so they relied exclusively on the market. The fol-
lowing story of this postgraduate from a British university is typical.
I found out about job openings through email, [the website] jobs.
ac.uk, newspapers or the internet. Nobody drew my attention to
any jobs. […] When I was called for an interview with my present
employer, I had no more idea of how this employer is than the
others. For me, it was a job application, like all the others – the
41st line of the Excel table that kept my applications in order. …
My slogan was ‘Apply, apply, apply!’ After a while, I lost track of
deadlines, how many applications I filed and where, so I had to
start a list. I knew the rule of thumb: if after three weeks I didn’t
hear anything, it meant I should not wait anymore. (Dan,
Romanian lecturer in London, 1997)
For many graduates and young professionals, applying for jobs in
London was an intensive and often lengthy process. Upon filing many
applications my interviewees learned that – in Dan’s words – ‘if I don’t
apply 50 times, I won’t pass the first step, which is the pain of being re-
jected 49 times’ They also learned ‘that failure is not necessarily a nega-
tive sign’. Yet, at the point of signalling availability, failing to pass even
the first round of selection represented a very difficult lesson in the pro-
cess of obtaining a job in London.
I have fallen flat on my face good couple times. You submit your
online application, which you have been working on for two
nights and, after ten minutes, you receive an automatic email
thanking you for your application and pointing out that, after
careful consideration and due to the large number of applicants
and their unusually high qualification levels, unfortunately your
application cannot be taken forward. (Bence, Hungarian invest-
ment banker in London 2004)
Most of the individual developers I interviewed, the cosmopolitan mar-
ket movers, obtained their first jobs in London by pursuing this kind of
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competitive, highly selective process. First they would apply – and be re-
jected – for many jobs, usually in finance, IT and academia, but also in
consulting or architecture. They would then be interviewed a couple
times, over the phone and in person. And finally, they would be offered
one or two jobs.
The signalling process was less complex for individual diversifiers,
the ‘home-oriented’ market movers, who look for jobs in London in or-
der to learn better English, to gain new skills and experiences and per-
haps to earn more. Their less advanced language skills make them hesi-
tant to look for jobs that suit their qualifications, yet they, too, rely on
the internet.
I started to look online for possible jobs [as an au pair] in
London. I found some portals which mediate between families
and students wishing to work as au pairs. There are many. You
can upload photos, create a website for yourself. I registered my
profile on a couple of websites […] and it was the family which I
work for now that found me. First, we started to exchange
emails, then spoke on the phone twice, and we found we could
relate to one another, so I came. (Anikó, Hungarian au pair in
London, 2004)
Inquiring about how they signalled their availability to British employ-
ers, I found that most individual movers − especially the cosmopolitans,
but also the ‘home-oriented’ – withheld some information for the sake
of preferential screening. During the process of signalling, interviewees
preferred to draw employers’ attention to their level of education and
work experience in general. However, they chose to share the least pos-
sible information about their background, origin or reason for wishing
to work in London. Taking advantage of the online application process,
in the first round, they preferred to avoid mentioning their geographic
location so as not to elicit any ethnic stereotypes that their prospective
employers may have had. A business graduate I spoke with believed
she had to withhold this information in order for employers to screen
her application.
If I send a CV to a private company, it will go straight in the bin
because of the word Romania’ on it. If I want a job in a public
company, I cannot get it because their policy is to employ only
people from the EU or the Commonwealth. […] So I changed my
strategy and reduced the occurrence of ‘Romania’ on my CV to
the absolute minimum. (Rodica, Romanian production operator
in London, 2003)
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Withholding information about their background was more frequent
among Romanian respondents than their Hungarian counterparts.
They believed they would only be guaranteed meritocratic screening if
they provided incomplete information. The reason for withholding
these ‘non-essential details’, as one Romanian lecturer pointed out, ar-
ose from a complex about being stereotyped based on their origins.
When applying for this job, I explained vaguely what the situa-
tion is: that I am a student at this and that [British] university. I
don’t think I specified that I was actually a visiting student from
Romania, studying here for four months only. I tried to avoid as
many details as possible since I thought that being specific
would ruin my chances of getting this job. You know, how em-
ployers’ stereotypes work: the more honest you are, the less you
remain with. So I chose for not telling some things that I was
doing; I did not lie to employers; I was concentrating on telling
only the essential details. (Sergiu, Romanian lecturer in London,
1998)
My interviewees highlighted the need to direct their potential employ-
ers’ attention. They preferred to have employers concentrate on advanta-
geous characteristics of their human capital (such as credentials, know-
ledge or particular skills) and ignore the details perceived as non-advan-
tageous (such as their non-British permanent domicile, their need for a
work permit and/or the fact that English was not their first language).
Overall, my interviewees sought to show that they are not different
from their British counterparts. Dan pointed out that he did not want to
be screened as ‘a Romanian wanting to work in Britain’; he wanted to
signal that he operates in the same mindset as everybody else within
the same profession.
I was concerned [about my Romanian citizenship]. No need to
hide this. Despite all the affirmation I received that I was good, I
was concerned that the system would work against me just be-
cause I am Romanian. This is part of the heavy Romanian legacy.
So I never put on my CV that I need a work permit in Britain. I
didn’t want all my applications to end in the trash because of
this. I simply wanted to be a British graduate; I was not a
Romanian wanting to work in Britain. I wanted to show that I
operated with the same mindset as all my colleagues from
Manchester or Edinburgh who applied for the same academic
jobs. I did not want to stand out as being different from the
viewpoint of immigration policy; I wanted to stand out because I
am good. (Dan, Romanian lecturer in London, 1997)
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All my cosmopolitan-minded interviewees’ accounts, including Dan’s,
show that when signalling availability, professional identity overwrote
ethnic identity. They did not want to be screened as Romanians or
Hungarians, the stereotypically ‘impoverished’ Eastern Europeans
wishing to work in Western Europe; rather, they wanted to find jobs as
well-educated bankers, academics and architects who happen to have
been raised in a different country and speak a non-English mother
tongue. They expected British employers to act under a universal frame
of reference, within which credentials and experience make the differ-
ence rather than ethnic belonging. Yet, while expecting this, they did
presume that ethnic stereotyping creates in fact a dual frame of refer-
ence, based on which employers screen natives and foreigners differ-
ently (and thus they preferred to withhold information about their eth-
nic belonging).
As it turns out, Waldinger and Lichter (2003) found how employers
do use a dual frame of reference. Employers hiring for unskilled jobs
say that immigrants are useful precisely because they are different from
natives, which makes them ideal candidates to fill jobs others do not
want. In the case of professional and graduate jobs, however, my inter-
viewees wanted to be hired because they are not different. Not wanting
to stand out meant they sought to apply for the same jobs as the
British, and they expected British employers to rely on a single frame of
reference. Therefore, unless they filled in skill shortages on the labour
market, these cosmopolitan foreigners sought to compete with profes-
sionals and graduates from around the world, including the United
Kingdom.
Network movers: Elite movers and traditional migrants
The market mover interviewees, especially the cosmopolitans, were
proud to be able to compete on the labour market with other profes-
sionals and graduates from around the world. As Dan pointed out,
Eastern Europeans’ ability to compete with other professionals provides
a sense of self-justification: their Eastern human capital could actually
be high enough to fill Western vacancies. Being able to compete on the
market showed the value of their human capital and, as many high-
lighted, not their social capital. Referring to what they perceive as a cli-
entelistic and nepotistic ‘system’ at home, interviewees highlighted how
getting into the labour market without having to rely on social capital
was an indicator of merit. It was not their occupational or industry ties
nor their kinship or friendship ties that permitted them to obtain a job
in London, but rather, their credentials, work experience, language
knowledge and particular skills. According to Tilly (2006), a lack of reli-
ance on social networks leads to the democratisation of migration:
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cross-border mobility also becomes possible for those who lack the rele-
vant social capital that contributes to the decrease in costs of migration
(including initial help and information flows). Yet, some interviewees
acknowledged that social ties make the process of signalling more
efficient.
I have to say that social ties have opened up the doors for me,
this is true. Nevertheless, they were not relevant during the re-
cruitment process. I am convinced that social ties do not matter
so much in Britain as performance and a daring attitude. This is
the huge difference between Britain and Hungary: here, they
would take you on board if you are good but not connected. In
Hungary, they wouldn’t. (Arnold, Hungarian investment banker
in London, 1999)
Being embedded in social networks decreases the time and costs of job-
seeking, since individuals do not, like Dan, have to file 50 applications
in order to be rejected 49 times (see also Fawcett 1987; Massey et al.
1987; Findlay & Garrick 1990). Also, social ties allow circulation of more
information about the job and, indeed, about the applicant than what
the job description or a cover letter contains, thus making speculations
about employers’ single or dual frame of reference unnecessary. Favell,
Feldblum and Smith (2006) suggested that individuals with high hu-
man capital would do better if they had equally high levels of social capi-
tal. This is not surprising. Social networks have long been identified as
crucial to the economic behaviour of migrants. On the one hand,
Massey et al. (1987) and Beaverstock (1996a) emphasised immigrants’
reliance on social networks to find out about job openings or to signal
availability to employers about jobs that have not yet been advertised. On
the other hand, Waldinger and Lichter (2003) extensively described em-
ployers’ reliance on social ties when signalling job openings and require-
ments. In fact, contemporary ethnographies document the tendency of
employers to rely on immigrant social networks as their primary recruit-
ing tool (Bean, González-Baker & Capps 2001). Nevertheless, the domi-
nance of social networks has the potential of organising labour markets
to partially closed, rather than open, competition for jobs (Bach 2001),
thus limiting the process of democratisation of migration.
A common turn of phrase I heard during my interviews was some-
thing akin to ‘an opportunity popped up and I took advantage of it’.
This often referred to an idea put forward by a former colleague, an ac-
quaintance or a friend of a friend about a possible job in London.
Whether based on occupational, industry or community ties, the pri-
mary role of these links was to transfer signals of availability in two di-
rections: from employer to future migrants and vice versa. In general,
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when social networks helped Hungarian and Romanian professionals
and graduates find employment in London, signals reached experienced
professionals through professional ties (elite movers) or ethnic ties (tra-
ditional migrants).
The professional networks of elite movers
Many of my interviewees arrived in London through intra-company
transfers within major professional services providers. This was espe-
cially the trend during the 1990s when many Western companies out-
sourced or off-shored functional practices to Eastern Europe, usually for
lower costs; these processes are well documented (see Martin 1999;
Taplin & Frege 1999; Commander & Köllő 2004). At that time, internal
moves within multinationals were relatively easy, especially for
Hungarians (many multinational companies established their
Hungarian offices shortly after the fall of the Iron Curtain; their
Romanian offices followed five to ten years later). A Hungarian profes-
sional working in one of the big accountancy firms in Budapest recalled
how easy the transfer was for her. The company took care of all work-re-
lated arrangements, including work permits.
I told one of the partners that I would like to come to work in
London for a while. He picked up the phone and that was it: I
could come for two years. […] Basically, I was handed over to
London. My contract didn’t contain a clause of return, London
was paying my salary and Budapest stopped being concerned
about me. (Dóra, Hungarian auditor in London, 1998)
Less experienced intra-company transferees than Dóra needed more
than a phone call to obtain an assignment in London. Yet, with suitable
knowledge of English, credentials and a willingness to work abroad,
young professionals could obtain temporary assignments to London.
These assignments were not only − but typically − within professional
services firms, as a journalist I spoke with said.
In our organisation, everybody can apply to work in a different
country for a while. You just submit an application and, if you
are successful, you can go; the company takes care of your repla-
cement until you are away. […] One of my colleagues left the
London office to work somewhere else and, since I spoke good
English and my employers were generally happy with what I did,
I was called to London to replace her. Basically, my move to
London was originally an intra-company transfer. (Árpád,
Hungarian journalist in London, 2000)
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The mobility of staff within multinational organisations has also been
well documented (see Salt 1992; Beaverstock 1996b; Findlay et al.
1996; Beaverstock 2005). Scholars agree that intra-company transferees
move along the network of offices of multinational corporations, typi-
cally towards global cities, where headquarters are often found.
Multinational companies also actively encourage the global mobility of
their employees. Confirming what my interviewees said, the human re-
sources consultant of a major international financial organisation noted
how mobility between headquarters and employees’ home country is
strongly encouraged.
We have offices all over the world, and a lot of our [graduate]
candidates may start in London, but then they may well move
back to their home countries or may well move to a different re-
gion. And that is something we encourage. We actively move
people geographically. (HR consultant in a major international fi-
nancial organisation in London, 2002)
Similar to intra-company transfers, mobility prospects also arose for pro-
fessionals when two or three firms merged and the restructuring created
opportunities to change jobs, locations or functional areas. A Hungarian
professional with many years of work experience whom I interviewed re-
ceived a job in London as the outcome of mergers and acquisitions.
Our company was restructured and, as always, there are opportu-
nities around restructurings. […] One of my options was to come
internally [to London]. I was asked to build up a regional procure-
ment business for our firm. All my life I was doing these
‘building-up’ things, so I thought I might even do it in London as
well. (László, Hungarian director of a company in London, 2000)
In general, those Hungarian and Romanian professionals and graduates
who signalled their availability or found out about job openings though
occupational ties responded to labour market demand that was often
connected to skill shortages in London. Some of my professional inter-
viewees, almost all working in financial services, were head-hunted
from London during the early 2000s, when the city’s markets were
booming and there was a shortage of individuals with experience (espe-
cially those experienced in emerging markets such as Hungary or
Romania).
My current employer head-hunted me from Hungary. I had been
doing business with them, but from the other side. One day, out
of the blue, a woman called me on my mobile, asking whether
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I’d be up for switching sides and do what she does now. […] And
even though I had a very good job at home, I didn’t hesitate for a
moment about whether I’d like to come or not. […] It was such
an opportunity that it was impossible to be left behind. (István,
Hungarian investment banker in London, 2002)
Recruiting talented people from Hungary or Romania to work in more
challenging and better-paying jobs in London was a practice used by
London-based employers around the years of the dotcom boom. Many,
like István or Cristian, cited below, had been working for British compa-
nies while based in Hungary or Romania, and they all received job of-
fers from London.
Our company had many contracts with companies abroad and
we had a huge client in Britain. This client offered my boss a
job, which he accepted. Then, they offered me a job and some of
my colleagues too. […] Initially, I rejected the offer, but after a
year they approached me again. (Cristian, Romanian engineer in
London, 2001)
Cristian elaborated on how the best IT engineers were ‘drained’ from
Romania during the dotcom boom via international corporations.
London was struggling with skill shortages, and Romania had lots of
good engineers; by offering higher salaries and challenging jobs, talents
could be easily transferred to Britain. As another interviewee pointed
out, however, it was not only British partners who ‘drained’ talents from
the East. In his company, the very best employees were putting pressure
on their British partner firms to employ them, or else they would quit.
Despite contractual limitations between the collaborating Romanian
and British companies regarding cross-company recruitment, the
British firm had no choice but to breach the agreement and take on the
best specialists rather than let them move to the competitors.
My company in Bucharest worked with a British company. The
Romanians used to come to Britain for short assignments. After
a couple of assignments, some of them told the British partner
that they wanted to work for them and not for the Romanian
company. Obviously, the main reason was financial. The problem
was that our companies had a contract saying that partners could
not take on the employees of the other [company]. Yet, the de-
mand for our knowledge was so high on the British market that
the Romanian employees had a strong case. They said that if the
British partner didn’t take them, they would go [and work] some-
where else. Therefore, the British partner had no choice but to
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breach the contract with the Romanian partner and take their IT
specialists on board. At least ten came to the same UK employer
that time. (Kálmán, Romanian engineer in London, 2000)
Using client-partner relations to signal job openings or productive capa-
cities was not only specific to certain occupations, but characterised en-
tire industries. From the end of the 1990s up until 2001, when the IT
bubble burst, IT specialists were in high demand in the UK. As such, it
was typical for them to experience internal or cross-company transfers
during this period. In the early 2000s, the place of IT specialists was ta-
ken over by those working in financial services, especially investment
bankers and financial lawyers who spoke various languages and had
some experience in emerging markets.
Looking at my interviewees who used professional ties to signal their
availability or to find out about job openings, I realised that the non-
market, network-based signalling is a very selective social process. Only
the most experienced or highly specialised Hungarians and Romanians
have professional social capital that they can convert into employment
benefits in London. Professional networks − by providing the right sig-
nals to the right people − select the very best of their field in Hungary
and Romania. They gave relevant, detailed information for network
movers in a more accessible, less costly and less time-consuming way.
Much like any other social networks, professional networks lowered the
social and economic costs of job-seeking. More importantly, they mini-
mised the risk of applying for the wrong job and maximised the chance
of making the ‘right choice’. Through professional ties, applicants
learned not only about specific openings, but also about the actual tasks
that may not be included in the prospective job’s advertisement. As the
following interviewee pointed out, network movers do a better self-
screening before applying.
The institute I worked for earlier has some ties with the one in
London. Basically, the director from here is a good friend of the
director in my previous organisation. So this opening was well
advertised for me. I knew exactly what I would be doing, how
much experience they needed, how much time the job would
take, what opportunities are available, and so on. I found out
about many details of the job, and all were relevant for me. So I
said, OK, I will apply since it seems to be the right choice.
(Georgiana, Romanian researcher in London, 2004)
Another interviewee also described how some information about possi-
ble jobs, their content or relevance is simply not circulated openly.
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Getting a job here is tightly linked to networking, to the people
you know and your personal initiative. […] If you don’t take the
initiative to go, to call, to meet people, to ask for information, no-
body cares about you. Without personal interaction you cannot
find out anything about the system, how things work, who is
doing what and what the planned projects are for the future.
(Sergiu, Romanian lecturer in London, 1998)
It became increasingly clear from my interviews that professional social
capital represents a source of labour market segmentation. Eastern
Europeans in professional or higher managerial occupations in London
seemed to have much more extended professional networks than those
in lower-level service-class jobs. While it is difficult to pinpoint whether
professional social capital was the cause or the consequence of obtain-
ing higher-level service-class jobs in London, it seems certain that they
went together. A Romanian consultant within an international financial
institution talked about the importance of building and cultivating pro-
fessional and occupational networks.
Professional networks are very important at my level. […] It is a
skill to generate and maintain networks. Your networks come
firstly from your colleagues. The likelihood of their being from
good families [with a] good background is bigger, as they ended
up at the same place as you did. By ‘good’ I mean similar to
yours. Good for you. […] How a network gets bigger and deeper,
that depends on you. It is a skill and it also depends on the num-
ber of years you spend in a certain country. First, I started my
network by getting in contact with people from here [through] re-
lying on my relations at home. Then I had to nurture, develop
and maintain all the new contacts: I am constantly expanding
them. […] Building professional networks is the only type of so-
cial relations I put energy into. (Mircea, Romanian consultant in
London, 1993)
Mircea’s opinion is shared by a Hungarian director within a large mul-
tinational corporation. He argued that experienced professionals’ friend-
ship networks need to overlap with their professional networks.
Networking consists of learning about business opportunities, better po-
sitions, possibilities for cooperation and financial prospects rather than
about shared values or interests.
My life has almost always been about work, and that is how it
will be in the future. […] At my level, the question is rather how
much time and disposition I have to build personal relationships
102 CSEDŐ
outside the business… or, should I build personal relationships
within the business? And I do build my relationships within the
business. It simply offers more. (László, Hungarian director in
London 2000)
Professional networks are generally homogenous when it comes to the
occupations of their members. This was not typical for the experienced
Hungarian and Romanian professionals only; expatriates were found to
spend much of their time socialising with other expatriates in their host
country who usually have similar occupations, rather than with host
country nationals or their co-ethnics (Johnson, Kristof-Brown, Van
Vianen, De Pater & Klein 2003). This suggests that foreign profes-
sionals sought relationships with like-minded people sharing profes-
sions, experiences or relevant characteristics. Such individuals not only
represented business or career opportunities and provided social sup-
port in a new environment, but were also found to impact the success
of international assignments overall (Black 1988).
Typically, my interviewees’ professional networks, through which they
signalled their availability or disposition for employment in London,
were formations that while occupationally homogeneous, are also ethni-
cally heterogeneous. Networks were formed primarily through work:
current or former colleagues exchange information about job openings
with former or current employers. Nurturing professional ties with for-
mer colleagues could lead to the formation of transnational professional
networks since my interviewees were geographically mobile themselves,
constantly between positions and countries. Some interviewees even
mentioned feeling globally well connected. As Mircea, a Romanian con-
sultant and frequent traveller noted: ‘London has business with the
world. […] My job is very internationally oriented. Ninety per cent of my
professional contacts are outside Britain’. The international dimension
of the jobs of most professionals, the elite movers, makes them well in-
tegrated into professional labour markets.
Another type of transnational professional network was formed while
studying abroad, usually in the UK or the United States, and subse-
quently keeping in contact with former colleagues from the university.
A Romanian lecturer who completed an American postgraduate degree
pointed out that, in cities such as London, it was relatively easy to stay
connected with university alumni because London proves attractive for
many other ‘spiralists’ like herself.
Most of my contacts in London are colleagues and friends from
the US: those who graduated from my university and also came
to work in London. Or not only London, also Oxford or
Cambridge. We managed to develop strong friendships on
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campus back in the US; now these alumni ties form a strong
professional network, and we keep ourselves informed about the
latest opportunities. Not having time to develop new relation-
ships, this network is my most significant source of ‘professional
gossip’. (Irina, Romanian lecturer in London, 2002)
Besides being ethnically heterogeneous, the professional network mem-
bership was gendered. I found that women were less likely to rely on
professional networks when signalling availability or learning about job
openings than were men. While young male graduates usually signalled
their availability on the market, experienced male professionals’ mobi-
lity almost exclusively relied on professional ties. This finding is not un-
ique to my research. Some studies highlight that many moves that oc-
cur as intra-company transfers may be arranged through male network-
ing (see Kofman & Raghuram 2005). Women’s social networks’
composition, range and, often, geography differ from those of men.
Alongside their careers, women need to take care of family and friend-
ship ties, thus limiting their time for building professional networks.
Another interviewee pointed out the disadvantages she experienced
from not seizing the opportunity to build professional networks.
During my MBA, I did not properly understand the importance
of building a [professional] network, and every day I had to bring
our child to school and back. So I had to dash off after the lec-
tures, whereas the others − mostly men − stayed on and met up
during the evenings in the neighbouring pub. Because my hus-
band was working and I had to take care of our family, I there-
fore missed out on the major part of networking so important
during an MBA. Nowadays, I could contact my former MBA col-
leagues – and I know most of them are still in touch with each
other – but it would come across as a bit strange: I wasn’t a
drinking buddy for them. (Mariana, Romanian consultant in
London, 1993)
Women’s professional networks were also restricted because they are of-
ten ‘trailing spouses’, rarely lead migrants. Frequently, their partners’
career benefited from the cross-country mobility, while the women were
expected to be adaptive followers, even if their own professional net-
works – should they exist – would send them to different destinations.
These women experienced a devalorisation of their productive functions
and a relegation to the domestic sphere (see also Yeoh & Khoo 1998;
Yeoh & Willis 2005). The gendered nature of professional networks,
however, has consequences. Because they are not as embedded in pro-
fessional networks as men are, women’s mobility between and within
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firms was less likely to be prompted by arising opportunities than by a
need to accommodate their partner’s career moves. This is a common
finding of studies on professional mobility: in many instances, the hus-
band’s career takes precedence. Moreover, there may be no appropriate
employment available for well-educated women where the husband’s
career takes the family, especially if spouses work in different sectors
(Kofman & Raghuram 2005, 2006).
While my interviewees’ professional networks were typically gen-
dered and ethnically heterogeneous, a particular form of professional
network still needs to be mentioned: that of graduates and young pro-
fessionals from Hungary and Romania who studied in their respective
home countries yet ended up together in London. These young net-
works were ethnically homogeneous, though it was common profession
and schooling that held these networks together rather than shared eth-
nicity. A young Hungarian investment banker first drew my attention to
the phenomenon.
It is very common to meet Hungarians in the City [ financial dis-
trict known as the City of London] who were once members of
one of the colleges for advanced studies. Some are here, others
were here but have already left. And through the college alumni
networks you always find out who is currently in London. (Máté,
Hungarian investment banker in London, 2004)
I found at least two ethnically and occupationally homogenous young
professionals’ networks in London. One exists for finance graduates
from Budapest University of Economic Sciences who, during their un-
dergraduate studies, were members of colleges for advanced studies
and after graduation started entry-level jobs in the City of London.
Bence pointed out how networks formed in their home country facili-
tate transnational information exchange between various cohorts of
graduates. Members of the networks could learn from one another.
They exchanged information about occupational and career standards
in their profession, contributing thus to the formation of their reference
group, as well as about the city’s stance on the labour market.
I know several Hungarians who graduated with my specialisation.
Just from my year, there are four here; we were all part of the col-
lege for advanced studies. There is surely a mass attraction in the
story: one graduate comes after the other. You hear what a cool job
the other has and you wish the same for yourself. […] It is difficult
to say, though, who came to London first. We all applied indepen-
dently, but then ended up here at the same time. […] Thirty to 40
per cent of my main friendship circle from home is now in
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London, and it also represents quite a good professional network.
(Bence, Hungarian investment banker in London, 2004)
These graduates, and indeed many other Hungarian young profes-
sionals, would often meet on Wednesday evenings in a City of London
pub called the ‘Pubszerda’. Providing an informal institutional frame-
work for professional network-building, the Pubszerda was considered
a great place to socialise, exchange information and network for young
investment bankers working locally. However, professionals not in the
financial sector would find the Pubszerda less useful for widening their
professional networks.
My knowledge about these Pubszerda youngsters is quite super-
ficial. […] It is not my main pathway, so to say. The major part of
the Hungarian professional community specialises in finance,
and I do not. I will gladly talk with them for a couple of hours,
but I am not sure that I am interested in so many details about
what happens in the City, and who made a transaction of how
many billion pounds. The majority of these kids cannot stop gos-
siping about the City. I am simply not interested. (László,
Hungarian director in London, 2000)
Although Hungarian finance graduates working in the City formed a
strong ethnically and occupationally homogenous professional network
in London, the same picture did not emerge for Romanian graduates of
the Academy of Economic Sciences. Romanian IT graduates – namely,
young engineers – were young professionals whose social networks in
London were similar to Hungarian finance graduates. Their network
was formed typically less on the basis of common studies than from
having shared a prior employer, either in Romania or in London.
Almost all IT engineers pointed out that Romanian programmers form
a loose professional network in London.
In my first job in Britain I worked with colleagues from
Romania. We were practically relocated from Romania to Britain.
[…] It was a pleasant group of people, we were also friends, with
pretty similar interests. […] We still keep in touch, although we
work for different employers now. You know, in every software
company in the UK you surely find two to three Romanian pro-
grammers. (Cristian, Romanian engineer in London, 2001)
Yet, Romanians also had a semi-formal institutional framework for pro-
fessional network-building. As one interviewee pointed out, the
Romanian Business Club was established with the deliberate aim of
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increasing networking opportunities among Romanian professionals in
London, mainly those working in the City.
There were multiple elements that led to the establishment of
the club. […] It is a great networking opportunity. You not only
meet similar people from different companies, so you can hear
all the business gossip, but you also can find out about business
opportunities, even in Romania. Additionally, you can socialise
with Romanians, make friends. Nevertheless, there are always in-
terests in the middle. Everybody is busy, generally, so there have
to be some tangible outcomes of the participation. […] To be con-
crete: on the one hand, networking; on the other hand, business
opportunities. The social facet is of tertiary importance. […] I was
indeed keen on meeting other Romanians, as I hardly knew any-
body [in London]. But of course, I was also curious: what are the
others working in? Who are they? And so on. […] I have found
some great friends at the club. And, of course, we have also done
some business together. (Mircea, Romanian consultant in
London 1993)
The Romanian Business Club shared very similar goals to the
Pubszerda’s initial aims. Both sought to network with co-ethnics work-
ing in the City in the hope of exchanging business information and
City gossip as well as to socialise. For this reason the perceived ‘pro-
blems’ with the club were the same as those experienced by the
Pubszerda. Membership of this professional network was enticing for
bankers and lawyers working in the City, but non-bankers were less in-
terested in the opportunity to obtain first-hand information about local
business exchanges.
The ethnic networks of traditional migrants
Grudges held against ethnically homogeneous networks did come up
during my interviews. This happened once I shifted from speaking with
Hungarian and Romanian investment bankers, lawyers and IT engi-
neers to speaking with business developers, architects, journalists, doc-
tors and academics. This group of professionals, who did not work in
the City, were not particularly interested in topics such as how many fi-
nancial transactions took place in the City or detailed information about
mergers and acquisitions. It was the rule rather than the exception that,
at one point during the interview, my respondents noted how shared
ethnicity was not enough for them to maintain social relations with
other Hungarians or Romanians in London. A shared profession and
ethnicity was a good facilitator for information exchange about the
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professional labour market. However, as mentioned earlier, ethnically
heterogeneous professional networks were more effective when signal-
ling availability or looking for openings. A Hungarian physician with
twenty years of work experience was one of the few interviewees to
touch upon the very essence of the unsuitability of ethnic networks
when looking for professional jobs. As she suggested, co-ethnics gener-
ally have non-influential positions in London. Ethnic networks are
therefore ineffective at placing members in higher professional or man-
agerial jobs in London.
The Hungarian [doctors] from London are very nice and lovely,
but everywhere bosses are British. So the Hungarians from here
are not in a position to be able to help [to find professional jobs].
Everybody is enthusiastic and encourages me […], but nobody is
actually helpful. (Anna, Hungarian physician in London, 2004)
In fact, when I asked interviewees about the ethnic background of three
persons whose advice they would consider when looking for a job, only
10 per cent replied that all three people would be of their ethnicity. For
26 per cent, two out of three would be of their ethnicity. For 23 per
cent, one out of three. The majority, 41 per cent of the survey respon-
dents, would not turn to their co-ethnics to find a job in London.
Another interviewee’s response corroborated this, despite his working
in an altogether separate industry and at a different level.
When I arrived in London I didn’t look for a company of
Hungarians. Quickly, I realised that there is a strong positive cor-
relation between the quality of the job you can get here and the
number of your non-Hungarian acquaintances. And I needed a
good job, since all this is about money. […] Only after the sum-
mer did I start to look for Hungarians; they are nice chaps, we
have great parties on the weekends, but that is it. (Sándor,
Hungarian manager in London, 2004)
Poros (2001) also found that those who rely on interpersonal – that is,
ethnically homogenous kinship or friendship ties – are likely to be un-
der-employed. A lack of organisational ties fails to channel well-educated
migrants into occupations consistent with their prior education or experi-
ence; community ties, however, make employment opportunities less
stable. It would be wrong to argue, however, that my interviewees have
not relied at all on ethnically homogeneous interpersonal ties. Sándor’s
observation was nevertheless true: ethnic ties, not being useful for ob-
taining highly skilled jobs, often perpetuated jobs within the low-skilled
sector. This was verified by a Romanian geography graduate working as a
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plasterer whose brother encouraged him to come to London and also
helped him find a semi-skilled job in the construction industry.
I came to London because of my brother. I am staying with him
now. Initially, I didn’t know how the story of self-employment
works, so my brother told me everything about it. First, I worked
with a false name through a construction agency as a labourer.
But then I quit because friends told me I should go into restau-
rants since [the restaurant industry] pays more. So I did. But I
was sacked because I was working full-time and I didn’t have the
right to do so. So I had to return to construction. My brother or-
ganised a job as a plasterer for me. (Eugen, Romanian plasterer
in London, 2003)
Similar to the example of Eugen, the following advertisement was
posted on one of the email groups sought to recruit those who – mostly
because of their poor English language skills – would have struggled to
find jobs elsewhere in the labour market:
If you would like to work for a five-star hotel or you know some-
body who is looking for work, call me or drop me an email. Big
chances of getting employed, even with very little English knowl-
edge! Next round of interviews is on next Saturday. A wide vari-
ety of positions is available, depending on experience and educa-
tion. (advertisement in Hungarian on the ‘Magyarkocsma’ email
group, 20 March 2007; my translation)
While cosmopolitan-minded interviewees did not rely on ethnic ties
during the signalling process for the very reasons mentioned by Anna
and Sándor, the ‘home-oriented’ movers were more likely to take advan-
tage of them. The reason for this was not that ethnic communities cir-
culate more information about better-paying jobs; rather, ‘home-or-
iented’ movers’ lack of English proficiency made it difficult for them to
access the British labour market. This delivers yet more evidence of the
strong labour market segmentational power of local language knowl-
edge. For ‘the home-oriented’, ethnic communities were the most effec-
tive social institutions to channel information about job openings or
productive capacities.
Overall, looking at the signalling process and employment outcomes
of the Hungarian and Romanian network mover professionals and
graduates, I have found that social ties ‘scatter’ my respondents on the
labour market of London. Professional ties facilitate obtaining higher
professional and managerial jobs because they connect individuals in
the same industry. Moreover, they were effective channels of
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information about the position and its requirements. Ethnic ties, how-
ever, were likely to channel my well-educated interviewees into routine
and manual occupations in London. Social ties thus have a centrifugal
role on the labour market, depending on the kinds that facilitate the sig-
nalling process, sorting individuals into higher or lower labour market
positions than what they could have obtained would they have moved
exclusively on the labour market.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have showed that amongst Hungarian and Romanian
professionals and graduates, the process of searching for employment
in London is not always based on the mobilisation of social networks.
Many of my interviewees were individual market movers who not only
chose London as a destination on their own volition, but signalled their
availability to potential employers exclusively on the labour market and
who learned about job openings via advertisements often posted on the
internet. Nevertheless, I have also argued that the process of signalling
is facilitated by social networks. Some of my interviewees relied on pro-
fessional or ethnic ties in order to get access to – or at least obtain em-
ployment-related information about – the labour market situation in
London. The cosmopolitans were more likely to signal their availability
through professional ties, or on the market; the ‘home-oriented’ relied
on signalling on the market, or through ethnic ties.
My findings confirm, as well as expand upon, the current literature.
On the one hand, my research presents further evidence to support
Favell’s (2008) findings regarding the free, market-regulated mobility of
the young and well-educated Europeans − ‘Eurostars’ − within the in-
creasingly interconnected markets of the EU. The present research
broadens the geographical coverage of the phenomenon by showing
that some Eastern Europeans are a part of that segment of the intra-
European mobile workforce who would not have moved, were it not for
the favourable structural and institutional environment that facilitates
mobility within Europe. With time, this could potentially lead to the de-
mocratisation of migration within the region (see Tilly 2006). Also, si-
milar to Findlay and Garrick (1990), Bagchi (2001) and Meyer (2001), I
have also found that when networks facilitate professional and graduate
migrants’ employment search at their destination, they are overwhel-
mingly formed by weak ties.
On the other hand, I also show that, despite witnessing how some
signs point to the democratisation of migration within Europe, Eastern
European professionals and graduates still have reservations about
being accepted as integral players with full rights in Western European
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markets. The market movers, in particular, have a strong desire to show
conformity to British professionals’ and graduates’ profiles, norms and
standards of behaviour. They are likely to withhold information that is
not directly related to their human capital (and which make them stand
out as ‘East Europeans’ such as their country of birth, foreign education
or their need for a work permit) in order to prevent employers from act-
ing on stereotypes. Therefore they seek to not stand out because they
are foreigners. They wish that British employers would use a single
frame of reference when screening their applications (for the contrary,
see evidence from the US in Waldinger & Lichter 2003).
Furthermore, I have also argued that social networks contribute to
the sorting of migrants with similar levels of qualification into more po-
larised labour market positions in their country of origin, depending on
the composition of these networks. Professional network embeddedness
facilitates access to higher professional and managerial jobs in London.
Professional network ties result in former colleagues or students with
similar occupations working in the same industry; they are ethnically
heterogeneous and gendered (i.e. predominantly male). Embeddedness
in ethnic networks channels well-educated migrants into routine and
manual occupations, transforming the migration patterns of the well-
educated into those of unskilled or semi-skilled traditional migrants.
Ethnic networks are occupationally heterogeneous and rarely comprise
co-ethnics with influential positions who could channel employment
signals towards professional and managerial jobs.
Overall, I found that social networks seem to be important yet invisi-
ble sources of labour market segmentation in London. Not only do
Eastern European professionals and graduates self-select according to
their social network membership (cosmopolitan vs. ‘the home-or-
iented’), but network-based signalling is also highly selective among
professionals. If Eastern Europeans are members of a professional net-
work, it is easier for them to surpass various labour market processes.
This is more difficult, time-consuming or both for individual movers
and even more so for members of non-professional, ethnically homoge-
nous networks. Yet, if social networks have a centrifugal force on
London’s labour market, the process of accreditation or employers’ so-
cial practices of screening may not be as meritocratic as many foreign
professionals and graduates perceive them to be.
Notes
1 This chapter is an abbreviated revision of a paper prepared for the IMISCOE Cluster
A2 conference entitled EU Enlargement and Labour Migration within the EU that
took place on 23 and 24 April 2007 at Warsaw University. I am thankful to Richard
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Black, Godfried Engbersen and Marek Okólski for their valuable comments on the
presentation in Warsaw and to the IMISCOE reviewers for their comments on earlier
versions of this chapter.
2 In my PhD dissertation (Csedő 2009), on which this chapter is based, I showed how
the Hungarian and Romanian interviewees have different expectations from their mo-
bility: the so-called ‘cosmopolitans’ operate under global, occupational standards, seek-
ing to obtain the maximum achievable returns to their human capital and the highest
benefits in their profession; the ‘home-oriented’ operate from a home-country, cohort-
based viewpoint, seeking to realise more than what is achievable at home for their
peers of similar education.
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6 ‘A van full of Poles’: Liquid migration from
Central and Eastern Europe
Godfried Engbersen, Erik Snel and Jan de Boom
Introduction
In May 2004, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom opened up
their labour markets to citizens of the new member states in Central
and Eastern Europe (CEE). In the summer of 2006, Greece, Portugal
and Spain also allowed workers from the new accession countries ac-
cess to their labour markets. The Netherlands followed in May 2007.
For Bulgaria and Romania, which joined the EU in January 2007, a
transition period is in force. Workers from these two countries still
need a work permit in order to work in the Netherlands. The
Netherlands could be described as a ‘third phase’ country, in that it
did not allow CEE migrants immediate access to its labour market.
However, it is incorrect to imply that there was no labour migration
from CEE countries to the Netherlands before May 2007. The
Netherlands was the second main destination of choice for migrants
from the provinces of Opele and Silesia, which formerly belonged to
the Prussian empire.1 Due to their dual Polish-German citizenship,
the ‘German Poles’ have enjoyed free access to the Dutch labour
market since the early 1990s (Pool 2004; Pijpers & Van der Velde
2007). Furthermore, under specific economic sector agreements,
‘Polish Poles’ and migrant workers from the new member states
were already working in the Netherlands, more specifically from the
early 2000s on. Polish workers dominated this labour force. Apart
from this regular labour migration, from the early 1990s, there were
also a significant number of irregular labour migrants from CEE who
were employed in agriculture, horticulture and construction (Burgers
& Engbersen 1996).
In other words, before the opening up of the Dutch labour market in
May 2007, regular and irregular forms of organised labour migration
could be observed in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, the European
Union’s enlargement has led to an accelerated growth of CEE migration
to the Netherlands. The figures presented in this chapter will show that
the largest category of CEE migrants arriving in the Netherlands come
from Poland. The numbers of immigrants coming from the other CEE
countries are still relatively small. However, we do not have complete
insight into the volume of temporary and irregular immigration from
the CEE countries to the Netherlands. As we shall explain later in this
chapter, the Netherlands has fairly accurate figures concerning the
numbers of immigrants that settle officially and for a longer period of
time (at least four months during the six months following registration)
in the country, but not concerning temporary and irregular migration.
This implies that official immigration statistics may underestimate the
volume of immigration from Poland and other CEE countries, as many
immigrants stay in the Netherlands for only short periods of time.
In this chapter we will analyse the main trends of labour migration
from CEE countries before and after the enlargement of the EU in May
2004 and January 2007. These countries include: Poland, Hungary, the
Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, the three Baltic states
(Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), Bulgaria and Romania. We will give a short
overview of Dutch immigration policies vis-à-vis citizens from the new
EU member states and we will briefly mention the statistical sources
that provide us information about immigrants from Poland and other
CEE countries. In addition, we will discuss some of the economic and
social consequences of the new labour migration, with particular refer-
ence to the issues of job displacement, wage reduction and housing. In
the next section, we discuss some of the new migration patterns and as-
sociated social myths that arose with the inflow of CEE migrants, and
we formulate the key research questions that we will try to answer in
this chapter.
‘Liquid migration’ and the social construction of new migration
myths
Current labour migration from CEE countries to the Netherlands is in-
teresting for several reasons. Firstly, it reveals important changes in mi-
gration flows and types of migration to the Netherlands (Engbersen,
Van der Leun & De Boom 2007). The new migration of the past fifteen
to twenty years differs from that experienced in the period 1950-1990.
Then, migration to the Netherlands was dominated by postcolonial mi-
gration from Indonesia (after 1949) and Surinam (after 1975), and by
guest worker migration (and later family migration) from Turkey and
Morocco (from the 1960s up until today). In the 1970s, almost half of
non-Dutch immigrants to the Netherlands came from just five coun-
tries: Turkey, Morocco, Surinam, the Netherlands Antilles and
Indonesia. Now, only about 20 per cent of non-Dutch immigrants to
the Netherlands come from these countries.
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The new migration of the past fifteen to twenty years is characterised
by new geographical patterns of migration and new types of immigrants
with weak or no residence status (asylum seekers, temporary labour mi-
grants and illegal immigrants). The new geography of migration relates
to increased long-distance migration to the Netherlands from a growing
number of countries. In addition, the traditional migration direction
from south to north is complemented by migration flows from east to
west. New categories of immigrants are increasingly being added to tra-
ditional labour immigrants, family immigrants and people from former
colonies and their offspring.
First, there are asylum seekers, whose numbers – though fluctuating
– increased sharply over the period 1990-2000. After a time in which
the numbers of asylum applications remained high (over 40,000 a
year), they began falling at the end of 2000. Second, besides the influx
of asylum seekers, there was an increase in the number of temporary
labour immigrants. More than two thirds of temporary labour immi-
grants come from Western countries (particularly the new EU member
states). Furthermore, the number of temporary labour immigrants from
Eastern European countries has increased sharply over the last few
years. Third, there is a relatively new type of immigrant, one that has
come to be known as an undocumented or irregular immigrant. The di-
viding lines between asylum seekers, commuting immigrants and ille-
gal immigrants are sometimes diffuse (see Düvell 2006). Polish immi-
grants who work in agriculture, for instance, were commonly regarded
as illegal immigrants, although they became regular immigrants after
enlargement. In other words, migration to the Netherlands became
much more differentiated and led to more diverse and floating popula-
tions. To paraphrase Bauman’s (1999, 2005) work on ‘liquid moder-
nity’, international migration has become ‘liquid’. The fairly stable mi-
gration patterns that marked the period 1950-1990 have dissolved into
more complex, transitory patterns in terms of transient settlement
– transnational or otherwise – and shifting migration status
(Engbersen, Van der Leun & De Boom 2007).
These observations are consistent with Vertovec’s (2007) concept of
‘super-diversity’. This notion underlines the multiple-origin, transna-
tionally connected, socio-economically differentiated and legally strati-
fied nature of international migration. It is therefore more difficult to
pin down contemporary migration patterns now than in the decades
after World War II because of their very temporary and fluid nature.
There is often a discrepancy between officially documented migration
and the non-registered reality of regular and irregular labour migration.
Labour migrants from CEE countries, in particular, have again con-
fronted the Netherlands with the importance of temporary labour mi-
gration, which often takes the form of ‘circular migration’ or
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‘transnational commuting’. Workers return home when a job is fin-
ished and come back another year (i.e. seasonal migration) or they tra-
vel to the Netherlands when they are required (e.g. for small-scale con-
struction work, home improvement). This classic form of migration
that has always been historically crucial for the Netherlands (Lucassen
1987) – for example in the period 1750-1800 – has gained in impor-
tance over the years, and is confusing Dutch policymakers and
specialists.
In the 1970s and 1980s, policymakers embraced the myth that guest
workers from Mediterranean countries would return to their countries
of origin once the jobs they came for were finished. This myth of immi-
grants returning home dominated official Dutch thinking on immigra-
tion and immigrant integration for many years (Van Amersfoort 1982;
Muus 2004). Currently, however, a new social myth seems to be emer-
ging: that a substantial number of labour migrants will stay in the
Netherlands. However, as experience in the UK and Ireland has shown,
many labour migrants do return. One of the implications of this new
myth is a fear that the Netherlands is not fully prepared to accommo-
date the large influx of temporary workers at local level. In the past, it
was not equipped to effectively incorporate large groups of Turkish and
Moroccan immigrants into Dutch society; at present, it is not suffi-
ciently organised to deal with large numbers of temporary workers.
Provisional arrangements have been set up, especially in the housing
sector, to accommodate large groups of temporary workers. Another re-
markable phenomenon is that the issue of highly skilled migrants dom-
inates political discourse and policymaking, while fewer highly skilled
temporary workers are dominant in the actual migration figures (De
Boom, Weltevrede, Snel & Engbersen 2007). As a consequence, there is
no comprehensive overview of current migration flows from the CEE
countries to the Netherlands. In this chapter we will try to answer three
basic questions: 1) From which countries do these CEE migrants come?
2) Do all have regular status or do some have irregular status? 3) Are
they actually temporary workers or are some categories settling in the
Netherlands?
The dominant view is that CEE migrants alleviate specific labour
shortages, do not put a strain on public services or the tax system and
do not compete with native workers. Nowadays, the Netherlands has a
very tight labour market and most labour migrants from CEE countries
work in low-skilled sectors where job vacancies have long existed, such
as agriculture and horticulture, transport, construction and meat proces-
sing. Although job displacement is very difficult to measure, given the
current tight labour market, it is thought to be fairly limited. A stronger
argument can be made for another kind of job displacement, namely,
that CEE workers are displacing irregular workers from outside the EU.
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However, the issue of illegal residence is still relevant for immigrants
from Bulgaria and Romania, as is the issue of illegal work. Many for-
merly illegal workers have become partly regularised because of EU en-
largement and an opening up of the labour market, but are still partly
engaged in irregular work. So the question arises as to whether current
CEE migrants are still working in very specific sectors of the secondary
labour market, or whether the pattern is more diverse. A related ques-
tion is what the economic impact (i.e. on wage levels, job displacement)
is on the labour market position of different social groups (such as na-
tive-born Dutch or irregular workers).
The inflow of CEE migrants into the Netherlands has also given rise
to new concerns about their incorporation into Dutch society. Some na-
tional and local politicians are exploiting the image of a ‘Polish inva-
sion’ – what they call an increase of Polish workers and the concentra-
tion of groups in specific neighbourhoods in the big cities, particularly
The Hague and Rotterdam (see also Engbersen, Van San & Leerkes
2006; Leerkes, Engbersen & Van San 2007; Leerkes 2007). The pre-
sence of these groups has raised questions about the length of their
stay, as well as about relevant policies to deal with temporary workers
and immigrants who settle in certain neighbourhoods. More and more,
the new immigrants become visible in specific neighbourhoods not
only out of their sheer numbers, but also because of the institutions
they create and renew, such as Polish churches, boarding houses, mi-
grant hostels and dance halls for temporary workers (Leerkes et al.
2007). In The Hague, where many Poles live, there is an urban district
known as Little Poland where one can find Polish shops, pubs,
churches and a Polish newspaper providing information on Polish den-
tists, doctors and obstetricians. This presence has also led to serious
concerns about the residents – legal or illegal – housing conditions and
about quality of life in the neighbourhood. At the end of this chapter
we will discuss some of the concerns formulated by Dutch
municipalities.
Dutch labour migration policy on EU enlargement
When analysing immigration to the Netherlands, it is essential to distin-
guish different channels that each have their own policies and regula-
tions. These include: marital migration, other family-related migration,
asylum migration, labour migration and student migration. Labour mi-
gration policies and regulations are of particular relevance to migration
from the CEE countries. Since the 1980s, the Dutch government has
been rather hesitant about labour migration to the Netherlands.2 Given
the large numbers of jobseekers and social benefit claimants in the
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Netherlands (including many with an immigrant background), it found
unrestricted labour migration unacceptable (Roodenburg, Euwals & Ter
Rele 2003; Engbersen 2003). Furthermore, the Dutch government would
rather stimulate labour market participation by women and older em-
ployees than invite foreign workers to the Netherlands. Labour migration
is only perceived as desirable for vacancies for which there are no Dutch
jobseekers (or jobseekers from other EU countries) available. This is also
the basic principle of the Dutch Aliens Employment Act (WAV). The pur-
pose of this act is to selectively allow the entry of labour migrants within
the more general framework of labour market policies. The WAV regu-
lates who is eligible for a temporary work permit in the Netherlands and
who is exempted from the requirements. As a general rule, all labour mi-
grants from outside the EU are required to obtain a temporary work per-
mit in the Netherlands, whereas labour migrants coming from other EU
countries are exempted from this obligation.
Under the WAV, Dutch employers can only recruit foreign employees
when there are no ‘preferred-status workers’ available – that is, jobsee-
kers from within the Netherlands or other EU countries. Only when
employers are unable to find a potential employee among preferred-
status workers can they apply for a temporary work permit (known as a
TWV) for a foreign employee. The Dutch Central Organisation for
Work and Income (the public employment service known as the CWI)
assesses applications made by employers for such employees. Among
other things, the CWI checks whether there are no preferred-status job-
seekers available for the vacancy (via a ‘labour market test’). If a Dutch
or European jobseeker is available or if the employer has made insuffi-
cient efforts to hire such a person, the application will be refused.
Originally, this procedure also applied in the case of labour migrants
from Poland and other new EU members. However, before enlarge-
ment in 2004, several exemptions were introduced from these relatively
strict labour market regulations. In the late 1990s, the Netherlands had
a period of economic growth and a fairly tight labour market. In this
period, there was high demand for labour, particularly seasonal labour
in the Dutch agricultural and horticultural sectors. At the same time, it
became clear, for instance, that in the Westland, a well-known horticul-
tural region in the Netherlands, one in four companies employed irre-
gular immigrants (WRR 2001; Engbersen et al. 2006). In 2002, the
Dutch government tried to end this situation with its Seasonal Work
Project, which made it easier for agricultural and horticultural compa-
nies to hire seasonal workers from Poland (Broeders & Engbersen
2007). In the same period, Dutch temporary employment agencies
started to recruit workers from Poland and other CEE countries. Polish
workers with German passports – who mainly came from the German-
Polish border region – were in particular demand. Because of their
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German passports, these workers did not need a temporary work permit
to be employed in the Netherlands. As a result, in early 2004, at least
25,000 Polish workers were employed in the Dutch agricultural and hor-
ticultural sector. Most of them had temporary work permits, but about
10,000 Polish workers had German citizenship and therefore did not
need a formal work permit (Corpeleijn 2007: 181). In other words, the
years prior to EU enlargement in 2004 had already witnessed a sharp in-
crease in the influx of workers, mainly Polish ones, to the Netherlands.
After the EU enlargement in May 2004, the number of foreign work-
ers from Poland and other CEE countries further increased. As stated
in this chapter’s introduction, the Netherlands was a ‘third wave’ coun-
try: it kept its borders officially closed to employees from the new EU
member states. In 2004, a transitional measure was announced to al-
low workers from the new member states access to the Dutch labour
market, provided they had a temporary work permit. In May 2006, this
transitional measure was prolonged for another year. However, many
restrictions on foreign workers from Poland and other CEE countries
were lifted as early as 2006. Although foreign workers from new mem-
ber states admitted in 2004 still needed a temporary work permit, these
were more easily issued and often without a labour market test. This
implied that employers looking for foreign employees were no longer
obligated to check whether potential personnel was available in the
Netherlands and in ‘the old EU’. In May 2007, all restrictions on for-
eign workers from Poland and other new member states were lifted.
Individuals from these countries now have free access to the Dutch la-
bour market. This does not apply to nationals of the latest arrivals to
the EU, Bulgaria and Romania. Nationals of these two countries, which
joined the EU in January 2007, are still confronted with a transitional
period in which they need a temporary work permit in the Netherlands.
Up until 2006, only limited numbers of formal immigrants from
Bulgaria and Romania came to the Netherlands. In 2007, the number
of regular labour migrants from Bulgaria and Romania greatly
increased.
Before presenting figures on immigration from Poland and other
CEE countries to the Netherlands, we should point out the statistical
sources of these data. The Netherlands basically has two different statis-
tical sources containing information about labour immigration,
although both have their shortcomings. The Dutch immigration figures
are based on the municipal personal records database (known as the
GBA). Every person who resides for at least four months in a Dutch
municipality is obliged to register in the municipality. If their former
place of residence was abroad, the GBA classifies them as immigrants.
The origin of an immigrant is established by place of birth. This source
gives an accurate picture of registered and long-term (at least four
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months) immigration to (and emigration from) the Netherlands.
However, many seasonal workers and other temporary workers from
the CEE countries are not registered in the GBA. The second main sta-
tistical source used in this chapter concerns statistics relating to tempor-
ary work permits. These statistics show the increasing number of tem-
porary work permits issued to residents of CEE countries. The short-
coming here, however, is that these figures refer to work permits and
not to individuals (one person can and often does obtain more than one
work permit per year). Furthermore, this source has no information
about the number of work permits issued to residents from new EU
member states after May 2007 because, after that date, they no longer
required a work permit. In the following section we present data about
the number of temporary work permits issued to residents from the
CEE countries from the mid-1990s until May 2007.
Table 6.1 Immigration from Poland to the Netherlands by motive of migration,
1995-2004 (number, row % in brackets)
Labour Asylum Marriage Other family-
related
Study Other Total
1995 87
(7.2)
23
(1.9)
540
(44.9)
441
(36.7)
47
(3.9)
64
(5.3)
1203
(100)
1996 202
(13.8)
10
(0.7)
673
(46.0)
407
(27.8)
61
(4.2)
110
(5.3)
1462
(100)
1997 190
(13.2)
24
(1.7)
628
(43.8)
286
(19.9)
89
(6.2)
220
(15.3)
1435
(100)
1998 306
(18.8)
10
(0.6)
595
(36.5)
314
(19.3)
128
(7.8)
275
(16.9)
1631
(100)
1999 248
(22.6)
11
(1.0)
335
(30.5)
171
(15.6)
161
(14.7)
167
(15.2)
1098
(100)
2000 567
(31.5)
18
(1.0)
485
(26.9)
306
(17.0)
202
(11.2)
221
(12.3)
1800
(100)
2001 804
(37.9)
1
(0.0)
599
(28.2)
266
(12.5)
264
(12.4)
186
(8.8)
2122
(100)
2002 731
(32.4)
7
(0.3)
649
(28.8)
333
(14.8)
310
(13.8)
222
(9.8)
2254
(100)
2003 771
(35.7)
5
(0.2)
651
(30.1)
322
(14.9)
240
(11.1)
175
(8.1)
2161
(100)
2004 1896
(37.2)
17
(0.3)
825
(16.2)
921
(18.1)
464
(9.1)
978
(19.2)
5097
(100)
Total 5802
(28.6)
126
(0.6)
5980
(29.5)
3767
(18.6)
1966
(9.7)
2618
(12.9)
20263
(100)
Of whom
Men 3982
(53.3)
73
(1.0)
482
(6.4)
1368
(18.3)
843
(11.3)
579
(7.7)
7477
(100)
Women 1820
(14.2)
53
(0.4)
5498
(43.0)
2120
(16.6)
1123
(8.8)
2039
(15.9)
12786
(100)
Source: Statistics Netherlands
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CEE immigration prior to EU enlargement
In the decade before the EU enlargement in 2004, over 20,000 workers
from Poland arrived in the Netherlands and almost 18,000 from the
member states that acceded in 2004 and 2007 (Table 6.1 and Table 6.2).
Since there is no separate information about Slovenia and the three
Baltic states,3 the figures relating to ‘other new EU member states’ refer
only to Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Bulgaria and
Romania. The figures in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 show that the earlier
waves of immigration from the CEE countries to the Netherlands were
primarily family-related. Around half of all Polish immigrants came to
the Netherlands for family reasons (marriage, family reunification or
other family-related migration). The same goes for 45 per cent of all
Table 6.2 Immigration from other selected A8 states* to the Netherlands by motive
of migration, 1995-2004 (number, row % in brackets)
Labour Asylum Marriage Other family-
related
Study Other Total
1995 95
(11.1)
89
(10.4)
323
(37.6)
253
(29.5)
42
(4.9)
60
(7.0)
858
(100)
1996 125
(10.1)
70
(5.6)
502
(40.5)
293
(23.6)
149
(12.0)
109
(8.8)
1241
(100)
1997 182
(12.8)
50
(3.5)
500
(35.2)
273
(19.2)
219
(15.4)
194
(13.7)
1419
(100)
1998 354
(20.2)
31
(1.8)
565
(32.3)
293
(16.7)
252
(14.4)
251
(14.3)
1751
(100)
1999 274
(18.3)
79
(5.3)
383
(25.6)
271
(18.1)
311
(20.8)
179
(12.0)
1495
(100)
2000 461
(22.4)
213
(10.3)
525
(25.5)
274
(13.3)
332
(16.1)
249
(12.1)
2060
(100)
2001 698
(30.2)
154
(6.7)
692
(29.9)
214
(9.3)
341
(14.7)
203
(8.8)
2313
(100)
2002 463
(22.3)
72
(3.5)
764
(36.8)
174
(8.4)
435
(20.9)
164
(7.9)
2078
(100)
2003 417
(20.6)
60
(3.0)
762
(37.6)
186
(9.2)
446
(22.0)
148
(7.3)
2025
(100)
2004 675
(25.4)
21
(0.8)
651
(24.5)
320
(12.1)
563
(21.2)
426
(16.1)
2654
(100)
Total 3744
(20.9)
839
(4.7)
5667
(31.7)
2551
(14.3)
3090
(17.3)
1983
(11.1)
17894
(100)
Of whom
Men 2609
(39.9)
438
(6.7)
713
(10.9)
646
(9.9)
1376
(21.1)
528
(8.1)
6535
(100)
Women 1135
(10.0)
401
(3.5)
4954
(43.6)
1354
(11.9)
1714
(15.1)
1455
(12.8)
11359
(100)
Source: Statistics Netherlands
* Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Bulgaria, Romania
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immigrants from the other CEE countries that came to the Netherlands
in the period 1995-2004. The majority (over 60 per cent) of immigrants
from CEE countries were women. In preceding years, the proportion of
family-related immigration and of women in total immigration from
these countries to the Netherlands was even larger.
Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 also show, however, that the number of la-
bour migrants was increasing before enlargement in 2004. Since
2000, labour migrants have been the largest sub-category among immi-
grants coming from Poland. Another important sub-category is stu-
dents. One in ten Polish immigrants settling in the Netherlands in the
period 1995-2004 was a student. This figure is as high as one in six im-
migrants in this period from the other CEE countries. Finally, we
should mention that in this period, too, the Netherlands admitted a
number of asylum migrants from countries that later became EU mem-
ber states. Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 only cover documented migrants
who came to the Netherlands legally and who are formally registered
with the local authorities.
After the EU enlargement of 2004, the number of immigrants from
these countries increased significantly (Figure 6.1). Whereas the total
number of immigrants from the new EU member states fluctuated
around 4,000 annually in the years 2000-2003, this number almost
Figure 6.1 Immigration from CEE countries to the Netherlands by place of birth,
1995-2007
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doubled after 2004 (8,400 immigrants) and further increased in subse-
quent years (9,800 immigrants in 2005, over 11,000 in 2006 and al-
most 20,000 in 2007).4 Immigrants from Poland are by far the largest
sub-category. Total immigration from Poland and other CEE countries
may be much larger, since these figures only include those immigrants
that stay in the Netherlands for a longer period of time (at least four
months) and who register with the municipal authorities.
This sharp increase in the number of immigrants from CEE coun-
tries also implies a change in the composition of immigrant popula-
tions. Family-related immigration is gradually making way for work-
related immigration and the overrepresentation of women in immigra-
tion from the CEE countries is disappearing. Unfortunately, there is no
information available about the migration motives of immigrants for
the years after 2004. Figure 6.2 shows, however, a substantial increase
in male immigration, particularly from CEE countries to the
Netherlands following the 2004 enlargement. The immigration of wo-
men from CEE countries to the Netherlands increased less radically
after enlargement.
One crucial question related to the new labour migration is whether
it is a temporary or permanent phenomenon. What complicates the
Figure 6.2 Immigration from CEE countries to the Netherlands by gender
(1995-2007)
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answer to this question is that social researchers cannot decide which
argument is correct. Asking immigrants whether it is their intention to
stay is not a very useful method, since most of them do not know what
the future will bring. Many former guest workers were also convinced
their stay would be temporary, but ultimately many became permanent
residents of Western European countries. The only way to obtain some
indication of the prospects of CEE labour migrants is to analyse their
demographic behaviour. Bringing their families over, and more specifi-
cally their children, is a clear indication they will not leave in the fore-
seeable future. The immigration of minor children from Poland and
the other CEE countries to the Netherlands is, however, still fairly low
(see Figure 6.3), and there has been only a small increase in recent
years. In 2007, the immigration of minor children increased to almost
2,000, but is still relatively small.
CEE immigration after EU enlargement: A sharp increase in
commuting
Whatever the future brings, most current labour migrants from Poland
and the other new member states come over for temporary work. There
Figure 6.3 Immigration from CEE countries to the Netherlands by age (1995-2007)
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are, in fact, numerous documented stories about buses or aeroplanes
shuttling Polish workers to and from the Netherlands on a weekly basis.
The fact that many temporary labour migrants fail to register with their
local authorities implies that they are not included in official Dutch im-
migration statistics. The only way to estimate the volume of temporary
labour migration is to analyse the number of TWV permits issued to
CEE nationals. We then see an increase in the total number of TWVs is-
sued in the Netherlands. This increase started in the mid-1990s, preci-
pitated by the tight Dutch labour market at the time (Figure 6.4). But
even after 2000, the number of TWVs issued further increased, despite
the economic crisis and rising unemployment. After the 2004 enlarge-
ment, more specifically in 2006, the number of TWVs issued rocketed.
Whereas in 1996 over 9,000 work permits were issued in the
Netherlands, ten years later, in 2006, 74,000 were issued. Most of the
latter TWVs were issued to CEE nationals.
In the first four months of 2007, the number of TWVs issued rose
even faster. In the year’s first trimester alone, no fewer than 38,261 per-
mits were issued in the Netherlands. Again, the large majority of these
work permits (34,564) were given to CEE nationals. In the next eight
months of 2007, the number of TWVs fell sharply to 11,766, mainly be-
cause CEE nationals no longer needed a work permit to be employed in
the Netherlands after May 2007 (see Van den Berg, Brukman & Van Rij
2007: 29). Only nationals of Bulgaria and Romania, which joined the
EU in 2007, still need a TWV to work in the Netherlands.
Figure 6.4 Number of temporary work permits (TWVs) issued in the Netherlands
(1990-2006)
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Figure 6.5 shows the increase in the number of TWVs issued to CEE
nationals in the period 1996-2006. Polish nationals are, by far, the lar-
gest sub-category among these temporary foreign workers. In 2006
alone, almost 54,000 TWVs were issued to Polish nationals (73 per cent
of the total 74,000 TWVs issued in 2006). The other categories still re-
main limited. Table 6.3 and Table 6.4 show in which professions and
economic sectors these temporary workers from the CEE countries
were working in the period 2003-2006.
The figures in Table 6.3 and Table 6.4 reveal that, by far, the majority
of temporary work permits are issued for agricultural and horticultural
work. Moreover, this number has increased over the last few years. In
2003, 60 per cent of all work permits were issued for agricultural and
horticultural work, while in 2006 this figure was almost 75 per cent.
Temporary labour migrants from Poland and Romania are especially
concentrated in agricultural and horticultural work. Other lower-
qualified professions that attract a relatively large number of labour mi-
grants include various industrial production jobs, chauffeurs and per-
sonnel for unskilled work. TWVs issued to nationals from Bulgaria and
Romania, being EU member states that joined in 2007, increased from
1,700 in 2004 to 3,000 in 2006. In 2007, the number of TWVs issued
Figure 6.5 Number of temporary work permits (TWVs) issued to CEE nationals
(1996-2006)
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Table 6.3 Number of temporary work permits (TWVs) issued to foreign nationals
from CEE countries by type of profession and year (2003-2006)
2003 2004 2005 2006
Agriculture/horticulture 60.9 68.4 76.1 74.6
Artistic professions 5.4 3.1 2.1 0.5
Production work 9.9 15.0 8.9 15.6
Science 4.7 2.6 1.5 0.8
Computer specialists 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.2
Executive professions 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.2
Advisors 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.2
Drivers 7.6 6.0 5.4 3.4
Hotel and catering 2.0 0.8 0.5 0.4
Other services 1.9 1.1 0.8 0.8
Construction 4.2 1.2 2.9 0.3
Health care 0.9 0.3 0.1 0.1
Sports 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
Unskilled work 0.1 0.0 0.3 3.0
Mechanics 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Other professions 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
Total (N) 13,650 26,121 31,875 61,133
Source: Dutch Central Organisation for Work and Income (CWI)
Table 6.4 Number of temporary work permits (TWVs) issued to foreign nationals
from CEE countries by type of profession and country (2006)
Poland Czech
Republic/
Slovak
Republic
Hungary Baltic
states
Slovenia Bulgaria Romania
Agriculture/horticulture 78.4 21.3 21.5 63.7 7.4 63.9 75.8
Artistic professions 0.3 1.6 1.9 1.3 3.7 7.4 1.0
Production work 15.1 24.5 51.5 18.1 48.1 9.3 6.2
Science 0.4 2.2 9.8 2.5 20.4 4.9 3.0
Computer specialists 0.0 1.7 0.6 0.9 0.0 0.9 1.2
Executive professions 0.1 0.9 2.4 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.6
Advisors 0.1 0.4 1.7 0.4 3.7 1.1 0.2
Drivers 1.6 34.8 1.4 0.9 5.6 0.5 8.9
Hotel and catering 0.1 4.1 1.1 0.7 0.0 2.3 0.4
Other services 0.6 2.6 3.6 4.5 7.4 3.7 1.2
Construction 0.1 1.2 2.7 0.0 0.0 5.4 1.2
Health care 0.1 0.3 0.6 1.4 0.0 0.3 0.1
Sports 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.1
Unskilled work 3.1 4.0 0.6 3.6 3.7 0.0 0.0
Mechanics 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other professions 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total (N) 53981 2907 633 553 54 739 2266
Source: Dutch Central Organisation for Work and Income (CWI)
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to Bulgarians and Romanians further increased to over 3,600. An expla-
nation for this is that it became much easier for Bulgarians and
Romanians to enter the Netherlands once their countries joined the
EU, and they no longer need residence permits (Van den Berg,
Brukman & Van Rij 2007: 30).
These data on temporary work permits have their limitations. Firstly,
like any official data, they do not include foreign workers who are in the
Netherlands without formal residence permits or work permits.
Secondly, these data only refer to foreign workers who work for Dutch
employers. CEE nationals working in the Netherlands on a self-employed
basis are not included. Self-employed individuals from the new EU
member states had free access to the Dutch labour market as early as
2004. Thirdly, figures relating to temporary work permits refer to the
number of permits issued in a certain year, but not to the number of in-
dividuals receiving a work permit. Available, however, are several esti-
mates of the number of foreign workers in the Netherlands from Poland
and other CEE countries. According to one estimate, in 2004, there were
97,000 jobs in the Netherlands taken by temporary workers coming
from the CEE countries. Most of these jobs were in agriculture and horti-
culture and were found through temporary employment agencies. Since
about one in four temporary workers from the CEE countries had more
than one job, the total number of temporary labour migrants from CEE
countries in 2004 is estimated at 72,000 (both employed and self-em-
ployed) (Corpeleijn 2007: 181). A more recent estimate of the number of
temporary labour migrants from CEE countries in the Netherlands refers
to the situation in 2008.5 The conclusion was that a minimum of
100,000 CEE nationals were working in the Netherlands on a temporary
or permanent basis in 2008. This figure is also used by the Dutch gov-
ernment as the official estimate of labour migration from CEE countries
to the Netherlands.
Economic and social consequences
The previous sections outlined the influx of officially registered immi-
grants and temporary labour migrants from Poland and other CEE
countries to the Netherlands after EU enlargement in 2004. This sec-
tion summarises what is known about the economic and social conse-
quences of this wave of immigration. We will focus on three issues:
wage competition and the possible negative effect of CEE labour migra-
tion on wage levels for Dutch workers; labour market displacement;
and the social consequences of the influx of CEE labour migrants to the
Netherlands, particularly in the housing sector.
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Effect on wages
Foreign workers from Poland and the other CEE countries evidently
come to the Netherlands and other EU countries because of huge wage
differences within the EU. Even though new labour migrants may work
for lower wages than is customary in the Netherlands, they earn much
more than they would in their own countries. Such practices can have a
negative effect on wage levels in the receiving countries, especially on
wages for low-skilled work. Earlier Dutch research based on the as-
sumptions of Borjas (1999) concluded that:
It is safe to assume that an increase in the number of migrant
workers will lead to a fall in wages for competing workers. The
greater the increase in the number of migrant workers (the ex-
pectation with the free movement of workers), the greater the
wage effects will be. (Versantvoort, Vossen, Van der Ende, Zoon,
Nugteren, Nauta, Azzouz, Donker van Heel, Ceglowska & Kreft
2006: 15)
Although, until now, there has been little evidence of a significant drop
in wages for low-skilled work in the Netherlands, there are some indica-
tions that there is a certain wage effect.
Interviews with employers’ organisations by Versantvoort et al.
(2006) paint a mixed picture. According to the employers’ organisa-
tions, most employers pay their foreign workers in accordance with col-
lective wage agreements for their economic sector. However, there are
also reports of employers paying less than the standard wage or even
less than the minimum wage level in the Netherlands. Versantvoort et
al. (2006: 85) also mention that CEE labour migrants often have no ob-
jections to working for lower wages than is customary. Employers have
developed a number of strategies to avoid official wage levels. One tactic
is for labour migrants to work partly for the official wage level but to
work overtime for lower wages. The employers interviewed also men-
tioned that an increasing number of foreign labour migrants work on a
self-employed basis. This construction is legal. Being self-employed al-
lows them to ignore collective wage agreements or to pay themselves
less than the statutory minimum wage. In practice, companies often
pay less for work done by self-employed foreign workers than for work
done by regular employees (either Dutch or foreign) (Ter Beek,
Mevissen, Mur & Pool 2005). Official figures show an increase in the
number of self-employed CEE nationals active in the Netherlands, from
442 in 2003, to 4,221 in 2006 (Kamer van Koophandel 2007). This
sharp increase in the number of self-employed workers can partly be ex-
plained with reference to the Dutch transitional regime for labour
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migrants from new EU member states after 2004 (which granted only
self-employed workers from those countries free access to the Dutch la-
bour market).
The Dutch Minister of Social Affairs has initiated various policy mea-
sures to prevent unequal payment between Dutch workers and foreign
workers. In principle, foreign workers should enjoy the same work con-
ditions as their Dutch counterparts. Since May 2007, the Dutch Labour
Inspection checks whether employers pay at least the legal minimum
wage to temporary foreign workers. The Minister of Social Affairs also
introduced a system of centres (known as meldpunten) where contraven-
tions of the Minimum Wage Act can be reported. Between June and
September 2007, around 50 such contraventions were reported, but
they have yet to be examined (Van den Berg, Brukman & Van Rij
2007).
Job displacement
A second issue is labour market displacement. Are Dutch workers (and
other immigrant workers) pushed aside by the newly arrived labour mi-
grants from Poland and other CEE countries? The studies available
come to different conclusions. Versantvoort et al. (2006: 15) expect
some labour market displacement, stating that: ‘It is estimated that for
every one hundred labour migrants, 25 jobs of Dutch citizens will be
lost.’ Other studies, however, expect hardly any negative job displace-
ment effects, particularly because of the tight Dutch labour market. The
large majority of temporary workers from CEE countries work in agri-
culture and horticulture. These economic sectors have been unable to
attract sufficient workers in the Netherlands for many years. What is
more, Dutch social benefit claimants are hardly eager to take up tem-
porary employment in these sectors. Although there may have been
some displacement of Dutch seasonal workers, the general conclusion
is that the temporary workers from CEE countries are a welcome and
necessary supplement to the available Dutch workforce.
Van den Berg et al. (2007) argue that wage differences between the
western and eastern regions of the enlarged EU are unlikely to disap-
pear suddenly in the future. As such, CEE labour migrants will con-
tinue to come to the Netherlands. The arrival of additional workers safe-
guards the prolongation of production in some economic sectors and
economic growth rather than displacing Dutch workers. Some agricul-
tural companies were considering leaving the Netherlands because they
could not get motivated workers willing to do open-field work and other
jobs that are considered difficult, dirty and/or low-paid (see Van den
Berg et al. 2007: 43; Pijpers & Van der Velde 2007: 829). But since the
influx of temporary workers from CEE countries, these companies have
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decided to stay, the jobs they provide thereby not being lost.
Nevertheless, the consequences may be different, depending on the eco-
nomic sector concerned. For instance, the transportation industry may
be experiencing an indirect displacement of native workers by truck dri-
vers from CEE countries who face less strict regulations (e.g. concern-
ing working hours) and are therefore less costly to hire than their
Dutch counterparts.
The general conclusion about the economic consequences of CEE la-
bour migration is that this has been advantageous for the Netherlands.
With some exceptions, there are no clear indications of downwards
wage effects or job displacement for native Dutch workers. However,
these outcomes partially depend on the current economic climate. In
the present positive economic climate, with its tight labour market and
increasing household incomes, possible negative effects of the influx of
temporary foreign workers – in terms of wage levels and labour market
displacement – seem limited. It is unclear, however, how this will work
out in times of economic recession.
Another impact of immigration not yet mentioned is the potential dis-
placement of illegal workers by labour migrants from the new EU mem-
ber states. It is an open secret that large numbers of irregular immi-
grants were informally employed in Dutch agriculture and horticulture;
many of these irregular workers actually originated from the current new
EU member states (WRR 2001; Leerkes, Van San, Engbersen, Cruijff &
Van der Heijden 2004; 2007). One can expect that many of these irregu-
lar workers will be pushed aside by the new CEE labour migrants who
have formal access to the Netherlands and the Dutch labour market.
There are in fact two different mechanisms at work here. On the one
hand, there may be a replacement of persons: immigrants in possession
of formal residence papers would replace illegal immigrants. On the
other, there may be a change in legal status: CEE immigrants who used
to be in the Netherlands illegally would have obtained formal legal status
because of the free movement of citizens within the EU. Whatever is true
of either mechanism, the estimated number of irregular immigrants
from CEE countries in the Netherlands fell significantly after EU
enlargement in 2004. In the years 2002 and 2003, there were approxi-
mately 63,000 to 70,000 irregular immigrants from CEE countries in
the Netherlands (Cruyff & Van der Heijden 2004). According to a new
estimate made in 2005, there were approximately 41,000 irregular im-
migrants from both the old EU countries (Western Europe) and the new
EU countries in CEE. Furthermore, there were approximately 22,000 un-
documented immigrants in the Netherlands from Bulgaria and
Romania, which at that time were not yet EU members (Van der
Heijden, Van Gils, Cruijff & Hessen 2006). These figures show a signifi-
cant decline in the number of irregular immigrants from CEE countries
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in the Netherlands. We take this as an indication of the displacement of
former irregular immigrants who were informally active in the Dutch la-
bour market by regular immigrants from the same countries.
Social consequences: Housing and other issues
Whereas economic studies and official reactions from the Dutch gov-
ernment are optimistic about new labour migration from Poland and
other CEE countries, local authorities are more concerned. In
December 2007, the ‘Poles Summit’ organised by the municipality of
Rotterdam was attended by 40 Dutch municipalities that house large
numbers of CEE migrants. The aim of the conference was to discuss
social problems caused by the influx of such migrants into these muni-
cipalities and to bring these problems to the attention of the national
government. Local policymakers argued that central government under-
estimates both the volume of new labour migration from CEE countries
and the social issues to which it gives rise. At the conference, which
was chaired by one of the authors of this chapter (Erik Snel), numerous
alleged problems related to CEE migrants were raised. These included
allegations such as Polish labour migrants are often insufficiently in-
sured – if at all – to make use of Dutch medical services; that an in-
creasing number of Polish children are entering Dutch primary schools
in some neighbourhoods, but many of them hardly speak Dutch; and
that Polish adults cause a nuisance in Dutch neighbourhoods, especially
when alcohol is involved.
Given particular mention was the fact that many CEE migrants settle
in deprived urban districts already facing serious problems with large
numbers of immigrants who barely speak Dutch and are insufficiently
integrated into Dutch society. Although many of these alleged problems
were qualified during the discussion and the municipal authorities re-
presented at the conference expressed their appreciation for CEE labour
migration’s economic contribution to society, one crucial social issue re-
mained on the agenda: the housing problem (see also Van den Berg,
Van der Lugt & De Bruin 2006).
According to the Dutch government, the employers of CEE labour
migrants are responsible for providing adequate housing for their for-
eign employees. The employer is obliged to endeavour to house tempor-
ary foreign employees at a reasonable cost in accordance with regula-
tions. Municipalities are responsible for monitoring the housing situa-
tion of temporary foreign workers. However, some CEE labour
migrants work for unreliable temporary work agencies that make no
housing arrangements for their employees. What is more, the notion of
‘adequate housing’ may vary among employers. As a result, there are
numerous reports of inadequate housing of CEE labour migrants:
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workers living in barns in farmyards, in overcrowded boarding houses,
in camper-vans, in rooms with insufficient sanitation, in fire-hazardous
buildings and so on. According to the municipalities that participated
in this conference, these poor housing circumstances are neither in the
interest of the workers involved nor in the interests of the municipality.
Apart from the fire hazard, inadequate housing for foreign workers
may further damage the quality of life, overall, in deprived urban
districts.
In March 2007, the Dutch government set up a national bureau
where unsafe or illegal housing could be reported. However, by the end
of 2007, only a few formal complaints had been reported to the bureau
(Van den Berg, Brukman & Van Rij 2007: 20). The municipalities re-
sponsible for monitoring the housing of foreign workers – especially in
major Dutch cities such as Rotterdam and The Hague with large num-
bers of foreign workers from CEE countries – are nevertheless very cri-
tical of the inadequate housing of these labour migrants and the pro-
blems it causes in their areas. The municipalities are therefore demand-
ing drastic measures to improve the housing situation of foreign
workers. Above all, they want to see an offensive against the temporary
employment agencies that employ foreign workers without adequate
housing facilities. The municipalities also require lists with names and
addresses of formally employed foreign workers from the national gov-
ernment, which would enable them to monitor their housing situation.
The municipalities themselves are trying to find practical solutions to
the problem. Some of their efforts include introducing ‘agricultural
campsites’ in regions with many temporary foreign workers and mak-
ing vacant houses due for imminent demolition available to temporary
foreign workers. Central government can also be helpful in this respect,
for instance, by making vacant facilities for asylum seekers – numbers
of asylum seekers have declined in recent years – available for tempor-
ary foreign workers. Whether these initiatives by local and national
authorities will be enough to provide adequate housing for large num-
bers of temporary foreign workers from CEE countries (annually
100,000 persons or more) will become clear in the future.
Local debates on Polish workers also demonstrate ambivalence on
the part of Dutch citizens and policymakers. Polish workers are ad-
mired for their motivation and working skills, but they are also criti-
cised because many of them reside in overcrowded and low-quality
housing – legal or otherwise – and scarcely participate in local commu-
nities. Many labour migrants work extremely hard – six days a week
and for long hours – and take Sunday to rest, watching Polish television
programmes and DVDs with their compatriots. They return to Poland
once their present work project is finished. Some of the observations
the American sociologist W.I. Thomas made in 1921 about Poles in
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New York are still resonant: ‘Letters show that they frequently reply to
the inquiries from home for a description of America, “I have not been
yet able to see America” (Thomas 1971 [1921]: 120-121). Similar remarks
are made by many Polish workers about the Netherlands. The image of
Polish workers for many Dutch people can be illustrated by the lyrics of
one of the most popular songs from the annual carnival celebration in
the Netherlands in 2008. The content of the song also articulates the ‘li-
quid’ nature of temporary labour migration that is as difficult to grasp
for the authorities as for local citizens.
A van full of Poles6
A van full of Poles
A van, a van
Go, go, go!
In the morning, in the evening, late at night
A van drives through our street, a van full of Poles
Look at them driving, where are they coming from?
Where are they hiding?
On the land, in construction, they don’t make such a fuss.
They’re coming together
For a few bucks and a can of beer,
They come to help, that’s why they are here
One spots them everywhere, they are a border case
Yet, they are my idols
Wherever I see them I give them a wave
A van full of Poles
They have hired a house in our neighbourhood
Cosy together
And in the evening, when the job is done
They turn their polka music loudly on.
This song encapsulates all the current stereotypes and myths about
Poles. It touches upon their geographic mobility, group cohesiveness,
work ethic and limited wages, their invisibility and seclusion from
Dutch society, the overcrowded, cheap housing they face, their weekend
rituals involving music and drinking and their positive image as hard
and reliable workers. Many Poles in the Netherlands were offended by
this song and the performer Johan Vlemmix received hate mail as the
local news reported (Algemeen Dagblad 23 January 2008). Teachers in
primary schools in The Hague have had to explain the nature of the
Dutch carnival to Polish children. The controversy notwithstanding, the
song perfectly conveys the uncertainty of Dutch society about Polish
workers. Although essential for some sectors of the Dutch economy,
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they are not yet fully accepted as an established immigrant group in
Dutch society.
Conclusion
This chapter tried to describe and explain contemporary patterns of la-
bour migration from CEE countries to the Netherlands. We introduced
the concept of ‘liquid migration’ to typify current migration patterns
from CEE. These migration movements are of a temporary, fluid and
uncertain nature. Because of that fluidity, it is difficult to obtain a clear
picture of what exactly is going on and what the future will look like. As
of 2008, approximately 100,000 CEE nationals were working in the
Netherlands. How many will leave and who is going to stay? There are
fierce debates about these two basic questions. Critics of ongoing immi-
gration fear that labour migrants from CEE countries, like so many of
the former guest workers from the Mediterranean area, will stay perma-
nently and eventually end up living on social benefits. Foreign workers
who now appear to be an asset to the Dutch economy may eventually
become a financial burden on the welfare state. However, the contem-
porary evidence presented in this chapter is that this ‘guest worker syn-
drome’ is not applicable to CEE migrants. The Dutch economy needs
these workers now and in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, most of
the CEE migrants are likely to be transnational commuters or circular
migrants. They will not settle in the Netherlands. We have also argued
that there is little evidence of a significant drop in wages for low-skilled
work in the Netherlands. There is also little evidence that CEE migrants
are competing with many native Dutch workers. The Netherlands has a
very tight labour market. The number of job vacancies was 236,000 in
the third trimester of 2007, and unemployment has been at its lowest
point (3.2 per cent) since 2002. However, there are indications that
CEE workers (including workers from Bulgaria and Romania) are dis-
placing irregular workers from outside the EU. EU enlargement has
partly regularised the irregular work force.
We have also documented some problematic aspects of contemporary
CEE migration, such as poor housing conditions and their only partial
integration in Dutch society. These problems are felt and expressed par-
ticularly by policymakers in urban areas who have to deal with a large
influx of CEE migrants into some of their neighbourhoods. They are
trying to formulate a policy that will deal more effectively with tempor-
ary labour migration, on the one hand, and help smaller groups to set-
tle, on the other. Given the ‘liquid’ nature of migration, it is very diffi-
cult for them to develop a sufficiently flexible infrastructure for tempor-
ary labour migration that is also supported by the local population.
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Notes
1 According to German law, these people are considered German if they are able to
document their German ancestry and, as such, are eligible for a German passport.
‘German Poles’ have admission to various EU labour markets because they are re-
garded as German citizens (Pijpers & Van der Velde 2007: 827).
2 The government, however, ‘tolerated’ irregular migration to the Netherlands until the
beginning of the 1990s. In the period 1990-2000, it was also fairly easy for irregular
immigrants to work in specific sectors of the Dutch economy (Van der Leun &
Kloosterman 2006).
3 In the Netherlands’ statistics concerning motives for migration, these countries are
treated as the former Yugoslavia or the former Soviet Union.
4 These figures include immigrants from Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania
and Bulgaria.
5 Van den Berg, Brukman and Van Rij (2008) have examined the number of foreign
workers from the new EU member states per economic sector (both employed and
self-employed).
6 Nol Roos and Johan Vlemmix (2008) ‘Een bussie vol met polen’ (A van full of Poles).
www.youtube.com/watch?v=pg84WbfcY1E
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7 Direct demographic consequences of
post-accession migration for Poland
Marta Anacka and Marek Okólski
Introduction
This chapter is devoted to demographic consequences of the post-acces-
sion migration for Poland. Based on official data published by the
Central Statistical Office (CSO), it is estimated that between 1 May
2004 – the day when eight Central and Eastern European (CEE) coun-
tries joined the European Union – and 31 December 2006, the stock of
temporary Polish migrants increased by over one million. That probably
represents the most intense outflow ever from Poland during peace-
time. Drawing from the Labour Force Survey data, we examine how this
enormous post-accession out-migration from Poland has been distribu-
ted across Polish regions and various categories of the resident popula-
tion, and attempt to establish the direct quantitative effect of the outflow
on particular regions and major population categories.
Making use of the Selectivity Index, we argue that the post-accession
outflow was not only highly selective, but significantly more selective
than the outflow in the immediately preceding period, especially with
respect to such characteristics of the population as sex, age and educa-
tion. Finally, on the basis of migrant selectivity analysis, we suggest that
migration-conducive factors specific to the post-accession period, such
as liberalisation of the access to labour markets in destination countries,
particularly in the United Kingdom, have brought about a wider partici-
pation of various groups of the Polish population in these out-move-
ments. This might have undermined the traditionally dominant role of
social networks in migration from Poland.
Background
Poland has for a long time been a net migration loser (Frejka, Okólski
& Sword 1998; Iglicka 2001). Let us focus on the last quarter of a cen-
tury. According to official records, between 1 January 1980 and 1
January 2007, the number of ‘permanent residents’1 increased by 2.7
million, whereas the total natural increase was 3.7 million. Therefore,
around 1 million (net) additional ‘permanent residents’ (27 per cent of
natural increase) were lost due to emigration (Table 7.1).
In that period, however, many ‘permanent residents’, who as such
have maintained an entry in Poland’s population registers, have also be-
come emigrants and have de facto ceased to live in Poland. In official
statistical sources, however, the de facto emigrants are included in the
estimates of Poland’s population as long as they figure in the registers
as ‘permanent residents’. The only way to remove someone from a reg-
ister of permanent residents is his or her voluntary act of cancellation
of residence, which most Poles perceive as unnecessary even if it is not
disadvantageous. For this reason, official estimates of Poland’s popula-
tion might be seriously biased due to not accounting for a sizeable
group (and excluding that group) of the former ‘permanent residents’
who live in some other country.2
The phenomenon of mass-scale outflow to foreign countries of Poles
who have retained the status of ‘permanent resident’ of Poland (and be-
cause of that have become excluded from the count of emigrants) has
quite a long history. According to the 1988 population census, as many
as 900,000 permanent residents were staying in a foreign country for
longer than two months. The next (and the most recent) census of
2002 found that 789,000 Polish residents were in such a situation,
626,000 of them having stayed abroad for longer than one year. A plau-
sible estimate based on census data suggests that, between 7 December
1988 and 21 May 2002,3 ‘invisible emigration’ (not reflected in popula-
tion registers) amounted to some 900,000 persons (Grabowska-
Lusinska & Okólski 2009). Together with officially recorded emigration
in that period (around 300,000), the outflow was 26 per cent higher
than the natural increase. Before 1 May 2004, Poland, more than most
other CEE countries, was renowned for a large-scale population of un-
documented migrants living abroad (Okólski 2004a, 2004b).
The CSO (2007) estimate suggests that, on 1 January 2007, 1.95 mil-
lion ‘permanent residents’ of Poland (approximately 5 per cent of the
Table 7.1 Population of Poland and contribution of natural increase and net
migration to its changes, 1980-2006 (thousands)
Year Population in the
beginning (1 January)
of a given period
Overall
population
increase
Overall
natural
increase
Overall net
migration
1980-1989 35,414 2,574 2,945 -371
1990-2003 37,988 203 775 -572
2004-2006 38,191 -66 -6 -60
2007 38,125 x x x
Source: CSO Statistical Yearbooks
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total population) lived in a foreign country. Those persons are officially
termed ‘temporary migrants’.4 It follows from the CSO estimate that,
on 1 January 2005, the population of Poland consisted of around one
million temporary migrants (in the sense just explained). It seems plau-
sible to assume that, between 1 May 2004, the date of Poland’s acces-
sion to the EU, and 31 December 2006, the number of such temporary
migrants increased by approximately 1.07 million. Bearing in mind that
over the same period around 50,000 Poles emigrated (and ceased to be
‘permanent residents’), the total outflow in the post-accession period
might be estimated at some 1.1 million people.
It might be observed that, in the past, a large part of the flow of tem-
porary migrants consisted in fact of long-term migrants, i.e. persons
whose sojourn in foreign countries was longer than twelve months. In
the Polish literature, those persons are called ‘invisible emigrants’
(Sakson 2002). For instance, in the period 1980-1989, the number of
those invisible emigrants amounted to around 1.1 million, which stood
at a little more than half of all temporary migrants (Okólski 1994).
Among all temporary migrants recorded on the day of the 2002 popula-
tion census, 79.6 per cent were long-term migrants (invisible emi-
grants). Of 626,000 long-term migrants, as many as 249,000 were out
of Poland for over ten years and 63,000 had never lived in Poland;
nevertheless, those persons had entries in Polish registers of ‘perma-
nent residents’ (CSO 2003).
All this suggests that official statistics of migration flows in Poland
are not reliable, as they substantially underestimate emigration. On top
of this, the concept of ‘permanent residence’, which has a landmark
role in the measurement of emigration and temporary outflow, hardly
grasps reality and often results in a statistical fiction. The crux of the
matter with recent population movements from Poland, however, is not
merely in their volume but also their selectivity, the way those move-
ments affect the composition of Polish society and the size of its parti-
cular components. Referring to past experiences, for instance, by not ac-
counting for invisible emigration, the total population in 1988 was over-
estimated by 1.9 per cent, with the male population overestimated by
2.1 per cent and the female population by 1.7 per cent. The overestima-
tion for men aged 30-39 years old was as high as 4.1 per cent, whereas
for children and the elderly it was lower than 1 per cent. Furthermore,
the actual population of urban areas turned out smaller by 2.6 per cent
from that officially registered and the population of rural areas smaller
by 0.8 per cent. Overestimation of population size was even more strik-
ing at regional level. The most highly affected region (eastern part of
Upper Silesia) lost an additional 5.4 per cent due to invisible emigra-
tion, while its rural part lost 5.9 per cent, and its 25-29-year-old female
segment 13.5 per cent (Sakson 2002).
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Unfortunately, hardly anything is known about actual losses suffered
by various groups of Poland’s population due to the outflow of people,
including temporary migration, after 1 May 2004. Based on the scale of
total out-migration in the period quoted above and the knowledge of
consequences of the outflow for various groups of population in earlier
periods, we have assumed that those losses might have been substantial
for some groups. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to analyse the se-
lectivity of the outflow from Poland in the post-accession period and to
assess the impact of that selectivity on regional distribution and demo-
graphic structure of the Polish population. In pursuing that aim, we will
use structural characteristics of ‘post-accession migrants’ derived from
the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and we will juxtapose and compare re-
spective numbers of migrants (estimated on the basis of those charac-
teristics) and the numbers reflecting official estimates of Poland’s popu-
lation in 2004.
Although the LFS in Poland has been designed to address mainly
economic activity and the position of households in the labour market,
especially unemployment issues, its results also seem very useful for
migration studies. This is true for at least three reasons. First of all, the
survey provides an opportunity to obtain some basic information about
those household members who had been absent (including those stay-
ing abroad) at the time when the survey was conducted. Whereas in a
survey based on a simple random sample these units (individuals)
would be subsumed under non-response category, in the Polish LFS
they can be easily classified as migrants. This possibility allowed us to
set up a special database that included information about persons who
were absent in the place of their ‘permanent residence’ and who, at the
time of the survey, lived abroad. A unit of that database is a ‘temporary
migrant’, i.e. a person registered in Poland as ‘permanent resident’
who, at the time of survey, stayed in any foreign country for more than
two months and whose Polish household was included in a given LFS
quarterly sample.5
Another advantage of using LFS data in this chapter is that the so-
called sample stratification has been based on regional division,6 which
makes it possible to estimate some variables at the regional level (the
NTS2 level) and compare those estimates with the corresponding na-
tional data. Lastly, the scale of the survey is relatively large – the quar-
terly sample size amounts to 25,000 dwellings, which stands for 0.2
per cent of all households. The importance of this information ensues
from the rate of emigration and, thus, the probability of having an emi-
grant in a sample usually is very low (close to zero), irrespective of the
volume of the outflow of population in absolute terms. This means that
larger sample size reduces the risk of drawing a sample with a very low
number of migrants. The ‘temporary migrant’ database includes the
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LFS data ‘permanent residents’ who, at the time of the survey, stayed
abroad for more than two months, extending from the first quarter (Q1)
of 1999 until the last quarter (Q4) of 2006. It contains more than
6,000 records with 35 variables.
Distinctiveness of the post-accession migration
Although it may appear obvious and platitudinous, we shall briefly de-
scribe basic reasons why studying the post-accession migration from
Poland seems valid before resorting to proper analysis. Those reasons
might be seen in three distinct characteristics of the movements: vo-
lume, structure and social role.
With regard to volume, it is sufficient to refer to the estimate dated
on 1 January 2007 of the stock of temporary migrants who left Poland
after 1 May 2004, which is approximately 1.07 million. That figure
might be expressed in relative terms as 2.8 per cent of the (official) total
of Poland’s population on 1 May 2004. Assuming that 4.9 per cent of
temporary migrants were persons below the age of fifteen and 1.0 per
cent persons 60 years old or more,7 we arrive at the estimate of around
1.01 million temporary migrants aged 15-59, which translates to 4.0 per
cent of the respective population of Poland. Such a large outflow in
such a short period of time (just 32 months) has few precedents in the
recent history of labour migration.
Specificity of the structure of the outflow will be demonstrated by
means of a comparison of major characteristics of migrants before 1
May 2004 and after that date.8 Probably the most conspicuous differ-
ence is that pertaining to the distribution of migrants by destination
countries. Before the date of enlargement, the role of the three coun-
tries that on 1 May 2004 fully opened their labour markets to the Polish
citizens (the United Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden) was marginal, and
their share barely exceeded one tenth (10.4 per cent); whereas the share
of the other five major target countries (Germany, United States, Italy,
Belgium and France) was overwhelmingly high (71.6 per cent). In the
following period, however, nearly half of migrants (46.5 per cent)
headed for the three labour markets where the access for them was
free, and the proportion of the other five declined by almost one half
(to 38.9 per cent). A crucial factor was the change in proportions be-
tween Germany and the UK; in the first instance from 37.8 per cent to
20.1 per cent, and in the second from 8.2 per cent to 34.5 per cent.
Another important change occurred with respect to the region of
migrant residence in Poland. Pre-accession migrants originated above
all from regions with a long-standing tradition of outflow and estab-
lished migrant networks. For instance, the highest outflow was noted
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in the case of Opolskie (the eastern part of Upper Silesia) with strong
ties with the diaspora in Germany and a large proportion of dual
(German-Polish) citizens in the population, followed by Podlaskie
(north-eastern Poland) with diasporic links to the US and Belgium;
Podkarpackie (south-eastern Poland) with diasporic links to the US
and Italy; Lubelskie (eastern Poland) with diasporic links to Italy and
Germany; and Małopolskie (southern Poland) with diasporic links to
the US, Germany and Austria. Relatively little outflow took place from
the economically most highly developed regions such as Mazowieckie,
Śląskie, Lodzkie and Wielkopolskie. In the post-accession period, net-
work-rich regions generally noted a decline in the intensity of outflow,
which in the cases of Opolskie, Podlaskie and Małopolskie was sub-
stantial. In most regions (ten out of sixteen), however, out-migration
intensified, most strongly in those with relatively weak outflow in the
pre-accession time and usually network-poor, i.e. Mazowieckie,
Śląskie, Kujawsko-Pomorskie (north-central Poland) and Lodzkie. In
effect, the outflow became significantly more evenly distributed across
regions.
The role of networks seemed to diminish – they ceased to be a major
driver of outflow – and were replaced in this role by labour demand me-
chanisms. In almost all the regions, Britain (the largest of all available
and open receiving labour markets) came to attract, by far, the highest
number of migrants. The only distinct exception among major regions
of origin remained Podkarpackie, from which migrants went in almost
equal proportions to three countries: the US, the UK and Italy.
It might be mentioned here that the migration pattern by type of set-
tlement – according to which residents of villages and, especially, small-
and medium-size towns tended to be overrepresented and residents of
large towns underrepresented relative to the general population of
Poland – changed but has not been reversed. The proportion of mi-
grants originating from large towns (with over 100,000 inhabitants) in-
creased (from 20.1 to 23.9 per cent), but remained lower than in the
general population (29.8 per cent). Also, the share of migrants who ori-
ginated from smaller towns (up to 100,000) increased (from 35.4 to
36.0 per cent), but in this case it was higher than in Poland’s popula-
tion (32.7 per cent) and the overrepresentation slightly increased. The
proportion of inhabitants from rural areas of all migrants declined
(from 44.5 to 40.1 per cent), but continued to be higher than the respec-
tive proportion in the general population (37.5 per cent).
What appears to be an additional conspicuous, accession-related
change in migration structure is a strong increase in the predominance
of males and a rise in their overrepresentation relative to the sex com-
position of the total population of Poland. While at the time of the ac-
cession, men constituted 47 per cent of the population of Poland aged
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over fifteen, their share in migrants was 57 per cent in the pre-accession
period and 65 per cent in the post-accession period.
Finally, post-accession migrants were slightly younger and better edu-
cated than pre-accession migrants. For both characteristics, such change
stemmed mainly from the reorientation of geographical distribution
and directions of the outflows. For instance, a shift from Germany to
Britain as a leading target country meant the declining importance of a
country that systematically attracts relatively older and less highly edu-
cated Polish migrants, and the rising importance of a country that at-
tracts migrants of a rather opposite profile. In fact, whereas the median
age of all migrants decreased from 30 to 28 years, in Britain, it in-
creased from 25 to 26 years and, in Germany, from 30.4 to 34 years. By
the same token, whereas the share of all migrants with tertiary educa-
tion increased from 11.8 per cent to 16.5 per cent, the respective propor-
tion in Britain remained constant (24.4 per cent) and, in Germany, it
declined from 8.1 per cent to 5.7 per cent. On the other hand, the over-
all share of a predominant educational category, i.e. migrants with voca-
tional education, consistently decreased from 34.9 per cent to 31.1 per
cent while, at the same time, it rose in Britain – from 18.8 per cent to
22.3 per cent – and, in Germany, from 45.1 per cent to 45.4 per cent. A
supplementary factor in the shift towards generally better-educated peo-
ple taking part in the outflow from Poland was an increased importance
of those regions of origin where young people are relatively more highly
educated and a decreased importance of regions with generally less
highly educated young people.
Let us now refer to the third novel characteristic of post-accession mi-
gration from Poland, which is its newly assumed social or – in other
words – modernising role. Due to space constraints, we will not elabo-
rate on that in this chapter. It seems, however, that the outflow after 1
May 2004 decisively contributes to what might be called a necessary
crowding-out of the Polish labour market. It is only then that migrant
workers from Poland, being largely a part of the redundant Polish la-
bour force, were granted equal rights in the access to – and equal career
opportunities on – labour markets of highly developed economies. This
enabled those workers to compete, seek regular and stable employment
and pursue long-term oriented strategies in those markets. This con-
trasts with pre-accession migrants who were predominantly circular mi-
grant workers engaged in various inferior and clandestine activities,
and who continuously gravitated towards Poland’s overcrowded labour
market and Polish welfare institutions, post-accession migrants consid-
erably relieve their home country’s labour market and welfare institu-
tions of many burdens, obligations and rigidities. With growing num-
bers of Polish workers who have gone away to enhance their employ-
ment prospects in some other country, the labour market in Poland is
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becoming more competitive, flexible and efficient. Moreover, by becom-
ing more and more compatible with the most ‘progressive’ spheres of
the economy, it reinforces further modernisation. Having said all this,
it seems justified to take a closer look at the nature and effects of the
post-accession migration from Poland. As already mentioned, we will
focus in this chapter on the selectivity of that outflow and its direct de-
mographic consequences.
Selectivity of post-accession migration
Introductory remarks
For the purpose of further analysis that exploits the LFS database that
we devised,9 it is useful to define the concept of selectivity of the out-
flow and to propose an empirical index to measure its value. By selectiv-
ity, we conceive a joint effect of the set of (unnamed) factors that reveals
itself in a difference between the distribution of migrants who originate
from a given territory and the distribution of the general population of
that territory, according to a specific characteristic (variable). Selectivity
will be measured by a ‘Migrants’ Selectivity Index’ (SI), which can be
estimated for various categories (or values) of any variable of interest. It
can be presented by means of the following formula:
SIV¼i ¼
MV¼i
M
 PV¼i
P
PV¼i
P
;
where SIV=i represents the Migrants Selectivity Index for category i of
variable V; MV=i represent the number of migrants in the general popu-
lation falling into category (or value) i of variable V; PV=i represents the
number of people in the general population falling into category (or va-
lue) i of variable V; and M and P respectively represent the overall num-
ber of migrants and people in the general population.
The selectivity of outflow takes place if the Migrants Selectivity Index
assumes a non-zero value for any category (value) of a given variable.10
A positive value of the SI denotes that migrants falling into a specific
category (variable) of a given variable are relatively more numerous than
people in the general population with the same characteristic, whereas
a negative value (but equal to or higher than -1) means the opposite.
The higher the positive value or the lower the negative value of the SI,
the stronger the selectivity.
Subsequent sections in this chapter deal with selectivity of the out-
flow from Poland from the viewpoint of such variables as sex, age, edu-
cation, region of residence and locality type. In the first step, the
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variable-specific selectivity in the pre- and post-accession period will be
presented and compared at a national level (Table 7.2). This is followed
by a more detailed analysis.
It is clear from SI values included in Table 7.2 that the selectivity of
the outflow significantly differed according to various characteristics of
the population. Moreover, its changes over time were far from being
unidirectional or uniform. By far, the strongest selectivity was asso-
ciated with age. In particular, the mobile age migrants (20-23) were
greatly overrepresented relative to the general population; despite a very
high pre-accession selectivity, the SI moved to a substantially higher le-
vel (by 25 per cent) in the post-accession period. With regard to sex and
education, although selectivity was generally much lower than in the
case of (mobile) age, still there was a positive selectivity of male and bet-
ter-educated migrants, whilst the level of selectivity again seemed to
have been influenced by the accession. Male overrepresentation in-
creased by 75 per cent (and female underrepresentation decreased cor-
respondingly). Overrepresentation of the migrants whose education was
rather low – that is vocational (ten years of school attendance) – de-
creased (by 12 per cent) and remained moderate. Migrants with an aca-
demic school diploma who, before the accession, displayed a neutral
propensity to migrate (SI close to zero) became significantly
overrepresented.
Region of origin as a selective factor
The region of a migrant’s origin seems a strong and rapidly changing
selective factor in Poland. As shown in Table 7.3, SIREG ranged from -
0.63 to 1.69 in the pre-accession period and from -0.49 to 1.48 after ac-
cession. In both periods, the population of Mazowieckie was relatively
the least prone to migration and the population of Podkarpackie was re-
latively the most highly prone. Before enlargement, as many as nine re-
gions displayed negative values of SIREG and seven showed positive va-
lues; after enlargement the proportions were the opposite. Changes in
Table 7.2 Migrants Selectivity Index (SI) for selected variables before and after
Poland’s accession to the EU
Variable SI before EU accession SI after EU accession
Age (mobile*) 0.97 1.21
Vocational education 0.34 0.30
Sex (male) 0.20 0.35
Tertiary education 0.02 0.42
*Mobile age here means 20-39.
Source: LFS (BAEL)/CMR database
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SIREG were significant in almost all regions. However, two regions
(Podkarpackie and Podlaskie) continued to send disproportionately large
numbers of people abroad (SIREG close to or above unity). Meanwhile,
in two other regions (Małopolskie and Opolskie), a very high positive se-
lectivity declined to a rather low (but still positive) level. Two regions
(Lubelskie, Swietokrzyskie) retained a moderately positive level of selec-
tivity and four regions (Lodzkie, Mazowieckie, Śląskie and
Wielkopolskie), a moderately negative level.
Despite evident difficulty in interpreting an interregional diversity of
SIREG, we attempted a relevant analysis, which is included in the
Appendix. A table in that appendix presents quartiles of SIREG distribu-
tion, where the notations are as follows: ‘+’ – less than first quartile in-
clusive; ‘+ +’ – less than second quartile inclusive, etc.; ‘*’ means that
SIREG is lower than zero.
Thanks to a specific construction of that table, it is relatively easy to
extract various characteristics of the outflow from a given region and in-
terpret their interrelations. For instance, in the pre-accession period in
Opolskie the selectivity of the most highly educated migrants was nega-
tive while the selectivity of migrants with vocational education was
strongly positive. This strictly copied a pattern of the outflow from
Opolskie to Germany, which at that time was by far the predominant
country of destination. Even though Britain appeared as a host country
option in the post-accession period, a strong selectivity was preserved in
the case of migrants with vocational education, who continued to head
Table 7.3 Regional Migrants’ Selectivity Index in the pre-accession and
post-accession period
Region SI before EU accession SI after EU accession
Dolnos´la˛skie -0.04 0.21
Kujawsko-Pomorskie -0.23 0.16
Lubelskie 0.44 0.32
Lubuskie -0.28 -0.17
Lodzkie -0.53 -0.43
Małopolskie 0.88 0.29
Mazowieckie -0.63 -0.49
Opolskie 1.63 0.22
Podkarpackie 1.69 1.48
Podlaskie 1.61 0.87
Pomorskie -0.26 -0.17
S´la˛skie -0.58 -0.47
S´wie˛tokrzyskie 0.27 0.53
Warmin´sko-Mazurskie -0.08 -0.06
Wielkopolskie -0.52 -0.35
Zachodniopomorskie -0.12 0.12
Source: LFS (BAEL)/CMR database
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for Germany. However, sex (males), age (20-39) and especially tertiary
education came to the fore in that period as many migrants moved to
the UK.
Sex as a selective factor
As we have noted (Table 7.2), male migrants continue to be overrepre-
sented in flows from Poland. This, however, differs across the country’s
regions. Even, in the post-accession period, the SI in some regions (e.g.
Lubuskie) was close to zero. In sharp contrast, in some others (e.g.
Lodzkie, Mazowieckie), it exceeded 0.6, which could be conceived as a
rather high selectivity. Still, the SI in a majority of regions (ten out of six-
teen) remained at a relatively low level (0.2-0.4). It might be added that,
in four regions, the overrepresentation of males decreased (most strongly
in Opolskie, by 0.2) whereas, in the other twelve, it increased. Are there
any obvious factors behind those differences and those changes? It does
not seem so. In most regions with a relatively high SI, sex-specific selec-
tivity was rather low and its change moderate, whereas regions with a re-
latively low SI displayed extreme values and strong change.
Age as a selective factor
As shown below, migrants from Poland are generally very young com-
pared to the resident population of Poland. A great majority are under
age 40, and a few are younger than twenty; they are typically what is
called a ‘mobile age’. For this reason, the focus here will be on this cate-
gory of migrants. Already in the pre-accession period, SIAGE=20-39 at the
national level was 0.97 and it typically varied across regions from 0.8 to
1.2 (with just two exceptions: 0.66 and 1.33). After EU enlargement, it
went up to 1.21; the increase was observed in all but two regions (those
with the highest selectivity in the past, i.e. Lodzkie and Opolskie).
Symptomatically, the region of Mazowieckie, in many ways earmarked
by a strong influence of its major city – Warsaw – displayed the stron-
gest rise in SIAGE=20-39 and its highest value in the post-accession peri-
od (1.67).
Education as a selective factor
Let us now consider selectivity of the outflow in two important cate-
gories of education: tertiary (university diploma or equivalent) and voca-
tional.11 Migrants with vocational education constitute the largest single
category of educational attainment among all migrants aged fifteen or
over,12 whereas those with tertiary education are rightly perceived as the
most ‘precious’ human capital, which might be subject to brain drain.
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In both categories, the SI was positive. With regard to vocational edu-
cation, the selectivity was moderate (around 0.3) either in the pre-
accession or post-accession period, with SIEDU=vocational displaying a
slight decrease. In contrast, SIEDU=tertiary in the pre-accession period
was close to zero but, after the enlargement, it reached the level 0.42.
Therefore, factors related to EU accession seemed to strongly affect mi-
gration of the most highly educated migrants and to be indifferent to
migration of people with vocational education.
While for the migrants with vocational education, the SI was positive
in all regions in both periods, its territorial dispersion was moderate and
it uniformly showed relative stability over time; the selectivity in case of
tertiary education was neither stable nor uniform across regions.
Strikingly, SIEDU=tertiary was positive in ten regions in the pre-accession
period and in twelve regions in the post-accession period, and it was ne-
gative in the remaining regions (six and four, respectively). In both peri-
ods, its regional values differed considerably – in the pre-accession peri-
od from -0.57 (Świętokrzyskie) to 1.50 (Lodzkie) and in the post-accession
period from -0.22 (Opolskie) to 1.54 (Śląskie). Moreover, the changes in
particular regions were rather diversified – from negligible (e.g.
Malopolskie and Opolskie) to strong (e.g. Śląskie and Świętokorzyskie)
and from negative (e.g. Lubuskie and Lodzkie) to positive (e.g. Śląskie
and Świętokrzyskie). Besides, in some conspicuous cases, negative va-
lues of SI changed to positive (e.g. Dolnośląskie, Podkarpackie and
Swietokrzyskie) or positive values changed to negative (e.g. Lubuskie).
Generally, however, an increase in the selectivity was much more preva-
lent (twelve regions) than a decrease (four regions) and, in most cases, it
was much stronger (e.g. in case of Śląskie SIEDU=tertiary rose by as much
as 1.15 and in case of Świętokrzyskie by 0.89).13
The above analysis of cross-regional selectivity of the outflow of mi-
grants with tertiary education – the conclusions’ complexity notwith-
standing – provides support to our hypothesis that the accession
strongly influenced migratory behaviours of the most highly educated.
We suggest that the different attitudes and policies of the ‘old’ EU coun-
tries with regard to free movements of labour from the ‘new’ EU coun-
tries and, in particular, the disparity between the position taken by two
countries (representing two large migrant-attractive labour markets)
– Germany and the UK – forms a major underlying reason for the
change in migratory behaviour of the most highly educated. Under the
circumstances of the restrictive German policy and the liberal British
policy, a major geographical shift in the outflow from Poland took place,
with the UK replacing Germany as the main destination country.
A more in-depth insight into Poland’s LFS data reveals that selectivity
of the outflow of the most highly educated differs not only across re-
gions of origin, but also according to destination countries. Let us focus
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here solely on the UK and Germany. Due to specific institutional ar-
rangements (e.g. bilateral agreement on labour migration) and other
factors (some of them historically determined), fifteen years before
Poland’s accession, Germany was not only the main receiving country,
but also strongly ‘attracted’ specific categories of migrants, such as sea-
sonal workers. Those migrants were mainly unskilled or semi-skilled
workers. The German labour market seemed ‘repulsive’ to the most
highly skilled. In the case of Germany, SIEDU=tertiary in the pre-accession
period took a negative value (-0.29), and the negative selection was ob-
served in almost all regions of Poland. This tendency became even
stronger in the post accession period (SIEDU=tertiary =-0.52). In striking
contrast, the UK seemed to continuously attract better-educated mi-
grants from Poland. Before and after 1 May 2004, the selectivity was
strongly positive, with SIEDU=tertiary as high as 1.09 and 1.13, respectively.
Thus. it might be argued that the opening up of the British labour mar-
ket to Polish workers on 1 May 2004, combined with a highly selective
admission policy followed by Germany, contributed to a significant
structural change in the outflow from Poland. With the UK taking an
upper hand over Germany, the selectivity of migration of the best-
educated people became clearly positive.
The geographical shift in labour migration from Poland also had a
bearing on selectivity of the less highly educated, namely those who
completed vocational school. Considering SIEDU=vocational for Germany,
we observe that, in the pre-accession period, it was not only positive, but
also rather high (0.51) and, after the enlargement date, it even increased
(to 0.57). However, for the UK it remained very low (0.07 and 0.11, re-
spectively). All this explains, at least partly, why, after the accession, the
selectivity of migrants with vocational education decreased and, in parti-
cular, why it became lower than the selectivity of those best educated.
Finally, we were able to throw still more light on the mechanism of
selectivity of the migrants by their educational attainment by adding an-
other potential underlying factor, namely the type of settlement. In or-
der to do so we examined a tendency in SIEDU specific to three major
types of migrant settlement in Poland14 (city, small- or medium-size
town and village15). What follows is a sharp decline in SIEDU for both
categories (tertiary and vocational), with growing size of settlement/lo-
cality. For instance, in the post-accession period, SIEDU=tertiary in the city
was 0.27 (two thirds of the national average), in small- or medium-size
towns 0.52 and in villages, 1.1 (two and a half times the national aver-
age). In the case of SIEDU=vocational, its values for both types of urban
settlements were equal and rather low (0.18), and it was much higher
for rural settlements (0.46). These results may suggest that post-
enlargement migration from Poland presents a case of crowding out
various Polish labour markets. The more backwards the area, the more
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crowded the labour market, and the stronger the propensity to emigrate,
especially among those who are better educated. This is particularly sig-
nificant given that Poland is sharply divided economically between
modern growth poles in cities, and backward rural areas.
Searching for the patterns and causes of migrant selectivity, it might
also be assumed that migration driven by crowding out is more visible
and prominent in ‘overcrowded’ regions – that is, those with a high pro-
portion of their population in rural areas. Pearson’s r, measuring the
statistical correlation between region-specific SIREG and rates of urbani-
sation (percentage of urban population in a region), proved negative
and relatively high (-0.69). It follows from Figure 7.1 that in the post-
accession period regions with a low share of urban population, such as
Podkarpackie, Podlaskie, Swietokrzyskie, Lubelskie and Malopolskie,
generated the largest outflow of migrants relative to their population
size. Of course, this does not mean that the level of urbanisation can be
Figure 7.1 Migrants’ Selectivity Index in the post-accession period and the percentage
of population living in urban areas
Source: LFS (BAEL)/CMR database
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treated as an independent or autonomous factor of selectivity of the
outflow.
An example of another underlying or intervening factor could be the
region-specific unemployment rate, which, among other things, is
symptomatic for labour market opportunities. However, a comparison
of unemployment rates and SIREG did not show any consistent relation-
ship. For instance, whereas the lowest unemployment rates in 2004
were reported in Mazowieckie, Podlaskie and Podkarpackie (15 per cent,
16 per cent and 17 per cent, respectively), in the post-accession period
in Podkarpackie, the labour market pushing-out effect was the strongest
of all Poland’s regions (the share of Podkarpackie in total outflow was
almost 1.5 times higher than its share in the overall population). At the
same time Mazowieckie was the most underrepresented region in the
total outflow. Hence, there is no simple rule that could describe the pat-
tern of post-accession migration structure and dynamics. However, con-
sidering all the facts so far mentioned, it seems that the most important
factor that affected mobility of Polish migrants after 1 May 2004 was
the opening of their labour markets by three of the ‘old’ EU countries,
particularly the UK.
Direct demographic consequences of the post-accession outflow
As evidenced, the post-accession outflow proved highly selective accord-
ing to such important characteristics of the population as sex, age, edu-
cation, type of settlement and region of usual residence. This finding
makes it legitimate and valid to hypothesise that the losses suffered by
particular population groups in Poland were not only diversified, but in
some important cases might also have been strikingly high. We will
now present a series of estimated losses by selected characteristics of
the population aged fifteen years or over (15+) as well as losses in a
cross-regional perspective. Each estimate referred to below is expressed
in relative terms and denotes the proportion of the population of a gi-
ven group as of 1 May 2004, which it is estimated had left between the
date of EU accession and 1 January 2007.
Regarding the already quoted overall outflow that accounts for 3.3 per
cent of Poland’s population aged 15+, the loss of males was twice as
high as that of females – 4.4 per cent vis-à-vis 2.2 per cent. From the
viewpoint of age, the largest loser was the group of 25-29 with 9.3 per
cent, followed by the group 20-24 with 8.8 per cent and the group 30-
44 with 3.8 per cent. The size of the youngest (below age twenty) and
the oldest (45 or more) was hardly affected by the outflow, with 0.8 per
cent and 1.1 per cent loss, respectively. That nearly one in ten people in
their late twenties left Poland is probably the most conspicuous fact.
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As revealed by the estimates presented in Table 7.4, the largest rela-
tive loss according to education was observed in two groups: in those
with secondary education and with vocational education where it was
4.3 per cent, followed by the most highly educated group (4.0 per cent)
and least highly educated group (1.0 per cent). Bearing in mind that at
present people aged 15+ very rarely finish their education below voca-
tional school level and very few migrants are recruited from among
those persons, the relative outflow in the case of all three major educa-
tional categories seemed rather even. Taking those three groups into
consideration, in males, the persons with secondary education suffered
the largest loss (5.8 per cent) whereas in females, those with tertiary
education (3.3 per cent).
Regions that lost the largest part of their population age 15+ were:
Podkarpackie (7.2 per cent) and Świętokrzyskie (6.0 per cent), which
strongly contrasted with Mazowieckie (1.8 per cent) and Śląskie (2.1 per
cent). In other words, consistent with what has been found earlier, the
least urbanised regions (40.4 and 45.4 per cent urban population in
mid-2004, respectively) sent abroad relatively more migrants than the
most urbanised regions (64.7 and 78.6 per cent, respectively). The two
greatest losers – Podkarpackie and Świętokrzyskie – held that position
in every respect, as they suffered the relatively largest losses in males
(8.8 and 8.4 per cent) and females (5.7 and 3.8 per cent), and in urban
(6.9 and 6.2 per cent) and rural (7.4 and 5.8 per cent) sub-populations.
The third position (occupied on average by Lubelskie and Podlaskie
with 4.8 per cent loss) was in contrast held by a range of regions, de-
pending on the group: for males, it fell to Podlaskie (6.8 per cent), for
females, to Lubuskie (3.8), in urban areas, to Podlaskie (5.5 per cent)
and in rural areas, to Lubelskie (5.2 per cent). Mazowieckie occupied
the bottom position in all respects and the losses in that region were
very small; for instance, in the female sub-population it was only 0.9
per cent. Undoubtedly, despite being the most populous region in
Poland, Mazowieckie, with Warsaw its major city, remained unaffected
Table 7.4 Percentage net loss of the population age 15+ (as estimated on 1 May
2004) due to temporary outflow in the post-accession period (until
1 January 2007) by sex and the level of education
Level of education (completed) Males Females Total
Tertiary -5.0 -3.3 -4.0
Secondary/post-secondary -5.8 -3.1 -4.3
Vocational -5.4 -2.4 -4.3
Lower -1.4 -0.6 -1.0
Total -4.4 -2.2 -3.3
Source: LFS (BAEL)/CMR database
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by Poland’s accession to the EU, at least insofar as migration is con-
cerned. The main factor behind that seems to be its central position in
politics, economics and culture, both literally and metaphorically, ensur-
ing a strong attraction to local people.
The comparative situation of the various regions is illustrated in
Figure 7.2. With just one (rather unimportant) exception (Lubuskie), in
all regions the losses encountered by males were higher (usually sub-
stantially higher at that) than those by females. In eight regions
(Kujawsko-Pomorskie, Lubelskie, Lodzkie, Małopolskie, Opolskie,
Podkarpackie Pomorskie and Warmińsko-Mazurskie), the rural areas
lost proportionately more people than the urban areas, whereas in the
remaining regions the opposite was true (except Dolnośląskie where the
loss of rural population equalled that of urban population).
One of the findings presented above suggested a very high selectivity
of outflow according to age. It might be useful to take a closer look at
that phenomenon by examining the two most affected age groups: 20-
Figure 7.2 Percentage loss of population age 15+ due to the outflow,
1 May 2004 – 1 January 2007
Source: LFS (BAEL)/CMR database
DIRECT DEMOGRAPHIC CONSEQUENCES 157
24 and 25-29, divided into three types of locality: city (towns with more
than 100,000 inhabitants), small or medium-size town (towns with up
to 100,000) and village. Table 7.5 consists of some estimates to which
we will refer in the analysis to follow.
In the 20-24 age group, the largest loss occurred in the rural areas of
Podkarpackie while in the 25-29 age group, in Warmińsko-Mazurskie
(in fact only in two cities – Elblag and Olsztyn); the former lost more
than every fifth inhabitant, whereas the latter nearly every fourth inhabi-
tant. In striking contrast, the rural areas of Wielkopolskie lost only 2.2
per cent of their population aged 20-24 and the small and medium-size
towns of Śląskie lost 3.3 per cent of the population aged 25-29. This suf-
fices to highlight a vast interregional locality-specific differentiation of
the losses caused by the post-accession outflow.
No clear tendency can be identified with respect to the most and the
least affected localities across regions. In the 20-24 age group, the big-
gest loss was observed in rural areas and the smallest, in cities in as
many as four regions. In two other regions, rural areas suffered the lar-
gest losses, but in those cases the smallest losses were noted in small-
and medium-size towns. In five other regions, the maximum loss took
place in small and medium-size towns; in only two of them, however,
the minimum was observed in the city. In the remaining three, it was
rural areas. Finally, in the five remaining regions, no significant differ-
ences between the three locality types were noted. The 25-29 age group
displayed even greater dissimilarities, with a variety of locality-specific
regional patterns of loss due to the outflow, and no more than two re-
gions characterised by the same pattern.
Only in three regions (Małopolskie, Podkarpackie and Świętokrzyskie)
was the locality-specific pattern of outflow the same in both age groups.
All three regions lost the lowest proportion of population in villages,
Małopolskie suffered the largest loss in small and medium-size towns,
and the two remaining regions in cities. Most of the other regions dis-
played considerable differences, which, in some cases, took a striking
direction. Despite our involvement in extensive and relevant empirical
research, no reasonable explanation of these somewhat disorderly ten-
dencies in the relative intensity of the loss experienced by Poland’s var-
ious sub-populations comes to our minds; it might still be too early for
clearer and more consistent tendencies to come to the fore.
Conclusion
The principal aim of this chapter was to describe the post-accession out-
flow from Poland, with an emphasis on its demographic consequences.
An estimate made by the Central Statistical Office of Poland of the
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number of Polish residents who temporarily lived abroad served as a
starting point in the analysis. That estimate led to a considerably higher
figure than the official one derived from population registers and it im-
plied, for instance, a loss of 3.3 per cent of Poland’s population due to
the post-accession outflow alone. To illustrate the importance of that es-
timate, if these populations are taken into account, Poland’s GDP per
capita in purchasing power parity terms stood at 55 per cent of the EU
average by the end of 2006, rather than 53 per cent when the group is
excluded (E 12,900, compared to E 12,500).
By exploiting additional data that were extracted from LFS, the
authors were able to present selectivity of the post-accession outflow in
its various dimensions, such as region of residence, sex, age, education
and type of settlement, and the change in selectivity relative to the pre-
accession period. Rankings of selectivity factors and regional selectivity
patterns were undertaken and interpreted. One of the important conclu-
sions was the role of the accession-related shift in the geography of mi-
gration of the Poles on changing patterns of selectivity. In particular,
the fact that Britain, rather than Germany, became the leading destina-
tion country, brought about a more even selectivity across regions and a
tremendous increase in the selectivity among young males with tertiary
education. Those changes signalled a growing significance of direct la-
bour market mechanisms and a decreasing significance of migration
networks in generating labour flows within the EU.
Finally, we combined the CSO estimate with LFS data and attempted
a comprehensive account of population loss due to the post-accession
outflow and its differentiation according to various structural character-
istics. It turned out that the differences in relative losses were quite re-
markable, with some categories of the population, especially those aged
20-29, reduced by a quarter (compared to the official numbers) through
the effect of migration.
Our findings on migrants’ selectivity and associated factors concur
with intuition and predictions based on a general knowledge of migra-
tion. The time that elapsed since the date of the enlargement is prob-
ably too short to find much more. We believe, however, that our ap-
proach and the method of analysis proved to be useful and can be ap-
plied in similar research endeavours in the future. We believe that our
preliminary results may be helpful in a more rigorous formulation of
hypotheses in the studies to come.
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Notes
1 A ‘permanent resident’ of Poland is someone who has been registered as such at any
specific address in Poland.
2 In official Polish sources the category ‘Poland’s population’ denotes the total number
of ‘persons actually living in Poland’ (ludnosc faktycznie zamieszkala), which, at a na-
tional level, includes all ‘permanent residents’ irrespective of the place (i.e. foreign
country) of their actual residence. In short, at the national level, all persons registered
as permanent residents of Poland are treated as actual de facto residents.
3 The dates of respective population censuses.
4 To be considered as a temporary migrant one has to stay abroad for at least two
months.
5 It follows from this that our ‘temporary migrant’ database must have incurred some
bias, namely, that it omitted migrants belonging to households in which all members
were staying abroad at the time of the survey. That leads to an underestimation of the
volume of temporary migration.
6 Poland is divided into sixteen major administrative units called wojewodztwo. Those
units broadly correspond to what is generally meant by regions.
7 Assumptions based on CSO records of temporary migrants (see Rocznik
Demograficzny 2005, 2007).
8 Comparisons presented here draw on two data subsets derived from LFS – the pre-ac-
cession subset including quarterly data from Q1 1999 until Q1 2004 and the post-ac-
cession subset including data from Q3 2004 until Q4 2006. A unit of observation
was an individual (a ‘permanent resident’) aged fifteen or over who, at the time of the
survey, lived in any foreign country for longer than two months.
9 Hereafter, we will refer to the database as the LFS (BAEL)/CMR database. BAEL is a
Polish acronym equivalent for LFS; CMR stands for Centre of Migration Research
(University of Warsaw) to which the authors are affiliated and where the database was
actually constructed.
10 If for a specific category of a given variable SI differs from zero, there must be at least
one more category of that variable for which SI assumes a non-zero value.
11 Following the logic of Poland’s educational system, graduates from a vocational
school, which ends after ten to twelve years of schooling, are not recognised as benefi-
ciaries of full secondary education and cannot be enrolled at any post-secondary
school. Vocational schools are meant to produce manual workers in relatively narrow
professions.
12 This includes six categories: tertiary, post-secondary (other than full tertiary), second-
ary technical, secondary comprehensive, vocational and everything lower.
13 The decrease did not exceed 0.1, with only one exception where it was 0.23 (Lodzkie).
14 Strictly speaking, that is a settlement where a migrant’s household in Poland was
located.
15 ‘City’ refers to towns with more than 100,000 inhabitants and ‘medium or small
town’ refers to those with up to 100,000 inhabitants.
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8 Brains on the move? Recent migration of the
highly skilled from Poland and its consequences
Paweł Kaczmarczyk
Introduction1
Poland is usually perceived and described as a typical country of emi-
gration. International migration does in fact play a significant role in
the contemporary history of Poland and in the process of its socio-
economic development. However, until the late 1990s migration-related
issues were almost absent in public debate with a few exceptions, such
as post-1968 migration resulting from the anti-Zionist campaign, mi-
gration of ‘ethnic Germans’ in the 1950s and 1970s or politically driven
migration in the 1980s. The debate on the causes and consequences of
migration started yet again prior to Poland’s accession to the European
Union as part of a general discussion on the potential consequences of
the accession of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries to the
EU, and then continued due to the spectacular increase in the scale of
the mobility of Poles in the post-accession period. Paradoxically, in con-
trast to migration debates prior to EU enlargement, when numerous ha-
zards were voiced as to what would be the impact of the expected inflow
of people on EU residents, in current debate, the issue of the conse-
quences of outflow for Polish economy and society plays the most pro-
minent role. Commonly expressed threats include labour shortages on
the Polish market and, particularly, the so-called brain drain that is un-
derstood as outflow of highly skilled persons.
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the scale and structure of mobi-
lity of the highly skilled in the broader context of recent trends in inter-
national migration from Poland. Emphasis will be put on such issues
as the question to what extent migration of professionals is a statisti-
cally significant phenomenon and the real and possible consequences
of recent outflows for the Polish economy and society. The structure of
the chapter is as follows: section two looks at the general trends in mi-
gration behaviour in the pre- and post-accession periods. Against this
background, section three analyses the phenomenon of the mobility of
the highly skilled. Section four includes an attempt to assess the impact
of recent migration of professionals on the Polish economy and society.
Section five concludes.
Migration from Poland in the transition period*
Ever since the nineteenth century, Poland has been playing an ever
more significant role in the global migration system as a major country
of emigration. However, apart from mass movements of population
caused by the redrawing of state borders and related international
agreements, migration from Poland after World War II was seriously
limited: a very low scale of mobility was a consequence of the restrictive
migration policy imposed by the communist regime. The increase in
migration was associated first with political changes in the mid-1950s.
However, notwithstanding the liberalisation in cross-border movements
and the normalisation of Polish-German relations in the 1970s, mass
migration to the West did not really start until the 1980s (Okólski
2006).
Due to poor quality of migration data and changes in migratory beha-
viour, the comparison of pre-transition and transition trends is hardly
plausible. Official statistical data gathered by the Central Statistical
Office (based on the Central Population Register, PESEL) show a clear
stabilisation in the number of departures associated with the declared
change in place of residence at 20,000-25,000 annually.2 In total, ac-
cording to this data source, over 353,000 people left Poland between
1990 and 2005 with the intention to settle abroad. More recent data re-
veals that, in 2006, over 50,000 persons deregistered themselves from
permanent residency in Poland – this number was around twice as high
as the scale of migration in previous years. This extraordinary increase
is to be attributed predominantly to the choices Polish migrants made
as a consequence of the Polish government’s tax policy.
The most reliable data concerning migrants staying abroad in the
1990s and early 2000s (i.e. in the pre-accession period) may be ob-
tained from registries and surveys. The 1995 Microcensus showed that
about 900,000 permanent residents of Poland had temporarily (i.e. for
over two months) stayed abroad, which amounts to about 2 per cent of
the total population. According to the 2002 national census, as many as
786,100 Polish citizens, counted as members of households in Poland,
were staying abroad for longer than two months (1.8 per cent of the
population) at the time of the survey. These data clearly show that
* This chapter was written in 2007-2008 and all included data encompass the first
post-accession phase (2004-2007). Thus, the analysis does not refer to the most re-
cent migratory phenomena.
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recent mobility of Poles did not start in May 2004 – during the 1990s
migration was already an important socio-economic phenomenon in
Poland while nearly one million permanent citizens were staying
abroad.
The best source to monitor intertemporal changes in Poles’ mobility
is the quarterly Labour Force Survey (LFS), which, since 1994, has re-
corded Polish citizens staying abroad.3 LFS data indicates that 130,000-
540,000 adults were staying abroad in each year between 1994 and the
second quarter of 2007 (Figure 8.1).
It is worth noting that, according to LFS data, there has been a steady
increase in the number of Polish migrants observed since 1998. This
trend continued after Poland’s accession to the EU: in 2004, on aver-
age, 250,000 Poles stayed abroad for at least two months and this fig-
ure constituted an over 20 per cent increase in comparison to 2003.
Additionally, in 2005 and 2006 in each quarter, the number of mi-
grants was higher than in the respective quarters of the previous year.
Two important features of contemporary migration from Poland are
obvious from LFS data. The first is the predominance of labour migra-
tion: according to LFS data, between 70 and 80 per cent of migrants
Figure 8.1 Polish migrants by length of stay abroad, 1994-2007 Q2 (thousands)
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undertake work during their stay abroad. Secondly, a significant part of
all temporary migrants (60-70 per cent) tend to stay abroad for shorter
than twelve months (see Figure 8.1). However, since 2006, a gradual
change in migration trends can be observed: in 2006 the number of per-
sons staying abroad for longer than twelve months more than doubled
compared to 2005. This may be a clear sign that recent Polish migrants
who moved in the early 2000s tend to prolong their stay abroad.
According to LFS data, the distribution of major destination countries
did not change dramatically after May 2004 (Figure 8.2). However, even
if we conclude that Germany remained the major receiving country of
Polish migrants,4 the most striking feature is the large increase in the
number of migrants to the UK and Ireland, i.e. the countries that
decided to open their labour markets for migrants from Poland and
other accession countries. This tendency has led to clear domination of
the UK as most important destination in 2006 and 2007.5
In the second quarter of 2006, the United Kingdom registered the
largest increase in migration in comparison to the second quarter of
2005 (and 2004 also): 130 per cent and 380 per cent, respectively. In
2007, an increase of an additional 41 per cent (with respect to the sec-
ond quarter of 2006) was noted. Consequently, in the second quarter of
2006, the share of migrants to the UK in the total number of tempor-
ary migrants from Poland reached 31 per cent and 32 per cent in 2007
(in 2000, nearly 4 per cent). In the case of Ireland, it was 7.5 per cent
Figure 8.2 Polish migrants by country of destination (2000-2007) Q2 (thousands)
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in 2006 and 12 per cent in 2007 (0 per cent in 2000). Figure 8.2 also
clearly shows that since the early 2000s, the destinations of Polish mi-
grants have gradually diversified, with a more and more important role
played by such countries as Italy, Spain and Belgium.
Following 1 May 2004, these datasets can be supplemented by immi-
gration-related data from those countries that decided to open their la-
bour markets for workers from the CEE countries. The accession to the
EU has, to a great extent, intensified visits to the UK by A8 citizens – that
is, citizens of the eight CEE countries that joined the EU in 2004. The
International Passenger Survey (IPS) records all visits to the UK and may
serve as a proxy of labour mobility, though it includes all persons enter-
ing the UK, not only those arriving with an intention to undertake work.
Over the years 2003-2006, the dynamics of visits to the UK by the na-
tionals of selected A8 countries was three to five times higher than the
EU-15 average. Over 1.3 million Poles visited the UK in 2006 alone,
nearly five times higher than the 300,000 who visited in 2003.
In the case of the UK and Ireland, the data on labour migration are
provided by specific registers applied after opening their labour mar-
kets. The Worker Registration Scheme (WRS) data – published regu-
larly by the Home Office – shows that the total number of workers
from Poland registered in the UK between May 2004 and March 2008
amounted to 540,755 approved applicants (approximately 67 per cent of
all registered workers from the A8 countries). It is important to note
that this data should not be used as a direct measure of the inflow of
workers into the UK in the post-accession period. In fact, in May 2004,
when the British labour market was opened to new EU countries, thou-
sands of Czechs, Slovaks and Poles had already been working in the
UK. Before the accession to the EU, as many as 34,000 migrants from
Poland were recorded as living in Britain in the 2003 LFS, and the
trend was clearly rising (Salt 2005). For most of these migrants, apply-
ing to the WRS was the only way to legitimise their employment status
(Portes & French 2005).
Ireland, another EU-15 country that opened its labour market to the
citizens of new accession countries in May 2004, had, since 2001, al-
ready been relatively open to inflows from these countries. The scale of
immigration to Ireland is reflected by the data on Personal Public
Service (PPS) numbers, required for every migrant worker. A total of
290,000 PPS numbers were issued to A8 nationals in the period 2001
to the end of October 2006, with almost 175,000 of these issued to
Polish citizens.
From this data, it is hardly possible to draw a comprehensive and reli-
able picture of contemporary migration from Poland. This is not only
due to the quality of the data, but also the very nature of the migration
process – the dynamics and diversity of flows make a general
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assessment of recent migration from Poland an extremely difficult task.
It can be argued, however, that the recent estimates provided by the
Polish Central Statistical Office constitute the most reliable assessment
of recent mobility of Poles (Table 8.1).
The below data shows that the stock of temporary migrants from
Poland more than doubled since EU enlargement – the post-accession
outflow can be estimated at around 1.1 million persons. The most im-
portant destination country became the UK (30 per cent of the total). In
contrast, the most favourable destination country for Polish migrants in
the pre-accession phase, Germany, received only 23 per cent of the out-
flow. The most notable increase was observed in Ireland, but also in the
Netherlands and Sweden. All in all, Table 8.1 shows that there is not so
much a tendency for concentration of Polish migrants in the UK and
Ireland but, rather, a ‘spilling-over’ from other EU destinations.
Additionally, the analysis of post-accession flows is very difficult due to
the complexity of the migration process.
As suggested by studies at the regional and local level, in the post-
2004 period, we observe two structurally different patterns of migration
from Poland. The first stream refers to relatively young and well-
educated persons, often single or in informal relationships and usually
without children. A large part of this group can communicate in
English, and this constitutes an important factor influencing their deci-
sion to migrate (together with an opportunity to legalise their work and
stay abroad). Therefore, the UK and Ireland are the most favourable
destinations for them. The second stream comprises relatively older
and less educated persons, mostly with no foreign-language skills but
quite often with previous migration experiences. Those migrants tend
Table 8.1 Polish citizens staying abroad for longer than two months by major
destination countries (in thousands)
Total/destination 2002 (May) 2004 2006 (December)
Total 786 1,000 1,950
EU 451 750 1,550
Austria 11 15 34
Belgium 14 13 28
France 21 30 49
Germany 294 385 450
Ireland 2 15 120
Italy 39 59 85
The Netherlands 10 23 55
Spain 14 26 44
Sweden 6 11 25
UK 24 150 580
Source: CSO 2007
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to rely on migrant networks and choose more ‘traditional’ destinations
(Germany, Italy, Spain or the US). In many Polish regions, both forms
of migration coincide though.
Highly skilled migration from Poland
Traditionally, a considerable role in Polish mobility was ascribed to the
emigration of highly skilled persons. Similarly to other less developed
countries, this process was described and interpreted as a form of
‘brain drain’. However, upon analysis of data on international migra-
tion, this thesis seems to be rather questionable with reference to al-
most the whole post-War period (Kaczmarczyk & Okólski 2002). With
the exception of an episode of (partially) forced migration of persons of
Jewish descent (1968-1971), when over 13,000 of mostly highly edu-
cated persons left Poland, the share of persons with tertiary education
among all migrants did not differ significantly from that of the total po-
pulation.6 However, the situation changed in the late 1970s and 1980s.
The brain drain thesis is particularly relevant in the case of massive out-
flow in the 1980s. Calculations based on policy register data show that
of almost 700,000 emigrants who left Poland between 1 April 1981 and
6 December 1988, 15 per cent had a higher degree and 31 per cent had
secondary education. If we consider that, for the whole population, the
share of university graduates was roughly 7 per cent, the data show that
there was a considerable overrepresentation of emigrants of high-quality
human capital in relation to the whole population of Poland (Sakson
2002). According to estimates of Okólski (1997), the scale of emigration
of specialists from higher social classes in the 1980s was so large that
as many as a quarter of Polish university graduates of all higher educa-
tion institutions left the country each year – around 15,000.
Various data sources suggest the situation had changed significantly
during the transformation. Using official data, we can conclude that,
after 1990, the share of individuals with the lowest level of education
who migrate increased, while the share of individuals with the highest
level of educational attainment has decreased. At the threshold of the
transformation in 1988, persons who had elementary or lower than ele-
mentary education constituted 37 per cent of emigrants aged fifteen
and over, and people with a higher degree 9 per cent. In contrast, in
2003, there were 55 per cent in the former group, and 4 per cent in the
latter. These observations were supported by the majority of studies
conducted both in Poland and in the receiving countries. Research car-
ried out by the Centre of Migration Research in the years 1994-1999 in-
dicated that the claim about brain drain can be upheld only in relation
to big urban centres. More importantly, in quantitative terms, migration
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from the peripheral regions was dominated by individuals with no
more than secondary educational attainment and by poor human capital
who took up employment almost exclusively in the secondary sectors of
labour markets in the host countries. Similar results were provided by
studies conducted both in Poland and in receiving countries. Each of
these studies supported the observation that a greater propensity to mi-
grate was typical for people with low cultural competencies and no
knowledge of foreign languages who encountered problems with find-
ing their feet in the new post-communist reality, particularly on the la-
bour market. These people were almost fully dependent on the employ-
ment offer addressed to unskilled workers, willing to start work any
time and for any period of time (usually on an extremely short-term ba-
sis). There were only a few exceptions observed, notably mobility to
Ireland, Scandinavia and, to some extent, the US (Kaczmarczyk &
Okólski 2005).
The thesis of structural change in Polish migration since 1990 was
supported by a few studies on highly skilled migration from Poland,
particularly in the case of scientists. The factors pushing scientists to go
abroad were actually parallel to other less developed countries: low in-
come and worse labour conditions, low prestige and social status of
science and education, poorly equipped study rooms and laboratories,
restricted access to the literature, lack of research funds, limited oppor-
tunities for contacting broader scientific circles. A massive migration
abroad could have been expected as the education in many states of the
region was of top quality.
Such a prognosis only came true, to a certain extent, as can be clearly
seen from the results of an in-depth survey that covered over one thou-
sand scientific institutions hiring roughly 45 per cent of all the scienti-
fic workers in Poland over the period 1980-1996 (Hryniewicz,
Jałowiecki & Mync 1992, 1994, 1997). Between 1981-1991, the scientific
centres surveyed (accounting for a total of 28,500 academics and re-
searchers) lost over a quarter of their staff due to termination of con-
tracts. However, emigration accounted for only 9.5 per cent of the staff
complement in 1991, whilst a loss of 15.1 per cent resulted from so-
called internal brain drain, i.e. taking up other posts within Poland that
typically paid higher salaries or offered better career opportunities. This
suggests that this migration stream originated mostly from lack of op-
portunities for effective application of human resources in Poland, and
should be described rather in terms of brain overflow than brain drain.
Taking into account the outflow of scientists from the institutions
under survey in the long-term, i.e. 1981-1996, one remarkable phe-
nomenon is an enormous increase in the number of persons who
left up until the years 1992-1993, with a radical reverse trend in
1994-1996 (Figure 8.3). The reason behind this phenomenon is easy
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to pinpoint: such interdependence was determined by resignations
that were not connected with emigration. Up to the early years of the
transition period, an increasing number of people gave up scientific
activities in order to take up positions in other industries; in the
years 1981-1988, annual resignations of scientists amounted to 1 per
cent, in 1989-1991, 2 per cent and in 1992-1993, as much as 4 per
cent. Later, in 1994-1996, this tendency diminished; at that time the
annual percentage of academic or research staff deciding to resign
equalled 2 per cent.
In comparison with losses in the research and development (R&D)
sector as a whole, emigration of scientists seems rather insignificant; in
the long run, it has proved to be almost marginal. This is demonstrated
by the share of scientists in the total outflow of scientific workers,
which diminished from 52 per cent in 1981-1984 to 11 per cent in
1994-1996. Only 51 per cent of emigrants continued working in the
scientific field after they had settled abroad, thus human capital should
not be considered as transferred but rather as partially lost – this also
applies to the case of those scientists who left for other positions within
Poland. In general, the case of scientists shows that the first half on the
1990s was a period of new opportunities for well-educated Poles which
significantly restrained the migratory potential.
Figure 8.3 Average annual number of scientists leaving the R&D sector in Poland,
1981-1996
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However, in the second half of the 1990s, the trend in migration of
the highly skilled reversed once again. The structure of migration chan-
ged as a consequence of the educational breakthrough, on the one
hand, and economic crisis on the other, particularly the deteriorating si-
tuation in the Polish labour market. Such a picture emerges from the
population census data. According to the Polish census of 2002, among
the 576,000 permanent residents aged fifteen or more who had been
living abroad for at least twelve months at the time of the census,7 0.7
per cent held a doctoral degree, 10.1 per cent a university diploma (i.e. a
Master’s degree) and 3.2 per cent other tertiary education diplomas (i.e.
a Bachelor’s degree), whereas among the general population the figures
were 0.3 per cent, 7.4 per cent, and 2.7 per cent, respectively.
Table 8.2 shows that the share of highly educated migrants was the
highest before the beginning of the transition (15.6 per cent), then be-
came relatively low in the years 1989-1991 (11.8 per cent), only to rise
again in the following years. The same conclusion can be drawn on the
basis of LFS data, which demonstrates that, since the late 1990s, the
share of migrants with tertiary education has increased significantly
(particularly in the post-accession period).
According to the CMR Migrants’ Database based on the Polish LFS,
the pre-accession outflow from Poland was dominated by persons with
secondary vocational and vocational degrees (61 per cent of all mi-
grants). After 2004, the share of persons with tertiary education in-
creased significantly: from 15 to 20 per cent. The comparison of the
above presented data with the share of university graduates in the over-
all population of Poland (in 2004, 14 per cent) leads to a conclusion
that there is now a positive selection of well-educated Polish migrants.
This is particularly the case of female migrants, of whom 27 per cent
were highly-skilled persons (Table 8.3). This observation was strongly
supported by the analysis of Migration Selectivity Rates based on the
CMR databases (see Anacka & Okólski in this volume).
Table 8.2 Educational level of permanent citizens of Poland (aged fifteen and over)
staying abroad for longer than twelve months, by year of departure (%)
Year of departure Tertiary Secondary Other
Up to 1988 15.6 34.6 49.8
1989-1991 11.8 33.4 54.9
1992-1994 13.4 36.3 50.2
1995-1997 13.4 36.4 50.2
1998-2001 15.2 35.6 49.2
Total 14.0 35.0 51.0
Source: Kaczmarczyk and Oko´lski (2005) based on unpublished census data
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Interestingly, the educational structure of Polish migration varies de-
pending on destination. The highly educated were underrepresented
among those migrating to Germany and Italy, and overrepresented
among those migrating to other countries, especially to the UK (Figure
8.4). Educational structure is also closely connected to the type of mi-
gration, with seasonal migrants being relatively poorly educated.
On the other hand, the most recent migration to English-speaking
countries is the domain of young and relatively well-educated persons.
According to Polish LFS data, in the third quarter of 2006, migrants
with tertiary education constituted over 18 per cent of all migrants. The
share of persons with tertiary education was relatively higher among
those staying abroad for less than twelve months (19.6 per cent com-
pared to 16.3 per cent for those staying longer than twelve months) and
for women (24 per cent compared to 15.3 per cent for men). A very si-
milar picture is revealed by data gathered through various surveys com-
pleted in destination countries – particularly in the UK (Kaczmarczyk &
Okólski 2008a, 2008b).
One of the most controversial issues in current public debate is the
migration of medical professionals. This is, above all, a consequence of
the permanent demand for this type of migrants in highly developed
states. In the light of unfavourable demographic trends as well as fluc-
tuations on the labour markets, the majority of Western European states
are facing significant deficiencies in the number of medical staff. In ad-
dition, this field represents a typical example of intangible services: that
is, the human flow cannot be easily substituted with mobility of goods
and services. In effect, potential immigrants may expect highly benefi-
cial financial and social conditions, integration support and, in at least
Table 8.3 The education structure of Polish pre- and post-accessionmigrants by sex (%)
Level of education Pre-accession1 Post-accession2
Total Men Women Total Men Women
University degree3 14.7 12.0 18.3 19.8 15.6 27.0
Secondary 14.0 7.1 23.1 14.2 8.8 23.8
Secondary vocational 26.1 26.0 26.3 28.1 29.8 25.1
Vocational 34.8 45.4 20.9 30.9 39.2 16.2
Primary 9.9 9.3 10.9 7.0 6.6 7.8
Unfinished 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: CMR Migrants’ Database based on Polish LFS
1Aged fifteen and over who have been abroad for at least two months in the period 1999-
2003
2Aged fifteen and over who have been abroad for at least two months in the period 1 May
2004 –31 December 2006
3Including Bachelor’s, Master’s and PhD degrees
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several receiving countries, simplified immigration procedures. Work
offers targeted at healthcare workers in CEE states are incomparably
better than the opportunities created by local labour markets. As a con-
sequence, a high migration propensity among this group should be
expected.
In the case of Poland, some indication of the scale of potential migra-
tion of medical professionals is provided by the issuing of certificates
that confirm the qualifications and professional experience required by
employers in Western European states. The number of issued certifi-
cates – 6,724 (as of the end of December 2007) amounted to 5.7 per
cent of the total number of medical doctors in Poland. In the case of
dentists, certificates were issued to 1,924 persons (6.3 per cent of the to-
tal). With regard to semi-skilled medical staff, around 9,300 certificates
were issued to nurses and midwives, which amounts to 0.3 per cent of
the total number of registered professionals in this group. A breakdown
of these figures for the period 2004-2006 by area of specialty is pro-
vided in Table 8.4.
It would be hard to consider the scale of migration estimated this
way as alarming. This is the line followed in evaluations by researchers
Figure 8.4 Level of education of permanent citizens of Poland (aged fifteen and over)
staying abroad for longer than twelve months by country of destination
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and specialists from the Ministry of Health. Although migration of the
so-called ‘white personnel’ is a noticeable phenomenon, its scale is not
so large as to pose a threat to the healthcare system in the short term.
This threat is not that significant because, in the experts’ opinion, the
Polish educational system ‘produces’ medical professionals at a rate still
higher than their potential outflow to other states. In fact, to some ex-
tent, migration of medical specialists may be viewed as a brain overflow
rather than brain drain, which is particularly true in the case of young
professionals trapped in the Polish ‘feudal’ organisational structures of
the medical profession with limited chances for promotion.
Nonetheless, the outflow of medical doctors appears very painful in the
case of certain specialisations. This is especially the case in specialties
such as anaesthesiology or radiology, where incomes are relatively low
in Poland, as well as specialties such as plastic surgery where there is a
high demand in foreign labour markets. Moreover, a temporary or per-
manent imbalance on local and regional labour markets is also likely,
and may already have occurred.
The data presented above may be supplemented by information on
the migration of students – a group usually perceived as extremely mo-
bile. However, the data on student mobility is very limited, whilst offi-
cial data says very little about the real scale of the phenomenon. Less
than 10,000 persons annually participated in exchange programmes
(ERASMUS, programmes based on bilateral agreements) in the pre-
Table 8.4 Certificates issued to medical professionals in key specialties, May 2004 –
June 2006
Specialty Number of economically
active doctors
Number of
certificates issued
Share of certificates
in total number of
specialists (%)
Specialties with the highest number of certificates issued
Anaesthesiology 3,984 625 15.6
Surgery 5,395 334 6.1
Orthopaedics 2,261 168 7.4
Internal diseases* 11,792 163 1.4
Radiology 1,993 154 7.7
Specialties with the highest relation of certificates issued to the number of active specialists
Anaesthesiology 3,984 625 15.6
Plastic surgery 142 21 14.7
Chest surgery 218 28 12.8
Radiology 1,993 154 7.7
Orthopaedics 2,261 168 7.4
Total 81,346 3.074 3.7
Source: Kaczmarczyk and Oko´lski (2005) based on the Ministry of Health data
* Data are until the end of June 2005.
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accession periods. More recent data reveals a significant increase in the
scale of student mobility in the last three to four years. According to
data gathered in destination countries, Poland is definitely the most im-
portant country of origin of student migrants among A8 states: in the
academic year 2006-2007, the number of Polish students in EU-15
countries was greater than 31,000, with the most important destina-
tions being Germany (around 15,000), the UK (almost 7,000) and
France (around 3,000). The highest increase was noted in the case of
the UK – between 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 alone, the number of
Polish students enrolled in the UK increased by over 55 per cent
(Wolfeil 2008). Similar data can be obtained on the basis of information
provided by the Polish Ministry of Education (and presented in
UNESCO education statistics): in 2005, the number of Polish students
studying abroad was estimated at 31,455 persons. Nevertheless, the scale
of student mobility in Poland is very low and far below Western
European standards: in 2005 the outbound mobility ratio equalled 1.5
per cent and was one of the lowest among the A8 countries (Wolfeil
2008). This theme is developed further in the following section.
Brain drain, brain exchange or brain waste?
The outflow of highly skilled individuals is one of the most controver-
sial, hot topics in migration debates. However, due to the complexity of
its consequences, assessment of the phenomenon seems to be very dif-
ficult. Table 8.5 summarises the variety of effects typically linked to mo-
bility of highly skilled people and presents both costs and benefits re-
lated to this type of migration, with special reference to the situation of
Poland. These effects have been grouped within three categories broken
down by the level of analysis, from micro level to the macro, i.e. indivi-
dual (family) level, company level and economy level, respectively. It is
worth noting that, on all levels, both positive and negative aspects of
highly skilled mobility can be observed, which makes the general as-
sessment of the phenomenon hardly possible. Additionally, issues com-
monly appearing in the public debate are not necessarily those that are
most important. In the case of Poland, effects that are typically stressed
in public debates are negative points such as the loss of scarce human
capital, shortages of labour and losses associated with (public) expendi-
ture on migrants’ education.
In addition, although Polish migrants are, at least to some extent, po-
sitively selected with respect to human capital, they are concentrated
predominantly in the secondary sectors of receiving economies and take
jobs in ‘typical’ migrant sectors such as construction, agriculture, clean-
ing and hotels. This observation is strongly supported by the WRS data.
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If we assume that the number and structure of applications to the WRS
may serve as a proxy of ‘real’ migration to the country – which does
seem reasonable to some extent – the data provided by the UK Home
Office allow us to build quite a precise picture of contemporary labour
migration to the UK. The data reveal that migrant workers from the A8
countries tend to concentrate in such sectors as administration, busi-
ness and management (39 per cent); hospitality and catering (19 per
cent); agriculture (10 per cent); manufacturing (7 per cent) and agricul-
ture-related sectors (5 per cent).
This might suggest that migrants from A8 countries are able to get
into primary labour markets and achieve a relatively good position in
the UK labour market. However, this picture may be misleading.
Table 8.5 Selected costs and benefits of highly skilled migration from Poland
Level Potential costs Potential benefits
Individual/
family
Loss of insider’s position
Bad working/living conditions
Low status of the job
Depreciation of human capital
Relative deprivation
Racism
Discrimination
Separation costs
Impact on family life
Better job opportunities
Better working/living conditions
Higher social status/higher status of
the job
Employment according to the skills
Ability to improve the skills
Higher income, no relative deprivation
New experiences (social, cultural)
Company Loss of highly skilled labour
Shortages of labour leading to
inflation pressure
Lost expenditure on training
Skills and experience of return
migrants
Cooperation with migrants staying
abroad
Gains of the recruitment sector
Gains of the migration-supporting
sectors
Economy Loss of scarce human capital
Loss of young people
Loss of production (potential)
Negative fiscal effects (lower tax
incomes)
Losses associated with expenditure on
migrants’ education
Negative impact on the R&D sector
Imbalances in local and regional
labour markets
Growth of income inequality
Socio-cultural changes – ‘culture of
migration’
Transfer of knowledge as a side-effect
of return migration
Lower demographic pressure
Remittances (direct and indirect
effects)
Impacts on human capital formation
Transfer of knowledge as an effect of
cooperation with migrants staying
abroad
Lower unemployment
Higher income equality
Multicultural societies
Source: Author’s own elaboration
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Considering the information on the occupations of applicants from ac-
cession countries, it turns out that they mainly undertake simple jobs
that do not demand high skills. From this perspective, data on occupa-
tions are hardly comparable with the data on sectors in which appli-
cants were employed (Table 8.6).8
The below presented data show that a vast majority (80-90 per cent)
of migrants from the A8 countries are hired for occupations that need
no professional qualifications. On the other hand, as noted, many
sources show that, out of the total number of migrants from Poland to
the UK, the share of persons holding a university degree exceeds 25 or
maybe even 30 per cent. This would indicate that, certainly, positive ef-
fects related to opportunities for qualification improvement or profes-
sional development are out of range for the majority of educated mi-
grants. Rather, ‘brain waste’ or deskilling, a typical phenomenon for the
migration of the 1980s, should be expected. A similar conclusion is
drawn from the analysis provided by Clark and Drinkwater (2008), who
showed that, according to the UK LFS data, the rate of return to human
capital is far lower for migrants coming from A8 countries than it is for
natives or migrants from the EU-15 countries. It suggests that the
Table 8.6 Top twenty occupations among A8 immigrants in UK, July 2004 – June 2006
Rank Occupation Number of
applicants
% of all
occupations
1 Process operative 212,405 27.5
2 Warehouse operative 63,590 8.2
3 Packer 46,515 6.0
4 Kitchen assistant 44,810 5.8
5 Cleaner, domestic staff 42,120 5.5
6 Farm worker 32,515 4.2
7 Waitress 27,430 3.6
8 Maid/room attendant (hotel) 26,075 3.4
9 Labourer, building 26,075 3.4
10 Sales assistant 21,700 2.8
11 Care assistant 20,980 2.7
12 Crop harvester 12,860 1.7
13 Bar staff 10,025 1.3
14 Food processing operative (fruit & vegetables) 9,810 1.3
15 Food processing operative (meat) 9,135 1.2
16 Chef (other) 8,590 1.1
17 Truck driver 6,385 0.8
18 Fruit picker 6,385 0.8
19 Carpenter 6,045 0.8
20 Welder 5,490 0.7
Total (20 occupations) 773,255 82.6
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on the Home Office data
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human capital of the post-accession migration in the most important
destination country is not being ‘employed’ in an efficient way.
On the other hand, it is important to consider the changes in the
structure of the Polish population. As already stated, recent migration
from Poland is marked by a higher share of persons with tertiary educa-
tion than for the total population. This picture may be completely mis-
leading without assessment of the educational structure of the Polish
population. In the last twenty years, Poland experienced a true educa-
tional breakthrough. Between 1970 and 2001, the share of university
graduates among the Polish population increased from 2 per cent to 12
per cent. At the end of the 1990s, the number of students was 2.6
times higher than in 1990. Nowadays in Poland, there are over 1.8 mil-
lion students, and the data from the Central Statistical Office shows
that, in the early 2000s, the gross enrolment ratio (the ratio of those
studying to the whole population) in the age group 19-24 was close to
50 per cent. This means that, as for the universality of higher educa-
tion, Poland has almost reached the standards of the developed coun-
tries. If we take into consideration that a higher propensity to migrate
is typically a feature of relatively young persons (aged eighteen to 35),
the recent increase in highly skilled migration may be a statistical arte-
fact only. In this context, the increase in the share of relatively well-
educated migrants should be perceived as a natural consequence of
educational developments in Poland. Additionally, as proven by the mi-
gration selectivity analysis, well-educated migrants tend to originate
from relatively backwards regions of Poland, quite often from small
towns or rural areas, i.e. from such places where labour markets cannot
offer them suitable professional opportunities.
In this context, the outflow of persons with tertiary education, who of-
ten face serious problems on the Polish labour market, can thus be de-
scribed as brain overflow and not brain drain. This process does not ne-
cessarily have to be negative for the Polish economy – those who leave
stand a better chance to find work and will accumulate money they may
use in the origin country afterwards, if they return. Additional benefits
may result from gaining professional and cultural experience.9
Interestingly, in the early 2000s, the share of migrants with tertiary
education among all expatriates in Poland was higher than in the case
of the total population but, at the same time, significantly lower than for
well-developed countries. In many cases the percentage of university
graduates among migrants was higher than 40 per cent, as it was in
case of the US (49.9 per cent), Japan (49.7 per cent), Australia (45.9 per
cent) and the UK (41.2 per cent). Against this background, the relative
scale of highly skilled migration from Poland seems moderate (26.6 per
cent according to OECD data), and is higher only than in such countries
as Turkey (6.4 per cent), Italy (13.0 per cent) and Spain (18.7 per cent).
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In this context, the increasing scale of highly skilled migration from
Poland is to be perceived as a rather typical – not exceptional – process,
proving that the structure of migration predominantly reflects the com-
position of the origin society (Kaczmarczyk & Okólski 2005).
Similarly, Figure 8.5 shows that the scale of student mobility from
and in Poland is far from well-developed countries’ standards. In con-
temporary societies, student migration has become a common and in-
evitable phenomenon – an integral part of an academic or professional
career. Looking at trends in the development of the educational systems
in Poland and other CEE countries, it would also be reasonable to ex-
pect a gradual increase in the mobility of students (as indeed has hap-
pened since 1 May 2004).
The mobility of the highly skilled does not necessarily lead to nega-
tive consequences as described in public debates. Recent developments
do not entitle us to draw dramatic pictures of brain drain. Interestingly,
the authors of a series of reports on the mobility of Polish scientists,
while using the alarming title Brain exodus for the first report in the ser-
ies, concluded their research with a relatively humble statement on the
‘mobility of scientists’ in the third report, spanning the period 1994-
1996 (Hryniewicz et al. 1997). They argue that the outflow of scientists
from Poland has not lead to a brain drain, but it also has not succeeded
in terms of brain exchange, i.e. exchange of thoughts, ideas and experi-
ences relevant for the development of scientific research in Poland.
Figure 8.5 Foreign students in selected OECD countries, 1998
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Conclusions
The outflow of highly skilled specialists is a very complex matter that
gives rise to many controversies. On the one hand, the outflow of spe-
cialists (i.e. loss of human capital) can be treated as one of the reasons
of the relative technological backwardness of the states from the region.
On the other hand, in the era of globalisation, migrations are becoming
an inevitable phenomenon. This particularly concerns specialists or,
more generally, persons with tertiary education. The global economy in
its current shape generates a considerable demand for such migrants
related to the recent global division of labour, entailed by the dynamic
growth of new technologies in the services (including intangible ser-
vices) and increasingly better opportunities in communications.
Migration of highly skilled persons is becoming a natural element of
economic and social processes, and human resources as well (e.g. scho-
larships; scientific internships; mobility within multinational compa-
nies). Therefore, the pejorative notion of ‘brain drain’ has been aban-
doned in favour of such terms as ‘brain circulation’ or ‘brain exchange’.
The crucial issue is that a significant share of highly skilled persons
among emigrants is a feature of highly developed states; the higher the
level of socio-economic development the more transparent this interde-
pendence. Therefore, the increasing contribution of immigrants from
Poland and other CEE countries holding university degrees should not
be a surprise. On the contrary, it is to be expected that social and eco-
nomic progress will result in the relative growth in the migration of
specialists from a given country or region. However, the brain drain
may be a real issue for countries of origin. This may occur if a negative
balance in the migration of highly skilled personnel is observed, and
would be particularly painful in the case of intangible services (i.e. med-
ical services). Such a phenomenon may be particularly true in the case
of Poland – a country with no tradition of immigration, where the in-
flow of highly skilled persons is relatively low.
Since accession into the EU, an increase in the scale of migration has
been observed. The most drastic changes concern migration to the UK
and Ireland, two of the three countries that opened their labour markets
in May 2004. Yet, changes in the scale of mobility observed since May
2004 concern highly skilled persons or specialists to a small degree.
The most significant increase was revealed in the case of students and
medical professionals. The first case should not be perceived in nega-
tive terms; to the contrary, the mobility of students in the contemporary
world is an important aspect of education and may increase future pro-
ductivity and stock of human capital. The case of medical professionals
is the most controversial issue in recent public debates on migration.
So far, this process is still far from being a mass phenomenon.
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However, even today, the outflow of nurses and doctors results in ser-
ious problems in local and regional markets (particularly in the case of
certain specialties). Additionally, in the face of the dramatic situation in
the Polish health services sector, the scale of medical professionals’ mo-
bility may increase dramatically. The only way to stop the outflow or de-
crease its level would be a deep reform of the public health care system,
including such spheres as education and training, working conditions
and earnings.
Up until the early 1990s, the EU countries were not attractive for
highly skilled migrants, who almost exclusively targeted traditional
immigration countries such as the US, Canada and Australia. This
situation has changed as a consequence of introducing selective pro-
migratory measures in migration policies and applying recruitment pro-
grammes. This, in turn, increases the risk of outflow from Poland. The
most recent migration to the UK and Ireland may serve as a perfect ex-
emplification of this thesis.
Mobility of top specialists could be and, in many cases, is a crucial
factor spurring the development of scientific disciplines, fostering re-
search and the exchange of thoughts and experiences. For example,
scientists, even when residing abroad can exert a huge influence upon
scientific activities in the country of origin and contribute to the trans-
fer of knowledge and technologies. The key obstacle is a lack of me-
chanisms of return migration. Thus, one of the most important tasks
for migration policymakers in Poland and other CEE countries would
be to create favourable conditions for those highly skilled migrants who
would like to return to their home countries.
Notes
1 This chapter relies heavily on Kaczmarczyk (2006).
2 Due to the adopted definition, the population of emigrants includes only those perma-
nent residents of Poland who left Poland in order to settle abroad, having registered
their departure with an administrative unit. Therefore, the official data on migration
portrays only a small fraction of the phenomenon, i.e. departures recorded as a per-
manent change of residence, and are useful to limited extent only.
3 These data relate only to adult persons who, at the time of the survey, had been
abroad for longer than two months and, at the same time, who had at least one house-
hold member still living in Poland.
4 This is true if data on Polish seasonal workers is considered.
5 Note that LFS data encompass only those migrants who are staying abroad for longer
than two months. An additional 300,000-350,000 Poles find legal employment
abroad each year on the basis of bilateral international agreements. An overwhelming
majority of them are seasonal workers, more than half of whom are employed in
Germany (according to the 1990 bilateral agreement on labour migration between the
Polish and German governments).
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6 In the case of emigrating Poles of Jewish descent, this share was over eight times
higher than the total population (Stola 2001).
7 That was 1.8 per cent of the total number of permanent residents of Poland aged fif-
teen and over.
8 This is particularly true in the case of administration, business and management,
where the problem is that workers in the sector work predominantly for recruitment
agencies and could thus be employed in a variety of occupations.
9 Additional benefits may arise due to the positive impact on human capital formation,
i.e. through the demonstration effect as proposed by Stark (2005). However, in the
case of Poland and other CEE countries – whose citizens, regardless of their skill le-
vel, are employed predominantly in secondary sectors of receiving economies – this
effect seems to be rather doubtful.
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9 Skills shortage, emigration and unemployment
in Poland: Causes and implications of
disequilibrium in the Polish labour market
Izabela Grabowska-Lusinska
Introduction1
The aim of this chapter is to scrutinise the apparently overlapping re-
search problems of skill shortage, emigration and unemployment in
Poland, focusing both on the causes and implications of disequilibrium
in the Polish labour market. The chapter shows that there is no straight-
forward relationship (or correlation) between skill shortages and the
outflow of people. Rather, the outflow of people (including seasonal,
pendulum migration) is one among a set of factors that impacts skill
shortages in Poland and cannot be analysed separately from these other
factors.
The first section of the chapter provides an overview of labour market
adjustments and associated challenges in Poland by tracking the pro-
cess of transition in Poland. The second section sets out the concepts of
structural mismatches, shortages and gaps as grounded in theory by ap-
proaching four main interpretations connected to: 1) turbulence in the
economy; 2) the lack of equilibrium in micro markets; 3) the mismatch
of ineffective allocations of labour and 4) the Non-Accelerating Inflation
Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU) as connected to labour resources.
This section also examines regional variations and divergences of the la-
bour market in Poland. The third section refers to internal migration
within, and emigration from, Poland after 1 May 2004. Section four
takes into account economic gaps as a characteristic of changes and
challenges in the Polish labour market, including analysis of the bar-
riers to growth of companies as reported by employers. Finally, section
five synthesises the set of factors identified across the analysis that
cause skill shortages, highlighting both their short- and long-term im-
plications for the Polish labour market.
A synopsis of labour market adjustments and challenges in
Poland
The transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy
has been accompanied by far-reaching changes in the labour market.
According to Dorenbos (1999: 1):
Excess demand for labour and shortage of labour were replaced
by a surplus of labour and shortage of jobs. Consequently, unem-
ployment emerged and grew rapidly: former centrally planned
economy converted from ‘job rights’ economy to ‘job search’
economy.
The next stage of this transformation seems to be a move to a ‘skill
search’ economy. It is apparent that the role of labour structure is cru-
cial in the process of transition to a market economy and economic
growth both in qualitative and quantitative terms. Optimal allocation of
labour, namely putting the right person with the right skills in the right
place is an enormous and complicated process. The quality of labour is
crucial to match the needs of transformed economic structures.
Selection of workers on the basis of labour market characteristics,
which reflect their labour productivity, is a key feature of the new struc-
ture of the economy. Moreover, job competition and crowding-out ef-
fects may lead to the segmentation of the labour market (Piore 1979).
The employment structure seems to be a barometer of adjustments
to the new conditions and challenges in the economy. This is because,
as a rule, changes in the division of labour across agriculture, industry
and services are seen as reflecting the process of economic
Table 9.1 Key economic indicators for Poland 2000-2007
Indicator 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007*
GDP growth (%) 4.2 1.1 1.4 3.8 5.3 3.4 6.1 6.6
Inflation rate (%) 10.1 5.5 1.9 0.8 3.6 2.1 1.1 2.2
Economically active
population (m)
17.3 17.4 17.2 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0
Employed
population (m)
14.5 14.2 13.8 13.6 13.8 13.9 14.6 15.2
Unemployment
rate (%)
16.1 18.2 19.9 19.6 19.0 18.2 13.8 10.7
Net migration -19,670 -16,740 -14,950 -44,000 -51,790 -48,440 -47,600 -47,790
Population mid-
year (m)
38.6 38.6 38.6 38.6 38.6 38.5 38.1 38.1
Source: Euromonitor International – Global Market Information Database 2007
* Forecast
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development. The employment structure also relates to the stock of la-
bour and the rationale of its utilisation at different stages of economic
growth.2
With the modernisation of the structure of production in Poland, the
sectoral composition of firms and the occupational structure of the la-
bour force have undergone radical changes. Changes in internal and ex-
ternal demand from 1995-2005 caused shifts between sectors of the
employment structure. The percentage share employed in agriculture
declined from 25.1 per cent to 21.3 per cent during this period, whilst
industry saw a decrease of about one million workers. The new employ-
ment structure, where the service sector has predominated since 1993
(increasing by 15 per cent), generated new demands for qualifications.
The retrenchment of employment in agriculture and industry, which
are less qualification-saturated, and the development of the service sec-
tor have increased opportunities for employment of the highly edu-
cated. Yet, this increasing share of services in the economy has resulted
not in an increase in demand in this sector, but merely a lower decrease
in the number of work places. This may explain why, throughout the
last decade, services have failed to mitigate the process of restructuring
of agriculture and industry by absorbing human resources in these sec-
tors. Net outflow from employment to unemployment and the share
that is ‘non-active’ has therefore been of an unprecedented scale.
Throughout these changes in the structure of employment, the only
group who has recorded increases in employment levels are the highly
educated (UNDP 2007: 106-107).
Labour mismatches, shortages, unemployment and mobility
Disequilibrium of supply and demand creates a basis for labour market
shortages.3 However, the concept of ‘structural shortage’ itself covers
many definitions, measures and interpretations. Schioppa (1991) pre-
sents four key interpretations of skill mismatch developed in econom-
ics. The first relates to turbulence in the economy. This approach was
developed by Lilien (1982), Abraham and Katz (1986), Loungani (1986),
Loungani, Rush and Tave (1990) and Davies and Haltiwanger (1992).
The collapse of certain industries and growth of new forms of entrepre-
neurship may generate economic shocks. This process is connected to
certain technological innovations, changes in foreign competition and
changes in the relative prices of resources. These factors affect the
structure of employment. Unemployment rates grow in declining sec-
tors (or regions) and, at the same time, the number of vacancies grows
in developing sectors (or regions). This implies deeper mismatches of
demand and supply of labour across sectors and/or regions. In order to
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eliminate these mismatches, high flexibility in the labour market is ne-
cessary. This means flexibility of wages and prices, high mobility of la-
bour and free access to information on the labour market (Brunello
1991: 57).
A second interpretation concerning structural mismatches relates to
lack of equilibrium in micro markets, namely regional and sectoral mar-
kets; the third approach connects mismatch with ineffective allocations
of labour; whilst the fourth interpretation comes from the Non-
Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU) model, which
strictly relates to labour resources. However, in order to explain the si-
tuation in the Polish labour market, the approach that focuses on turbu-
lence in an economy seems to be the most suitable and adequate.
A process of labour market restructuring such as that experienced by
the Polish economy may also create regional diversification. This means
that the process may cause regional mismatches of supply and demand
resulting in skill shortages in some places, even though there are sur-
pluses elsewhere. This is well grounded in the economic geography of
Poland, where some branches of the economy, such as the shipping in-
dustry, heavy industry, and agriculture, are very much associated with
certain regions. Indeed, many Polish regions have been defined in the
past by their association with particular productive activities. One may
assume that the resulting regional variations in labour markets may
also cause structural mismatches (Gawronska-Nowak & Kaczorowski
2000). There are also differences in the level of real wages across differ-
ent regions and, generally, low mobility of labour in Poland – both of
which have a negative impact on the flexibility of the labour market and
may enhance and petrify regional divergences in supply and demand
(Gawronska-Nowak & Kaczorowski 2000).
Regional variations and divergence of labour market
Full employment was a major policy goal in all former centrally planned
economies. Every person over school age and under retirement age was
entitled to work (Dorenbos 1999).4 Nowadays, the situation is totally
different. Excess demand and a shortage of labour have been replaced
by a surplus of labour and shortage of jobs, but also by a shortage of
skills. The change is well depicted in Figure 9.1, which shows regional
labour activity rates in Poland in the 1988 population census (towards
the end of the communist era) and the 2002 census (already in the ad-
vanced transition period).
Despite the already long transition, the labour market participation
rate has not changed much in Poland across this period of time.
Moreover, Poland has one of the lowest – if not the lowest – employ-
ment activity rate in the EU-27: 7.6 points lower than the average of
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EU-27 and nearly ten points lower than the average of EU-15 (Figure
9.2).
Why is it the case in Poland that there are low levels of labour force
participation? There are at least two explanations for this phenomenon.
One relates to various government schemes that put people outside the
labour market, such as an early retirement scheme (covered people
born before 1 January 1949); an ‘unable to work’ scheme (connected to
health) and a scheme favouring those with a minimum number of
years of employment, namely five or ten years shorter than the usual re-
tirement age, called the ‘bridging retirement scheme’ at one point. The
list of professions eligible to join the latter scheme covered more than
one hundred professions. Another explanation relates to the ability – or
rather inability – of people to become active in the labour market. The
proportion of those who are unable to become active in the labour force
(at least in the official registers) is one of the largest of any European
Figure 9.1 Regional employment activity rate in Poland in population censuses
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country, reflecting high rates of long-term unemployment or long-term
employment in the grey economy.
Changes in the labour market are also well reflected in the economic
geography of Poland. Poland’s regions differ considerably regarding their
economies. The variation refers mainly to their economic structures, le-
vels of development, living standards and their regional and local labour
markets. This is mainly manifested in the three-sector structure of the
economy (agriculture, industry and services), which can be described and
defined from the perspective of sectoral split of total employment and
added value by regions (see Figure 9.3). The situation in Poland is dis-
tinct for its relatively large share of the employed population concentrated
in the agricultural sector but – at the same time – for the small share of
this sector in terms of added value both nationally and regionally
(Kwiatkowski, Kucharski & Tokarski 2004). It is worth noting that the dy-
namics of changes in the employment structure are significant.
Although labour productivity in agriculture (measured by added value
per employee) is well below average in certain regions, labour productiv-
ity in the service sector is well above average (Kwiatkowski et al. 2004).
The regions of Świętokrzyskie, Podlaskie, Podkarpackie and Lubelskie
can be regarded as typically agricultural ones. They are characterised by
a dispersed agrarian structure (small farms) with a predominance of
Figure 9.2 Employment activity rate in Poland and in the EU (average): 1997-2007
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private farms. During the transition period these farms acted as contain-
ers absorbing excess labour, accelerating social tensions in the labour
market (Kwiatkowski et al. 2004). But at the end of the twentieth cen-
tury, these containers had blown up, uncovering and diffusing unad-
justed labour resources.
As mentioned, the transition period was accompanied by the weaken-
ing and even collapse of some branches of industry (such as the textile,
coal-mining and metal industries). However, the relative share of em-
ployment of certain declining branches of industry is still large in some
regions: above all in Śląskie and Dolnośląskie, but also Opolskie,
Lubuskie, Wielkopolskie and Kujawsko-Pomorskie. The high level of in-
dustrialisation of the Śląskie region reflects the dominance of the
mining and metal industries, which have been facing advanced restruc-
turing at the final phase of transition, namely in the second half of the
1990s. In contrast, a substantial share of services, which reflect a mod-
ern economic structure, can be found in the Mazowieckie region and in
northern Poland (Zachodniopomorskie, Pomorskie, Warmińsko-
Mazurskie) where they are mostly associated with the hospitality sector.
Figure 9.3 Structure of employment in Polish regions 1995-2001 (period average, in%)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Do
lno
ślą
sk
ie 
    
    
    
    
 
Ku
jaw
sk
o-
Po
m
or
sk
ie 
   
Lu
be
lsk
ie 
    
    
    
    
    
  
Lu
bu
sk
ie 
    
    
    
    
    
Lo
dz
kie
    
    
    
    
    
    
 
M
ało
po
lsk
ie 
    
    
    
    
 
M
az
ow
iec
kie
    
    
    
    
 
Op
ols
kie
    
    
    
    
    
    
Po
dk
ar
pa
ck
ie 
    
    
    
   
Po
dla
sk
ie 
    
    
    
    
    
 
Po
m
or
sk
ie 
    
    
    
    
    
Ślą
sk
ie 
    
    
    
    
    
    
 
Św
ięt
ok
rz
ys
kie
    
    
    
 
W
ar
m
ińs
ko
-M
az
ur
sk
ie 
W
iel
ko
po
lsk
ie 
    
    
    
Za
ch
od
nio
-P
om
or
sk
ie 
   
Agriculture Industry and construction Services
Source:Author’s own elaboration based on Kwiatkowski et al. (2004)
SKILLS SHORTAGE, EMIGRATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN POLAND 193
Regions differ also with respect to their GDP per capita. The highest
GDP per capita is in the Mazowieckie region, with the capital city of
Warsaw, whilst second is Śląskie, the most highly urbanised and indus-
trialised part of Poland. The lowest values are found in eastern Poland
(Lubelskie, Podkarpackie, Podlaskie) and also in Warmińsko-Mazurskie,
Swietokrzyskie, Opolskie, Małopolskie and Lodzkie. Interestingly, the
sets of regions with the highest and lowest GDP per capita have not
changed over the period of transition, with inequality even deepening
in this respect. In 1995, GDP per capita in the Mazowieckie region was
64 per cent higher than the lowest regional GDP, while in 2002 the dif-
ference rose to 98 per cent (Kwiatkowski et al. 2004).
Regional differences in GDP per capita are closely linked to regional
variations in labour productivity (GDP per employee). The Mazowieckie
and Śląskie regions have the highest level of labour productivity, fol-
lowed by regions in the west of the country. The lowest are observed in
eastern, predominantly agricultural regions, namely Lubuskie,
Podkarpackie and Podlaskie. Regional differentiation of wages is consid-
erably lower than that of labour productivity: the Mazowieckie region
has the highest wages, followed by the Śląskie region, whilst eastern re-
gions have the lowest wages.
The map of unemployment in Poland is also interesting. The regional
pattern that characterises employment structure, GDP per capita and
productivity levels also seems useful for understanding unemployment
rates. The transformation shock made regions differently vulnerable to
its effects (Figures 9.4 and 9.4). A first group of regions is defined by
the process of restructuring of agriculture. Among them are those re-
gions most strongly affected by the remnants of the pre-transition sys-
tem: Warmińsko-Mazurskie, Zachodniopomorskie, Lubuskie, Pomorskie
and Kujawsko-Pomorskie. They all experienced a sharp decrease in la-
bour demand. A second group of regions, those dominated by traditional
industries,5 also experienced a strong decline in labour demand, includ-
ing Lodzkie, Dolnośląskie and Lubuskie. The smallest decreases in la-
bour demand were noted in three regions with modern economic struc-
tures, characterised by a relatively high share of services in the employ-
ment structure, namely Mazowieckie, Małopolskie and Wielkopolskie.
The economies of these regions managed to adapt quite flexibly to the re-
quirements of a market-driven economy. The process of their adaptation
was mainly enhanced by agglomeration effects in the cities of Warsaw,
Krakow and Poznan (Kwiatkowski et al. 2004).
Unemployment and its export: A nexus?
The total unemployment rate in Poland mirrors the dynamics of the
transition process. Unemployment started rising rapidly in mid-1992
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(12 per cent on average) up to 1995 (16.2 per cent on average), then
started falling due to stabilisation of the restructuring process, reaching
10 per cent on average in 1998. The unemployment rate started rising
again from 1999-2002 and remained high up to the end of 2005
(Figure 9.6). Since then, perhaps linked to the enlargement of the
European Union in 2004, rates have fallen again.
Falling unemployment in the last two to three years may be a result of
different factors: an economic growth effect with the end of the ‘jobless
economic growth’ of the transition period, increased seasonal demand
for workers in agriculture, construction and services (due to mild win-
ters) and the systematic and dynamic outflow of labour and systematic
inflow of remittances. In June 2007, a decline in the number of unem-
ployed was observed in all regions (Figure 9.7), although the structure of
registered unemployment is still territorially deeply differentiated.
Figure 9.4 Unemployment rate by region in 2005 (end September)
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on Central Statistical Office
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The share of women in the total number of the unemployed in Poland
is high, at 58.5 per cent in 2007. In addition, relatively young people
have been more affected by unemployment, with the largest group of un-
employed people consisting of persons aged 25-34 years (Figure 9.9).
The highest percentage share of unemployed people aged between 25
and 34 in the total number of the unemployed was observed in the re-
gions of Lubelskie (31.5 per cent), Podkarpackie (30.5 per cent),
Świętokrzyskie (29.2 per cent) and Kujawsko-Pomorskie (28.6 per cent),
while the lowest was in the regions of Dolnośląskie and Opolskie (25.6
per cent), and Podlaskie (25.7 per cent) (GUS 2007).
A high percentage of the unemployed registered in the labour offices
consisted of persons with relatively low levels of education. The two lar-
gest groups among the unemployed were those with basic vocational
Figure 9.5 Unemployment rate by region in 2007 (end September)
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on Central Statistical Office
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education and lower secondary, primary and incomplete primary educa-
tion (amounting, respectively, to 30.1 per cent and 32.5 per cent of the
total number of the unemployed registered at the end of June 2007).
These groups jointly amounted to 62.6 per cent of the total unem-
ployed. In contrast, those with post-secondary certificate and vocational
secondary education made up 22.3 per cent of the total number of the
unemployed, those who had completed secondary school made up 9
per cent, while those who had completed tertiary education represented
6.1 per cent (GUS 2007).
Poland also experiences the problem of hidden unemployment –
those who do not appear in unemployment statistics because they are
considered ‘not active’. This may relate to work in the grey economy
and/or seasonal work abroad, which means they are recorded locally as
being not economically active. This structure may also petrify mis-
matches of labour supply and demand in Poland, contributing skill
shortages.
Is it fair to say that Poland has exported its unemployment through
the outflow of people? Figure 9.9 shows the relationship between
changes in unemployment and outflows of people. There appears to be
a strong relationship between the two for much of the twentieth cen-
tury, but not for the post-accession period, where the relationship ap-
pears to have reversed. Kaczmarczyk and Okólski (2008: 49) argue that
this is because over 50 per cent of people moving abroad have perma-
nent jobs in Poland and, whilst this should create job opportunities for
Figure 9.6 Unemployment rate in third quarter of each year 2000-2007
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those who are left behind, this does not happen because of internal im-
mobility and structural disequilibria in the labour market.
Polish migration since 1 May 2004
Internal migration
This section analyses the factors that influence the performance of re-
gional labour markets in Poland. The circumstances of the economic
transition in Poland might suggest a strong propensity for the country’s
inhabitants to migrate inter-regionally. In fact, Poland has experienced a
decline in inter- and intra-provincial and regional population flows since
the beginning of the transition period. The decline in rural-urban
Figure 9.7 Unemployment rate in regions: Change between 2006 and 2007
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Source: Extracted from Central Statistical Office
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migration and a very slight increase in flows in the opposite direction
are of particular interest.
There are several significant and complex factors that tend to limit
the process of internal migration in Poland: the propensity to migrate
internationally because of its greater attractiveness, low wage differ-
ences between regions, an underdeveloped road and railway infrastruc-
ture and the housing market, namely shortages in housing. All these
factors may imply a low level of reallocation of skills in relation to de-
mand by a concentrated cluster of similar industries. Some scholars
even argue that Poland’s regional concentration of services, namely
gravitation to agglomeration economies, may diminish intra-regional
mobility and imply deeper inter-regional divergence (Deichamnn &
Henderson 2000).6 Moreover, working abroad seasonally or periodically
may be a viable alternative, bearing in mind the effort required to move
abroad and net gains of such effort. As a result, the inter-regional mobi-
lity is very low in Poland, with inter-regional flows amounting to 0.2-0.3
per cent of the population in 2005.
Inter-regional flows depend on regional variations in GDP per capita
as well as on regional variations in unemployment rates. Econometric
analysis by Kwiatkowski et al. (2004) shows that the regional variation
in GDP affected migration outflows more strongly that the regional
Figure 9.8 Structure of registered unemployed persons by age and sex, second
quarter of 2007
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variations of unemployment rates. However, as mentioned above, the
low number of internal migrants cannot be due to a lack of propensity
and willingness to move, bearing in mind the recent dynamics of inter-
national migration from Poland.
International migration
Migration out of Poland since May 2004 is characterised by increas-
ingly diversified flows with respect to receiving countries. In particular,
there is a visible shift of migration from old to new immigration coun-
tries (Table 9.2), with flows to the former declining (e.g. Germany) and
flows to the latter increasing (i.e. United Kingdom, Ireland, Spain, Italy,
the Netherlands). These trends are also corroborated in the administra-
tive data of receiving countries.
Although the growth in Polish migration is an experience of almost
every ‘new’ receiving country, the unprecedented growth in flows of mi-
grants was particularly marked in the UK and Ireland, where movement
has also been quite seasonal with increases in summer and decreases
around Christmas (Grabowska-Lusinska 2008).
Post-accession change is also occurring through the substitution of
legal migration for illegal migration, with the young and the better-
educated more involved in the migration stream, including those who
Figure 9.9 Migrants from Poland and the unemployment rate according to LFS,
1994-2007
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migrate in order to study. In addition, there was a growth in shuttle mo-
bility during the transition period, as people were pushed out of their
homes in order to earn money at a destination outside the country, but
quickly returned in order to spend this money. This new form of migra-
tion, also referred to as ‘incomplete migration’, is often connected to
work in a secondary segment of a labour market in a foreign country
and a strategy of ‘work there, live here’ (Jazwinska & Okólski 2001).
Trends in migration – both internal and international – confirm find-
ings on the co-existence of skill shortages and unemployment. Internal
migration has decreased significantly since the beginning of the transi-
tion period and internal migration does not seem to have helped allevi-
ate large unemployment differentials between small geographic areas.
There is a group of factors explaining the situation of low internal and
high external migration dynamics pinpointed above. It is important to
realise that when these factors operate singularly they do not threaten
the situation in local labour markets; but when they operate in combi-
nation may imply deeper discrepancies between Polish regions and fi-
nally put them into crisis.
Educational changes
The process of systemic transition in Poland has also influenced the
education system. Up until 1989, the education system in communist
Poland was autonomous in practice and was very loosely attached to the
labour market. During the first years of the transformation, the effects
of centrally planned education were keenly felt. They mostly resulted in
a low correlation between educational programmes and education levels
with demand in the labour market. The lack of a match between occu-
pational education and the labour market generated a high rate of un-
employment of graduates from vocational schools. The system of
Table. 9.2 Distribution of major countries of destination for migrants from Poland,
second quarter of 2000-2007 (%)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
UK 4 7 7 9 11 20 31 32
Germany 35 37 34 31 29 25 20 16
Ireland 0 0 0 0 3 6 7 12
Italy 6 8 14 13 11 12 8 8
US 19 23 19 20 19 11 11 7
The Netherlands 2 4 5 4 3 2 3 6
Spain 0 2 3 4 4 5 3 3
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Kepinska (2006, 2007) based on Labour Force Survey (BAEL)
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occupational education was mainly blamed for generating this unem-
ployment (Kwiatkowski 2000). Too narrow an educational perspective
made it difficult for graduates to change occupation as they were too
specialised. The closure of vocational schools – predominately attached
to huge communist factories – meant an effective suspension of most
occupational education in the country and a reduction in the perceived
value of such education. Very few substitution measures have been im-
plemented in order to narrow future skill gaps. A net effect is that there
are nowadays very few vocational schools and their graduates are almost
all directly recruited by foreign companies. With expanding skill
shortages and limited access to state programmes helping to alleviate
these gaps (e.g. occupational training and courses), employers have ta-
ken vocational education into their own hands by sponsoring classes
and training workers onsite (mostly in construction and the car indus-
try). This often implies a very quick, unsystematic, ungrounded and
narrow training, which may be associated with exploitation. This is par-
ticularly the case in the construction and services sectors, where skill
shortages make these sectors unable to face up to the economic boom.
Thus, skill shortages as revealed by official data reflect the inadequacy
of education in Poland.
There is another side to the coin when it comes to education gaps.
This relates to the emergence of new occupations in areas such as tele-
communications, internet and information technology; biotechnology
and its applications; environmental protection; sea and seabed exploita-
tion; servicing of the regional integration process; modern financial op-
erations and e-banking; e-trade; health care, health promotion, home as-
sistance for elderly people; the popular culture and entertainment in-
dustry; education and e-learning (Borkowska & Karpinski 2001).
Specialists in some of these areas already exist in the Polish labour mar-
ket, but some need to be educated or properly trained in order to fill
this gap, whilst some may need to be imported.
What do available data reveal in terms of skill shortages in Poland?
Poland has a shortage of both specialists and qualified workers, includ-
ing welders, ironworkers, upholsterers, bricklayers, drivers, crane opera-
tors and workers in routine jobs.7 Fourteen per cent of employers re-
port a shortage of workers and have problems in finding those with ap-
propriate skills. The lack of such workers may also limit the
productivity of affected industries. The problem has been increasing, as
shown by the fact that at the beginning of 2004, 8.2 per cent of employ-
ers reported a shortage of skills, whereas in 2005, after enlargement of
the EU in 2004, the number had increased up to 14 per cent. Skills
gaps are differentiated across different regions and branches of the
economy. For example, one in four furniture producers in Poland cur-
rently report not being able to find workers with appropriate skills,
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while two years ago only one in ten had this problem. In the forestry in-
dustry the situation is critical. One in three employers report having
problems in finding people with appropriate skills, while before enlar-
gement only one in five had this problem. In the construction sector,
which has recently boomed in Poland (and is likely to do so in the run
up to the Euro 2012 soccer tournament), every fifth company cannot
find workers, whereas before enlargement only 3.7 per cent of construc-
tion companies suffered from shortages. In electronics in 2005, 22.7
per cent of companies were facing a shortage of workers, while before 1
May 2004, only 2.2 per cent reported problems. In the car industry in
2005, 20.8 per cent of companies suffered from shortages of workers,
whereas before enlargement the figure was 7.4 per cent (CSO 2004-
2006).
In research conducted by the National Bank of Poland in the fourth
quarter of 2006 (Figure 9.10), a majority of employers reported pro-
blems with recruitment of new employees mainly due to the availability
of skills in specific areas of the labour market, saying this was caused
by the strong labour outflow or people leaving jobs in anticipation of
migration. This means that many jobs are vacant in the long term, mak-
ing employers unable to meet the needs of the booming economy
(especially in certain sectors, e.g. the construction and road sector).
Figure 9.10 Difficulties with recruiting and keeping employees in Poland in the
fourth quarter of 2006 (% of replies)
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According to a range of research studies, problems with recruitment
and retention of employees, as reported by employers, have a variety of
causes. These include a systematic increase in employers’ demands for
specific skills, the creation of new workplaces, the extension of the peri-
od during which people remain in education, a rapid movement of peo-
ple of productive age into non-productive activity, declining economic
activity of women with small children, avoidance by employers of en-
gagement in fixed-term contracts and the low level of interregional mo-
bility and dynamic outflow of skills abroad, both seasonally and
periodically.
Conclusions
The co-existence of skill shortages, outflows of labour and unemploy-
ment results from a constellation of factors that operate in combination.
This combination of factors have different implications for the labour
market. First, an increase in mismatches of supply and demand across
sectors, regions and occupations may lead to disharmony and diver-
gence and may deepen disequilibrium in the labour market. Second, a
high share of agriculture in the employment structure and low share of
services may lead to slow adaptation to global markets, resulting in high
long-term, structural unemployment and a declining employment activ-
ity rate. Third, low inter-regional mobility of labour caused by shortages
in housing, underdeveloped road and railway infrastructure, small wage
differences, low level of re-specialisation of regions and high concentra-
tion of services may lead to a sustaining of the status quo of skill
shortages and skill surpluses, resulting in a large waste of human re-
sources and the perpetuation of under-utilised labour pools. At the end
of the day, this may deepen systemic transition gaps between regions.
In addition, segmentation of the Polish labour market with an enlar-
ging secondary sector may lead to an excess of labour along with in-
creasing shortages, which may unevenly lead to an increasing demand
for foreign labour. Gaps between the nature of the education system
and actual demand for labour may also progressively complicate the la-
bour market situation, given the development of new technologies on
the one hand, and the narrowing and specialisation of the economy on
the other. These gaps should create an urgent need for recognition of
new occupations and specialisations in the education system as well as
changes in the way education addresses the demands of existing occu-
pations, in order to meet labour market requirements. Otherwise, skill
shortages will be an indigenous defect of the transition process, which
can be cured only by exogenous labour, recruited from outside the
Polish labour market.
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Finally, in the short term, periodic emigration may be a solution for
high unemployment (constituting the export of unemployment), but
may in the long term contribute to a ‘brain drain’, both nationally and
regionally. ‘Incomplete migration’, both in the short term and the long
term, may also lead to a disharmony of employment activity of indigen-
ous labour resources because people working abroad seasonally prefer
not to be economically active in the local labour market when they are
back in Poland.
Notes
1 A part of this text was originally published under the theme ‘Political economy of mi-
gration and mobility in the EU’ at www.migrationonline.cz. The initial conclusions
presented in this chapter are part of an analysis conducted for the project ‘Migration
policy as a measure of promoting and combating unemployment in Poland’ (module
2 ‘Demand for foreign labour in Poland’) co-financed by the European Social Fund,
Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources (activity 1.1).
2 Sadowska-Snarska (2000) demonstrated a correlation between changes of employ-
ment structure and economic growth in Poland.
3 Beveridge curves provide a useful perspective on potential skilled labour shortages as
well as on structural changes in the labour market. High and increasing levels of un-
filled job vacancies, especially at low levels of unemployment, may denote skilled
worker shortages and labour market tightening. If combined with sustained levels of
high unemployment, they may indicate a mismatch in the labour market between
skills available and skills required. In addition, an outward (or inward) shift of the
curve over time may denote a decrease (or increase) in the efficiency of labour market
matching. However, any analysis of the Beveridge curve must bear in mind the defi-
ciencies of currently available job vacancies data as indicators of unsatisfied labour de-
mand (OECD 2001, Employment Outlook).
4 Except the indigent, students, the clergy and homemakers, those temporarily in work
deliberately avoided statutory retirement.
5 The fall in demand in heavy industries was fairly mild, and dispersed over time. ‘Soft’
rather than shock measures were implemented during the process of restructuring
the heavy industries. This was achieved thanks to strong pressure from trade unions
who managed to win special treatment from the state, including protective and pre-
ventive programmes.
6 The recent recovery of the construction sector might enhance internal migration, par-
ticularly if international migration loses its attraction.
7 Data extracted from Central Statistical Office.
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10 Optimising migration effects:
A perspective from Bulgaria
Eugenia Markova
Introduction
Research on Bulgarian migration has been rather sketchy, often being
based either on small purposive samples in selected host countries or
on macro data of unreliable quality from Bulgaria itself. More recently,
some analyses have focused on certain socio-economic impacts of the
emigration phenomenon on Bulgaria. These analyses mainly refer to
the effects of remittances and of a ‘brain drain’ on labour supply and
on family structures, particularly on the children of migrant parents.
A better and more thorough understanding of the positive and nega-
tive consequences of migration for Bulgaria is needed as this would
heighten the possibility for policymaking, both in receiving and origin
countries, to help optimise the benefits of migration. This chapter aims
to enhance this understanding by identifying the size and nature as well
as the dynamics of emigration, providing empirical evidence on the eco-
nomic and social costs and benefits of emigration for Bulgaria and dis-
cussing the most recent government measures to maximise the benefits
of migration. The chapter concludes by summarising the major chal-
lenges for policymakers in Bulgaria.
The discussion is supported by data from the 2001 population census
in Bulgaria, the Bulgarian National Bank, the National Statistical
Institute, the Institute for Market Economics, the OECD and the Council
of Europe, the Agency for Bulgarians Abroad, in-depth interviews with
local authority officials and returned seasonal migrants (Guentcheva,
Kabakchieva & Kolarski 2003) and quantitative evidence from household
survey data (Mintchev & Boshnakov 2006), together with micro survey
data collected by the author (Markova 2001; Markova & Sarris 2002;
Markova 2006; Markova & Reilly 2007). The last section of the chapter
draws on policy documents produced by the Bulgarian government.
The dynamics of migration from Bulgaria: An overview
The period: September 1944 – November 1989
The end of World War II marked a fundamental change in the migratory
processes and policies in Bulgaria and a new era for Bulgarian ethnic
minorities as well. A ban on the free movement of Bulgarian citizens
was introduced through sophisticated border policing systems and a very
restrictive and highly complicated system for issuing passports.
Bulgarian emigration in this period was predominantly motivated by po-
litical reasons or was related to ethnicity. Labour emigration was entirely
controlled by the state. Labour supply was regulated by bilateral agree-
ments either with other countries from the Warsaw Pact or with coun-
tries in the Arab world, such as Syria, Libya, Tunisia, Iraq and others that
followed policies that were sympathetic with communist principles.
Ethnic emigration
Ethnic emigration during this period occurred mainly in three massive
waves. The first occurred in the period 1946-1951 when predominantly
Bulgarian Turks, Jews, Armenians and Russians left Bulgaria. The emi-
gration of Bulgarian Turks remained the most significant phenomenon
in the history of post-World War II Bulgaria. Facilitated by a bilateral
agreement signed with Turkey, some 154,000 Bulgarian Turks migrated
to Turkey in the period 1950-1951. They settled primarily in the
Marmara and the Aegean Sea regions. The collectivisation of land in
Bulgaria was also considered a strong ‘push’ factor for the first mass
outflow of ethnic Turks since the majority of them were farmers and
the expropriation of the land in 1949 was felt as a severe shock. In sub-
sequent years, several agreements were signed with Turkey to reunite
divided Turkish families, and another 130,000 people left for Turkey be-
tween 1968-1978 (Zhelyaskova 1998; Petkova 2002). After the Turks,
Jews were the second-largest group involved in the post-World War II
ethnic emigration flows from Bulgaria.1 Between 1948-1949, some
32,106 Jews emigrated from Bulgaria to Israel. Earlier, another 4,000
Jews, mainly youth and children, had migrated to Israel to join the
Zionist struggle (Guentcheva et al. 2003: 12). In the period 1946-1951,
there was a mass emigration of Armenians as well. Actively facilitated
by the Soviet government, about 8,000 left, mainly to Armenia
(Mintchev 1999). Several dozen Russian families from north-eastern
Bulgaria also left for the Soviet Union. Around 2,000 Slovaks and
Czechs returned to their home country from Bulgaria between 1949
and 1951 (Guentcheva et al. 2003: 12-13).
The second wave of mass ethnic emigration occurred during the peri-
od 1966-1980, when the total net emigration from Bulgaria reached
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115,309 people. Almost all of these emigrants were ethnic Turks who
moved to Turkey in accordance with bilateral agreements (Guentcheva
et al. 2003: 11). This emigration was particularly intense between 1976
and 1979, with a highpoint in 1978 when net emigration from Bulgaria
reached 33,000 (Gächter 2002).
In the spring of 1989, a few months before the fall of the communist
government, there was a large exodus of Bulgarian Turks leaving for
Turkey. This was the infamous mass exodus, ironically called ‘the big
excursion’, which most political scientists in Bulgaria believed had a
great impact upon the shattering of the communist regime
(Guentcheva et al. 2003: 14). It marked a dramatic culmination of years
of tensions and resilience among the Turkish community, which inten-
sified with the Bulgarian government’s assimilation campaign in the
winter of 1985 that attempted to make ethnic Turks change their names
to Bulgarian Slavic names. The campaign began with a ban on wearing
traditional Turkish dress and speaking Turkish in public places followed
by the forced name-changing campaign. This ‘Bulgarisation’ policy pro-
voked resistance among the Turkish minority, expressed in the form of
protests and demonstrations, many of which were violently suppressed
by troops. Some Turks went on hunger strike. In May 1989, the
Bulgarian authorities began to expel Turks (Poulton 1993). When the
Turkish government’s efforts to negotiate with Bulgaria for an orderly
migration failed, Turkey opened its borders to Bulgaria on 2 June 1989.
A mass influx followed. Some claimed that Turkey was given more than
US$ 250 million in grants and loans by the United States government
and the Council of Europe in order to open its borders to Bulgarian
Turks (Bobeva 1994: 225). However, the Turkish government decided
on 21 August 1989 to reintroduce immigration visa requirements for
ethnic Turks, which had been temporarily lifted in June (Kirisci 1996).
It was estimated that about 360,000 ethnic Turks had by then left for
Turkey (Zhelyazkova 1998). More than a third would subsequently re-
turn to Bulgaria once the ban on Turkish names had been revoked in
December 1989 (Guentcheva et al. 2003: 14).
Political emigration
The establishment of the communist regime determined a wave of poli-
tical emigration from Bulgaria, especially after 1948 when the leftist op-
position parties were dissolved. According to figures from the
International Refugee Organisation (IRO), in the period 1947-1952
about 2,000 Bulgarians demanded political asylum in Yugoslavia, 850
in Australia, 590 in the US, 560 in Canada and 360 in Brazil; some
1,500 Bulgarians were granted political asylum in the German Federal
Republic.2 At that time, there were also about 900 Bulgarian refugees
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in Yugoslavia and 800 in Turkey (Vernant 1953). According to data from
the IRO, there were 14,283 applications for asylum in Europe made by
Bulgarian nationals between 1947 and 1987 (Gächter 2002).
From the end of World War II until 1949, the principal channels
used by political emigrants were through Turkey and Greece. However,
during the 1944-1949 civil war in Greece, access to the country became
difficult and even dangerous. Moreover, the frontier was very strictly
guarded by the Bulgarian authorities and entry was forbidden into a
twenty-mile deep military zone to all persons lacking a special permit.
These difficulties did not prevent several thousands of Bulgarians from
fleeing the country and some even chose the roundabout route through
Romania and Hungary on their way to the West. The deterioration of
Bulgaria’s relations with Yugoslavia created a third migration channel
through the western border between the two countries (Vernant 1953).
The largest communities of political emigrants were concentrated in
the neighbouring countries of Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia and in
Western Europe, namely Italy and France. Bulgarian political emigra-
tion was ideologically and politically divided. It was even more divided
in 1950 when the communist government decreed an amnesty that al-
lowed a one-year grace period for all political refugees to return to
Bulgaria, the only exception being those found guilty of political espio-
nage. As a result, Bulgarian political emigration never managed to con-
solidate itself and become a powerful opposition to the communist gov-
ernment (see Guentcheva et al. 2003). The number of Bulgarian politi-
cal asylum seekers grew in the late 1940s and early 1950s and then
decreased in the late 1950s, when only 1,063 managed to emigrate. The
numbers decreased further in the 1980s to just 684 registered emi-
grants between 1981 and 1988 (Table 10.1). However, the accuracy of
the official emigration data contained in the Statistical Yearbooks of
Bulgaria, from 1952-1989, is highly debatable as it would not have cap-
tured those who had used ‘illegal’ ways to leave the country and re-
quested asylum abroad. For example, the official statistics in Bulgaria
point to 684 emigrants who left the country in 1981-1988. For the same
period, the statistics of the host countries have registered 2,761 asylum
applications lodged by Bulgarian citizens: 893 in Germany, 851 in
Austria, 384 in Italy, 166 in Switzerland, 119 in Greece, 105 in Turkey,
67 in Belgium, 55 in Sweden, 41 in Spain, 24 in the Netherlands, 20 in
the UK, 19 in Denmark, 13 in Norway, 3 in Portugal and 1 in Finland
(calculations based on data in UNHCR 2001).
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The period after November 1989
On 10 November 1989, the Bulgarian communist regime fell after 45
years of uninterrupted rule, and Bulgarian citizens were allowed free-
dom of travel again. According to the National Statistical Institute
(1992), some 218,000 Bulgarians left the country in this particular year
and emigration flows were mainly directed towards Turkey (Table 10.2).
This emigration wave is estimated to have been the highest since 1989.
The subsequent emigration wave was prompted by continuously dete-
riorating economic conditions and widespread disillusionment, espe-
cially amongst young people, with the first democratic elections in
1990 won by the renamed communist party. Almost 88,000 people left
in 1990. Once again, most of them were Bulgarian Turks. This time,
however, they were ‘pushed’ by economic reasons since the country’s
economic decline affected especially ethnically mixed regions of
Bulgaria, where people’s main livelihoods were tobacco growing and
Table 10.1 Total number of emigrants from Bulgaria, 1946-1988
Year Emigrants
1946-1950 100,121
1951-1955 101,454
1956-1960 1,063
1961-1965 429
1966-1970 14,280
1971-1975 27,139
1976-1980 73,890
1981-1988 684
Source: Statistical Yearbooks of Bulgaria, 1952-1989
Table 10.2 Bulgarian emigration 1989-1996
Year Men Women Total
1989 106,432
(48.8%)
111,568
(51.2%)
218,000
(100%)
1990 68,759
(78.2%)
19,136
(21.8%)
87,895
(100%)
1991 19,112
(47.5%)
21,152
(52.5%)
40,264
(100%)
1992 Figures for these years are not broken
down by gender
65,250
1993 69,609
1994 64,000
1995 54,000
1996 66,000
Source: National Statistical Institute
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construction. The prices of tobacco were plummeting, the markets in
the former socialist block countries were lost, the construction sector
was collapsing whilst residents in the border regions no longer enjoyed
state privileges as part of the border control system during commu-
nism. In addition, there was rising unemployment. At the end of 1990
the total official number of unemployed reached 70,000. Although this
was a small proportion of a workforce of almost four million, it had a
significant psychological impact. Many people were leaving the country
because of fears of growing unemployment (Hutchings 1994). The
most popular country of destination was Germany, chosen by 20 per
cent of total emigrants. In 1991, the German Ministry of Foreign
Affairs recorded about 13,000 Bulgarian asylum seekers. Seasonal mi-
gration to Greece intensified in 1990. According to unofficial data from
the Bulgarian Ministry of Interior, around 33,000 Bulgarian citizens mi-
grated to Greece in 1990 as seasonal farm workers. This emigration
wave was characterised by a ‘brain drain’ as well because 55 per cent of
the emigrants had an educational level at secondary school or higher,
and 12 per cent were university graduates. Of the highly qualified work-
ers, 10 per cent came from engineering and technical fields, followed
by economics and agricultural specialisations. The main driving force
for the highly qualified was their desire to work in their chosen profes-
sions while there was a growing threat of unemployment due to the clo-
sure of many Bulgarian research institutes and the redundancy of man-
agement posts in the public sector (SOPEMI 1993).
In 1991-1992, the emigration of highly qualified workers continued.
Some 12 per cent of emigrants were university graduates and 18 per
cent had post-secondary diplomas. In the autumn of 1992, emigration
to Turkey resumed at an even greater rate. The ‘push’ factors were
mainly related to the depressed economic conditions. The semi-
mountainous regions inhabited by ethnically mixed groups, especially
Bulgarians of Turkish origin, were left without state subsidies or other
forms of state assistance and experienced deep recession (SOPEMI
1993). According to the 1992 census, some 344,849 Bulgarians of
Turkish origin had migrated to Turkey between 1989 and 1992, which
resulted in significant demographic decline in southern Bulgaria and
the complete depopulation of some municipalities (SOPEMI 1995).
In 1993, Bulgaria was placed on the EU’s visa ‘blacklist’. Restrictive
visa regimes by EU countries significantly changed the direction and
character of the migration flows. Official emigration to Western Europe
– excepting Austria, a traditional economic and commercial partner,
and Germany – dropped dramatically. Emigration to Greece and Italy
was largely undocumented in character.
After 1993, Bulgarian emigration had a predominantly economic
character. In the period 1990-1994, employment levels dropped by 45
212 MARKOVA
per cent and the real-wage rate by 52 per cent. The real-wage decline
was affected by two price shocks in 1991 and 1994, together with an in-
adequate compensation policy for the population (Beleva, Dobrev,
Zareva & Tsanov 1996). Therefore, higher living standards and the de-
sire for prosperity were the most important ‘pull’ factors for
emigration.
By 1996, Bulgaria was facing its most severe political and economic
crisis. The average monthly salary plummeted to less than US$ 70 in
the second half of May 1996, following the drastic devaluation of the
national currency; the rate of inflation was officially recorded at 310.8
per cent for 1996. This level of inflation was reminiscent of the figure
for 1991, when, for the first time in Bulgaria, prices were liberalised
and inflation hit the record level of 438.5 per cent. Survival was the
most powerful reason for leaving the country. In 1997 and 1998, emi-
gration was facilitated by the Central European Free Trade Area
(CEFTA), which favoured migration between the countries in transition.
Emigration was directed mainly towards the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Romania (SOPEMI 1999). Spain, in addition, became an attractive
destination for Bulgarian migrants in the second half of the 1990s.
Anecdotal evidence attributes this migration mainly to the comparative
tolerance of the Spanish authorities, employers and local people towards
undocumented foreign workers. Researchers at the Gabinet d’Estudis
Socials (GES) in Barcelona estimated the total number of registered
Bulgarians in Spain on 1 January 2007 to be 118,182 (GES 2008). In
the second half of the 1990s, the number of Bulgarians choosing the
UK as a destination became more significant, when Bulgarians started
making use of the ECAA visas that allowed them entry into the UK as
self-employed business people.
Since 2001, Bulgaria has experienced appreciable though declining
rates of emigration. According to OECD data for the period 2001-2004,
an estimated 60,000 to 100,000 people left the country, which repre-
sented a considerable fall compared to an estimated 210,000 people
who emigrated during the period 1998-2001. With about 88,000
Bulgarian immigrants registered in European Union countries in
2004,3 Bulgaria ranked fourth amongst the top ten countries of origin
for migrants in the EU, after Romania, Poland and Morocco (SOPEMI
2006). This was a period of intensive reconstruction and implementa-
tion of sound macroeconomic policies in an attempt to fulfil the EU ac-
cession criteria. As a result, average growth exceeded 6 per cent per
year in 2004-2007. The country successfully completed EU negotia-
tions in June 2004 and then, in April 2005, the accession treaty was
signed in Luxemburg. On 1 January 2007, Bulgaria joined the European
Union. Per capita income increased by an average of 6 per cent per year
since 1998 (at purchasing power parity in real terms). Unemployment
OPTIMISING MIGRATION EFFECTS 213
was reduced substantially from close to 20 per cent in 2000 to below 7
per cent in 2007. In the first half of 2007, the tendency for a real
growth of GDP above 6 per cent continued to signify a stable pattern of
economic development in the country.4 However, despite an overall po-
sitive performance, Bulgaria continues to be one of the poorest coun-
tries in the EU. The country’s per capita income in 2006 at purchasing
power parity was just 37 per cent of the average level of the EU-27.5 The
large income differences reflect significant gaps in investment and pro-
ductivity and in the functioning of product and factor markets, and still
propel emigration. A recent EU audit of the management of EU funds
in the country published in July 2008 revealed that Bulgaria was not
able to fully benefit from the EU assistance because of critical weak-
nesses in administrative and judicial capacity at all levels. High levels of
corruption and organised crime exacerbated these problems.6 However,
the ‘push-pull’ factors of emigration from the 1990s are still valid.
Following the country’s EU accession in 2007, Bulgarians continue
to leave the country because of low living standards, for better profes-
sional realisation and for access to education. Key amongst emigrants
are young people accepted at universities abroad and seasonal workers.
The growing tendency towards temporary and seasonal migration,
rather than permanent settlement – with the most preferred destina-
tions being Greece, Turkey, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany and Spain
– intensified in the spring of 2001 when Bulgaria was removed from
the Schengen ‘blacklist’. As a result, Bulgarian citizens could travel
freely within the Schengen area for three months. Many exploited this
opportunity to undertake illegal employment in Europe while residing
there legally. This phenomenon has further expanded with Bulgaria’s
EU membership. Most member states have imposed labour market re-
strictions for Bulgarian citizens except for self-employment; however,
Bulgarian workers are exercising their right for free movement in the
EU zone; while doing so they often undertake semi-legal jobs for a few
months; they are a particularly mobile category of temporary semi-legal
workers. The rise in temporary or circular (repeated) economic migra-
tion, predominantly undocumented or semi-documented (with a legal
right to residence but not to work) in character, is attributed to in-
creased unemployment in certain regions within Bulgaria. Pockets of
extreme poverty still persist in the country, especially in ethnically
mixed rural areas. Thus, seasonal and circular migration becomes more
ethnically and regionally specific. In some municipalities in Bulgaria,
the emigrants are entirely of Turkish origin while, in others, there are
ethnic Bulgarians. In some other municipalities, Roma people are pre-
dominant. For example, of all undocumented Bulgarian migrants in the
Netherlands, 80 per cent were said to be ethnic Turks, most of them
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coming from the south-eastern Bulgarian district of Kurdzhali
(Guentcheva et al. 2003).
Last but not least, the US, via its Green Card lottery system, remains
an important destination for permanent settlement, attracting annually
between 5,000 and 6,000 Bulgarian immigrants (SOPEMI 2005).
Review of the empirical evidence on the effects of migration on
Bulgaria
Migration impacts a home country in a variety of ways, depending upon
the magnitude, composition and nature of migration flows as well as
upon the specific context from which migrants are drawn. In the case
of Bulgaria as a migrant origin country, six key aspects of migrations
may be distinguished: the demographic effects that also include the ef-
fects of working-age labour migrants; the economic effects that encom-
pass the contribution of remittances, the consequences of a brain drain
and the potential for gain routed through an educated, economically ac-
tive diaspora and the importance of return migration; and the social
consequences. What does the empirical evidence on Bulgarian migra-
tion indicate with respect to each of these?
Demographic effects
In the years between the last two censuses of 1992 and 2001, the
Bulgarian population fell by 6 per cent and over one third of the reduc-
tion was attributed to emigration – some 217,809 people left the coun-
try during this period (National Statistical Institute 2004: 43). This fig-
ure is inconsistent with previous official statistics for the same period.
For instance, for the period 1993-1996, the National Statistical Institute
(NSI) estimated that the number of emigrants was 253,609 people
(Table 2). For 1998-2001, official estimates put the emigrant number at
210,000 people (SOPEMI 2006). Results from Bulgaria’s 2001 census
put the country’s population at 7.9 million, a decrease of about half a
million from the previous census in 1992. The Economist Intelligence
Unit in London gave even lower population figures, estimating
Bulgaria’s population in 2001 at 7.7 million and forecasting a further
fall to a total of 7.3 million by the year 2006.7.
At the end of 2004, the permanent population of Bulgaria was
7,761,049, a decrease of 40,224 people compared to the population fig-
ures of 2003 (National Statistical Institute 2005: 14). The negative devel-
opment in the last few years is attributed to both a negative natural po-
pulation growth (a low fertility level and an extremely high mortality
rate) and emigration. Bulgaria is amongst the five ‘oldest’ countries in
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Europe together with Italy, Greece, Germany and Spain, with a share of
the older-age group (65 and over) at more than 16 per cent of the total
population (Council of Europe 2004). At the end of 2004, the share of
young people under fifteen years of age was 1,073,000 (13.8 per cent).
For the period 1998-2004, this share decreased by 268,000 and the
share of people above 65 years of age increased by 26,000, and by the
end of 2004 reached 1,331,000 people (17.1 per cent). In 2004, the
working-age population was 4,782,000 people (61.6 per cent); as a re-
sult of mainly legislative changes, this category of people had increased
by 35,000 people (0.7 per cent) compared to 2003. Nevertheless, the
country’s old-age dependency ratio (the number of people below fifteen
and over 64 per 100 of the population between fifteen and 64) dropped
to 44.9 per cent in 2004, a reduction of 4 per cent compared to 1998
(National Statistical Institute 2005: 16).
Massive emigration, especially from the ethnically mixed regions in
south-east Bulgaria resulted in the depopulation of some areas.8
Research on the home impacts of seasonal migration from Bulgaria
(Guentcheva et al. 2003) pointed to some serious political consequences
of the phenomenon. For example, as a result of the decline in the popu-
lation in the ethnically mixed Kurdzhali region, two parliamentary seats
were lost, which diminished the region’s overall political power.
Bulgaria is already experiencing labour shortages both of high- and low-
skilled labour. Recently, the government announced the transformation
of the country from a migrant origin and a transit country into a mi-
grant receiving one (Ministry of Labour and Social Policy 2008).
Forecasts by the National Statistical Institute (NSI) of Bulgaria indi-
cate that in the next 50 years the population of Bulgaria will shrink to
5.1 million, regardless of increasing birth rates. The annual drop in pop-
ulation will be 40,000 people if current rates of socio-economic devel-
opment persists and policies remain unchanged. The Director of the
NSI’s Population Department has commented in the press that emigra-
tion was the main reason for the dramatic population decrease. His cal-
culations estimated about 20,000 Bulgarians leave the country each
year. However, the Minister of Labour and Social Policy presented a
more optimistic picture of the Bulgarians’ intensions for emigration –
in 2007, the share of Bulgarians who were planning to work abroad de-
creased by 80 per cent compared to 2001. Employment agencies in the
country claim that recently they have been receiving requests from qual-
ified Bulgarians living abroad who are interested in finding a job and
returning more permanently to the country.
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Economic impact of migration
Remittances
Data released by the Bulgarian National Bank show that the amount of
money sent by Bulgarians abroad to relatives in the country has in-
creased consistently in absolute terms and as a percentage of GDP,
from 1998 onwards (Table 10.3). For example, money transfers in 2004
comprised about 4.2 per cent of Bulgarian GDP and amounted to a
greater share of national income than the educational and healthcare
budget of the country. In 2006, the World Bank registered an increase
in the amount of remittances, recording a total flow of US$ 1,695 mil-
lion, or about 5.4 per cent of the country’s GDP (World Bank 2008: 71).
Given the existence of informal methods of remitting money (transfers
in cash and in-kind from returning Bulgarians emigrants), this figure is
likely to under-report the actual scale of such transfers. Mintchev and
Boshnakov (2006) estimate that the official figures register just some
45-50 per cent of actual migrant remittances.
According to data released by the Agency for Bulgarians Abroad,9 at
least 300,000 people send amounts ranging between US$ 100 to US$
300 to their families on a regular monthly basis. Remittances are used
primarily to cover basic needs and the purchase of durable goods.
Stanchev, Kostadinova, Dimitrov, Angelov, Dimitrova, Karamakalakova,
Cankov and Markova (2005) argue that remittances have become very
important for improving living standards and reviving local economies
through increased consumption and investment. These macroeconomic
effects, they claim, can also have the effect of delaying government
Table 10.3 The size of remittances and their share of main macro-indicators
Year Remittances
(E million)
Exports
(%)
Imports
(%)
GDP
(%)
FDI
(%)
Healthcare
budget (%)
Educational
budget (%)
1998 170.2 3.18 3.20 1.48 35.61 … …
1999 233.3 4.30 3.81 1.92 30.75 … …
2000 305.9 4.01 3.66 2.24 27.82 … 50.0
2001 472.5 5.83 5.01 3.11 52.94 77.3 77.5
2002 531.7 6.22 5.45 3.22 55.90 72.3 76.8
2003 613.0 6.48 5.50 3.48 49.64 89.2 87.9
2004 812.3 7.15 6.08 4.18 35.66 103.2 101.5
2005
(January-September) 587.0 3.09 2.53 1.95 22.60 … …
2006* 1,356** … … 5.4 … … …
Source: Bulgarian National Bank and National Statistical Institute (in Kostadinova 2005,
available at www.ime.bg)
* World Bank (2008: 71)
** The figure is based on the average exchange rate for 2006, US$ 1  E 0.80
(www.x-rates.com/d/EUR/USD/hist2006.html).
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reforms for economic restructuring and policies to tackle underlying
causes of emigration. The ability of the private households to satisfy
their immediate needs independently from the government can create a
disincentive for the authorities to work for a better business environ-
ment and to deal with the economic and structural problems that
pushed the people to leave initially.
A qualitative study on the effects of seasonal migration on Bulgaria
by Guentcheva et al. (2003) confirms the use of remittances for con-
sumption and the purchase of houses and flats. In an interview about
the use of remittances, the secretary of the Momchilgrad municipality,
in the Kurdzhali region, commented:
In spite of the widespread belief that remittances in the
Kurdzhali region are at least E 100 million a year, they are con-
sidered ‘dead capital’, immobilised into purchases of apartments,
houses or luxury cars. This money does not circulate, does not
serve local businesses. Money from seasonal workers abroad is
not significant, because such people work primarily in low-wage
sectors, do not bring much money and whatever they bring is
used for consumption (often conspicuous). Our municipality is
the region with the most Mercedes cars per person in the whole
country. (in Guentcheva et al. 2003: 49)
Bulgarian migrants do report spending money on health during their
short visits home, notably on dentistry as they cannot afford to visit a
dentist in Italy or Greece, where they live.
The pattern of allocating migrants’ money to houses and apartments
has boosted the real estate market in the region, significantly pushing
up prices. A quantitative study by Mintchev and Boshnakov (2006),
which used data from a random sample of 1,000 households, found
that migrant remittances were mainly used for consumption, purchas-
ing a car and property; very few, though, expressed an interest in buying
land. This was explained by reference to the underdeveloped land mar-
ket. Interestingly, it was also found that every fifth household receiving
transfers from abroad was involved in some kind of entrepreneurship
– to establish a new business and/or to support an existing one – whilst
this was true for only one in ten households not receiving remittances.
Transport, services and trade were the main sectors of productive in-
vestment. These were usually small- and medium-size businesses as
well as leasehold (e.g. purchase of a car and its use as a taxi).
Research regarding seasonal and undocumented migrants suggests
that they remit more and remit more often. A study by the author based
on questionnaire interviews with 100 undocumented Bulgarian immi-
grants living in Athens, Greece, in 1996, revealed that undocumented
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Bulgarians remitted on a monthly basis over half of their earnings and
there was no differentiation by marital status, number of family mem-
bers in Bulgaria, intentions to stay in Greece or any other attributes.
The only exception was the gender variable, indicating that women were
sending a larger share of their income to Bulgaria compared to men.
This could be explained by the fact that most of the women in the sam-
ple – divorced or married – had their children or whole families in
Bulgaria. The analysis of another sample of 153 Bulgarian immigrants
interviewed by the author in Athens and Crete in 1999, some ten
months after the implementation of the first legalisation programme in
Greece, showed considerable alteration in immigrants’ remitting and
saving behaviour. Almost half of the sample, having acquired legal sta-
tus and access to the banking system in Greece, had started saving
more money there, thus reducing the amount sent home. In contrast,
undocumented migrants being uncertain about their stay in Greece re-
mitted more often and remitted almost their entire income. The vari-
able on the number of family members in Bulgaria had a significant ex-
planatory power (at 1 per cent level of significance); an additional family
member in Bulgaria increased the probability of remitting by 34 per
cent (Markova 2001; Markova & Saris 2002). These findings are similar
to those reported by Markova and Reilly (2007). These authors, utilising
data from a sample of 188 Bulgarian immigrants living in Madrid in
2003-2004, found that the volume of remittances was higher, on aver-
age and ceteris paribus, for females and those married. The impact ef-
fect for the gender control suggested that, on average and keeping all
other variables constant, a female remitted annually about E 588 more
to Bulgaria than a male migrant. A married individual remitted over
E 420 more in the reference year than those in all other marital status
categories. If the number of family members in Bulgaria rose by one,
the volume of annual remittances would rise by E 135. In contrast, one
additional family member in Spain corresponded with a fall of E 402.
The legal status of the respondents had the strongest effect. Bulgarian
immigrants who were living and working legally in Spain remitted al-
most E 1,220 less per year than those who were undocumented.
Brain drain effects
In addition to the impacts on demography and the availability of finan-
cial capital through remittances, SOPEMI (1998) suggests that a large
proportion of emigrants from Bulgaria are highly skilled, triggering
worries that Bulgaria is losing development potential (Gächter 2002).
According to Stojtchev, director of the Sofia branch of Gallup interna-
tional polling agency, 50-60 per cent of the emigrants are highly-
educated, and include well-trained specialists (Tomiuc 2002). Analysing
brain drain and brain gain within Europe, Wolburg (2002) points out
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that some 20,000 scientists left Bulgaria in 1989 heading West, primar-
ily to Germany, Ireland, the UK and France. In the period between
1990 and 1992, another 40,000 specialists left the country (Straubhaar
2000). For the same period, Bulgarian sources report an exodus of
some 40,000 Bulgarian scientists (Sretenova 2003). Chobanova (2003:
24 cited in Gill & Guth 2005: 6) states that in the case of Bulgaria: ‘The
country has lost one small town of 55,000 to 60,000 of its highest edu-
cated and skilled population each year during the last decade’. Horvat
(2004) argues that Bulgarian students are among the largest Southern
and Eastern European student populations in many European countries
and scientists from Bulgaria usually have a very high skill ratio. An in-
creasing number of Bulgarian citizens applied for the Highly Skilled
Migrant Programme (HSMP) in the UK during 2002-2005. The num-
ber of successful applicants ranged from six in 2002, when the scheme
began, to 40 in 2005.10
It is plausible to assume that the unfavourable demographic trends –
namely the dramatically declining birth rate and the emigration of
young people and whole families – have strongly affected the school en-
rolment rate in Bulgaria in recent years, which has resulted in job
losses for teachers. The number of children enrolled in primary and
secondary education has dropped since the mid 1990s. In turn, the
number of teachers in primary education fell from 24,601 in 1993-
1994 to 16,585 in 2007-2008, a decrease of 32.6 per cent; the decrease
of the number of secondary school teachers for the same period was
33.6 per cent (12,160 teachers).11 This author’s research has shown that
some 6 per cent of a sample of 100 undocumented Bulgarians in
Athens in 1996 were last employed in Bulgaria as primary and second-
ary school teachers; the figure rose to 9 per cent for Bulgarians inter-
viewed in Athens in 1999, in a sample of 153 (Markova 2001). In a sub-
sequent sample of 202 Bulgarian immigrants interviewed by this
author in Madrid in 2003-2004, some 7 per cent were teachers
(Markova 2006).
Nonetheless, brain drain had particularly severe consequences for the
development of the ethnically mixed regions in the country. Guentcheva
et al. (2003: 52) provide empirical evidence for this, showing that recent
emigration from these areas involved the most active and qualified seg-
ment of the population, i.e. those who had lost their privileged social
status during the transition years of the 1990s. Among them were for-
mer mayors, representatives of municipal councils, former policemen,
technicians, students and doctors. In an earlier piece of research based
on a set of Turkish statistics, Bobeva (1994: 227) showed that the com-
munity of Bulgarian Turks lost 9,000 university graduates to emigra-
tion during the early 1990s.
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Other researchers, however, believe that ‘there has been just a trickle
of highly qualified emigrants, and even cumulatively it is not big
enough to make any difference at all’ (Gächter 2002). They argue that
there has been no dearth of professionals and specialists in Bulgaria, at
least compared to other Balkan countries. The number of scientists and
researchers among Bulgaria’s working-age population still remained
high, especially in relation to GDP per capita at purchasing power parity
(PPP). Moreover, the reduction in the number of scientists and profes-
sionals only served to bring the numbers of technicians to a more rea-
listic and sustainable level, in line with other, wealthier, countries in the
area (Gächter 2002).
Bulgarian diaspora
There are still no accurate numbers on the size of the Bulgarian com-
munities abroad. The recently published National Strategy of the
Republic of Bulgaria on Migration and Integration (2008-2015) contains
some estimates both of the old political immigrants and the new immi-
grants who left the country after 1989: over 50,000 in Germany, about
25,000 in Austria, about 10,000 in the Czech Republic, about 50,000
in Italy, about 3,000 in the Slovak Republic, about 5,000 in Hungary,
about 4,000 in Belgium, about 110,000 in Greece, over 60,000 in the
UK, about 2,000 in Sweden, over 15,000 in France, around 10,000 in
Portugal, over 120,000 in Spain. Another 200,000 Bulgarians are in
the US, about 45,000 in Canada, some 15,000-20,000 are thought to
be in South Africa, and another 15,000-20,000 in Australia (Ministry of
Labour and Social Policy 2008: 5). However, Council of Europe data on
the stock of registered Bulgarian citizens in selected European destina-
tions for the period 2000-2004 suggest much lower numbers (Table
10.4).
Even without repatriation, the diaspora has the potential to play an
important role in Bulgaria’s economic development. In 2003, the
Agency for Bulgarians Abroad conducted a unique survey on the prob-
lems faced by the Bulgarian migrant community abroad in their at-
tempts to participate in Bulgaria’s economy.12 The survey found that a
lack of sufficient and reliable information on privatisation deals, invest-
ment possibilities and other aspects of economic reform in Bulgaria, as
well as corruption at all levels of governance and onerous bureaucratic
procedures, were amongst the main issues pointed out by Bulgarians
abroad as issues that affect the willingness of the Bulgarian migrant
community to invest in Bulgaria. Based on their responses, the survey
identified four main groups of Bulgarian migrants, according to their
economic relations with the country.
The first group consisted of very rich expatriates (about 50-70 per-
sons) who had made some large investments in the country. However,
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some of them have been accused of destabilising actions against the
state. Others were sceptical about investing in Bulgaria, fearing the
strong, ‘hidden’ influence of the former communist party. The second
group represented the ‘middle class’ of Bulgarian emigration (about
20,000 people). It is mainly in the US, Canada, Germany, Austria and
other Western European countries. They are considered as an already
established Bulgarian ‘lobby’ and a good investment potential for the
country. They are usually in professional occupations, with good man-
agerial skills and in good social and institutional positions in the host
countries. The third group comprised a wider range of Bulgarian emi-
grants, from those who migrate on a seasonal or temporary basis and
who are usually undocumented migrants, to legal migrants in the lower
Table 10.4 Stock of Bulgarian citizens in selected European countries
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Germany
Council of Europe, 2004
Federal Office for
Migration and Refugees
Germany (Haug 2005)
32,290 34,359 38,143
42,420
42,419
44,300
…
Greece
2001 census
Baldwin-Edwards 2004
35,104
46,114
Denmark* 394 408 426 460 …
Iceland* 44 58 62 72 68
Spain*
2005 census
3,031 … … 44,151 63,155
91,509
Italy* 5,637 6,758 … … …
Latvia* 22 24 25 23 28
Norway* 355 … 464 533 567
Portugal* 343 376 431 … …
Romania* 92 86 92 92 67
Slovenia* 127 66 68 … …
Hungary
Council of Europe 2004
SOPEMI 2005
1,499
1,200
1,200
1,100
1,146
1,100
1,085 1,118
Finland* 317 297 308 326
The Netherlands* 713 870 1,074 1,360 …
Czech Republic
Council of Europe 2004
SOPEMI 2005
5,454
4,000
4,131
4,100
3,558
4,200
3,783
4,100
3,904
UK
2001 census
(England & Wales)
5,154
5,350
Switzerland* 1,943 2,012 2,293 2,596 2,589
Sweden* 1,065 1,002 805 796 …
* Source: Council of Europe (2004: 310)
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social strata of the host country. Some 80 per cent of these people were
estimated to remit small amounts of money each month to their fa-
milies and relatives in the country. Finally, the fourth group included
ethnic Bulgarian who have resettled, usually close to Bulgarian borders.
They strive to establish economic ties with their motherland.
In the last few years, some young Bulgarian financial brokers have set
up organisations which aim to attract business interest to Bulgaria. The
City Club in London and the Wall Street Club in New York were the
most successful among them. It was the former prime minister, Ivan
Kostov, who in 2000 first attempted to attract the interest and expertise
of young Bulgarian expatriates to Bulgaria, organising an event titled
‘Bulgarian Easter’. Shortly after this, a similar initiative followed in the
summer of 2000, and was organised by the then president, Peter
Stoyanov. Ironically, just a year later, some of those invited to the event,
such as financial brokers from London, became the main reason
Kostov’s party suffered major losses in the election of June 2001.
Ironically, just a year later, some of those invited to the event, such as
financial brokers from London, became the main reason Kostov's party
suffered major losses in the election of June 2001. This election pre-
sented a very interesting situation: the winner was a party formed at the
last minute and led by a former king (who became prime minister fol-
lowing the elections). Among this party's candidates were professional
Bulgarian emigrants – including prominent participants in recent
Bulgarian government initiatives to attract highly skilled migrants to
Bulgaria – who put on hold their careers in the West to participate in
Bulgarian politics. They formed the first government comprised mainly
of returned professionals.
Greek banks in Bulgaria: Another emigration effect?
At the beginning of the 1990s, increasing transactions and rising de-
mand for financial services had motivated Greek banks to expand their
services into Bulgaria. The establishment of banks in Bulgaria, as in
other countries in the region, has also been prompted to a large degree
by the increased level of emigration and has thus facilitated remit-
tances. Legalised migrants are the main users of the banking system in
transferring their money home. Since 1998, when the Greek govern-
ment implemented its first regularisation programme to grant legal sta-
tus to undocumented foreigners, the number of Bulgarian immigrants
legally residing and working in Greece has substantially increased.
Statistics from the database on residence permits, cited in the 2004
Hellenic Migration Policy Institute (IMEPO) report and compiled for
the year 2003-2004 by the Mediterranean Migration Observatory
(MMO), identify 66,787 Bulgarians in Greece (Baldwin-Edwards 2004).
This increase may explain the growing number of Greek bank branches
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in Bulgaria in recent years. For example, Alpha Bank has now opened
branches in twenty cities in Bulgaria. Five Greek banks – National Bank
of Greece (which owns 99.9 per cent of the United Bulgarian Bank),
EFG-Eurobank (affiliated with Postbank), Alpha Bank, Piraeus Bank
and Emporiki Bank – currently have a market share of 25-30 per cent in
Bulgaria.13 It is plausible to assume that these bank branches are in-
creasingly turning into important employers for local people, especially
for those who have worked in Greece.
In addition to the Greek banks in Bulgaria, there are 419 Greek busi-
nesses operating in the country; some 40 per cent of them were regis-
tered after the year 2000 following almost a decade of Bulgarian immi-
gration to Greece.14 Anecdotal evidence suggests that some of them,
especially small- and medium-size companies have been established
through connections with Bulgarian immigrants in Greece, and have
been recruiting bilingual returnees from Greece.
Social effects
There is little empirical evidence – with the exception of a few studies –
on the social effects of emigration in Bulgaria. Most of the available in-
formation is anecdotal and discussed in the press. The main social ef-
fects of emigration reported in Bulgaria consist of changes in family
composition and child outcomes in terms of health and education.
Changes in family composition occur either when only one partner
emigrates – which sometimes leads to a break-up – or when both part-
ners emigrate and the children are left at home. Research on Eastern
European immigrants in London and Brighton, UK, conducted in
2005, revealed that a little over one in five Bulgarians had left their part-
ners in Bulgaria and most of their children lived there (Markova &
Black 2007). Some male migrants involved in circular migration to
Greece reported having families in both the home and the host country.
As many have been reported as saying: ‘I have a home here and there; I
have a wife in Bulgaria and two children; now, I have a partner and a
child in Greece as well’ (Markova 2005).
Children are most affected by the emigration of their parents. A
study by Guentcheva et al. (2003) warns of the high dropout school
rates amongst children of migrant parents who have been left behind
in Bulgaria in the care of grandparents or aunts. According to teachers,
such pupils enjoy the freedoms associated with having more money
than children whose parents did not migrate. They become easily
spoiled and undisciplined and do not obey their elderly grandparents or
other relatives serving as their guardians. They start smoking and drink-
ing and eventually leave school altogether.
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In the last few years, the Bulgarian press has often described these
children as having ‘Skype parents’.15 One study on access to education
in Bulgaria found that the most frequently cited reason for dropping
out of school was to join family members who have left for seasonal
short-term or longer-term stay abroad (Iliev & Kabakchieva 2002).
However, research also reveals some positive stories of families of re-
turned seasonal migrants who have invested their savings into securing
a better education for their children (Guentcheva et al. 2003).
State management of emigration
State policy towards emigration has changed significantly since the
communist era. Prior to 1989, emigration policies were directed at
eliminating or reducing international travel. Bulgaria’s post-communist
migration policy aimed to achieve an optimal balance between the free-
dom of movement of people and the control of undocumented migra-
tion, whilst at the same time respecting the fundamental human rights
and freedoms as guaranteed by international and European standards
and conventions (Mintchev 1999). Strategic policy goals included: im-
provement in the management of economic migration; increasing bor-
der security in view of taking on regional responsibilities for the protec-
tion of the external borders of the EU; protecting the rights and promot-
ing the integration of legal immigrants in Bulgaria; international
cooperation and compliance with international treaties on migration
(Ministry of Labour and Social Policy 2004). In an attempt to stem un-
documented migration, since 1991, several bilateral agreements for em-
ployment of seasonal or temporary workers have been signed.
At present, bilateral employment agreements exist with Germany,
Spain, Switzerland, France, Luxembourg, Portugal, the Czech Republic,
the Flemish Union of Belgium and the region of Lombardy in Italy.16
These agreements provide for the employment of a limited number of
Bulgarian nationals, including students, for specified periods of time
and in professions where there are skill shortages in the host country.
Bilateral agreements on social security exist with Germany, Poland,
Spain, Luxembourg, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, FYROM, Ukraine,
Croatia, Serbia, Turkey, Hungary, Austria, Cyprus, Romania, Albania,
Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Libya.17
As a response to the dramatic depopulation of the ethnically mixed
regions in Bulgaria, the government attempted to resettle ethnic
Bulgarians from abroad. The ‘unwritten’ policy amounted to an attempt
to achieve an ethnic balance in ‘ethnically sensitive areas’ – border areas
in the south with ethnically mixed populations. Thus, returning ethnic
Bulgarians from Moldova and Ukraine were resettled in the Kurdzhali
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region. However, the programme was not particularly successful as
most of the returning ethnic Bulgarians wanted to settle in the cities,
where some of the young ethnic returnees were enrolled at universities
through a special government programme (Guentcheva et al. 2003: 53).
Recently, the Bulgarian government introduced its long-awaited na-
tional strategy on migration and integration for the period 2008-2015.
Its main objective is to attract Bulgarians living abroad and foreign citi-
zens of Bulgarian origin to settle more permanently in the country; it
also plans to attract highly skilled third-country nationals to cover labour
shortages. However, the government tends to ignore the fact that low-
skilled shortages will be more acute or as acute as highly skilled labour
shortages in the medium and long run, and will also need to be covered
by migrant labour. The new state policy to attract Bulgarian emigrants
to permanently return will be implemented by several institutions that
will be established and coordinated by the Council of Bulgarians
Abroad of the Council of Ministers. In the autumn of 2008, informa-
tion campaigns for Bulgarians working in Spain, Germany, Greece and
the UK were organised – with Bulgarian employers present – to discuss
employment opportunities at home with potential returnees. These four
countries were selected because of the large Bulgarian communities
there and because of the presence of labour attachés in the respective
embassies who are able to inform Bulgarian emigrants about current
working conditions and remuneration in Bulgaria. State measures also
include the establishment of websites on the labour market conditions
in Bulgaria and current vacancies. Bulgarian students abroad are of spe-
cial interest. The government plans to include them in a special register
that will be made available to interested employers (Ministry of Labour
and Social Policy 2008).
Conclusion
Emigration from Bulgaria continues, albeit at a declining rate. In recent
years, a clear pattern of circular and temporary migration can be identi-
fied, especially after April 2001 when Bulgarian citizens were allowed a
three-month visa-free stay in countries within the Schengen zone and
more recently, after the country’s EU membership in January 2007.
Preferred destinations are Greece, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands,
Germany, Turkey and the UK. The US remains an important destina-
tion for permanent settlement. Temporary migration has become more
regionally and ethnically specific with migrants increasingly originating
from poor, ethnically mixed rural areas.
Large out-migrations have considerably distorted the demographic
profile of the population between 1989 and 2001. Young people and
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whole families have migrated abroad, thus contributing to the continu-
ously decreasing birth rate and steadily placing Bulgaria amongst the
five ‘oldest’ countries in Europe.
Brain drain through emigration is not a clear-cut issue for Bulgaria.
However, it has had more severe consequences for the development of
ethnically mixed regions in the country, where emigration involved the
most active and qualified segments of the population.
An estimated four million Bulgarians live abroad. The newly adopted
National Strategy of the Republic of Bulgaria on Migration and
Integration for 2008-2015 targets these people for a more permanent
return. The group of Bulgarians who do not plan to return but are will-
ing to contribute to Bulgaria’s economic development should not be ig-
nored by policymakers. They need to be provided with accurate and reli-
able information by the relevant state institutions, such as information
on privatisation deals, conditions for investment and other aspects of
economic reform in the country. Trade departments and labour attachés
within Bulgarian diplomatic missions abroad can play an important role
in the process.
Bulgaria is already experiencing a turn from being a migrant origin
and transit country into a migrant receiving country. There is the need
not only for highly skilled professionals, but also for unskilled labour.
This particular development has been ignored in the National Strategy
on Migration. It is crucial that policymakers reconsider this issue and
incorporate it in their plans. If they fail to do this, the country risks at-
tracting unskilled undocumented migrant labour and expanding its al-
ready flourishing shadow economy.
Notes
1 With the help of prominent Bulgarians, MPs and the Bulgarian king himself, some
50,000 Jews were saved from Nazi concentration camps during World War II
(Guentcheva et al. 2003: 12)
2 Some of them were already abroad when they acquired refugee status.
3 It should be noted, however, that this figure includes new residence permits as well
as renewed ones for people who had left the country in previous years and then
returned.
4 See www.ime.bg.
5 See www.worldbank.org.
6 See www.europe.bg/en/htmls/page.php?category=230&id=15949.
7 Radio Free Europe (RFE)/ Radio Liberty (RL), Prague, 27 August 2002 (www.rferl.
org/nca/features/2002/08/27082002142636.asp).
8 At the end of 2004, 144 formerly populated areas in the country became entirely de-
populated (population=0). These areas are mainly border regions in the south and
west of the country. See Capital (2006), ‘Peasants of urban type: Government policy is
needed to put an end to the depopulation of villages’, issue 28 (in Bulgarian). This is
OPTIMISING MIGRATION EFFECTS 227
due to increased urbanisation and external migration. According to NSI data, 67.1 per
cent of the population in 1990 lived in urban areas while in 2004 this figure had ri-
sen to 70 per cent.
9 The Agency for Bulgarians Abroad (ABA) is a state institution tasked with collecting
data about expatriate Bulgarians. It also coordinates and supports the activities of state
institutions towards expatriate Bulgarian communities (www.aba.government.bg). It
should be noted that ABA uses the term ‘expatriate Bulgarian’ and does not use the
concept ‘Bulgarian emigrant’.
10 The HSMP started on 1 February 2002, so data for 2002 are for 1 February to 31
December 2002.
11 Author’s own calculations based on data made available by the NSI in Bulgaria; www.
nsi.bg/SocialActivities/Education.htm (in Bulgarian).
12 See www.aba.bg.
13 www.invgr.com/se_europe.htm.
14 Data provided by the Economic and Trade Office of the Greek Embassy in Sofia,
Bulgaria during the author’s research visit there on 7 November 2006.
15 So-called after the Skype voice over internet programme that facilitates free video and
telephone calls.
16 www.mlsp.government.bg/bg/integration/agreements/index.htm (in Bulgarian); ac-
cessed 17 August 2008.
17 ibid.
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11 Return migration and development prospects
after EU integration: Empirical
evidence from Bulgaria
Vesselin Mintchev and Venelin Boshnakov
Introduction1
Substantial research interest has been directed towards the intensified
out-migration from Central and Eastern Europe’s (CEE) transition coun-
tries since the start of reforms in the early 1990s. This out-migration
has been an important aspect of the radical socio-economic changes in
post-communist countries, and a number of issues have driven the de-
bate about the effects of migration to Western Europe on labour mar-
kets and long-term demographic trends. Although many EU countries
started to reassess their migration policies upon considering the bene-
fits of labour migration (regarding the labour shortages in some eco-
nomic sectors), there is still much concern about increased trafficking
of irregular migrants and the potential destabilisation of social security
and asylum systems in Europe (see Straubhaar 2001; Laczko 2002;
Piracha & Vickerman 2003; Martin 2003).
A range of publications reveals CEE migration’s various idiosyncra-
sies, positioning the migration behaviour of Eastern Europeans between
the extremes of ‘developmentalism’ and ‘Dutch disease’ (Taylor 1999).
Some indications also support the assertion that migrants from South-
Eastern European transition countries tend to favour Mediterranean
countries as new EU destination countries. This migration is charac-
terised by predominantly short- to medium-term (mainly seasonal) em-
ployment, subsequent return or circular migration and a high share of
unregistered remittances with a considerable supplementary effect on
sending households consumption, but also some use of remittances for
household assets acquisition and small business development (Leon-
Ledesma & Piracha 2004).
Bulgaria is often considered a country that has not been as severely
affected by out-migration processes, as was expected in the context of
unfavourable patterns of the early market transition. In fact, during the
fifteen years of transition (1989-2004), the Bulgarian population de-
creased by about 13 per cent or 1.2 million in absolute figures – about
500,000 of which was due to natural decrease and 700,000 due to
emigration (Mansoor & Quillin 2007). It could plausibly be argued that
the total Bulgarian diaspora, both historical and newly generated,
amounts to 2.5 to 3 million, compared to Bulgaria’s current domestic
population of around 7.5 million. Yet several studies of potential CEE
emigration have shown that, despite intensive emigration processes
during the economic transition between 1990 and 1994, Bulgarian out-
migration pressure ten years later (during the European Union acces-
sion period) was felt only within a small percentage of the population
(Bauer & Zimmermann 1999; Wallace 1999; Mintchev, Kaltchev, Goev
& Boshnakov 2004). These findings were confirmed in a report by the
European Commission on the functioning of the transitional arrange-
ments introduced in 2004 concerning international labour mobility
(European Commission 2006).
Empirical studies on return migration, remittances and their usage
in Bulgarian households are challenging for several reasons. Firstly,
there is a lack of trustworthy information and comprehensive studies
on these issues. Secondly, there is the difficulty of obtaining a represen-
tative sample of return migrant households in order to draw reliable
conclusions regarding their consumption and/or investment patterns.
We attempt, therefore, to assess some facets of the impact that return
migration and remittances have had on development Bulgaria during
the process of EU integration. Our analysis will be based on micro-data
from a representative household survey conducted at the end of 2005.
The period of interest was retroactively extended five years so as to cap-
ture the intensified international mobility of Bulgarian citizens after the
EU visa regime was lifted in 2001.
Remittances and economic performance during the EU accession
period
During the period in focus, we notice a considerable upwards shift of
current transfers from abroad. In absolute figures, the inflow of these
transfers grew nearly twofold for the years 2001-2005, compared with
the previous years, reaching a level of almost E 1.2 billion with a rela-
tive share in GDP of about 4-5 per cent at the end of the period (Table
11.1). A number of analysts devote special attention to this fact underly-
ing the foreign currency influx, showing how it contributed to trade def-
icit compensation and thus sustained the macroeconomic stability in
the country (Stanchev, Kostadinova, Dimitrov, Angelov, Dimitrova,
Karamakalakova, Cankov & Markova 2005). Some caution, however, is
necessary when considering the amount of remittances. According to
the methodology applied by the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB), current
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transfers inflow are recorded as unilateral free transfers to Bulgarian re-
sidents where two main recipients are distinguished: i) public sector
units (receiving grants transferred from governments or international
organisations) and ii) private sector units (households and NGOs receiv-
ing private transfers, donations, etc.). A basic component of the trans-
fers to the government sector encompasses funds received from EU
pre-accession instruments – current public transfers account for about
a quarter of total current transfers from abroad on average for the peri-
od. Although the transfers to individuals (i.e. household members) are
of particular interest for our study, they are not currently distinguished
in the official data from transfers to other entities.
The official figures for private transfers to individuals obtained
through bank system records are commonly considered to underesti-
mate their actual level. Precise recording is hampered by the wide-
spread practice of importing foreign currency in cash (personally or
with assistance from acquaintances), thus avoiding bank transfers or
non-bank electronic financial services. In this respect, starting from
year 2001, Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) experts apply a methodology
for indirect estimation of the compensation of employees working abroad
as an element of the income account in the balance of payments that is
assumed to be remitted to the home country. The item ‘compensation
of employees’ comprises wages, salaries and other benefits earned by
individuals in economies different from those where they are residents
and paid by residents of host economies; ‘employees’ include seasonal
or other short-term workers (i.e. less than one year) having centres of
economic interest in their own economies. According to this methodol-
ogy, the income is estimated as a product of the number of workers
and the minimum wages in the respective country. It is assumed that
Bulgarians illegally employed abroad stay for three months in the
Table 11.1 Inflow of current transfers and compensation of employees in Bulgaria
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005* 2006**
Current transfers (E million) 674.0 676.9 762.5 1051.2 1171.8 956.8
Compensation of employees (E million) 476.6 766.8 913.7 1004.9 902.1 960.7
as a % of GDP 3.1% 4.6% 5.2% 5.1% 4.2% 4.0%
as a % of exports 8.3% 12.6% 13.7% 12.6% 9.5% 8.1%
as a % of imports 6.4% 9.7% 10.0% 9.2% 6.5% 5.8%
as a % of the trade balance -26.8% -40.8% -37.7% -34.0% -20.8% -20.9%
as a % of FDI 52.8% 78.2% 49.4% 36.8% 38.8% 25.6%
per capita (E ) 60.18 97.52 116.94 129.14 116.46 126.01
Sources: BNB, NSI, February 2007
* Data are preliminary for 2005.
** Authors’ forecasts for 2006 are based on the preliminary data for the first three quarters
of 2006.
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country and then return to Bulgaria. Assuming that illegal workers re-
ceive the minimum wage in this country (without paying any taxes, in-
surance, etc.), their expenditures are estimated by the cost of living for
the respective country. The number of workers is estimated on the basis
of data for Bulgarian citizens leaving the country for ‘tourist reasons’
(provided by Border Police), surveys among Bulgarian tour operators
and additional household surveys.2
The development impact of remittances are generally considered, in
migration literature, as beneficial at both micro and macro levels, being
an important source of foreign exchange and funds for domestic con-
sumption and investment (e.g. Ammassari & Black 2001; Lucas 2005).
The aggregate level of the compensation of Bulgarian employees abroad
was estimated at about E 4 billion for 2001-2005, reaching over E 900
million at the end of the period. With a persistently decreasing popula-
tion for the period, its per capita significance has doubled since 2001
(Table 11.1). The modest share of the compensation of employees work-
ing abroad in GDP (4-5 per cent), however, supports the widespread
view that Bulgarian economy cannot be considered as substantially de-
pendent on remittances.
Compared to the level of foreign direct investments, employees’ com-
pensation amounted to over 40 per cent of FDI inflow in the country
during the EU accession period. The remittance level amounts to about
10 percent of exports, thus positively influencing the negative current
account balance through the compensation of about one third (on aver-
age) of the foreign trade deficit. Also having in mind the stable albeit
low annual GDP real growth rates (4-6 per cent) and comparatively low
annual inflation rates, macroeconomic analysts agree on the important
role that remittances inflow played in sustaining macroeconomic stabi-
lity in the country during the period. According to the insights provided
by the New Economics of Labour Migration theory, the household per-
spective of the analysis of migration behaviour should be explored in or-
der to obtain a solid microbase for the economic analysis. Various
Table 11.2 Selected Bulgarian macroeconomic indicators, 1999-2006
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005* 2006**
GDP real growth (%) 2.3 5.4 4.1 4.9 4.5 5.7 5.5 6.3
CPI (%, end of year) 6.2 11.4 4.8 3.8 5.6 4.0 6.5 6.5
Unemployment (%) 16.0 17.9 17.3 16.3 13.5 12.2 10.7 9.1
Population growth (%) -1.4 -0.4 -3.1 -0.7 -0.6 -0.4 -0.5 -1.6
GDP per capita (E ) 1482 1674 1919 2101 2258 2515 2771 3123
Sources: BNB, NSI, February 2007
* Data are preliminary for 2005.
** Authors’ forecasts for 2006 based on the preliminary data for the first three quarters of 2006.
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household attributes (e.g. physical and human capital attained by house-
hold members) are possibly influencing migration decisions through
their effects on migration costs as well as the potential impacts of re-
mittances on income security and the overall household well-being
(Taylor 1999; Mora & Taylor 2006).
Bulgarian return migration: A ‘snapshot’ at the end of 2005
To date, there is no comprehensive evaluation of the development po-
tential of return migration and remittances on the basis of micro-
studies among return migrants in Bulgaria. The usual approach of stu-
dies focused on Bulgarian return migration and remittances is based on
in-depth interviews with households whose members have returned
after being employed abroad. Typically, surveys are conducted among
households in settlements in Bulgaria with high migration rates
(Guentcheva, Kabakchieva & Kolarski 2003) as well as among migrant
communities in order to explore Bulgarian emigrants’ performance
(Markova & Sarris 1997; Markova 2004; Markova & Reilly 2006). A re-
cent World Bank multi-country study reveals some details on the basis
of quite large samples of return migrants in Bulgaria and five other
countries (Mansoor & Quillin 2007).
Mintchev and Boshnakov (2006) present various empirical results con-
cerning the profile and experience of Bulgarian return migrants inter-
viewed at the end of 2005. This study was initially set up as an exploratory
survey aimed at providing descriptive data for the profile of Bulgarian re-
turn migrants, their expenditures and savings abroad, as well as for the
use of remittances and their impact on the economic status of migrant
households. Data was collected through a representative sample survey3
among Bulgarian households, with an initially planned sample size of
1,000 households using a two-stage cluster design, typically used by NSI
and professional agencies in Bulgaria. Census enumeration clusters of
households were used as primary sampling units. In each selected unit,
twenty households in urban clusters and fifteen in rural clusters were ran-
domly chosen and interviewed. As households with a return migrant
were of particular interest for this study, 52 such households were addi-
tionally interviewed. In order to preserve the originally obtained number
of return migrant households (136 out of 1,000), all observations of that
type were weighted by a reduction ratio. The discrepancy of the sample
structure regarding two main demographic variables, i.e. the household
size and area of residence (urban-rural), was compensated by additional
adjustment of the observations using weights according to the expected
structure of Bulgarian households population obtained during the last po-
pulation census in 2001.
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One of the main goals of the survey was to estimate some indicators
of the degree of penetration of migration processes among all Bulgarian
households. For this purpose, a specific definition for ‘return migrant’
was adopted: a person who had stayed abroad at least once during the
last five years (2001-2005), for a period of three months or longer, and
who is currently in Bulgaria. Consequently, a ‘return migrant house-
hold’ is a household with at least one return migrant. The relative share
of return migrant households was assessed at about 12 per cent.
Additionally, if the ‘current migrant’ households (having at least one
member who is currently abroad) are taken into account, the share of
households with at least one return or current migrant was estimated at
about 15 per cent at the end of 2005. Out of a total of 2.9 million
Bulgarian households, it is estimated that the total number of return
migrant households is approximately 345,000; moreover, roughly
440,000 Bulgarian households had participated (or were currently in-
volved) in international migration through their member(s) who had
been or were currently residing abroad. Furthermore, the average num-
ber of persons per household who have stayed abroad in 2001-2005 for
a period of at least three months was estimated at 0.143 (or 143 persons
per 1,000 households). This was used for the estimation of the total
number of return migrants at the end of 2005 at about 415,000.
Although not directly comparable, a recent multinational IOM sam-
ple survey on human trafficking (with 1,007 respondents in Bulgaria)
also provides estimates for some migration penetration ratios (IOM
2006). It estimates the share of extended families (with a median size
of seven members) with persons who have been abroad for the period
2003-2005 at 8.3 per cent (past penetration) as well as current pene-
tration (as of 2006) of about 11.4 per cent of these families (or
120,500 currently working abroad). Surprisingly, the rate of legal em-
ployment abroad (approximated by the ratio of family members who
work legally to all family members that work abroad) was estimated at
72 per cent.
Socio-demographic profile and foreign experience of return migrants
This section summarises the main findings regarding the socio-demo-
graphic profile of respondents on the basis of 162 interviews with re-
turn migrants (for more details see Mintchev & Boshnakov 2006). The
evidence shows that the majority of migrants were male (69 per cent).
Young and middle-aged persons prevailed (43 per cent were aged under
35, and 44 per cent aged 36-55). More than half of the women inter-
viewed were under 35 years of age. The majority (about 60 per cent) of
respondents was married. The proportion of individuals with at least
secondary education was over 80 per cent and the proportion of return
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migrants with some secondary professional (vocational) education was
almost 40 per cent.
Even though the educational level of return migrants was relatively
high, a large proportion of them had left the country without any
knowledge of the language spoken in the host country. Almost half of
respondents did not have any command at all (45 per cent) and about
one third had only elementary knowledge of the respective official lan-
guage. However, one fifth of migrants said they spoke the language flu-
ently (11 per cent) or at least at an intermediary level (10 per cent) at the
time of their departure. About two thirds of respondents went abroad
by bus (53 per cent) or by car (14 per cent), reflecting the proximity of
migrant destinations, and the availability of inexpensive transport ser-
vices that have developed over the years, and which facilitate migration.
The interviews revealed several aspects of Bulgarian migrant net-
works. About 80 per cent of return migrants declared that they had al-
ready arranged for their accommodation in the host country prior to de-
parture. In more than one third of cases, the housing was provided by
compatriots who had already settled in the host country and, in the re-
maining cases, by the intermediary company/person arranging the em-
ployment, or by the employer. However, one in five individuals had left
without having ascertained some accommodation in the target country
in advance. At the same time, almost half of the women had arranged
housing with their acquaintances, mainly members of their family that
had already settled in the target country. Less than one third of male
migrants had this option.
A similar situation is observed regarding the prior arrangement of a
job – over 70 per cent of return migrants declared that they had ar-
ranged for a workplace before leaving Bulgaria. They relied mainly on
contracts with employers (26 per cent) or assistance from acquaintances
residing in the respective country (17 per cent). There are, however, sig-
nificant gender differences in this respect – about one third of female
migrants did not have any arrangement of a job at the time of their de-
parture, whereas only one fourth of male respondents were in this
situation.
EU member states were the leading destinations of Bulgarian return
migrants in the period of interest (Table 11.3). Germany was the most
attractive country for men, and Greece for women. The Mediterranean
states of Greece, Italy and Spain attracted over 40 per cent of intervie-
wees, or almost half of those who went to Southern European
destinations.
The average duration of the stay in the destination countries of return
migrants is slightly over one year (15.6 months), but over two thirds of
them have resided there for periods of less than a year. In southern EU
countries, such short-term migration prevailed (83 per cent) compared
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to the other European destinations where a third of respondents had
stayed for more than two years. Therefore, the profile assessed by the
study should be considered as valid more for short-term (i.e. temporary
or circular) Bulgarian migrants than for returnees who had spent pro-
longed periods abroad.
A plausible explanation of the preferences for these destinations and
the length of stay abroad can be found when the employment of return
migrants by economic sectors is considered. Almost a quarter of re-
spondents were employed in agriculture, one in six in the transport sec-
tor, one in seven in tourism and the same share in constructions (Table
11.4). About 43 per cent of respondents who had been in Southern
European countries were employed in agriculture while about 40 per
cent of respondents who had been in other EU member states had jobs
in construction and tourism. More women were employed in house-
keeping, social care and tourism services and, to a lesser extent in agri-
culture, industries or education. Male migrants have found jobs mainly
Table 11.3 Distribution of respondents by countries of destination (%)
Country/region Men Women Total
Germany 16.7 11.8 15.5
Greece 12.5 20.6 15.1
Spain 16.7 8.8 14.0
Italy 16.7 8.8 13.8
Other EU country 13.9 26.5 18.7
Turkey 4.2 8.8 5.6
US, Canada 5.6 8.8 5.7
Other countries
(Russia, Israel, etc.)
13.7 5.9 11.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Mintchev and Boshnakov (2006)
Table 11.4 Sector of main employment of respondents (%)
Sector of employment Men Women Total
Agriculture 26.8 12.1 22.3
Construction 19.7 – 13.7
Industry, crafts 5.6 3.0 5.4
Transport 23.9 3.0 17.0
Tourism/bars, hotels, restaurants 8.5 27.3 13.8
Housekeeping, childcare, healthcare – 21.2 7.4
Care for the elderly/ill/disabled – 15.2 5.0
Science/education 1.4 6.1 2.4
Other 14.1 12.1 13.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Mintchev and Boshnakov (2006)
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in agriculture, transport, construction and, to some extent, tourism ser-
vices. It is worth mentioning that most return migrants (almost 80 per
cent) had no direct contacts with the local labour administration.
However, this could hardly serve as a basis for conclusions regarding
the scale of non-documented Bulgarian emigration, as contacts with la-
bour administration are usually a prerogative of employers.
Determinants of satisfaction and re-migration likelihood
The self-assessment of respondents’ satisfaction from their stay abroad
provides valuable opportunities for identifying particular factors of suc-
cessful emigration (Table 11.5). It is noteworthy that over 80 per cent of
respondents reported a degree of satisfaction (complete or to some ex-
tent) with regard to their professional advancement during the work
abroad. The acquisition of skills and experience abroad is perceived as a
potentially useful benefit for return migrants when considering the fu-
ture employment or economic activity either in the home country or
abroad. The highest satisfaction related to the occupation of qualified
jobs as well as to jobs under official contracts with employers.
The level of professional satisfaction was related to particular sectors
of employment in the host countries. The most satisfied respondents
had jobs in industries, transport and tourism. Significant shares (25-40
per cent) of unsatisfied return migrants were employed in agriculture,
care for elderly and housekeeping. Clear differences in satisfaction le-
vels were found also regarding the region of stay. For instance, almost
each third respondent returned from Southern Europe was dissatisfied
with their experience abroad. In contrast, almost all migrants who have
been in other EU countries were more or less satisfied. A similar
Table 11.5 Responses to the question ‘Are you satisfied with your stay abroad, in
terms of professional advancement?’ (%)
Characteristics of main
occupation abroad
Yes, completely Yes, to some
extent
No Total
Full-time job
No 33.3 41.7 25.0 100.0
Yes 36.5 45.9 17.6 100.0
Qualified job
No 19.0 47.7 33.3 100.0
Yes 51.9 44.2 3.9 100.0
Job under an official contract
No 28.8 44.2 26.9 100.0
Yes 44.7 48.9 6.4 100.0
Source: Mintchev and Boshnakov (2006)
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distribution is found for those respondents who have returned from
non-European destinations.
To learn more about the determinants of a successful stay abroad, we
asked respondents to rank a series of factors in response to the ques-
tion: ‘In your opinion, what are the most important things that provide
a successful emigration?’. Table 11.6 shows the main results for both ca-
tegories of respondents – those who said they had a qualified job
abroad and those who said they did not. In the table, ‘rank’ refers to the
average rank attached by the interviewees and ‘response’ refers to the
share of respondents from each sub-group who chose each answer.
It is not surprising that ‘personal skills and qualification’ is the factor
most frequently ranked by qualified return migrants (77 per cent). The
other two important factors are the preliminary job contracting (40 per
cent) and the language proficiency (43 per cent). The answers of low-
skilled migrants are more dispersed and the modal factor here is the
language proficiency (59 per cent), which is strongly perceived as a ser-
ious advantage. Besides qualifications, the importance of having ac-
quaintances abroad as well as a job and accommodation already ar-
ranged were quite often emphasised. This suggests that migrants parti-
cipating in this labour market segment are relying on informal migrant
networks to support the success of their migration abroad.
In order to identify the determinants of re-migration likelihood, two
binary logistic regression models were estimated (Table 11.7). The
Table 11.6 Opinion on the factors of successful migration
Determinants of a successful stay abroad Did your job abroad require particular qualification?
Yes (55.2%) No (44.8%)
Rank Response Rank Response
Preliminary contract or arrangement
(official or verbal) with an employer or
agency
1.61 40.3% 1.93 27.5%
Good professional qualification 1.71 77.4% 1.96 28.8%
Availability of friendly/close citizens of
the country
2.11 18.2% 2.51 17.0%
Availability of acquaintances settled in
the country
2.19 19.1% 2.04 31.7%
Good foreign language proficiency 2.47 43.9% 1.96 58.8%
Availability of initial funds for financing
the move abroad
2.62 19.4% 2.08 29.8%
Accommodation arranged beforehand 2.63 28.7% 2.68 27.4%
Tolerant attitude of the authorities to
immigrants
2.67 10.3% 2.64 15.7%
Appropriate labour legislation 2.92 21.1% 1.94 19.8%
Source: Authors’ own calculations
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dependent variable of the first model uses the answers to the question
‘How likely is it for you to go abroad again?’, where 1 stands for ‘very
likely’ or ‘somewhat likely’ and 0 for ‘little likely’ and ‘not likely’. The
second model aims at discriminating between short-term and long-term
intentions on the basis of the question ‘What is the desired length of
the intended stay abroad?’ (0 combines the answers ‘just a few months’
and ‘up to 1 year’; 1 combines the answers ‘a few years’ and ‘emigration
for good’). The following independent variables were included in the
specification:
– gender (1 for ‘female’; 0 for ‘male’);
– age (number of years);
– family status (1 for ‘married’; 0 otherwise);
– education (1 for ‘higher education’; 0 for ‘secondary or lower
education’);
– household size (number of household members);
– household income per capita (monthly average, in euro);
– satisfaction from the previous stay abroad (1 for ‘completely’; 0 for
‘in some extent’ and ‘no’);
– no prospects for our future in Bulgaria (1 for those indicated this
reason for their international migration).
Neither model revealed any net effects of the gender and age; only fa-
mily status appeared to be a limiting factor in respect to re-migration
likelihood. However, higher educated return migrants were less willing
Table 11.7 Binary logistic regressions for the likelihood to leave
1) Likely to leave again 2) Long-term preference
B Exp(B) B Exp(B)
Gender -0.750 0.472 0.187 1.205
Age -0.045 0.956 -0.029 0.971
Family status -3.115 *** 0.044 -1.006 * 0.366
Education -1.556 ** 0.211 0.620 1.859
Household size 0.369 1.446 -0.257 0.774
Household income per capita 0.008 * 1.008 -0.006 0.994
Satisfaction 0.781 2.183 -0.216 0.806
No prospects in Bulgaria 1.162 * 3.197 1.504 *** 4.497
Number of observations
(unweighted)
144 137
% of correct prediction 79.1 77.7
Source: Authors’ own calculations
* Significant at 0.10 level
** Significant at 0.05 level
*** Significant at 0.01 level
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to leave again (the correlates of this attitude should be considered in
some more detail). Household characteristics did not show the expected
effects – migrants from larger families were not significantly more will-
ing to leave again, and the household income per capita obtained a posi-
tive coefficient sign (although significant only at the 10 per cent level).
The better position of return migrants households’ wellbeing did not
act as a limiting factor regarding re-migration intentions.
One of our hypotheses was that there will be a positive net impact of
the degree of satisfaction – that return migrants more satisfied with
their previous stay abroad will have a higher likelihood to leave again –
but this was not confirmed. At the same time, the inclusion of the ‘fu-
ture prospects’ perception shows significant stimulating impact on re-
migration intentions. Apparently, those who do not see any domestic
perspective for improvement in their well-being and also have experi-
ence in a foreign country are persistently oriented towards consecutive
out-migration (mainly long-term) as a realistic development alternative
at the micro level.
As Black and Gent (2004) note, return itself is not enough, it needs
to be ‘successful’ and ‘sustainable’. Although they focus on refugees’ re-
turn, the issues raised with regard to success and sustainability of a re-
turn to the country of origin are valid for economic migrants, too.
However, the doubts regarding the opportunities of returnees to re-
integrate in the home countries are still considerable. Mansoor and
Quillin (2007) outline various aspects of a problematic return: changes
in the labour market might have taken place during their absence and
these could reduce the attractiveness of job opportunities; migrants per-
ception of inferior local conditions in comparison to the income, profes-
sional and social experience gained abroad; migrants with longer peri-
ods abroad may also experience difficulties with their adjustment to
their sometimes considerably changed communities.
Development prospects of remittances use in receiving
households
The migration literature suggests that return migrants gain useful pro-
fessional skills and social capital during their stay abroad, except when
working in a low-skill labour market segment. Moreover, it is argued
that in sending households, remittances sent during migrants stay
abroad or brought upon return, support not only current consumption
levels, but can also induce personal and community development
(Gatcher 2002; Guentcheva et al. 2003; Vladimirova 2004; Mansoor &
Quillin 2007). The distribution of households by type of migrants and
whether they receive remittances or not does reveal that a variety of
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cases were found in the sample (Table 11.8). There are cases with and
without return or current migrants who both received and did not re-
ceive remittances during the period under study. Thus, the unit of con-
cern with respect to the use of remittances is households that receive
remittances – and, in some cases, ‘return migrant households’.
It is commonly assumed that Bulgarian emigrants still rarely use offi-
cial channels for transferring remittances (Gächter 2002; BNB 2007).
The channels of money transfers to Bulgarian households were of parti-
cular interest for the survey. A total 56 per cent of households received
funds mainly in cash on a regular basis (directly from migrants or from
intermediaries), and 19 per cent received money just once when the mi-
grant returned. In fewer cases, bank transfers (24 per cent) or other
electronic transfer systems like Western Union or MoneyGram (19 per
cent) were used regularly or once (Mintchev & Boshnakov 2006).
Undoubtedly, such financial services are yet underexploited and there is
a potential market for both bank and money transfer institutions.
The survey provided various insights on remittances use although
such estimates should be considered cautiously, as has been suggested
in migration literature (e.g. Taylor 1999; Rapoport & Docquier 2005).
Lucas (2005) outlines two aspects of remittances’ impact: 1) their effect
on poverty and inequality and 2) the potential stimulus upon savings,
investment and economic growth. The recent World Bank survey in se-
lected transition countries revealed the importance of remittances as a
stable source of income for many households in the region, especially
in the rural areas. The estimations of remittances’ macroeconomic im-
pact suggest that there is some positive impact on long-term growth.
However, the evidence on remittances’ impact on the incidence of pov-
erty is mixed (Mansoor & Quillin 2007).
Table 11.8 Distribution of households by migrant type and receipt of remittances (%)*
Households Current migrant in the household: Total
No Yes, at least 1
Not received
No return migrant in the household 84.0 1.3 85.3
At least 1 return migrant 2.1 0.6 2.7
Total 86.1 1.9 88.0
Received
No return migrant in the household 0.9 2.1 3.0
At least 1 return migrant 6.9 2.1 9.0
Total 7.8 4.2 12.0
Source: Authors’ own calculations
* Percentages are calculated on the basis of the sample size of 1,000 weighted cases.
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Our survey reinforces these conclusions. According to our research,
the use of remittances is more ‘subsistence’-oriented rather than ‘devel-
opment’-oriented (Table 11.9). Almost 38 per cent of households receiv-
ing remittances used at least three quarters of the funds for consump-
tion. This share was found to be higher (43 per cent) for the sub-group
of households with a migrant who had returned after a short-term stay
abroad, compared to those with returnees who stayed abroad longer (28
per cent). Moreover, only 36 per cent of households with short-term re-
turnees had spent on consumption, whereas 60 per cent had done so
in the other sub-group. This provides clear evidence that temporary and
seasonal Bulgarian migration in the period 2001-2005 is used mainly to
provide funds for covering the current subsistence needs of sending
households. At the same time, however, about 26 per cent of the house-
holds with short-term returnees have saved at least a quarter of the
money, as a protection against future income risks.
The second direction of remittances is the acquisition of motor vehi-
cles – 26 per cent of all receiving households have, to some extent, used
the funds for this purpose. This trend is observable mainly in the
households with long-term return migrants (40 per cent compared to
23 per cent in the other group) where the absolute level of remittances
is reasonably higher. The share of home buyers is relatively lower
(about 14 per cent), and there is no significant divergence between short
and long-term migrant households. It is interesting to compare and
contrast the acquisition of particular types of properties by receiving
and non-receiving households. The survey provides evidence that the
shares of households that have acquired real estate property, cars, land
and home appliances among those receiving remittances are quite high-
er in comparison to households that do not receive such funds (Table
11.10). The divergence is quite evident in regard to the purchase of cars
Table 11.9 Use of remittances by receiving households (%)
For what household needs
did/do you use the funds
from abroad?
All of it About 3/4 About 1/2 About 1/4 None
Consumption 28.8 8.9 16.7 31.4 14.3
Loan repayment 1.1 0.8 3.8 18.9 75.4
Saving 3.5 1.5 4.0 12.7 78.2
Education 2.4 1.6 1.9 11.9 82.2
Health care 3.4 1.4 2.1 12.5 80.6
Private business 0.4 1.1 3.1 8.4 87.0
Motor vehicle(s) 8.6 4.8 5.2 7.9 73.6
Dwelling(s) 4.3 2.1 6.7 0.7 86.1
Other real estate 1.0 – 2.3 0.7 96.0
Source: Authors’ own calculations
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and household appliances. Yet, it is worth noting the very weak interest,
as a whole, in buying land. The latter is usually found as a consequence
of the rudimentary and inadequately regulated agricultural land market
as well as persistent administrative complications (e.g. problems with
the cadastre, uncompleted process of farmlands restitution and ineffec-
tive legal procedures).
The World Bank survey of return migrants reveals some general im-
provement in household living standards in Bulgaria, Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Romania, even though various difficulties were met
by migrants’ families during member’s stay abroad. Respondents re-
ported an increased capacity to cover the purchase of food, clothing,
public utilities, household appliances as well as to buy cars or to travel
abroad (Mansoor & Quillin 2007).
With regard to the use of remittances for business the study suggests
that 20 per cent of the households receiving transfers from abroad en-
gaged in entrepreneurial activities, while this was the case for only 10
per cent among households not receiving remittances. Funds were used
either for start-ups or for investing in already established businesses
(Table 11.11). Remittances are invested mainly in transport, services and
trade and rarely used for the production of goods. These businesses are
usually small or medium size, or people launch in various forms of for-
mal or informal self-employment, e.g. the purchases of automobiles for
use as taxis and the establishment of cafes and neighbourhood shops.
(Guentcheva et al. 2003; similar cases are described by Nicholson 2001).
Conclusions
Our study suggests the following in regard to the possible impact of re-
turn migration and remittances on development. Firstly, remittances’
inflow covers a substantial share of the trade deficit providing a positive
impact on the recent economic development. Undoubtedly, remittances
Table 11.10 Shares of households that have acquired assets, by remittances receipt
status (%)
Receipt of funds
from abroad in
the household
Has your household acquired the following kind of property
during the last 5 years?
Housing property Motor vehicles Land Household
appliances
Not received 7.7% 14.3% 1.7% 41.9%
Received 11.7% 38.3% 3.3% 75.8%
Total sample 8.2% 17.2% 1.9% 46.0%
Source: Mintchev and Boshnakov (2006)
RETURN MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS AFTER EU INTEGRATION 245
transferred by Bulgarian return and current migrants play an important
role in the macro-economic stability of the economy. Yet, funds are
transferred mainly through unofficial channels and it is difficult to esti-
mate their volume.
Our sample survey shows that although the bulk of Bulgarian migra-
tion is engaged in low-skilled temporary jobs in agriculture, construc-
tion, transport, housekeeping and child/elderly care, return migrants
feel satisfied with their stay abroad. The vast majority of these migrants
were not legally employed and the improvement of labour regulations
in host countries regarding the temporary hiring of foreign workers
may provide substantial progress in the formalisation of circular migra-
tion processes.
The survey estimates that roughly 15 per cent of Bulgarian house-
holds have participated in the international migration process in the
period 2001-2005. Bulgarian return migrants showed a high propensity
for savings. Remittances sent home had a significant impact on house-
holds’ well-being mainly through supporting consumption and, to some
extent, providing funds for other acquisitions (real estate and cars).
Thus, migrants’ transfers have played – and are still playing – an impor-
tant role in keeping households away from poverty during the process
of economic reforms. Moreover, 20 per cent of receiving households
run their own businesses while this share is twice as low for the other
families.
There is little evidence of direct impact of economic development
through productive investment of remittances. Even in a worldwide per-
spective, it is debatable whether remittances lead to additional invest-
ments and assets accumulation (Lucas 2005). Nevertheless, even if
households spend remittances on consumption, automobiles and
houses, an economy-wide multiplication effect definitely takes place
(see also Gächter 2002). From the perspective of this study, along with
Table 11.11 Use of the funds for development of one’s business
If there are funds
used for own business
development, what was
the main purpose?
Share
of those
indicating
Of which:
investment capital working capital both
Establishment of a new firm 6.8% 48.4% 26.7% 25.0%
Supporting an existing firm 7.5% 15.1% 54.3% 30.6%
Total 14.3% 30.9% 41.2% 28.0%
Sector of the main activity of the firm:
Agriculture 2.7% Trade 25.7% Construction 3.5%
Manufacturing 2.1% Transport 38.3% Services 27.7%
Source: Mintchev and Boshnakov (2006)
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the overall positive effect on the balance of payments, this is the major
development benefit of migrant remittances in Bulgaria during the pro-
cess of its integration in the EU.
Notes
1 This chapter presents some of the results from a research project entitled ‘Bulgarian
Return Migration and Households Wellbeing’, conducted by the Centre for
Comparative Studies (CCS) in Sofia. It was supported by a research grant from the
Global Development Network – South Eastern Europe (GDN-SEE) under the supervi-
sion of Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW). We are grateful
to our discussant Danny Sriskandarajah as well as to helpful comments from
Vladimir Gligorov, Michael Landesmann, Anna Iara and other participants in the
GDN-SEE workshop that took place in May 2006 in Vienna.
2 For methodological notes, see www.bnb.bg.
3 The sample survey was conducted in November 2005 by a research team consisting
of experts from the CCS, the Institute of Sociology at the Bulgarian Academy of
Sciences (BAS) and the National Statistical Institute (NSI). Acknowledgements are
due to Emilia Chenguelova (BAS) and her team as well as to Yordan Kaltchev (NSI)
for questionnaire and survey design as well as fieldwork organisation.
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12 Transitioning strategies of economic survival:
Romanian migration during the transition process
Swanie Potot
Introduction
Whereas West European countries often treat economic migration from
poorer countries with a certain degree of misgiving, in departure re-
gions migration is often viewed as a valuable opportunity, a way of
opening new horizons. This chapter deals with temporary Romanian
migrations to Western Europe, focusing particularly on understanding
their causes and effects in the source country.
The chapter draws on several years of qualitative fieldwork conducted
with Romanian migrants both within their home regions and during
their stays in France (Paris and Nice), Spain and the UK. It concentrates
on two particular groups. The first is composed of relatively young
adults, aged 18-30, who come from Târgoviste, a mid-sized city located
near Bucharest, and were working in London, Paris or Nice at the be-
ginning of the 2000s. The second group involves individuals who come
from rural parts of the Danube Plain, from the Teleorman County, and
who were working in Almeria province in Andalusia in the same
period.1
The first group mostly migrated to Nice between 1998 and 2000 as
tourists and then extended their stay by claiming asylum, or by remain-
ing illegally. The principal occupation of these migrants was as street
newspaper vendors and, although some settled in France for several
years, the more common migratory pattern consisted of short stays of a
few months, renewed regularly, but always interrupted by long periods
(at least six months) in their home city. This practice changed at the
end of 1999 when newspaper agencies, under pressure from public
authorities, increasingly refused to employ foreigners without a work
permit. Then some of these migrants turned to London, where un-
skilled work abounds and where the black market is relatively tolerated.
London has become a particularly popular destination because salaries
in the construction and hotel sectors are substantially higher than in
Southern Europe and the authorities are perceived as less likely to expel
foreigners having entered illegally.
The social profile of the second group of migrants is different, in that
they are of diverse age groups, are less often qualified and are more of-
ten from small cities or villages. At the time of the fieldwork, they were
working, like many other foreigners, as daily workers in agriculture in
Spain for low salaries, around E 5 per hour, and in hard physical condi-
tions. In the area of Almeria, this group was growing constantly, as re-
cently arrived European migrants were preferred to traditional workers
from Maghreb or Africa.
However, both migrant categories resemble each other in their fre-
quent travel between Romania and Western Europe. These movements
are oriented and reinforced by the increasing number of individual mi-
gration experiences, which enable migrants to raise their own standard
of living as well as that of family members in their home country. Such
migration is of great significance in Romania: Sandu (2000) reports
that between 1990 and 2000, 35 per cent of Romanian households had
at least one member abroad.
Interviews with these migrants showed that their objective was not to
flee Romania in order to build a new life elsewhere but, rather, to tem-
porarily compensate for the deficiencies of a faulty social and economic
system (Morokvasic 1999). Their migration thus becomes a way of life
that involves movement back and forth between a relatively comfortable
home and an undefined elsewhere.
This chapter looks first at the national context from which these mi-
grations emerged, and suggests that this transnational activity is one of
a number of survival strategies used by Romanians to counter the eco-
nomic hardship that has ensued since the 1989 revolution. The chapter
also argues that these new economic strategies are the prolongation and
modernisation of informal activities developed during communist
times. The second part of the chapter argues that migration – although
it emerged from a destabilising context – may work in favour of the
transition process. Even though Romanian migration has long been
considered a problem in terms of the process towards EU accession,
Romanian migrants have contributed in many ways to the economic re-
structuring of their homeland. By investing remittances in Romania
and developing transnational culture and networks, they have actually
accelerated the transformations of the country towards European life-
styles and standards.
Post-communist Romania and survival strategies
Romania: An economy in transition
December 1989, for the Romanian people marks the end of one of the
most authoritarian regimes of the communist system. The revolution is
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also remembered, however, as the event that marks the beginning of
the socio-economic crisis engendered by the transition process. In the
first years following 1989, recession seemed a natural phase in the
course of events. Social difficulties induced by the adoption of the mar-
ket economy, once surpassed, were expected to be compensated by the
growth and development of a consumer society. Yet neither economic
reforms, in the form of aid from international institutions such as the
International Monetary Fund or the World Bank, nor political reforms,
ever truly led to such growth. Only in 2004 did the EU finally character-
ise Romania’s market economy as ‘viable’. During the first ten years of
the transition, recession was constant; only at the turn of the millen-
nium did the country finally experience positive GDP growth.
By 2000, the day-to-day difficulties faced by many Romanians led
some to the conclusion that, regardless of the dictatorship, ‘things were
better before’.2 They thus turned their efforts towards the satisfaction of
personal needs. Although the situation has noticeably improved over
the last five years, the average monthly salary remained under E 295 in
2007 and many households are still unable to meet their minimum
needs. For example, inflation fell from 15.3 per cent in 2003 to 5.7 per
cent in 2007, but is still high enough to limit the purchasing power of
the middle class. In this context, the country’s dreams of rapid
Westernisation have slowly given way to basic material concerns. For
many Romanians, the principal objective during the last ten years has
been to maintain their family’s basic standard of living.
Partly as a result, the informal economy, already flourishing under
the communist regime, has become more developed during the years
following the revolution (Rainer 2002). Informal transactions were al-
ready commonplace at the time of Ceausescu, allowing individuals to
compensate for the deficiencies of the formal economy and to maintain
a minimal standard of living (Kideckel 1993; Verdery 1996). The size of
the parallel economy today can be understood as an extension of these
earlier practices. Under communism, the informal economy primarily
took the form of selling everyday consumer products. A study con-
ducted by Schneider (2002) shows that the shadow economy passed
from an average of 27.3 per cent of Romanian GDP in the period 1990-
1993 to an average of 33.4 per cent for the period 2000-2001.3 It also
shows that this trend is shared by all the Central and Eastern European
countries. A decade after the fall of communism, Rainer (2002) esti-
mated that the informal sector concerned two thirds of Romanian
households.
The unemployment rate, rarely surpassing 11 per cent between 1989
and 2000 and reaching a record low of 5.9 per cent in 2007, does not
explain this boom in the informal economy (Duchêne 1999). Whereas
during the dictatorship, the informal economy was attributed to a lack
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of products on the market, today it is attributed to organisational flaws
of the official system. For example, administrative complexity and disar-
ray, corruption in the public services and the emergence of an unreli-
able legal structure since 1989 have encouraged people to resort to the
parallel economy, since business on the black market has become easier
and less costly. Meanwhile, in the context of low average salaries, the in-
formal economy allows for people to make ends meet. Indeed, Rainer
(2002) argues that the parallel economy is in no way the privilege of a
corrupt or marginal few but, rather, is a common strategy throughout
all of Romanian society. It not only affects smugglers or traffickers, but
also many who have a formal job, who supplement their earnings with
a second, undeclared activity or through the sale of produce from their
gardens.
The parallel economy subsists in several domains that are outlined
below in order to clarify the link between this sector and transnational
migrations. Duchêne (1999: 36) offers the following definition of infor-
mal activities:
the ensemble of legal and illegal economic activities undertaken
by small-scale (family or individual) units which generate pro-
duction in the sense of the National Accounts System and which
operate on the margins of the regulated socio-fiscal systems en-
forced by the State.
To clarify what we are dealing with here, we can refer to the notion of
‘small tricks’ proposed by Heintz (2002: 79), contrasting with the ‘big
tricks’ that concern a high level of corruption or traffics of national size.
In what follows, an abridged typology is sketched of the principal infor-
mal activities in Romania, according to the level of involvement
required.
Some sections of the informal economy develop on the margins of
formal economic institutions. The agricultural sector is unique in that
sales on the rural market are only rarely declared, thus situating this
sector firmly within the informal economy (Duchêne, Albu & Kim
2002). Other small-scale businesses are more ambiguous, however.
Professions such as mechanical repairs, tailoring, painting and decorat-
ing or private teaching can be practised partially or totally beyond state
control. Such work therefore falls within the black market, which repre-
sents either the individual’s principal activity (primary source of reven-
ue) or a complementary activity to salaried work or unemployment.
Recourse to this form of secondary economic activity does not involve
just one specific social category but, rather, is commonplace throughout
the working population; Pelinescu (2003) states that 36.1 per cent of the
interviewed households had an income from a second job in 1996.
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Petty trade is also a major component of the parallel economy.
Although the majority of this market consists of products that are not il-
legal to sell, the conditions of commercialisation, however, often are ille-
gal, with merchandise procured illegally from large businesses for re-
sale on a small scale. This sometimes involves theft from state compa-
nies, a practice frequent under communism, which continues today,
although undoubtedly in smaller proportions. Take the example of a na-
tional train company factory that makes windows in Teleorman County.
Because for years, some of the factory parts were stolen by employees
and then sold to local inhabitants, nowadays, many residences in the
area have train panes for windows. This unexpected appearance – of
small, curve-shaped windows – illustrates in the landscape just what a
survival economy can be. A second form of illegal trade consists of leg-
ally purchasing merchandise from the manufacturer, but selling it clan-
destinely in retail or wholesale markets, avoiding state tax and control.
One of the informants had, for example, legally bought the engines of a
wood factory that was closing and intended to sell them to entrepre-
neurs he knew without paying any taxes.
On top of these black market transactions are numerous other ex-
changes that are outside of the monetary system, relying on reciprocity
(Mingione 1991). As such, the trade of vegetable conserves from the nu-
merous small private gardens is as frequent as the traffic of influence
or ‘influence peddling’. For instance, an individual can request that a ci-
vil servant help accelerate an administrative procedure, offering in ex-
change untaxed petrol from a relative who works at a petrol station.
Present in nearly every aspect of domestic life, the parallel economy is
not limited to minor transactions. The entrepreneur who built the
house of one interviewee, for example, was paid entirely in bottles of
tsuica, a highly sought-after homemade alcohol made from plums.
Beyond the ability to negotiate face to face (Péraldi 2001: 6), these ex-
changes require social actors to place themselves within an extended
network of relations where each is both debtor and creditor towards the
others, daily and in the long term. Such reciprocity therefore involves a
socialising that relies on and maintains close relations of confidence,
placing social actors in situations of perpetual interdependence.
Another type of trade, directly tied to the mobility of individuals, took
on new dimensions when European borders opened. The ‘suitcase
trade’ entails small-scale undeclared import and export activities that,
although extremely risky during the dictatorship, have become wide-
spread since 1990 (Aktar & Ôgelman 1994). These small business ven-
tures, orientated particularly towards Turkey, Hungary and Serbia, are
composed of individuals acting either alone or in partnerships rarely of
more than two or three persons who collaborate to divide the tasks. The
objective is to sell products that were individually acquired on foreign
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markets in Romania: audio cassettes and clothing from Istanbul are
well-known examples. The comings and goings are generally by bus or
train and the stays abroad are for no more than a day or two. At the
crossroads of transnational migration and local trade, this type of busi-
ness takes advantage of the international setting to minimise the effects
of unfavourable economic circumstances.
Transnational migration as an alternative survival strategy
According to Badie (1995: 16): ‘reflecting on transnational networks (…)
consists of analysing the construction of the social relations that bring
reality and life to globalisation’. Short of aligning with Portes’ (1997)
concept of ‘globalisation from below’, it can be argued that migration is
part of the process of social and economic global exchange, which in-
creasingly exceeds the limits drawn by national borders. As Badie high-
lights, the power of states on an international level is tending to lose
some of its hegemony in favour of greater leeway for the strategies of
autonomous social actors. The social networks they establish are in-
creasingly spreading across multiple poles, whether through multina-
tional companies or through the ‘globalisation from below’. This does
not suggest, however, that borders or spatial, social and economic dispa-
rities no longer play an important role for the migrants.
On the contrary, transnational migration relies on the specific capa-
city of certain social actors to interrelate dissimilar localities, crossing
from one to the other. The migratory networks thus create a ‘transna-
tional social field’ (Glick Schiller & Levitt 2007) that links different
places of passage, situated ‘neither here nor there, but here and there at
the same time’ (Tarrius 1993). The fact of simultaneously belonging to
different and dissociated localities is indeed what renders the situation
of migrants advantageous. Such advantages are not drawn uniquely
from differences in wealth, something highlighted by Piore (1986) and
confirmed in the case of Romanian migrants whose meagre salaries
earned in the West can still be spent in Romania at multiplied value.
Rather, the fieldwork conducted on Romanian migrants shows that ad-
vantages are also drawn from increased social distance, which also
makes the migration worth the sacrifice, in that the degraded social sta-
tus endured abroad has little or no impact on experiences in the home
society.
The application of the term ‘transnational’ not only refers to the geo-
graphic dimension, which engenders increased autonomy, but also calls
attention to the spaces of socialisation, which underlie these move-
ments. These spaces are characterised by ‘a horizontality of social rela-
tions [which], scarcely institutionalised (…), are constituted within infor-
mal sphere’ (Badie 1995: 22). Apart from dependency on state power,
254 POTOT
there is in fact no pre-established hierarchy. The social relations, less co-
dified than in institutional structures, contribute to a constant evolution,
and even at times to a reversal of power relations over time. Within
these networks, as in the transactions that connect them to the societies
they cross, negotiations and interpersonal relations have the utmost im-
portance, much more than that of any strict regulations. Thus, when re-
ferring to transnational Romanian migrations, it is important to consid-
er the practices of circulatory mobility, in the form of continual move-
ments between the home city and various migratory poles in the
European space, as well as the forms of organisation and structuring of
social relations that underlie this mobility (Potot 2008).
In Romania, these migrations must be understood as the multiplicity
of individual strategies that are developed to minimise the deterioration
of socio-economic conditions. As Morokvasic (1995: 119) writes, they
‘concern people who are reacting to a crisis situation by hitting the
road, in order to avoid being left behind in societies engaged in a rapid
and particularly unpredictable process of transformation’. Searching
elsewhere for the means to live better at home is the principal guide to
these practices. According to Sandu (1999), temporary business trips to
richer countries are associated with an older habit of ‘shuttling’ between
city and countryside. This ‘shuttling’, known in Romania as navetism,
once enabled the inhabitants of rural zones to improve their living con-
ditions by commuting to work in the city, without entering entirely into
the urban economic circuit. The parallel with current international mo-
bility is clear in that the objective still consists of extending one’s activ-
ities to a new territory without socially or economically breaking from
the former.
In this way, transnational movements do not disrupt the local equili-
brium but, rather, represent a specific form of adaptation to a crisis. It
is in this way that Romanians interpret their temporary migrations,
more as an alternative to the local bartering system than as a way to de-
finitively escape the Romanian condition (Diminescu 2003; Michalon
2005; Morokvasic 2004; Potot 2007; Sandu 2000). This continuity al-
lowed the idea of ‘doing a season’ in the West to become very popular
(Diminescu & Lagrave 1999). According to the Public Opinion
Barometer, in 2007, 12 per cent of the Romanian population considered
their principal preoccupation to be leaving in order to work abroad
(Fundatia Soros Romania 2007: 45).
For many Romanians we met during the fieldwork, migration was an
option that requires somewhat more investment than informal trade,
but which, in exchange, promises greater profit. Similarly, the legal re-
strictions imposed upon border-crossing appear more as challenges to
surmount than as actual barriers to migration. Until 1 January 2002,
the EU, through the Schengen space, kept its borders closed to
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Romanian citizens, who were forced to obtain sparingly delivered visas.
Even with the opening of borders to circulation in 2002, and full acces-
sion to the EU in 2007, several European countries have continued to
protect their labour markets, so much so that labour migration to the
West is often still considered an illegal practice.
Diversified migratory practices
In order to situate the case study that follows, this section provides a
brief chronological sketch of international migration from Romania
since 1989.4 At first, seasonal labour migration intensified to the
neighbouring countries of Hungary, Yugoslavia and Turkey at the be-
ginning of the 1990s, reflecting established ties with these countries
and opportunities to combine such migration with business trips.
Then, from 1993-1994, departures to countries that were more distant
and more difficult to access became increasingly widespread. Two
types of migrations were juxtaposed. On the one hand, several coun-
tries – Germany and Israel in particular – recruited Romanian labour.
In the framework of the Werkertrage agreements, German firms signed
contracts with Romanian firms that provided not only the workers, but
also the materials needed for certain construction sites. Particularly
popular between 1993 and 1996, these exchanges have now practically
disappeared. In Israel, the authorities decided each year on a quota of
guest workers by nationality. Romanians, who represented 29 per cent
of legal foreign workers in Israel in 2000, constituted the most repre-
sented national group.5 This recruitment always took place through lo-
cal Romanian agencies that served as intermediaries between candi-
dates for departure and foreign private employers (Ellman & Laacher
2003). Financed either by the recruitment agency or by the company
itself, the latter generally committed to housing workers onsite.
Concretely, this meant the possibility to obtain, from Romania, a tem-
porary contract for migration in which everything was included and
the migrant was taken care of. The advantage is clear for individuals
with no experience of living abroad, particularly at a time when circu-
latory migration was just beginning, and the migratory networks that
would later facilitate temporary migration were not yet in place. For ex-
ample, the availability of free housing and organised travel was attrac-
tive, in a context where emigration overall appeared quite risky. In
turn, this attractiveness inspired a great deal of corruption: we could
witness during the fieldwork that, despite being remunerated by the
foreign companies, the Romanian agencies in charge of recruitment
systematically sold contracts to migrant workers. As the number of
contracts was limited, the agencies were able to increase the cost of
work contracts on the black market. Some contracts could thus be sold
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for up to US$ 2,500; whereas the monthly salary guaranteed by the
contract only amounted to around US$ 1,000.
Since 1995, these temporary migrations under contract have begun
to serve more independent initiatives. Some contractual workers abroad
maximise their revenue by accumulating jobs. In addition to the work
for which they were employed, they devote their evenings or days off to
undeclared second jobs. The value of the official contracts for the
Romanian public is therefore directly related to the control exerted over
the labourers’ free time. As a result, housing that is located at the con-
struction site itself, for example, is now in low demand, due to the diffi-
culties that this represents to circumvent the employers’ supervision.
These contracts can also serve as passports for more independent mi-
grants. After having made the trip with the company and perhaps hav-
ing worked some time for the official employer, some migrants leave
for more generous positions nearby. Indeed, the salaries of ‘imported
workers’ are always rather low, reduced all the more by the withhold-
ings that supposedly compensate for food and/or board. Once in the
country, migrants can easily find more advantageous conditions on the
national labour market. As such, the initial contract presents two mani-
fest advantages: first, the migrant can take the time to appraise his
place of work and analyse other employment options while being as-
sured work. Some migrants maintain this initial employment for sev-
eral months before moving on. Furthermore, formal recruitment attri-
butes the right to stay legally in the country until the end of the con-
tract. However, as the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics notes, the
workers often do not immediately return to their home countries at the
end of these contracts (Ellman & Laacher 2003). Familiar with the area
after several months of working legally at the initial site of employment,
they may consider staying on in the country illegally for some time.
This partially accounts for the fact that mainly illegal individual mi-
grations first appeared alongside legally organised migrations
(Diminescu 2003). Migrants bound by no contract followed in the foot-
steps of those who were, at least initially, contractual. The preferred des-
tination of illegal movements was, as of 1993-1994, Germany. Having
procured a contract there, migrants often served as relays for their inde-
pendent compatriots. Even without giving any real assistance onsite,
they were the initial link between the homeland and the host destina-
tion. Having conveyed information to their families and friends about
their experience abroad, they implicitly encouraged journeys to these re-
gions. Likewise, the Aussiedler6 recently emigrated from Romania cre-
ated ties between certain regions of Germany and departure regions in
Transylvania (Michalon 2003), prompting the independent migrants to
follow the same paths. In this way, legally framed migrations have or-
iented undocumented migrations since their outset.
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Migration later expanded to other European countries, facilitated by
the very concept of the Schengen space. The convention that binds the
signatory countries stipulated the elimination of the control of people,
regardless of their nationality, at interior borders, through the harmoni-
sation of customs controls at the exterior borders and the development
of homogeneous visa policies. As a result, after crossing the first border,
migrants are no longer hindered in travel between one country and an-
other. It has since been possible for them to explore different countries
with the aim of identifying the particularly attractive destinations. Thus,
informants explain that when Germany increased its labour controls in
1997, restricting black market labour, or when France limited the re-
quests for asylum in 1998,7 reducing the opportunities to remain leg-
ally in its territory, they simply left these countries for other European
destinations.
The range of destinations was once again modified with the integra-
tion of Romania and Bulgaria into the EU in 2007 and the subsequent
opening of their labour markets. Numerous discussions with Romanian
migrants of both groups studied reveal that the choice of a migratory
destination depends on several factors. The most important is undoubt-
edly the profitability of the migration. In other words, it is indispensa-
ble for them to have the possibility to work upon arrival. Their arrival
must therefore coincide with labour potential in the host country’s la-
bour market.
In the south of Spain, for instance, a substantial ‘pull factor’ in the lo-
cal agricultural sector has attracted a high number of migrants from
Teleorman County. Undocumented immigration has been greatly uti-
lised by the agricultural sector in this region over the last twelve years.
Thanks to low salaries and the lack of legal rights offered to this work-
force, the sector has been able to reduce its production costs and be-
come a leading European region for the fresh produce. Yet, besides do-
mestic work, which provides employment for some women, undocu-
mented Romanians have no other employment opportunities in the
province of Almeria. Their arrival in this region is thus clearly corre-
lated with opportunities offered by the agricultural sector where the
working conditions were quite hard. It is then clearly the guarantee to
easily find a job that ‘pulled’ migrants to this region.
The case observed in the French Riviera also illustrates the factors in-
fluencing migrants’ geographical and labour trajectories. For four years,
migrants from Târgoviste interviewed by this author worked as street
vendors for a newspaper in Nice. This activity allowed them not only to
meet their needs onsite, but also to put aside savings for their return.
Although black market labour in construction sometimes complemen-
ted this income, Romanians were not able to obtain full-time employ-
ment due to the lack of positions. It was thus the initial activity that
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assured the success of the migration. As of 1997, the popularity of
street newspaper sales in France began to decline. Then in 1998, in or-
der to restore its image, the publishing company in Nice terminated
employment of undocumented migrants among its vendors, conse-
quently ending the principal occupation of the Romanians who were
the focus of my research. The outcome within the migrant network was
immediate; Nice was abandoned in favour of regions such as Milan and
London, which promised other opportunities. Some of them left for
London where they could work principally in the construction, hotel
and catering industries in positions generally taken up by foreigners.
With minimal controls on illegals working in the UK, Romanian mi-
grants appear to have no difficulty in being employed alongside legal
co-workers. These observations show that the type of job does not mat-
ter for these people as they can easily pass from one sector to the other
if it gives them the opportunity to improve their earnings and/or their
living conditions.
A second essential factor in choosing a migratory destination con-
cerns the collective knowledge of the location. Only the most informed
migrants dare to conquer new territories. The majority take positions al-
ready tested by the network they are affiliated with, in locations where
they already have friends who have provided useful information. The
migrant is thus bound to the collective memory of the group, which is
utilised to orient his or her actions. Each experience enriches the stock
of shared knowledge, orienting new migrants in the same direction.
The migrants therefore branch out into niches (Waldinger 1994)
throughout the European space, inhabiting some territories and leaving
others.
Another important element in the choice of destination includes the
relations of local authorities with undocumented migrants. As being ex-
pelled to one’s home country before having collected sufficient savings
constitutes a failure, migrants seek destinations that present the least
possible amount of risk. For undocumented migrants,8 who constitute
the majority of independent migrants interviewed,9 the way that laws
are applied is more important than the legislation. Some countries, in-
cluding France, Germany or Austria, are particularly uncompromising
towards illegal migrants, while others – where the economies make
massive use of undeclared labour – are more indulgent. The study con-
ducted in Almeria provides a good example of the informal manage-
ment of undocumented migration. In this agricultural province, mi-
grants are not stopped by the police during farming breaks, between
noon and 4 p.m. However, foreigners are systematically monitored if
they loiter in public spaces during working hours. In this way, the
authorities ‘sort’ migrants who fulfil the economic role expected of
them from those who attempt to leave the agricultural sector. Likewise,
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undocumented migrants are aware that police leniency ceases at the
perimeter of the agricultural territory. Travelling in the rest of the coun-
try means leaving the zone of leniency that characterises the province
of Almeria. These observations demonstrate that beyond national bor-
ders, there are enclaves in the European space that are willing to consti-
tute migratory niches.
In other words, there is evidence that working migrations, even when
not officially acknowledged, do not only serve the interests of individual
migrants or their family; they also play a role at a more collective scale.
In Western economies, the use of low paid, foreign manpower allows
weak economic sectors to remain competitive despite the globalisation
process (Potot 2007). Meanwhile, remittances sent by migrants in coun-
tries of origin can be a valuable income for relatively poor states. The
economic impact of the migratory activities on national economies is a
recurrent subject of studies, both in receiving countries (Borjas 2001;
Friedberg & Hunt 1995) as in countries of origin (Domingues Dos
Santos & Postel-Vinay 2003; Drinkwater, Levine, Lotti & Pearlman
2003; Ratha 2005; World Bank 2008). Contrasting, there are not many
sociological surveys evaluating the social evolutions engendered by mi-
grations in the country of departure.
The migrants during the transition process
The aim here is not to evaluate the overall economic contribution of mi-
gration but, rather, to use concrete observations to indicate the different
aspects of local socio-economic life that are noticeably influenced by mi-
gratory activity. Three principal means can be observed through which
the migrants, in bridging their city of origin with Western locations,
transform Romanian lifestyles. To begin with, their activity generates
new lifestyles for themselves and new attitudes towards consumption in
Romania. Secondly, the formation of a social group identified by migra-
tion and rising social status fosters an increasingly capitalist outlook
within the middle classes, which encourages the creation of small busi-
nesses in the departure regions. Thirdly, transnational skills can be put
to the service of other social actors in order to facilitate trade and, above
all, to support the implantation of foreign companies in Romania. Each
of these phenomena is explored in more detail below.
A new consumerist model
To understand how migration has transformed modes of consumption
in Romania, we must first briefly return to the economy of Romanian
households and individuals. The transition from one political system to
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another can be summarised in the words of one of the interviewees:
‘Before we had money but the stores were empty. Today the stores are
full but we no longer have the means to buy the bare minimum.’10
Indeed, although, as noted above, the average monthly salary after tax
in 2007 was only around E 295, the prices of many commercial pro-
ducts are now only slightly lower than in the West. This situation leads
the majority of Romanian households to employ strategies in order to
meet their daily needs. Besides various financial solutions for buying
things that they cannot afford with one salary, like credit or leasing, the
informal economy, which once served to compensate for supply
shortages in the official market, is today therefore a precious resource
to compensate for reduced purchasing power. Thus, the role of the sha-
dow economy is still to maintain the standard of everyday life when the
official system does not offer this possibility.
According to my research, before their first departure, migrants were
often already involved in informal transactions; their behaviour trans-
forms when they return. At this point, they tend to abandon the infor-
mal market, turning towards the formal consumer economy, which they
perceive as typically Western. Everyday consumer products such as food
or clothing are primarily bought in retail stores, preferably in the local
subsidiaries of foreign chain stores. In the city studied, the mini-mart
of the Total petrol station had become the primary source of necessities
for returning migrants. For them, the 50 square metres of this shop in-
carnated the Western European mode of consumption. Direct access to
products of brightly coloured and illustrated packaging led Romanian
clients to consider these purchases in a new and amusing way. Within
a few years, Carrefour stores became the symbol of Western consumer-
ist modernity. By shopping regularly in this type of store, in spite of
higher prices than at the traditional market, returning migrants show
their fellow citizens to what extent the migration has transformed their
lives. On the one hand, it has provided the financial means to abandon
the black market that is now described by the informants as the pathetic
legacy of a time past; while, on the other hand, it has conditioned them
to a different and more modern lifestyle that has been integrated into
their daily lives.
The fact that these practices are part of a performance aimed at show-
ing the different sides of the image of the migrant is of little impor-
tance here. What emerges is not only that part of the profit from migra-
tion that is reinvested in the formal economy, but that the latter has am-
plified value on a symbolic level. The migrants’ behaviour associates the
notion of social mobility with consumer practices in the formal econo-
my. Now spread beyond the migrant circle, this tendency contributes to
reducing the number of informal transactions and encourages beha-
viour that more resembles European standards. This inclination is also
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supported by widespread advertisements promoting a very modern
Western way of life, which developed with the growing implantation of
Western brand shops throughout the country. In parallel, the political
elite – whose objective was, until 2007, to integrate Romania into the
EU – tend to encourage such a model. Adopting this way of consump-
tion is then seen as a testimony of modernity. Such trends increase the
clientele of legitimate businesses, boosting their economic situation.
From this standpoint, it appears that migratory movements contribute
to transforming not only the perceptions of the middle classes, but also
their economic behaviour.
Emulation of capitalism
Although these attitudes undeniably impact consumption behaviours
concerning daily needs, we cannot conclude that all of the profits from
migration are reinvested in the formal economy, nor that migrants have
given up taking advantage of their social networks to obtain certain re-
sources. On the contrary, migration also enriches migrants’ social capital
(Bourdieu 1985), which is highly valuable in the home regions. From
the fieldwork conducted in Romania, we can learn that this shared so-
cial status of ‘returnee’ in Romania, along with the shared experience of
‘migration’ abroad, engenders a sort of social group in the departure re-
gions. Rapid upwards mobility and the sense of belonging to an ex-
tended geographical space create ties between migrants that lead them
to distinguish themselves from their fellow citizens and to rally around
a common culture. The two principal markers that identify the returned
migrant group in Romania thus concern a shared experience abroad
and the collective construction of the migrants’ image in the home re-
gion. Although some migrants may have helped each other out during
the stays abroad, there is little observable sense of community belong-
ing amongst migrants whilst they are abroad (Potot 2007). It is really
only in the country of origin that the migrants publicly demonstrate a
collective identity. Groups of migrants are commonly encountered in
the fashionable bars and discothèques, verbosely expressing their affec-
tion for the region of their recent migration. Many symbols are em-
ployed to express this attachment, such as using certain words in
French, English or Spanish, wearing clothing of Western brand names
or arriving in cars with foreign plates even several months after the re-
turn to Romania.11 Not only do these public demonstrations enable the
migrants to boast about their upwards mobility, but they are also useful
in the world of business.
In addition, migrants generally put aside some savings for their re-
turn and, although one part of this will be spent in ostentatious fashion,
many will attempt to exploit this capital once they are back in Romania.
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To do so, belonging to a defined social group of returned migrants
could prove to be useful. For example, we observed that migrants may
find that their peers have an investment capacity more or less equiva-
lent to their own, are willing to take some financial risks, generally have
partners abroad they can rely on and have a similar goal to maintain
their new living standard. It is thus common for migrants to engage in
small-scale business activities together. This often entails transitory
business ventures: examples from fieldwork included buying material
from a factory that was going out of business to resell it for a profit, ex-
porting wood to Turkey or reselling telephones from Germany. Each
time, an ex-migrant found such an opportunity within his own social
network – connected with the transnational social capital he acquired
during his migration (Rusinovic 2008) or not – and then invited one or
two colleagues to take part in the business. This can be a simple finan-
cial support, but the other participants can also bring some contacts
with potential clients or any administrative support for international
business. The dynamics that encourage the spirit of enterprise also oc-
casionally lead to the creation of more perennial businesses. In one ex-
ample, a taxi business in Bucharest was created when a migrant’s stay
in France enabled him to buy a car, for which he employed a driver in
order to return abroad and save enough funds to buy a second vehicle.
While some of these endeavours, as in the example cited, were planned
before the initial departure and represent the principal reason for mi-
gration, others were generated from opportunities arising directly from
the experience abroad. A young man who had spent a few months in
the agricultural sector of Andalusia, for example, returned to Romania
in order to open an exporting business of window boxes, which he sold
directly to his former Spanish employer through a compatriot who had
remained there.
Migration not only provides the economic means to launch this
type of business, it also develops the necessary skills such as the ca-
pacity to negotiate, to handle uncertain situations and to make a prof-
it from the marginal domains that are neglected by the public autho-
rities. Similarly, Taylor (1999) reveals an indirect effect of the migra-
tions on entrepreneurship: because they accumulate capital, migrants
can serve as financial guarantors for friends and family. In this way,
even when unspent, the existence of savings to rely upon in the
event of bankruptcy has encouraged risk-taking even by those not di-
rectly involved in migration. It therefore appears clear that, even if
many of these business ventures have a limited life span, migratory
movements support the development of small-scale enterprises
through individual initiatives in a country where the majority of the
private sector emanates from foreign investments and the privatisa-
tion of large state businesses.
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Transnational mediators
Finally, the migrants can be considered as strategic elements in foreign
investments, as their multinational culture enables them to bridge for-
eign businesses or investors and Romanian society. Their skills can be
put to a multitude of uses. Stocchiero (2002) highlights the role of mi-
grants in the region of Veneto, Italy, during the relocation of the Italian
clothing industry to the region of Timisoara-Arad. The study argues that
there is an association between the arrival of undocumented Romanian
workers in this Italian province during the 1990s and the massive relo-
cation of the clothing sector to Romania that subsequently took place.
A qualitative approach enables clarification of the part played by the
migrants. Not only were they familiar with several languages but, hav-
ing lived abroad, they were in a position to anticipate some of the diffi-
culties and expectations of foreign entrepreneurs investing in Romania.
They are therefore better able to assist investors in dealing with
Romanian bureaucracy, as well as in negotiating with public authorities
or potential partners of the budding businesses. For a small-scale for-
eign investor, the support of a person of confidence is often essential.
Additionally, regardless of the migrants’ occupation during their stay in
the EU, their experiences usually involve their working in an environ-
ment that contrasts starkly with that in post-communist businesses.
Even when relegated to the least respected positions, they were obliged
to conform to Western styles of working, to accept company rules, to
work long hours and/or to show initiative. These tendencies are often
absent in state enterprises where, for several decades during commun-
ism, work was mandatory, over-employment the general rule, inactivity
frequent due to the lack of raw materials and the plundering of the
company a normal way to compensate for the failures of the system.
Even today, it is noticeable that the behaviour of an employee of a large
Romanian company, such as the Romanian National Railway Company,
is a far cry from the conduit of a young dynamic employee promoted
by Carrefour or McDonald’s who is at the service of the customer.
Foreign businesses, which not only import products but also new work-
ing codes, require that their Romanian employees adapt in a number of
ways. Although this adaptation is encouraged by offering higher salaries
than those offered by local businesses, it requires tedious efforts onsite
with the employees, who are expected to integrate a work ethic that was
only recently imported to Romania (Heintz 2002). The migrants, who
themselves had to adapt during their stay abroad to a work environment
that they were not accustomed to, are particularly competent at convey-
ing the requirements of the foreign businesses to the Romanian em-
ployees. Being familiar with work habits in Romania, they can antici-
pate the difficulties that could be brought about by Western-style
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personnel management as well as fully trained managers who had theo-
retically studied the subject for several years.
One young woman, for example, recounted her one year of work in a
shoe-making business in the region of Milan, stressing that when this
company relocated part of its production to Romania, she was first
asked to participate in the prospective phase, during which she worked
as an interpreter, serving as go-between with the local administration.
Later, when the factory opened, she became the personnel supervisor
and the link between the Italian directors and the Romanian workers.
On top of the recruitment of new personnel, her role consisted of con-
veying the company’s expectations to the new employees. Her two prin-
cipal objectives at the time of our meeting were to end the numerous
unexpected and unjustified employee absences, which greatly disturbed
the rhythm of production, and to avoid theft of raw materials and fin-
ished products which was not so rare in state factories during commu-
nist Romania (Oprescu 2000). She attested to the difficulty of putting
in place a work ethic in the context of a large factory even if it had
seemed natural in Italy. At the same time, she was not surprised by
these obstacles and stressed that, if the numerous Romanian migrants
were able to adapt without difficulty to the Italian business spirit, it had
to be possible to ‘make the Romanian mentalities evolve as well’. It is
indeed this role that is expected of returning migrants: that of mediator
between different work environments.
Conclusion
The aim of this chapter is in no way to glorify the Western model of so-
ciety; it does not aim to judge the so-termed transition process, which is
inclined to transform a country deeply rooted in communism into a ca-
pitalistic society.
Its purpose was to underline the continuity within the evolution of
Romanian society. I have shown that the path from one economic mod-
el to the other was supported by deeper social processes which were
adapting to the evolving situation. Actually, the reform of the economic
system goes with progressive changes, both in everyday life habits and
in representations. The involvement of a large part of the population
within the shadow economy has existed for several decades, allowing
Romanian people to survive decently despite economic recession. In
this sense, present survival strategies can be seen as the adaptation of
the strategies developed under communism in order to resist the diffi-
culties of those times. The transition process towards capitalism has
not resolved the everyday-life difficulties, but has offered new means of
skirting around them. Transnational migration, as short working stays
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abroad, is therefore part of the set of informal practices available to im-
prove the life of many Romanians.
Ironically, it appears that these informal movements have contributed
in some way to the formalisation of the Romanian economy encouraged
by the various Romanian governments and international supports, such
as the World Bank, in the period of pre-accession to the EU. Yet,
whereas the subject of migration is often approached as a factor inhibit-
ing accession to the EU12 or otherwise as ‘desertion’ of the young work-
ing force at a time when the country needs all its human resources, this
analysis highlights the contribution of migrants to economic and social
changes occurring in Romania. It highlights the fact that the financial
gains sent home, ‘remittances’ in the economic literature, are not the
only contribution of the migrants to their country. Throughout their
transnational movements, they acquire behaviour, knowledge and skills
that are also reinvested in their home regions. In doing so, far from the
projects of international cooperation or the programmes of cultural ex-
change supported by the ministries, the migrant networks promote a
European standard of living which is progressively penetrating the
countries that have only very recently joined the EU.
Notes
1 Data mainly come from fieldwork conducted between 1997 and 2001 in Romania,
France, Spain and the UK and has been completed by occasional contacts with infor-
mants in France since then.
2 The standard of living in 2000 represented only 80 per cent of its material value in
1989 (Lhomel 2001).
3 For an average of 29.2 per cent of GDP for Central and Eastern European countries
altogether and 16.7 per cent in the OECD countries in 2001.
4 This section relies on several articles from the collective publication edited by
Diminescu (2003), Visible mais peu nombreux.
5 These statistics, published in The Internet Jerusalem Post on 30 October 2001, do not
take account of Palestinian workers whose status is particular.
6 Aussiedler are defined by the 1953 law on refugees and displaced persons
(Bundesvertriebenen- und Flüchtlingsgesetz), as German-origin minorities, from the
CEE or the former USSR. They have a right to apply for German nationality.
7 In accordance with the law known as Loi Chevènement of 11 June 1998, requests for
asylum from Romanian citizens are urgently processed in less than ten days and are
almost systematically refused.
8 Even before the end of the visa system, the majority of Romanians travelled abroad
with a legitimate tourist visa for the Schengen space. However, the interdiction to pro-
cure salaried work and the limitation of stays to a period of less than three months
rendered these migrants undocumented in the countries where employed.
9 Independent migrants are those who left Romania independently in search of work or
a better life, as opposed to those recruited directly by contract from Romania.
10 This remark was heard repeatedly during the interviews in Romania.
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11 Several people interviewed claimed to have bribed the police in order to keep their for-
eign plates beyond the legal time limit.
12 The ‘migratory potential’ of Romania has often instigated debate in the negotiations
regarding accession to the EU. See this website devoted to EU enlargement: http://ec.
europa.eu/enlargement.
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13 Modernising Romanian society through
temporary work abroad
Dumitru Sandu
Introduction
The consequences of migration are rarely integrated into solid theoreti-
cal constructions. The main approach in the literature seems to be fo-
cused on designing theories that explain the determinants of migration.
‘Neoclassical economics’, ‘new economics’, ‘segmented labour market’,
‘world system’, ‘social capital’ or ‘cumulative causation’ theories
(Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino & Taylor 1998) are all
centred primarily on determinants of international migration rather
than the discussion of the consequences of this phenomenon. This si-
tuation can be partly explained by the fact that it is quite difficult to
build a theory of migration consequences, as consequences could be in-
tended or unintended, manifest or latent, short-, medium- or long-term,
at individual, household, community, region or national levels, at origin
or at destination. The typical solution to this problem is to talk about
‘migration and development’ for particular countries (Escobar,
Haibronner, Martin & Meza 2006) or about specific consequences of
migration (Dayton-Johnson, Katseli, Maniatis, Muntz & Papademetriou
2007).
Understanding the causes of the migration process could be useful
in portraying its consequences. The logic of cumulative causation in ex-
plaining migration (Massey et al. 1998: 45-50), for example, could be re-
levant for understanding specific chains of migration consequences.
Migration culture, as a key term in the cumulative causation theory of
migration, could also be highly relevant for changes that are generated
by migration, but that have effects going in different directions or
spheres. Changes in origin countries’ local mentalities shaped by exter-
nal migration experiences could be responsible for new family beha-
viours and new household economic patterns. Temporary migration
abroad induces changes at origin that are mediated by three basic inter-
mediary variables: remittances, network capital and changes in ‘mental-
ity’. It is quite difficult to find changes induced by migration at indivi-
dual, household, community or regional levels that are not mediated by
these variables. Starting from this perspective, this chapter seeks to re-
construct a causal chain that explains changes in demographic beha-
viour at the family and community levels in Romania, as induced by
temporary emigration abroad after 1989.
Circular or temporary migration abroad from Romania is a rather re-
cent phenomenon. Between 1989 and 1996, Romanians explored the
world outside Romania, trying to identify appropriate niches where they
could fit in and function, using their own resources and cultural abil-
ities (Sandu 2006). Given the short history of this process, is it possible
to identify mass consequences of temporary migration for Romanians?
Some of the economic consequences are obvious: Romania is among
the top ten developing countries by the total amount of remittances re-
ceived in 2007 – about US$ 7 billion according to Ratha, Mohapatra,
Vijayalakshmi and Xu (2007). But what about non-economic conse-
quences, mediated by changes in the human, cultural and network capi-
tal? Are they visible at community and regional levels?
Data, method and hypotheses
The general hypothesis of this study is that the experience of working
abroad became a modernising factor for Romanian society, despite the
fact that this is a new phenomenon and highly uneven at the commu-
nity and regional levels. The chapter uses the case of the possible im-
pact of temporary emigration experience in Romania after 2000 on fa-
mily life and demographic transformations as a way to answer the ques-
tions stated above. The first part of the chapter describes the types of
temporary emigration experiences1 that individuals and families have
accumulated and the relationship between these experiences and social
differentiation in terms of material, human, network and cultural capi-
tal. These two factors are in a continuous interaction. In some cases, it
is possible to infer the consequences of migration for the stock of capi-
tal held by families and individuals while, in other cases, the relation-
ship between migration experiences and capital stocks is so intimate
that it is hard to assess the causal nature of the relationship.
The second part of the chapter explores the consequences of the mi-
gration experience at the community level. This includes analysis of re-
gional variations in how migration has impacted the housing market
and demographic trends. Using rural community-level data, multivari-
ate models are developed to compare rates of migration from, and re-
turn to, each Romanian commune (in 2002) with birth, marriage and
divorce rates, and the rate of construction of private houses (in the peri-
od 2003-2005). Two types of hypotheses are developed: measurement
hypotheses (h) and substantive hypotheses (H).
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The basic hypothesis at the community level (H1) is that migration
could have a delayed effect on demographic behaviour. Communes
characterised by high migration prevalence rates (returned migrants
plus current temporary emigrants to 1,000 people in the reference area)
are expected to exhibit high divorce rates and lower birth and marriage
rates only after several years, controlling for development level, socio-
demographic composition of the local population, community culture
and location factors (distance to the nearest city, distance to a moder-
nised road, etc.). Community culture is correlated with the general ferti-
lity rate, calculated from the most recent census in 2002. The measure-
ment hypothesis (h1) here states that villages (as territorial sub-divisions
of communes) with high fertility rates are formed by a more traditional
population, whereas those with low fertility rates have more modern
populations.
Data for the individual and family levels are provided by a survey
carried out in 2006 on a national representative sample.2 The basic
hypothesis at this level (H2) is that personal- and family-level effects
of migration are functions of the type of migration experience. This
experience could include an individual living abroad temporarily for
work or non-work purposes, or living in a family where another fa-
mily member lived abroad for work or non-work purposes. The inter-
section of these two dimensions generates four classes of migration
experience: personal work experience (7 per cent), personal non-work
experience (9 per cent), family work experience (14 per cent) and fa-
mily non-work experience (3 per cent). The rest of the sample (68
per cent) does not have any migration experience. More than 30 per
cent of the Romanians interviewed in the 2006 survey lived in
households where at least one household member had lived abroad
temporarily. For half of these respondents, this had been a personal
experience.
A second methodological hypothesis (h2), which could help in inter-
preting the data, is that the four types of migration experience are asso-
ciated not only with different levels of economic and human resources,
as indicated by previous studies, but also with different degrees of indi-
vidual emancipation or modernity (Figure 13.1). Previous surveys (2001-
2004) indicate that the typical potential emigrant for temporary work
abroad is young, male, with education between primary and secondary
level, with previous experience of living abroad, neither rich nor poor,
living in more developed communities from more developed counties
from the historical region of Moldova (Sandu 2007: 37). The four types
of migration experience listed above are expected to order – from high-
er to lower – individual modernity as a propensity to accept calculated
risk for success, to value leisure time, to promote tolerance in social in-
teraction and to use mass media as a source of information decreases.
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Hypothesis h2 is directly supported by more recent data that shows
the migration experience to be deeply rooted in personal status (Table
13.1). The respondents that worked abroad are the youngest among the
four categories mentioned above. Three quarters of them are men with
high school or vocational education, coming from households of med-
ium economic status. Their network capital based on connections
Figure 13.1 Relationship between emigration experience, capital resources and
individual modernity
Economic, human and network capital resources
Low Middle High
In
di
vi
du
al
m
od
er
ni
ty Low
Middle Family work experience
High Personal work experience Personal non-work experience
Table 13.1 Status profile function of migration experience
Migration experience Total
Personal
for work
reasons
Family
for work
reasons
Personal
for non-work
reasons
Family
for non-work
reasons
Without
migration
experience
Average age 36 45 44 45 52 49
% male 73 35 44 48 47 47
% urban 53 51 77 70 51 54
Index of household
goods*
6.80 6.38 8.23 8.28 5.49 6.02
Average number of
years in school
11.18 9.58 12.10 11.23 9.56 9.94
Index of network
capital in the
country**
0.80 0.65 1.26 1.10 0.47 0.61
Index of network
capital abroad***
0.57 0.41 0.46 0.30 0.14 0.24
Source: Field survey
*Index counts the available durable goods in the household – car, telephone, mobile
phone, refrigerator, cable TV, colour TV, video, freezer, washing machine, automatic
dishwasher, computer, internet access at home, double glazing windows. The index
therefore varies from 0 to 13.
** Index counts whether useful connections were reported in health centres, judicial
institutions, town hall, police, in employment services, in business and at the county level.
The index therefore varies between 0 and 7.
*** Index indicates whether respondents reported having relatives or acquaintances
abroad (0 = no; 1 = having either relatives or acquaintances abroad; 2 = having both
relatives and acquaintances abroad).
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abroad is the highest, compared to any other category in the classifica-
tion. Network capital in Romania is generally high, but it is lower than
for those who were abroad for non-work reasons. Those with work ex-
perience abroad come in equal part from rural and urban communities.
This segment of the population has a status profile quite similar to that
of people without direct migration experience, but coming from house-
holds in which another person had experience with working abroad.
Those having direct experience of living abroad for non-work reasons
are older, better educated and come from households with better eco-
nomic status. They are much more likely to be in urban areas than
those with work experience abroad. In terms of human and material ca-
pital, they are rather similar to people from families with migration ex-
perience for non-work reasons. Considering these similarities in status
profiles, one can expect that persons who have direct or indirect experi-
ence of working abroad are also similar from the point of view of mi-
gration consequences. They are expected to differ significantly from per-
sons who had direct non-work migration experience.
The causal chain that starts from migration experience abroad at indi-
vidual or family level leads to community demographic consequences by
a series of first-, second- and third-order effects (see Figure 13.2). First-
order effects are those involving increased financial resources, increased
network capital and modern values. Many other consequences (second-
order effects) in individual or family consumption, investment beha-
viour, choice behaviours or family life result from these first-order ef-
fects. Changes in community life are third-order effects, like those trig-
gering modifications in housing stock, fertility, divorce rates, etc.
Hypothesis H1 focuses on this type of demographic consequences of mi-
gration experience at the community level. Changes in the demographic
life of the community are clearly cumulative. All these changes are selec-
tive by reference to personal/family status and to community stocks of
economic, human and cultural capitals. An increase in divorce rates and
decline of birth rates are not only effects ‘of the diffusion of demographic
modernity’ (Fargues 2007: 162). Due to the fact that they are produced in
the early stages of experiences of migration abroad, they are also effects
of simple separation between family partners caused by working abroad
and of the problems associated with the uncertainties of experiencing a
new way of life in a new cultural and economic environment.
Family-level consequences
Converting experience into a ‘migration ideology’
The type of migration experience generally appears to influence respon-
dents’ opinions about specific consequences of working abroad (Table
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13.2). For example, more than half of the Romanian population believes
that ‘it is good that some people leave for work abroad’. Among those
who have already worked abroad, about three quarters of respondents
have a positive opinion. About 60 per cent of respondents who have
worked abroad consider that after this experience, people ‘think differ-
ently’. In contrast, those who had not lived abroad but were part of a fa-
mily with migration experience were rather less likely to agree with this
statement (45 per cent), whilst respondents who had not migrated and
were not part of a family with migration experience showed the lowest
level of support for this view.
A similar pattern is seen for other opinions surveyed. Half of those
who had worked abroad thought that after the experience they would be
likely to divorce. The same opinion was supported by only 42 per cent
of those that have no migration experience. The difference could be
Figure 13.2 The micro-meso level of migration consequences
Personal/family 
level
Work/non-work
experiences
Higher 
consumption
Investment 
behaviour
Modernised 
family behaviours 
Increase financial
resources 
Increase network
capital 
Modernise values
Improving 
housing stock 
Private sector 
development
Increased divorce 
rate, declining 
birth rate 
Migration experience First-order effects Second-order 
effects (examples)
Third-order effects
(examples)
Community levelPersonal/household level
Community capitalEconomic, human, network and cultural capital related to status
Table 13.2 Opinions about working abroad
Migration experience Total
Personal,
for work
reasons
Family
for work
reasons
Personal
for non-work
reasons
Family
for non-work
reasons
Without
migration
experience
‘It is good to work abroad’ 73 58 62 68 51 55
‘It is both good and bad
to work abroad’
16 19 19 18 23 21
Those that work abroad…..
‘get richer’ 87 87 83 83 82 83
‘get divorced more easily’ 51 42 39 40 42 43
‘help each other abroad’ 39 46 40 35 33 36
‘help those at home’ 80 71 73 75 65 68
‘have a different way of
thinking’
60 45 56 53 32 38
Source: Field survey
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interpreted as consistent with the hypothesis that working abroad fa-
vours divorce by separation and modernising experiences, although this
difference is not statistically significant. In turn, experience of migra-
tion is also highly associated with the idea that whilst abroad, migrants
help those who are still at home, with those who had worked abroad
again showing the highest level of support for this view (80 per cent,
compared to 68 per cent, the sample average).
Solidarity networks occasioned by migration are, in the social percep-
tion, more structured among family members who are in different
places, abroad and at home, than among the migrants at destination. A
total of 39 per cent of former economic migrants supported the view
that ‘migrants help each other abroad’ compared to 80 per cent from
the same population segment considering that ‘migrants help those at
home’.
The only clear exception to the rule that migration experience is re-
lated to opinions about migration concerns the view that ‘those who
worked abroad get richer’, a statement supported by more than 80 per
cent of those surveyed, irrespective of their migration experience. This
shows an overwhelming consensus on the positive consequences of
temporary economic emigration.
The analysis so far focuses on bivariate logic, but it is also possible to
test hypotheses about the relationship between migration experience
and opinions about migration using multivariate analysis – in other
words, controlling for key status variables such as age, gender, educa-
tion, household assets and rural versus urban residence. When such
multivariate analysis is conducted, personal experience of working
abroad continues to be a significant predictor of the opinion that ‘mi-
grants think differently’, and the view that migrants help those still at
home, compared to those with no migration experience, even after con-
trolling for the status variables listed above. However, there is no differ-
ence between these two groups with respect to whether migration fa-
vours divorce when one controls for status variables.
Given that Romanian migration is highly regionalised (Sandu 2005;
see Figure 13.3), regional variations in the pattern of migration experi-
ence might also be expected to influence opinions about migration.
With this in mind, the regression models were run for each region,
with opinions about migration as dependent variables and migration ex-
perience as predictors (and controlling for status variables). This analy-
sis suggests that, whilst some regions such as Moldova and
Transylvania are typical of the country as a whole, with a significant as-
sociation between personal and family work experience and opinions
about migration, in other regions such as Oltenia and Crisana-
Maramures, it is not so much individuals who have worked abroad who
have more positive attitudes about migration, but more their families.
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This may reflect the fact that there were relatively few individuals in
these latter regions who had personal experience of working abroad, in
contrast to Moldova, the region with the highest propensity for work
emigration, and Transylvania, where non-work emigration experiences
are very rich, especially in counties with a large share of ethnic minori-
ties – Covasna, Harghita, Sibiu, Brasov (Sandu 2007: 40).
The idea that working abroad brings a higher propensity for divorce
is supported significantly only in the Banat region, amongst the fa-
milies of former work migrants. Banat is known in Romania for a long
tradition of low fertility (Trebici 1986: 104-106). It is likely that in such
an environment, the population is more sensitive to factors such as mi-
gration, which could bring demographic changes. Timis, the county
with the largest population in Banat, has for a long time had one of the
highest divorce rates in the country (Trebici 1986: 84). In contrast, the
view that work migration does not bring higher divorce rates is sup-
ported in the southern region of Muntenia, where people from families
with work experience abroad systematically reject the idea that migra-
tion is a factor that increases the rate of divorce.
Figure 13.3 Temporary emigration rates by historical regions of Romania, 2002-2006
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Note: Regions’ names are in larger block letters; county names are in smaller
print.
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In addition to the opinions on migration noted above, respondents of
the survey were also asked what were the ‘things a person who returns
home from work abroad should spend money on’, with a range of
choices being offered (Table 13.3). Here, the differences between popula-
tion groups based on their experience of migration were minimal, with
widespread agreement amongst population groups that the major items
of expenditure and investment for migrants are housing, business de-
velopment and meeting family needs.
Behaviour and value correlates of migration experience
Individuals think about the future on the basis of their resources, needs
and values. Migration may alter any or all these factors that affect plans
for the future; in turn, to the degree that changes in resources and va-
lues brought by migration are considerable, one can expect significant
variations in life plans, depending on whether individuals do or do not
have experience of working abroad and, also, depending on their direct
or indirect experience of work, business or tourism outside the country.
The majority of former economic migrants plans to upgrade the physi-
cal structure and facilities of the current house over the next two or three
years (Table 13.4), a significantly higher percentage than in the case of
people without any migration abroad experience or those that lived
abroad for reasons other than work. Former economic migrants are also
twice as likely as those without any migration experience to have plans to
build a new house, whilst they are three times more likely to plan to open
a business. Both of these differences are statistically significant.
The two segments of the population with the highest propensity ‘to
change their lifestyles’ are former economic migrants and those who
did not migrate, but live in households with persons that were abroad
for non-work reasons (trade, tourism, visits to relatives, etc.). An open-
ended question was asked of those who planned to change their lifestyle
Table 13.3 Responses to the question ‘On what should a person returning home
from work abroad spend money on?’
Build or buy a house 32%
Develop a business 22%
Meet family needs for a better life 14%
Buy a car 5%
Invest in real estate 4%
Renovate the house 4%
Buy durable goods 3%
Assure a better future for own children 2%
Other 6%
Source: Field survey
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concerning why they would do so. The majority of answers indicated a
wish to ‘improve their level of living’.
These differences in life plans, even if significant from the statistical
point of view, could be the result of factors other than migration experi-
ence. Overall, controlling for gender, education, economic situation and
residence (urban versus rural) using multivariate analysis does not can-
cel the significant effect of migration experience on having plans to im-
prove migrants’ housing. For example, former work migrants or per-
sons living in households of former work migrants are more inclined
to plan improvements in their current flats or houses, or to plan to
build a new house, irrespective of gender, education, economic status
or residence. However, adding age as a predictor changes the situation.
Controlling for age differences cancels the significant impact of migra-
tion experience on plans for housing improvement, as well as on plans
for changing lifestyle. The effect of migration on plans for house im-
provement also varies according to the regional context. The only histor-
ical region of the country where experience working abroad is asso-
ciated with a higher propensity to plan for major housing improve-
ments is Transylvania. It is here that former work emigrants have a
higher propensity to make important improvements to their house, irre-
spective of personal characteristics (age, gender, education, goods in the
household, residence).
In contrast, the intention to open a business is one of the most stable
effects of having work experience abroad. This category of people is
Table 13.4 Responses to questions about future plans ‘for the next 2-3 years’ (%)
Migration experience Total
Personal
for work
reasons
Family
for work
reasons
Personal
for non-work
reasons
Family
for non-work
reasons
Without
migration
experience
Improve conditions in
current house
56 46 43 50 37 40
Increase income by
supplementary work
45 26 28 43 27 29
Get another job 35 27 14 33 21 23
Holiday abroad 35 18 51 38 13 19
Change lifestyle 27 24 16 28 14 17
Relocation to a better house 23 16 20 25 14 16
Continue studies 21 18 23 30 10 14
Build a house 23 13 17 15 11 13
Open a business 27 12 14 23 8 11
Buy land 20 10 18 8 8 10
Source: Field survey
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more likely to open a business, even after controlling for the personal
characteristics mentioned above, age included. There are also some re-
gional variations that characterise this relationship. It is only in the re-
gions of Oltenia, Dobrogea and Crisana-Maramures that the experience
of working abroad increases the probability of plans to open a business.
In the largest regions of the country – Moldova, Muntenia and
Transylvania – the link between experience of labour migration and pro-
pensity to start a business is rather poor according to the 2006 survey
data used in this analysis. This regional variation is hard to explain.
Working abroad also has a significant impact on other opinions and
plans that can be characterised as representing ‘personal modernity’.
Even after one controls for status characteristics such as education, age,
gender, economic status, education or residence, those that have tem-
porary migration experience appear more likely to take risks in order to
be successful and to consider leisure time to be important in life; in
turn, those who have personal non-work experience abroad are signifi-
cantly more likely to consider work an important in being a successful
person and to reject the idea that God is an important source of success
in life.
Demographic and housing effects at community level
About one fifth of the country’s communes, as basic rural administra-
tive units, had a high rate of migration prevalence (over 30 per thou-
sand) in 2002. These communes are mainly located in Moldova and
Transylvania. At the other extreme, communes with a low rate of tem-
porary emigration prevalence (under 10 per thousand) representing
about 40 per cent out of the total communes of the country, and are lo-
cated mainly in the southern regions of the country, Oltenia and
Muntenia. The initial hypothesis that communes with high rates of mi-
gration will have higher rates of divorce is supported by data presented
in Table 13.5. Similarly, marriage rates and rates of building new houses
are also higher in regions where temporary migration is more
prevalent.
However, high divorce rates may also occur in communes that are
more ‘modern’ for reasons other than emigration – for example, be-
cause they have high levels of education or rates of marriage, low ferti-
lity rates, are closer to modernised roads and cities, or attract more in-
migrants. The same may be true for birth rates, marriage rates and
rates of new house building. To test this, again multivariate analysis
was conducted (Table 13.6). Looking first at divorce, the analysis sug-
gests that the effect of migration is significant even when controlling
for several other important factors of community profile (age structure,
education stock, location in relation to modern roads and major cities,
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historical region, etc.). The aggregate data at the community level do
not allow us to distinguish the effect of temporary separation within fa-
milies, on the one hand, and the effects of more ‘modern’ attitudes, on
the other. However, it is reasonable to include ‘modernity’ in an expla-
nation of this phenomenon, given that we know from individual-level
data that the experience of working abroad is associated with more
‘modern’ attitudes.
Birth rates seem to be higher in communes of high temporary emi-
gration experience, according to the data in Table 13.5. Once one con-
trols for several other variables as in Table 13.6, one can note that the
relation has a different sense: the higher the emigration rate, the lower
the birth rate, keeping under control education and age structures of
the population and location factors.
The impact of temporary emigration on the marriage rate and rate of
housing construction is as suggested by the bivariate data from Table
13.5. That means that, irrespective of population composition and loca-
tion factors at community level, the temporary emigration has net posi-
tive effects on marriage rates and housing construction phenomena.
The net positive effect of emigration on marriage rates is at odds with
the H1 hypothesis that implied a negative relationship. That could be
the result of the fact that the current or returned temporary migrants
still have the origin community as the key reference and feel rather dis-
tant from the communities of their destination abroad.
Table 13.5 Demographic and housing indicators by commune
Rate of temporary migration prevalence in 2002* All
communes
Very low
under 1‰
Low
2‰-10‰
High
10‰- 30‰
Very high
over 30‰
Divorce rate 2003-2005 0.74 0.91 1.01 1.16 0.99
Marriage rate 2003-2005 11.80 14.22 15.56 17.07 15.23
Birth rate 2003-2005 9.16 10.30 11.05 11.51 10.79
New private houses
2003-2005 per 1,000
existing houses in 2003
5.93 8.68 10.12 12.24 9.87
Sources: National Institute of Statistics (NIS) data; author’s own computations
Notes: Rate of temporary emigration is computed as: (number of returned emigrants in a
community census in December 2001 + temporary emigrants recorded in national census
March 2002) * 1,000/total population of commune in 2002.
The community census of migration is described in Sandu (2005). Averages are computed
without weighting by commune population. Working with weighted data gives slightly
modified figures but the same hierarchy by type of migration experience at commune
level.
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Conclusions
The individual- and community-level data presented here support the
initial hypothesis that migration experience abroad has a significant im-
pact on individual- and community-level attitudes that reflect ‘moder-
nity’. The extent to which living or working abroad impacts on people’s
attitudes depends on the type of migration experience – whether it in-
volved work or non-work activities, and whether it was a personal ex-
perience or the experience of a family member – and also on the regio-
nal and community context and the time period. In other words, migra-
tion abroad brings a higher level of modernity not in general, but for
specific categories of people, from specific communities and regions
and for certain time periods.
The modernisation of Romanian society of the 2000s as a conse-
quence of the experience of working or living abroad can be assessed
by looking at various transformations in regard to resources (influenced
by remittances) and attitudes. The research emphasises modernisation
effects with regard to personal lifestyle choices, but also at the commu-
nity level, with regard to demographic consequences and the quality of
housing. However, these modernising effects are counterbalanced by
the fact that temporary migration abroad brings the costs for temporary
separation from families. Each of these areas is briefly summarised
below.
Values and social ideologies
Former migrant workers, irrespective of age, education, gender, eco-
nomic status or residence are more inclined to base their life on risk
taking, importance of work, secular motives for life success and on a
higher valuation of leisure time. These are particular forms of the
*Dummy variable. Transylvania is the reference region for the dummies of regional location.
Communes are the basic rural administrative units. Their number at the 2002 census was
2,686, but increased to 2,851 in 2005 (primary data sources are from the NIS; author’s own
computations). The significance level for regression coefficients is rather conventional as al-
most all communes are included in the computations. The data are not about a sample of
communes but on all the statistical population of communes and the standard errors in-
volved into computations of significance levels are related to the logic of the sampling.
**A full model included general fertility rate in 2002 as a proxy for demographic modernity
of the commune. R2 increases to 0.15 and all the predictors that were significant in the re-
stricted model continue to be in the full one. Fertility rate is a negative, significant predictor
of the divorce rate, with p=0.001. Geographic location becomes a significant positive predic-
tor in the full model.
***A full model including general fertility rate keeps the same structure of significant coeffi-
cients and R2. Fertility rate is a negative and significant predictor of housing construction
for p=0.001.
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‘modern man syndrome’ (Inkeles 1996: 572) manifested through ‘open-
ness to new experiences’, favouring the time planning, the support of
science and information.
Former migrants assess that working abroad is an opportunity to
change one’s own way of thinking in relation to work, life strategies,
use of time, sociability, etc. They support such a view much more than
the non-migrants.
Plans
The intention to open a business is higher for people who worked
abroad, irrespective of their personal characteristics such as age, educa-
tion, gender, economic status, rural-urban residence. This behaviour is
a mix of higher economic resources and support for free market values,
which are associated with the personal experiences of working abroad.
The analysis showed that as the experience of working abroad in-
creases, so does the probability of having plans for more active consu-
mer and investment behaviour, irrespective of education, gender, eco-
nomic status and type of residence. However, migration experience is a
differentiator with regard to consumer behaviour mainly within the
same age category.
Ideologies on migration, social values and plans are differentiated
significantly by type of migration experience at individual or family le-
vel, as expected, in accordance with the hypothesis H2. People who
worked abroad or are part of families with non-work experience abroad
are more likely to open a business or to receive income by supplemen-
tary work (Table 13.4).
Divorce
Former migrants think, to a higher degree than people without experi-
ence of working abroad, that temporary emigration is associated with a
higher probability for divorce. Divorce and marriage rates are, in accor-
dance with the hypothesis H1, significantly higher in rural commu-
nities, which have a richer experience of labour migration, irrespective
of education, regional and geographic location, size of community, age
structure, etc. (Table 13.6). This could be a result of new or different va-
lues, more social contacts and family separations.
Regional selectivity of migration effects
Value changes, social ideologies, plans and demographic behaviours as-
sociated with the experience of migration vary according to the regional
context. Why is it that in some regions, temporary emigration has
MODERNISING ROMANIAN SOCIETY THROUGH TEMPORARY WORK ABROAD 285
significant effects on value orientations, plans for the future or demo-
graphic or housing variables, but not in other regions? At least three
types of situations could explain the variation of migration effects at the
community level: the presence of a migration culture associated with
high rates of temporary emigration; a longer period from the starting of
the process; or a weak effect of other modernising factors at the regio-
nal level. That is the case for the Moldova region, which is poor, has
very high rates of temporary emigration and a rather long experience of
migration. At the other extreme is the case of Transylvania, a region
that is much richer and has a much larger set of modernising opportu-
nities.3 Due to that configuration of factors, Transylvania is a place
where temporary emigration from rural areas does not have significant
effects on divorce, marriage or birth rates or the rate of new house con-
struction. Finally, in Banat, another highly modernised region, a link is
seen between migration and birth rates, but not divorce or marriage
rates, or rates of new house construction. Further case study evidence
would be necessary to better understand the situation in this region.
Temporary emigration is but one of the modernising factors of cur-
rent time Romania acting directly at individual level. In the same series
the expansion of modern mass media use could be mentioned. Access
to internet is an example of how fast preconditions of cultural moderni-
sation emerge in the country. The 2008 proportion of people aged fif-
teen and over who had internet access at home was around 32 per cent.
This is still far from the 53 per cent average in the European Union,
but the speed of the process is a considerable one if one takes the coun-
try’s situation three years earlier as reference (11 per cent internet ac-
cess) (Sandu, 2008).
At the structural level, the key modernising factor is the process of
adjusting country institutions to the EU model. In fact, ICTs, free move-
ment of persons and the adoption of EU institutions are acting in close
connection as basic modernising factors for the post-communist
Romanian society.
Notes
1 ‘Migration experience’ in the context of this study refers to the experience of tempor-
ary emigration. Where migration is internal or permanent, this is stated explicitly.
2 Probabilistic sample of 1,400 persons, aged eighteen and over. For details on the sam-
ple see Sandu (2006a).
3 An index of community modernity was constructed as a factor score of education
stock (0.83), rural to urban commuting rate in 2002 (0.85), general fertility rate in
2002 (-0.68), infant mortality rate in 2003-2005 (-0.22) and distance to the nearest
city (-0.63). Figures in parenthesis indicate the loading for each variable in the compo-
nent matrix from factor analysis. Based on this index, the country’s regions range
286 SANDU
from lowest to highest modernity in the following order: Moldova, Dobrogea, Oltenia,
Crisana-Maramures, Muntenia, Banat, Transylvania and Bucharest-Ilfov.
References
Dayton-Johnson, J., L. Katseli, G. Maniatis, R. Muntz & D. Papademetriou (2007), Gaining
from migration: Towards a new mobility system. Paris: OECD.
Escobar, A., K. Haibronner, P. Martin L. Meza (2006), ‘Migration and development:
Mexico and Turkey’, International Migration Review 40 (3): 707-718.
Fargues, P. (2007) ‘The demographic benefit of international migration: A hypothesis and
its application to Middle East and North African Countries’ in C. Ozden M. Schiff
(eds.), International migration, economic development & policy, 161-182. Washington,
D.C.: The World Bank & Palgrave Macmillan.
Inkeles, A. (1996), ‘Making men modern: On the causes and consequences of individual
change in six developing countries’ in A. Inkeles & M. Sasaki (eds.), Comparing na-
tions and cultures: Readings in a cross-disciplinary perspective, 571-585. Upper Saddle
River: Prentice Hall.
Massey, D., J. Arango, G. Hugo, A. Kouaouci, A. Pellegrino & J.E. Taylor (1998), Worlds in
motion: Understanding international migration at the end of the millennium. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Ratha, D., S. Mohapatra, K.M. Vijayalakshmi & Z. Xu (2007), Remittance trends. http://si-
teresources.worldbank.org/EXTDECPROSPECTS/Resources/476882-1157133580628/
BriefingNote3.pdf.
Sandu, D. (2005), ‘Emerging transnational migration from Romanian villages’, Current
Sociology 53 (4): 555-582.
Sandu, D. (2006a), ‘Exploring Europe by work migration: 1990-2006’ in D. Sandu (ed.),
Living abroad on a temporary basis: The Romanians and the economic migration: 1990-
2006, 17-25. Bucharest: Open Society Foundation.
Sandu, D. (2007), ‘Community selectivity of temporary emigration from Romania’,
Romanian Journal of Population Studies 1 (1-2): 11-45.
Sandu, D. (2008), Eurobarometer 69. Public Opinion in European Union. Spring 2008.
Romania. Brussels: European Commission. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/ar-
chives/eb/eb69/eb69_ro_exe.pdf.
Trebici, V. (1986), Demografia teritorială a României [Regional Demography of Romania].
Bucharest: Editura Academiei.
Trebici, V. (2006), Romanian demographic yearbook. Bucharest: National Institute of
Statistics.
MODERNISING ROMANIAN SOCIETY THROUGH TEMPORARY WORK ABROAD 287

14 Pressure of migration on social protection
systems in the enlarged EU
Krzysztof Nowaczek
Introduction1
Since the accession of ten new member states in 2004, the formal divi-
sion between Western and Eastern European countries has diminished.
However, despite clear benefits from this development, in the view of
some commentators, accession has had a negative impact. One year be-
fore the enlargement, Migration Watch, a conservative London-based
think-tank criticised the decision of the UK government claiming that
the politicians fostered ‘(...) inward flows of people on a scale unknown
in our history – without any apparent thought for the consequences’
(Migration Watch 2003). One of the alleged consequences is a pressure
of new immigrants on fragile social protection systems in Western
Europe. This concern was addressed by UK Prime Minister Tony Blair
in 2004, who stated that ‘(…) we are not against people coming here to
work properly; we will not, however, allow our system to be exploited or
abused’ (House of Commons 2004).
For students of European integration, social policy and international
migration, studying the impact of immigration on politics of redistribu-
tion in Europe might be a mutual point of departure. From a global per-
spective, contrary to the liberalisation of trade and capital flow, ‘unblock-
ing’ free workers’ circulation is lagging behind. Yet the European
Union, with the guaranteed free movement of workers, has been a ‘pol-
icy laboratory’ where internal borders have been opened not only for
goods, but also for people. For all decades of European integration, this
brought about some serious socio-economic and political consequences.
States have been under constant ‘contradiction management’ by keep-
ing the balance between openness for migratory movements (due to la-
bour shortages or humanitarian reasons) and closedness (caused by
limited national resources and security reasons). Yet for a number of
scholars, to argue whether migration poses a significant threat to the
welfare state resources or if it rather provides a major support to wel-
fare state budgets is pointless. At the current level of international mi-
gration and on the account of migration policies applied across the EU,
immigrants are not the main answer for current demographic chal-
lenges, nor do they stand at the core of the social policy-related pro-
blems. Against this background, Geddes (2003) disagrees with the
claim that migration might have a major impact on European welfare
states. Similarly, Baldwin-Edwards (2002) and Boeri and Brucker (2001)
do not identify any direct impact of migration on welfare regimes in
Europe.
In spite of this, public perception has been fuelled by less rational ar-
guments so that policymaking has not been evidence-based but rather
anecdote-driven.2 Summarising the concerns in the pre-enlargement
debate and referring to Borjas’ research on the US case study (1997), it
might be claimed that the search for a job is not the main reason for
migration, but rather, income per se, and the welfare benefits might be
a significant source of money. Welfare magnets as such exist. It is now
debatable how important they are in terms of numbers.
The chapter is structured as follows. First, it takes stock of the studies
related to migrants’ contribution to the national budget and their parti-
cipation in social assistance and social security schemes.3 It explores
the theoretical assumptions about migrants’ mobility, welfare magnets
and ‘organisational borders’ imposed by the state. Subsequently, the
chapter focuses on the post-2004 immigration’s pressure on social pro-
tection systems in the UK, Ireland and Sweden. If the thesis of ‘welfare
migration’ in post-enlargement Europe is to be proved correct, it should
be observed in these particular states. Finally, the chapter concludes
with some considerations on the possible changes in the scale of the
phenomenon under investigation and offers some conclusions about
the consequences of these developments for the welfare state.
Migrants’ contribution to the public purse
The chapter elaborates on the case of immigrants from new member
states. It excludes from the empirical analysis the impact of third-
country nationals (see Buchel & Frick 2003; Anastassova & Paligrova
2006) but the reference to the general studies on migrants’ dependence
on the welfare state and their contribution to the budget might be use-
ful. Results of such surveys are critically dependent on the underlying
methodology and assumptions. In theory, the fiscal impact of labour
migrants on the budget largely depends on their wage, age, composition
of household and eligibility and take-up of benefits and public services.
Generally speaking, over the life cycle, natives are a net fiscal burden
while they are in compulsory education, they become net contributors
when they are employed and are a burden again when they are unem-
ployed, retired or require extensive medical care. The pattern in the case
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of migrants tends to be the same. As for the first generation, the state’s
budget does not fund education and newly arrived migrants might not
be allowed to claim unemployment or income-related benefits for a cer-
tain preliminary period of their stay. As a consequence, it is more likely
that they put less pressure on the public purse.
A cross-country comparative study on the participation of migrants in
social protection systems poses serious theoretical and methodological
challenges due to the variety of the types of welfare regimes, character
of immigration flows and immigration policy regimes. First, the classi-
fication of welfare regimes is correlated to the scope and eligibility of
social benefits and it differs across countries. For Banting (2000), this
has direct consequences on migrants’ incorporation. Welfare states with
expansive regimes tend to have restrictive immigration control mea-
sures, but do extend benefits to migrants. On the other hand, liberal
welfare regimes encourage (particularly labour) immigration, but re-
strict access to social benefits. However, the above typology has been
criticised, especially on the account of the recent immigration policy de-
velopments and their outcomes. It has been argued that social policies’
effects on migrant population have different outcomes than on citizens.
In this respect, expectations regarding the migrants’ access to social
benefits in the countries with a given regime are not straightforward
(Morissens & Sainsbury 2005). Since the research covers the case stu-
dies representing liberal (the UK and Ireland) and social-democratic
(Sweden) welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990), findings of this
study may deepen the understanding of a relation between immigrants’
dependence on social assistance programmes and the structure of the
welfare state.
Second, as much as the above typology stands at the core of the pro-
blem, it is also the variety of immigration flows across time to the coun-
tries under scrutiny that should be taken into account. The level of edu-
cation of migrants has a strong impact on their participation in social
protection systems. In situations where low-skilled migrants prevail, it
is expected that the participation of foreigners in the social protection
systems will increase. Accordingly, in the 1960s, there was no evidence
of immigrants relying on social benefits more heavily than natives. In
the following decades, when the flow of low-skilled migrants from low-
income countries intensified, economists found an increasing depen-
dence of foreign-born population on social assistance programmes
(Borjas 1999; Boeri, Hanson & McCormick 2002).
In spite of a number of studies on migrants’ dependence on welfare
states, the ‘welfare magnet’ thesis has been still an understudied sub-
ject. Both Lundborg in his survey on Scandinavian countries (1991) and
Borjas on the US case (1999) found that indeed the size of the welfare
system had some impact on immigration and the choice of a state of
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origin. To the contrary, Pedersen, Pytlikova and Smith (2004) suggested
there was not enough evidence to sustain this thesis and Kaushal (2005)
found that in the case of newly arrived low-skilled unmarried immigrant
women, the US social assistance programmes had little effect on the
choice of the target state. A generous welfare state itself might stand in-
deed as a ‘welfare magnet’, but, on the other hand, it poses some obsta-
cles in migrants’ incorporation into hosting societies. According to
Bommes and Geddes (2000: 2): ‘(…) national welfare states can be
viewed as political filters that mediate immigrants to realise their
chances for social participation’. In this sense, shaping the eligibility cri-
teria for social protection benefits has become an ‘internal’ method for
migration management. However, as for EU citizens moving to other
member states, the institutional framework built through the European
Community legislation has gradually diminished these obstacles.
Welfare migration in the enlarged European Union: Consequences
and solutions
For the sake of clarity of further arguments, three main principles of the
European Community’s social security legislation4 should be introduced
(Guild 2002). First, nationals of another member state cannot be discri-
minated against compared to nationals of the state. The European Court
of Justice (ECJ) (1999) has already ruled against the requirement of habi-
tual residence as a breach of the equality principle, although govern-
ments can introduce waiting periods based on contributions. Second, in-
dividuals may be affiliated to only one social security system at a time.
Third, EU migrants are entitled to export their benefits to any other
member state. The ECJ has interpreted these principles in a broad and
favourable manner towards migrants. According to the ECJ rulings,
member states could not keep their social gates closed (Ferrera 2005:
102). As Conant put it:
(…) consistent ECJ case law has eliminated virtually every possi-
bility to exercise discrimination based on nationality in the provi-
sion of social and tax advantages for EU nationals. (2002: 185)
In spite of the constant attempts of the European Commission and the
ECJ to enhance the free movement of workers, recent reports by the
European Commission on the application of European Community law
show evidence of discriminatory treatment and related infringement
proceedings.
Kvist’s investigation (2004) built upon the assumption that western
EU member states engaged in strategic interactions implying a race to
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the bottom in their social protection systems. The author argued that it
might have been the case due to concerns about welfare migration from
accessing Central and Eastern European states. Against this backdrop,
three forms of mobility concerns related to enlargement were intro-
duced. Firstly, ‘social tourism’ describes the migration of individuals
who seek to get as many social benefits as possible with only limited
contributions. Secondly, the double meaning of ‘social dumping’ relates
to the situation in which Western companies move eastwards in order
to be less constrained when it comes to wages and social standards, or
migrant workers from new member states establish themselves as self-
employed in EU-15 countries (on the basis of the free movement of ser-
vices). The third phenomenon, ‘social raid’, was defined by Kvist as ‘(…)
a surprise attack on national social security by a small or large group of
people from abroad’ (Kvist 2004: 306). The difference from social tour-
ism is that in the former case, migrants do work and the work permit
is actually considered as an entry ticket to welfare state benefits that are
an essential contribution to the regular income. The evidence indicated
by the author supports the assumptions on governmental tactic to re-
strain the access, eligibility and scope of social rights. Nevertheless, ac-
cording to Kvist, on the basis of the developments prior to enlargement,
it is impossible to claim that the EU-wide race to the bottom takes
place. Different forms of restriction were merely one-time initiatives or
had a temporary character.
The most critical study of free migration of citizens from accession
states was Sinn and Ochel’s. They argue that unrestricted intra-EU mi-
gration would lead to diminution of the welfare state (Sinn & Ochel
2003). The scholars pointed out that provisions included in the
Constitutional Treaty could guarantee the constitutional right of every
EU citizen to welfare migration. According to them, if ‘work’ is no long-
er a requirement before migrating, a large number of immigrants from
new member states would have incentives to move to Western Europe5
and consequently become a burden on national welfare states. Finally,
this would mean that governments, trying to halt the inflow of mi-
grants, could trigger a race to the bottom in welfare provisions.
Similarly, having analysed the interaction between the welfare state and
immigration policy within the old EU-15, Facchini, Razin and Willmann
(2004) indicate that the 2004 enlargement and the free movement of
workers might lead to an endogenous reduction in the size of the wel-
fare state in the destination countries. This change could be the most
significant in countries receiving a disproportionate share of migrants
and with the most generous welfare states. In addition, Sinn and Ochel
(2003) noted that east-west migration could trigger frustration about
the ‘too protective’ welfare state. This assumption is confirmed by
Alesina and Ferrara (2004) who, by application of empirical findings on
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the less generous US welfare state to the EU case, claimed that ‘if
Europeans from the middle-class come to believe that a high proportion
of the poor consists of recent immigrants, this will erode their en-
trenched confidence in the virtues of the welfare state’ (cited after
Ederveen 2005: 53).
What solutions to these problems have been suggested by scholars?
Bertola, Jimeno, Marimon and Pissarides (2001: 89-96) affirm that to
prevent this negative trend, an EU transfer system, co-financed by the
EU budget, guaranteeing a minimum welfare level to all citizens should
be established. Recently, in the framework of the debate on the
European Social Model, a similar idea re-emerged on the EU political
agenda. In November 2006, in an interview with Prime Minister of
Luxembourg, the ‘Frankfurter Rundschau’ Jean-Claude Juncker, made a
strong plea for a ‘minimum social salary throughout the EU’. However,
in the opinion of politicians and scholars, this idea is not only unfeasi-
ble, but also unwise from an economic point of view. Sinn and Ochel
(2003: 892-893) drew upon the ‘principle of selectively delayed integra-
tion’ proposed by the Ifo Institute (Sinn 2001) and the European
Economic Advisory Group (2003) as an alternative to the harmonisation
of replacement incomes. Following this principle, new EU immigrants
would have free access to the selected provisions, yet the access to the
range of other benefits would be restricted so that the social assistance
payments received by migrants would be balanced to the contributions
they made through taxation. This would ensure that while the rule of
free movement of workers is observed, migration would be driven by
genuine market signals and the abuse of the welfare state would not
take place. This solution was promoted as a better and more economic-
ally rational alternative compared to the restrictions on free mobility of
workers introduced by most member states following the 2004 enlarge-
ment. As a matter of fact, two countries, i.e. the UK and Ireland, fol-
lowed this line of reasoning and applied provisions mirroring the ‘prin-
ciple of selective delayed integration’.
Migrants’ dependence on welfare state: Case studies
The following sections demonstrate data on the selected countries: the
UK, Ireland and Sweden. In all three countries, migrants from CEE
countries have had unlimited access to labour markets. However, only
in Sweden have newcomers been entitled to social benefits without any
extra conditions, while the UK and Ireland introduced a requirement of
a two-year long habitual residency. Each analysis commences with the
pre-enlargement debate and institutional developments on the topic un-
der scrutiny. The sections are followed by a description of the available
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data on the dependence of migrants from new member states on var-
ious social benefit programmes.
United Kingdom
The government’s Report on Community Cohesion dramatically under-
lined the pressure of immigrants on local resources:
(…) inward migration does create tensions (…) communities will
perceive that newcomers are in competition for scarce resources
and public services (…). The pressure on resources (…) is often
intense and local services are often insufficient to meet the needs
of the existing local communities, let alone newcomers.
(Community Cohesion Panel 2004)
In this context, the words of Immigration Minister Tony McNulty, mir-
roring local sentiments, came as no surprise. Launching the
Consultation on Managed Migration Routes to the UK – Making
Migration Work for Britain – he declared that:
(…) this country needs migration – [they] make a vital contribu-
tion to the UK economy. We need to ensure, however, that while
we let in migrants with the skills and talents to benefit Britain
we stop those who are trying to abuse our hospitality and place a
burden on our society. (Home Office 2005)
In summer 2006, the report Migration from Eastern Europe: Impact
on public services and community cohesion initiated a hot debate about
the effects of the past and future migration flows from Eastern
Europe. Most newspapers cited the most ‘juicy’ parts of the docu-
ment stating that ‘(…) immigrants from Eastern Europe who were
sleeping rough – sometimes because of the welfare ban – were be-
coming drunk and aggressive and filling up homeless hostels’ or that
‘Eastern European patients are also already ‘blocking’ hospital beds
because they are ineligible for social care and benefits if they leave’.
On top of societal and health challenges, the evidence suggested that
more English teachers are required in the near future and the price
of housing had risen dramatically due to the high demand. Media
suggested that this might lead to ‘ghettoisation’ of some areas and
even further social disturbance. The report was published a few
months before another enlargement (January 2007) when more
Bulgarians and Romanians were expected to arrive in the UK.
Against this background, according to the media, the report con-
cluded with sweet and sour predictions for the future:
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(…) despite the Government’s underestimation of the number of
migrants, public services had generally coped (...). But the expected
influx of Romanians and Bulgarians meant that this optimistic as-
sessment may not continue to hold good in, say, a year’s time.
Were such dramatic reactions justified on the basis of numerical evi-
dence? Pre-enlargement government’s estimations on a number of
newcomers from A8 countries proved underestimated. This provided a
very strong argument to opponents of unrestricted migration (e.g. UK
Migration Watch). In the period 2005-2006, Poland, Lithuania and
Slovakia were among the top five countries of origin applicants for na-
tional insurance numbers (171,000, 30,000 and 26,000, respectively).
The number of National Insurance Numbers (NINos) allocated to for-
eigners from A8 countries increased dramatically, i.e. almost a ten-fold
growth between the second quarter of 2004 and the second quarter of
2007 (see bars on Figure 14.1). While there has been an almost constant
growth of issued by the UK authorities to A8 migrant workers, it is
striking how few of them were allocated to ‘benefit purposes’ (see line
on Figure 14.1). In the period between May 2004 and June 2007, 5,193
NINos for benefit purposes were issued, which accounted only for 0.7
per cent of all 681,536 NINos. Only in the first quarter of 2007, this
percentage exceeded one point.
As for tax-funded, income-related benefits, the Home Office mea-
sures applications for three kinds of benefits: income support, income-
based Jobseeker’s Allowance and state pension credit.6 There has been
Figure 14.1 National Insurance Numbers allocated for employment and benefit
purposes to A8 nationals, UK, May 2004 – June 2007
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a growing tendency of A8 nationals’ recourses to social payments, yet
the growth in absolute numbers is still minimal (Figure 14.2). In total,
in the period under scrutiny (May 2004-June 2007) 3,600 applications
for income-related benefits were approved. Around 1,805 applications
were accepted in the first half of 2007, which accounts for almost half
of all approved applications in the entire period.
A8 nationals received much more in child benefit payments.
Approved applications for child benefits reached 12,000 at the begin-
ning of 2007, which was an eight-fold increase compared to the analo-
gical period in 20057 (see Figure 14.3).
Three important factors that influence migrants’ pressure on the wel-
fare state: the age of foreign nationals, the composition of their families
and the length of stay, can be somewhat telling in the UK case.
Immigrants from A8 countries are relatively young with over eight out
of ten applicants being younger than 34. Simultaneously, between May
2004 and June 2007, only a small minority (7 per cent) of registered
workers declared that they had dependents living with them in the UK
at the moment of application. Amongst those who did have dependents,
the average number of dependents was 1.5. In total, for each dependent,
there are ten registered workers. According to the replies provided by
applicants to WRS, it seems that more than half of A8 nationals do not
intend to stay more than three months in the UK (Home Office 2007:
10-12).
Figure 14.2 Applications from A8 migrants for tax-funded, income-related benefits
(income support, income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance and state pension
credit), UK Q2 of 2004 – Q4 of 2006
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Ireland
Given the very good macroeconomic indicators in Ireland, the pre-
enlargement debate in Ireland focused more on protecting the welfare
system from possible abuse rather than limiting access of new member
states’ nationals to the labour market. In autumn 2003, the prime min-
ister established an inter-departmental committee to assess the conse-
quences of opening labour markets on Ireland’s social protection sys-
tem. The Department of Social and Family Affairs was one of the first
departments required to give closer consideration to the potential impli-
cations of EU migration for the provision of its services (National
Economic and Social Council 2006: 206). Several lobby groups, such
as the Immigration Control Platform and the National Platform, advo-
cated for protecting Ireland’s social welfare system. Following public
pressure and international implications of the introduction of restric-
tions in the UK (Department of Social and Family Affairs 2004a), the
government decided to partially mirror the provisions from the fellow
member of the Common Travel Area. The Habitual Resident Test was
envisaged as a condition to be satisfied by an individual claiming a so-
cial assistance payment or a child benefit. This ‘prudent and sensible
measure for the benefit of recipients and those who fund the annual so-
cial welfare budget’ was introduced – as underlined by Minister for
Social and Family Affairs Mary Coughlan –, to ‘ensure our social wel-
fare system does not become over burdened’. The restriction was con-
sidered as a ring fencing the system of social protection (Department of
Social and Family Affairs 2004b).
Figure 14.3 Applications for Child Benefit, UK, Q2 of 2004 – Q2 of 2007
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Besides a substantial continuous period of residence (at least two
years), five other criteria, officially based on the ECJ jurisprudence
(European Court of Justice 1999), establish the eligibility for Habitual
Residence Condition. The criteria relate to the character of stay, absence
from Ireland, employment, main centre of interest in Ireland and fu-
ture intentions (Department of Social and Family Affairs 2005). The in-
troduction of HRC was a significant change in the legal regime since,
until May 2004, every person legally residing in Ireland, even for a
short period of time, and satisfying the conditions related to the pay-
ments was immediately upon arrival eligible for social welfare. Four
months after the enlargement, Coughlan declared that:
(…) the Habitual Residence Condition is being operated in a very
careful manner to ensure that Ireland’s social welfare system is
no longer open to everyone who is newly arrived in Ireland,
while at the same time ensuring that people whose cases are ap-
propriate to the Irish social welfare system get access to social as-
sistance when they need it. (Department of Social and Family
Affairs 2004c)
Nevertheless, in its Letter of Formal Notice to Ireland on 22 December
2004, the European Commission challenged some rules of procedures
related to access to benefits. The European Commission pointed out
that the two-year requirement might be a breach to the EU Regulations
1408/71 and 1612/71. Highlighted was the fact that the new conditions
were more likely to affect migrant workers than workers of Irish nation-
ality or those already residing in Ireland before the Common Travel
Area. Irish authorities were warned that these might have constituted
discrimination on the grounds of nationality (Department of Social and
Family Affairs 2006: 22). In particular, the European Commission
pointed out that some benefits (such as child benefit or family pay-
ments) should have been available for workers from all EU countries, ir-
respective of the fulfilment of conditions attached to the HRC.
Consequently, those considered ‘workers’ (or those who had previously
worked and paid contributions) should become eligible for social wel-
fare allowance regardless of the HRC. Additionally, EU workers can ac-
cess child benefit even if their children are not resident in the state.
With reference to the required changes, the Department of Social and
Family Affairs sent a circular to community welfare officers reminding
them that migrants from other EU states should be treated in the same
manner that Irish workers are treated in the access to Supplementary
Welfare Allowance.8 In the internal review of the Habitual Residence
Condition, the Department of Social and Family Affairs reminded the
deciding officers to take into consideration the national legislation as
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well as the EU regulations dealing with this issue (Department of Social
and Family Affairs 2006: 19). After clarifications submitted by the gov-
ernment and changes introduced to the domestic system, on 4 April
2006, the European Commission decided not to pursue the infringe-
ment proceeding, stating that Ireland complies fully with the European
Community legislation.
From May 2004 to the end of April 2006, non-Irish citizens sub-
mitted 25,571 applications for social benefit payments. Nationals from
ten new member states filed over 5,000 applications, which accounted
for almost exactly 20 per cent of all applications. During this period,
around 200,000 persons from A10 countries were allocated Personal
Public Service Numbers. That means that the number of claimants
from these states represents only 2.5 per cent of the total number of im-
migrants from new member states residing in Ireland. Citizens from
Western Europe submitted not more than 30 per cent applications with
a large majority of requests being filed by UK citizens (due to the
Common Travel Area arrangements). The ‘success rate’ in the case of
new member states’ nationals’ requests was around 50 per cent (Figure
14.5).
The most ‘popular schemes’ among foreigners were unemployment
assistance and child benefit, which accounted for over 85 per cent of all
applications.9 This is not surprising since child benefit is the main in-
come support scheme for families, while unemployment assistance is
the main short-term social assistance allowance available to people of
working age (Department of Social and Family Affairs 2006: 7-8).
Figure 14.5 Total number of applications for various social assistance schemes filed
by foreigners, Ireland, May 2004 – April 2006
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Among various forms of social assistance, immigrants from new mem-
ber states applied most often to unemployment assistance (around 25
per cent of applications submitted by all foreigners). Child benefit was
less popular among nationals from these countries, accounting for
around 15 per cent of all foreigners’ applications. Over 70 per cent of all
applications for child benefit were filed by third-country nationals
(Figure 14.6).
Other forms of social payments are Supplementary Welfare
Allowances (SWA). Basic SWA is distributed among persons with no
means to meet their basic needs at a rate equivalent to other social wel-
fare payments, such as unemployment assistance. Those entitled to
Basic SWA or having an equivalent level of income are also eligible for
receiving an ongoing payment in respect of house rental; its most com-
mon form is Rent Supplement. Although data available are limited only
to payments made in the week ending in 30 June 2006, they give a
clear picture of the recourse of foreign citizens to additional supple-
mentary allowances (Figure 14.7). Migrants from ten new member
states received more payments in total than nationals from thirteen
member states from Western Europe (nearly five times more payments
in the case of Basic SWA). Yet, the total number of payments distribu-
ted to the former group of migrants accounted for not more than 3.5
per cent of the entire outflow of Basic SWA and 2 per cent of Rent
Supplement. This is much less than in the case of third-country
Figure 14.6 Number of applications by scheme and nationality, Ireland,
May 2004 – April 2006
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nationals who received nearly 20 per cent of all Basic SWA and Rent
Supplement payments.
The Irish authorities reported that more than 140 nationalities are
listed for recipients of Basic SWA payment and more than 150 Rent
Supplements. Besides Irish and UK citizens, migrants receiving the
most Basic SWA and Rent Supplements were from Nigeria (8 per cent),
Romania (around 3 per cent) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (1
per cent). Comparing to migrants from A10 countries, the top three ap-
plicants were from Lithuania, Poland and Latvia, the total number of ap-
plicants from these three countries accounted for only 2 per cent in the
case of Basic SWA and 1 per cent for Rent Supplement. Payments made
to this group of nationals constituted respectively 57 per cent and 50
per cent of all payments made to nationals from A10 states.
Sweden
If the logic of the ‘welfare tourism’ thesis is to be proved correct,
Sweden should have already been flooded by immigrants from A8
countries. The 2002 government report estimated that although immi-
gration might cause only minor disturbances in the labour market, and
that it was the vulnerability of the Swedish welfare system (exposed to
organised crime and unscrupulous employers) that should trigger a de-
cision on transitional measures. In November 2003, on the basis of the
findings of the government report,10 the Swedish national television
Figure 14.7 Payments of Basic Supplementary Welfare Allowance and Rent
Supplement recipients made in the week ending in 30 June 2006
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broadcast a documentary on the possible problem caused by immi-
grants from Central and Eastern European coming with their families,
working only ten hours per week, and benefiting from the welfare pro-
visions (SIEPS 2006: 82-83).
Before the end of 2003, the Swedish government did not consider
the introduction of transitional measures. However, in November 2003,
Prime Minister of Sweden Göran Persson expressed concerns about the
Swedish welfare system after the enlargement and a possible abuse of
the welfare system by immigrants from A8 countries (SIEPS 2006: 77).
Bearing in mind the above developments, it was rather ironic that, in
general, the Swedish media followed a more liberal standpoint and the
great majority of articles from that period were supportive towards im-
migration and criticised the government’s U-turn. As the analysis of the
pre-enlargement poll suggested, public opinion varied depending on
the specific wording of the questions asked in the surveys. In total,
some anti-immigration feelings were present in Swedish society, but
they were not solid enough to trigger a more radical behaviour of politi-
cal parties (SIEPS 2006: 83-87).
The reports published by the Swedish Social Insurance
Administration (Lönnqvist 2005, 2007), showed that the amount of pay-
ments of family benefits to EU nationals tripled between March 2004
and December 2004 and reached the level of approximately E 1.3 mil-
lion. Yet throughout 2006, the monthly payments did not drop below
E 1.8 million (February 2006) and reached the peak in December
2006 with nearly E 2.5 million. In 2004, out of the total amount of ap-
proximately E 8 million, 78 per cent of payments went to citizens of
the other Nordic states (i.e. Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Norway)
and only approximately 1 per cent of that sum (around E 108,000) was
granted between May and December 2004 to migrants from the ten
new member states (Figure 14.8). 2006 saw significant growth of fa-
mily benefit payments to EU nationals, i.e. around E 26 million. The
proportion of payments to nationals from new member states grew to 5
per cent of the entire sum and in the absolute terms it increased over
eleven times to the amount of around E 1.25 million.
The Swedish reports addressed also the key concern of the Swedish
public. Are our welfare benefits exported to other EU countries (and
particularly new member states)? According to the Regulation 1408/71
(Council 1971), non-Swedish EU nationals working in Sweden are eligi-
ble, upon meeting certain criteria, to benefits for their family members
still residing in the country of origin.11 In 2004, out of around E 8 mil-
lion paid to EU migrants, not more than E 1.5 million went to family
members residing abroad. Most social benefits transferred outside
Sweden were received by family members residing in Nordic countries
(Finland, Denmark, Norway and Iceland), due to geographic proximity
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and bilateral agreements, and some old member states (UK and the
Netherlands). Export of payments to new member states was quite in-
significant. Between May and December 2004, not more than E 15,000
were sent to family members residing in the new member states.
Interestingly enough, most benefits were paid at the end of the year.
Within this group, Polish and Hungarian citizens received the highest
amount of allowances. In 2006, the entire amount of benefits trans-
ferred outside Sweden doubled to the sum of E 3.3 million. Payments
sent to new member states increased nearly six times, yet in absolute
number, around E 85,000 was still an insignificant amount
(Försäkringskassan 2005: 24, 2007: 22).
As highlighted in the Swedish Social Insurance Administration re-
port, there is an increasing awareness of migrants regarding their social
rights under the EU legislation, also due to the government’s efforts to
inform migrants about their status. The report therefore indicates that a
low percentage of migrants from new member states benefiting from
social assistance payments cannot be explained by the lack of informa-
tion. The report suggests that the amount of payments will increase in
the future, but the present evidence does not suggest that the Swedish
welfare state is under threat (Försäkringskassan 2005: 8, 13). As a mat-
ter of fact, although payments of family benefits to non-Swedish
Figure 14.8 Allocation of family benefits to EU nationals 2004 and 2006; data for
2004 refer to the period March – December; May – December 2004 in
the case of new member states
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citizens increased noticeably, in absolute numbers it did not amount to
worrying evidence. It is sufficient to put the 2006 amounts into the
wider context to notice that only around 1 per cent of the entire spend-
ing on family benefits goes to pockets of non-Swedish EU citizens
(Försäkringskassan 2007: 23).
Results and some preliminary conclusions: Implications of
welfare tourism on the welfare state?
Scarce availability of relevant quantitative data on immigrants’ welfare
dependence was a major constraint in elaborating a genuine compara-
tive study in this respect. Numbers provided by national administra-
tions related to different programmes, covered different periods and dif-
ferent categories of immigrants. In spite of technical difficulties, some
general results can be suggested. The pre-enlargement debate in the
three countries was an arena for the clash of different opinions and dif-
ferent forces. Owing to the membership in the Common Travel Area,
Ireland listened carefully to the discussion in the UK and consequently
decided to follow the UK restrictions in the access to social benefits.
Sweden, the most liberal in this respect, was not under very strong do-
mestic pressure and restrained from imposing similar limitations.
Sweden served as a case study to address two assumptions. Firstly, in
spite of the total opening of the labour market and granting unlimited
access to social assistance programmes, there was no large growth in
the number of individuals from these countries before and after the en-
largement. Secondly, evidence suggested that immigrants from new
member states did not use the ‘window of opportunity’ provided by the
EU legislation to export social benefits to their country of origin on a
large scale.
On the other hand, a growth of applications for most social benefits
was observed in the UK case and reached a peak in 2006. However, ab-
solute numbers are still limited. Similarly, data on the Irish case pro-
vided no evidence of the public purse being under significant pressure.
A number of applications were relatively small compared to those filed
by UK nationals or third-country nationals. Drawing upon the ‘welfare
magnet’ assumption, the above analysis proved Borjas’ assumption
(1997) wrong. For immigrants from new member states, it was not so-
cial benefits but rather work itself that was the main source of financial
income; employment, rather than the possibility to receive benefits,
stood at the foundation of the decision to migrate.
To understand implications of different welfare regimes for migrants’
dependence on social protection programmes, one would need more
data than those currently available. In future research, two working
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hypotheses could be tested. The first and the more obvious one would
imply that, in social-democratic regimes, welfare state provisions are
distributed more generously towards newcomers and, as such, play a
greater factor in migrants’ decision to move to the relevant country.
However, to challenge this assumption it is necessary to wait for the
complete abolition of barriers in free movement of workers. The second
and somewhat more ‘revolutionary’ hypothesis could claim that in the
studies on a relation between dependence on social benefits and welfare
state regimes, a simple division between ‘citizens’ and ‘immigrants’
does not suffice anymore. With the rapid growth of east-west migration
and hitherto unprecedented constitutionalisation of social rights at the
EU level, a more persistent attempt to include in all studies a new cate-
gory of recipients, i.e. intra-EU immigrants, is required. In studying im-
migration and welfare state, this particular category of immigrants
stands somewhere in-between citizens and newcomers from third-
country nationals. It is evident not only from the legal and political
points of view, but also in the psychological (e.g. motivation to migrate)
and social (e.g. strengthening social cohesion) contexts.
What can explain the findings provided by the three case studies in
question? Demographic features (i.e. relatively young age) and family
status (i.e. single and/or no children) of immigrants from new member
states could be decisive why dependence on social assistance of this
group of immigrants has been limited. Large numbers of immigrants
considered work in another member state only as a temporary solution.
In the UK case, age composition of immigrants from CEE countries
has been stable throughout the last four years (around 80 per cent of
registered workers were aged 18-34). While the number of dependents
as a proportion of the number of registered workers still remains low, it
has been steadily growing from 7 per cent in 2004, 13 per cent in 2006
and over 17.5 per cent in the first semester 2008 (it should be noted,
however, that the Home Office does not verify the responses given by
immigrants in WRS application on which base the number of depen-
dents is calculated).
Several factors helped migrants apply for social benefits depending
on needs. Networks of immigrants already residing in key destination
cities (i.e. London, Dublin or Stockholm) provided new migrants with
information about the eligibility and procedures on social assistance
programmes. More details could have been found in newspapers and a
number of online forums where immigrants exchanged experiences
about the best paths to follow in order to access benefits. Following the
transparency rules and in the framework of a campaign promoting so-
cial rights’ protection, national authorities and non-governmental orga-
nisations wanted also to ensure that newcomers would be aware of the
social assistance programmes. Information included on websites or
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leaflets was published also in the languages of immigrants and distribu-
ted even in their countries of origin.12 Last but not least, besides being
a strong advocate of uplifting the transitional periods in other member
states, the European Commission has carefully observed the rules ap-
plied in the UK, Sweden and Ireland. It successfully intervened with
the Irish authorities when pre-enlargement restrictions were found in-
coherent with the current acquis communautaire. This interesting devel-
opment proved again that member states cannot unconditionally decide
upon eligibility of EU nationals to social benefits. If this door has been
closed for national authorities, is the reduction in the size of the welfare
state a solution for continued flows of immigrants from new member
states and the pressure on social policy expenditure?
Some preliminary ideas on this question are as follows: previous stu-
dies on immigration and redistribution proved that international migra-
tion indeed has mattered in relation to the size of the welfare state.
Although all developed Western countries increased their social policy
expenditures, growth was smaller in the states more open to immigra-
tion. It was mainly the pressure of the native population on mainstream
political parties that might have led to a slower expansion of the welfare
state in the face of growing immigration (Soroka, Banting & Johnston
2003). Owing to internal market rules and particularly the principle of
the free movement of persons, member states cannot limit the inflow
of EU migrants. On the other hand, their social policies are not con-
strained by the European Community legislation and are merely coordi-
nated at the EU level (through the open method of coordination) and
based on general standards (such as non-discrimination provisions). Is
it hence the case that under the pressure of migrants, EU welfare states
shrink? This question could serve as the basis of another study alto-
gether. A quick overview of the development of the welfare state in
member states suggests that it is not the case. National authorities have
recently decided to allocate more financial resources to social policy-re-
lated programmes and to increase rates for social benefits’ payments.
In this sense, intra-EU migration has not influenced public spending
on social policy. On the contrary, what has rather preoccupied policy-
makers was the recent trend to enhance social cohesion.
In all three countries under scrutiny, the amount of social benefits re-
ceived by immigrants from new member states has been relatively
small, but seems to be growing in scale. For the time being, EU migra-
tion has not proved to be a major challenge for welfare state systems. It
might be considered problematic (especially in the public and policy
discourse) in a short-term perspective. It is, however, a minor problem
compared to the economies’ race for increased competitiveness under
the pressure of globalisation, a relatively small rate of employment and
ageing societies – phenomena that are having a greater impact on the
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welfare state. Last but not least, intra-EU migration is perceived as a
marginal challenge in comparison with the inflow of third-country na-
tionals and the resulting implications for the European societies.
Notes
1 The author wishes to acknowledge the support of Collegio Carlo Alberto from
Moncalieri (Turin), Italy, in conducting the research.
2 A survey conducted in 2001 (EUMC 2001) indicated that 52 per cent of respondents
supported the statement that people from minority groups abuse the social welfare
system. It was an increase of 4 per cent compared to figures from 1997.
3 As defined in Article 4 of EC Council Regulation No. 1408/71 on the application of
social security schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the
European Community, social security branches include sickness and maternity bene-
fits, invalidity benefits, old-age benefits, survivors’ benefits, benefits in respect of acci-
dents at work and occupational diseases, death grants, unemployment benefits and fa-
mily benefits. Naturally due to the scarcity of data and their limited relevance, not all
above schemes are covered in the study.
4 For the wider coverage on the current acquis in this field refer to Ochel’s chapter in
this volume.
5 In 2001, net income in new member states was less than 30 per cent of German so-
cial assistance (Sinn & Ochel 2003: 891-892).
6 Depending on the age and family status, claimants receive £ 34,60 to £ 90,10 weekly.
Weekly Jobseekers’ Allowance means £ 34,60 for claimants between eighteen and 24
and £ 45,50 for persons aged 25 or over. Pension Credit guarantees everyone aged 60
and over an income of at least £ 114.05 a week for a single person, and £ 174.05 a
week for an applicant with a partner. Data available at: www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/tabtool.
asp.
7 For the tax year 2006-2007, the Guardian’s Allowance accounts for £ 12.50 a week
per child.
8 All EU workers, as long as they have a history of ‘effective and genuine work’ (to be
decided by the Community Welfare Officer), are entitled to these allowances. Most
Exceptional Needs Payments are not available to newly arrived migrants, but a differ-
ent approach is employed for migrants with children at school or with the intention
to stay. The Reception and Integration Agency (RIA) offers accommodation (up to
three nights) to EU nationals pending their repatriation. The RIA also organises and
pays for the return journey home.
9 The current rate of unemployment assistance is E 185.80 per week, with an additional
E 22 for each qualified child. Monthly child benefit allowance for the first and second
child is E 150; for the third and subsequent children it reaches E 185. Starting in
April 2007, the rates increased by E 10. The maximum weekly rate of the Carer’s
Allowance is E 180 if an applicant takes care of one person and E 270 if he or she
cares for two people or more.
10 Drawing upon the ECJ cases, the 2002 report stipulated that even the ‘ten hour per
week’ employment would suffice to access social benefits. The ‘ten-hour-rule’ became
a benchmark (at least for the Swedish public and media) and was confirmed by the
European Commission in its communication on free movement of workers
(Commission 2002: 5).
11 Monthly child benefit accounts for around E 100 per child. Large family supplements
are also available, e.g. families with children receive an extra allowance of
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approximately E 220. More detailed data available at www.forsakringskassan.se/fak-
ta/andra_sprak/barnbidrag_eng/index.php.
12 According to an interview-based survey on labour migration from Poland (sample of
44 respondents), the perception of possible benefits granted by the state has been
high. Almost half of respondents had some knowledge about social benefits available
in Ireland and one-fourth of interviewees received a child benefit allowance. Quoted
in the report, a 26-year-old ‘would-be-migrant’ underlined that family benefits seemed
to be much higher in Ireland and ‘(…) moving just with children should be worth the
effort’ (Radiukiewicz 2006: 40).
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15 The EU Directive on Free Movement:
A challenge for the European welfare state?
Wolfgang Ochel
Introduction1
The European Union Directive on Free Movement (2004, herein re-
ferred to as the Directive) has extended the right of free movement to
non-gainfully employed (inactive) EU citizens. At the same time, this
group of persons has been given access to the welfare benefits of host
countries. Moreover, the right of residence of gainfully employed EU ci-
tizens (employees and self-employed persons) has been broadened.
People falling into this category already had the right to take up resi-
dence in other EU member countries. Nonetheless, permanent right of
residence after a stay of five years was only granted if the applicants
had sufficient resources to ensure that social assistance would not be
applied for in the future. The Directive has done away with this restric-
tion. Gainfully employed EU citizens will be granted a right to perma-
nent residence on the sole basis of five years of uninterrupted legal resi-
dence. They will have a right to the same welfare benefits which the
host country provides its own nationals.
In this chapter, I examine the extent to which these measures pro-
voke migration to those countries with the highest levels of welfare ben-
efits. Since the Directive was not implemented in national laws and reg-
ulations until 2006, there is no basis for formulating an answer to this
question based on an ex-post analysis of migration flows. Rather, the ap-
proach pursued here is to quantify the financial incentives to migrate
by comparing estimated future flows of income and costs that are rele-
vant for the migration decision.
The analysis focuses only on financial incentives. Non-financial in-
centives resulting from the social sphere, language and cultural differ-
ences and from individual factors such as life expectancy, life plan and
the evaluation of risk are not taken into account here, although they are
important determinants of migration. So one has to be cautious draw-
ing general conclusions from the model calculations used here.
The financial incentives are quantified for those persons who – as
will be explained later – are most affected by the Directive: inactive
persons (pensioners, persons unable to work, illegal migrants being of-
ficially ‘inactive’) and self-employed persons. In this chapter, Poland is
taken as the country of origin and Germany as the host country.
The chapter focuses on the rights of EU citizens to move and reside
freely within the EU, their access to the system of social assistance in
Germany and the financial incentives of the different groups of inactive
persons and of the self-employed to migrate.
EU citizens’ right to move and reside freely in the EU
The right to free movement and residence in the EU has been consider-
ably extended since its founding in 1957. At its inception, free move-
ment was conceived of as an economic freedom. Workers were guaran-
teed freedom of movement and the self-employed were guaranteed free-
dom of establishment. However, those not gainfully employed had no
right to establish residence outside their own country. Since the begin-
ning of the 1990s, the right to stay in a member country other than
one’s own is no longer tied to participation in the economy. This was
expressed clearly in the Directives on Free Movement and Residence of
the early 1990s, which provided, under certain conditions, a right of re-
sidence for students, retired persons and other inactive persons. In
1993, the Maastricht Treaty explicitly provided (in Article 18) that every
EU citizen, whether gainfully employed or not, has the right to move
and reside freely within the territory of member states. The implement-
ing regulations and the relevant decisions of the European Court were
developed further and summarised in Directive 2004/38/EC
(Hailbronner 2006).
The Directive provides for graduated regulations governing residence:
no conditions are imposed on an EU citizen and his or her family
members for residence in a member country other than valid identity
papers for a period of up to three months. For a stay of between four to
60 months, a residence certificate is required. In order to obtain it, the
EU citizen must establish his or her residence in a member state and
register with the relevant authorities. At the end of five years of uninter-
rupted legal residence,2 the EU citizen is entitled unconditionally to per-
manent residence.
Granting a residence certificate for inactive EU citizens in the period
between the fourth and the sixtieth months requires that they have
means of subsistence sufficient for the entire stay and that they have
adequate health insurance. These requirements are designed to ensure
that social assistance will not be applied for. Health insurance coverage
is considered adequate when it is – in the case of Germany – equivalent
to statutory health insurance. Since access to statutory health insurance
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in Germany is subject to restrictive conditions (Figure 15.1), as a rule,
foreigners from other EU countries have to obtain health insurance
from private insurers. Self-employed persons are entitled to a residence
certificate, provided they exercise a gainful economic activity.
Figure 15.1 Health insurance available for a Polish national residing in Germany
Source: Compilation by CESifo
When an EU citizen registers in Germany, the registration office pro-
ceeds on the assumption that the requirements for residence are ful-
filled if the person registering declares that they are. Unless there are
prima facie grounds for doubt, no enquiries are instigated before issu-
ing the certification requested. In the ensuing five years, no check on
the fulfilment of the conditions for permanent residency is carried out
unless the EU citizen applies for welfare benefits. In such a case the
authority responsible for foreigners, after having been informed by the
Social Assistance Office, can examine whether the requirements for re-
sidence continue to be fulfilled. In the case of an inactive EU citizen,
the required amount of means of subsistence should not exceed the
threshold defined for social assistance for nationals. At the same time,
no uniform amount for means of subsistence should be fixed. On the
contrary, regional differences and the personal situation of the applicant
must be taken into account. Merely claiming social assistance is not suf-
ficient grounds for expulsion; only laying a claim to excessively high
A) Voluntary coverage in Germany’s statutory health insurance
Requirements according to Art.9 of the Social Code V:
– Absolved from the insurance requirement of Polish Social
Insurance (ZUS)
– During five years before being absolved, at least 24 months; or
immediately before being absolved, uninterruptedly at least
twelve months insured in Poland’s National Health Fund
(Narodowy Fundusz Zrowia – NFZ)
Additional conditions imposed by the German Federal
Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs:
– Prior insurance coverage for at least one day in Germany
B) Coverage by a private provider of health insurance in Germany
C) No possibility exists to continue insurance coverage in Poland if
residence is changed to Germany
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benefits. What is excessive, however, is left unclear. Gainfully self-
employed persons are required to exercise an independent activity. The
intensity with which this activity must be exercised is also not defined
by law. Yet, it is not necessary that the self-employed person be able to
cover his or her living expenses from the exercise of the activity
completely.
Access of EU citizens to the systems of social assistance of host
countries
As long as inactive EU citizens had no right to take up residence in
other member countries, they could not claim welfare benefits in those
countries. The extension to them of the right of free movement has
changed the situation radically. As such:
– During a stay of less than three months, inactive EU citizens are not
entitled to social assistance. Parity with citizens of the host country
is not provided.3
– During a stay lasting between four and 60 months, inactive EU citi-
zens are, as a matter of principle, entitled to welfare benefits,
although the requirement of sufficient resources and adequate
health insurance coverage is designed to ensure that this entitlement
remains theoretical. In case the resources are exhausted sooner than
expected or when health insurance coverage is not adequate, the
Social Assistance Offices grant benefits even though the conditions
for residence are not fulfilled. If the host country wants to avoid this,
the EU citizen’s stay must be brought to an end (Sander 2005:
1016). As set out above, this involves an examination by the author-
ity responsible for foreigners as to whether the claims to welfare
were inappropriate.
– After a stay of five years, the EU citizen is entitled to the same wel-
fare benefits as those the host country provides its own nationals.
Gainfully self-employed persons who reside legally in Germany are,
from the very beginning of their stay, entitled to welfare benefits (as a
rule, Unemployment Benefit II which also may supplement own in-
come). During the first five years of their stay, however, the authority re-
sponsible for foreigners may examine whether the conditions for con-
tinued residence are still fulfilled (adequate economic activity). If condi-
tions are not met, the residence certificate may be cancelled. At the end
of the five years of legal residence, the EU citizen has a right to all wel-
fare benefits.
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Legal migration of inactive persons into welfare systems
The Directive limits the incentives to migrate in that it restricts access
to welfare benefits in the host country. The migrating EU citizen must
reside in the host country during a five-year waiting period before he or
she can claim welfare benefits. During this waiting period, the migrant
must support himself or herself out of personal resources and must
pay health insurance premiums in the host country. In the case of inac-
tive persons, income from employment is not relevant, and this means
that changing residence to another EU country requires that the mi-
grant should dispose of sufficient financial assets.
According to Borjas (1999a; 1998b), the financial migration incen-
tives depend on the present discounted value of the net income differ-
ential, that is to say the difference of social security benefits (S), which
must exceed the costs of migration (MC) plus the present discounted
value of living expenses differential (LE). Non-gainfully employed per-
sons will decide to migrate from O (land of origin) to H (host country)
if the condition in (1) is fulfilled, where T is the remaining life time
and r the discount rate. The living expenses include normal expenditure
for subsistence plus health insurance premiums.4
ð1Þ
ZT
0
ertfSHðtÞ  SOðtÞgdt >
ZT
0
ertfLEHðtÞ  LEOðtÞgdtþMC:
The magnitude of the financial incentives to migrate is influenced by
the characteristics of the potential migrants. Their age, gender, family
status, etc., play a role in determining this magnitude (Ackers & Dwyer
2002). For practical reasons, I focus my quantifications on a small
number of cases. The rationale for choosing the cases is their relevance
for estimating the financial incentives to migrate under the Directive.
In addition to sufficient financial assets, migrants must be non-gain-
fully employed in the host country and fulfil the conditions for receiv-
ing social assistance. In Germany, they must also be at least 65 years
old. At this age they receive social assistance for the elderly
(Grundsicherung im Alter) even if they are able to work. This group of
people includes Poles who have been active up to the age of 60 and re-
ceive a pension from the Polish pension fund at the age of 65. If they
are needy, in spite of receiving a Polish pension, they are entitled to the
difference between the Polish pension and the German social
assistance. Having migrated to Germany, they belong to the group of
amnesty-seeking international retirement migrants (Dwyer &
Papadimitriou 2006).5
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Alternatively, if they are younger they must be unable to work.
Otherwise, they would qualify in Germany for Unemployment Benefit
II (instead of social assistance) and would be obliged to search for a reg-
ular job, which is not covered by the Directive. We assume that our re-
presentative of this group of persons is 40 years old.
Figure 15.2 describes the migration decision of a prototype pensioner,
a 60-year-old Pole who can claim old-age benefits in Poland upon
reaching the age of 65. In the upper panel, assets are entered on the
vertical axis and time on the horizontal axis. Assets of the amount of
AB are required in order to cover living expenses in Germany during
the waiting period.6 In the case of a change of residence to Germany,
Figure 15.2 Incentives to migrate with old-age benefit entitlement in country
of origin*
* The incomes and costs in the graph are those for a single person.
Source: CESifo
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the migrant’s assets will decline as shown by the curve AE. At the point
in time E, they will be entirely exhausted. At the end of the five-year
waiting period, the Polish migrant is a pauper fulfilling the conditions
for receiving welfare benefits just sufficient to cover his or her subsis-
tence-level consumption.
If, however, the migrant had remained in Poland, he or she would
only have used up part of his or her initial assets, since the cost of liv-
ing would be lower and premiums for health insurance would be less.
Thus in the case of non-migration only CD of their assets would be
used up; at the end of five years he or she would still own assets
amounting to DE.
In the lower panel of Figure 15.2, the annual flows of income and
costs that are relevant for the migration decision are shown graphically.
They are converted at purchasing power parities. During the waiting
period, total expenses associated with the stay in Germany amount to
the area FHJM. This can be thought of as negative income. In Poland,
on the other hand, the costs of living (including health insurance pre-
miums) are lower (area FGJL). On balance, there is a difference in the
expenditure for living expenses during the waiting period amounting to
GHLM. After the waiting period there is no surplus of net income that
compensates for this difference. The net income (Net IN: social security
benefits – living expenses) in Germany is zero, whereas it is positive in
Poland. Migration to Germany would not be financially attractive.
The scenarios thus far illustrated are based on calculations that are as
realistic as possible. They are based on 2005 values. The decision to mi-
grate requires that a Polish migrant has adequate monetary resources,
for he or she must be able to cover his or her living expenses in
Germany during the first five years out of his or her own resources. A
socio-culturally defined subsistence minimum must be met at all times.
In Germany, this is defined by the statutory rate for social assistance in-
cluding subsidies for housing and heating costs of E 672 per month
for a single person as of July 2005. Moreover, he or she needs private
health insurance, with a monthly premium of E 600 for a man or
E 620 for a woman. Given these hypotheses, a single person would
need initial assets of E 71,876; for a couple without children, the
amount required would be E 128,100 (Ochel 2007).
Apart from the possession of adequate assets, migration from Poland
to Germany also depends on the expected gain in income that must be
sufficient to cover the difference in living expenses as well as the direct
migration costs (which are neglected in these calculations). In making
this calculation, the streams of net income in Poland and Germany
must be made comparable, i.e. the difference in the cost of living in the
two countries must be taken into account. This has been done here by
converting the stream of net income in Poland with the purchasing
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power parity of the euro and the zloty. Table 15.1 shows present values
of net incomes. The net income streams have been discounted by a
nominal interest rate of 4.5 per cent (real interest rate 3.0 per cent, in-
flation rate 1.5 per cent). Social assistance that could be claimed in
Germany after the waiting period is compared to the old-age benefits
that an average employee receives in Poland and the living expenses in
the two countries. The comparison shows that starting at the age of 65,
a single person in Germany can expect within the next ten years a net
income that is below his or her net income in Poland by E -5,757. For a
couple without children, net income in Germany exceeds the corre-
sponding figure in Poland by E 11,973 which is not enough to compen-
sate for the difference in living expenses during the waiting period. In
both cases, changing residence from Poland to Germany is not finan-
cially attractive.
Table 15.1 Financial incentives for changing residence from Poland to Germany for
a 60-year-old non-gainfully employed person with a claim to old-age
benefits at age 65 (in E , year 2005 present values)
Expenditure during the five-year waiting period
(years 1-5)
Single person Couple,
no children
(1) Living expenses in Germany1 37,972 59,162
(2) Health insurance premiums in Germany2 33,904 68,938
(3) Living expenses in Poland, PPP3 19,900 31,008
(4) Health insurance premiums in Poland, PPP4 7,478 14,951
(5) Difference in living expenses (1 + 2 - 3 - 4) 44,499 82,141
Income starting at the age of 65 (years 6-15)
(6) Welfare benefits in Germany1 60,610 94,432
(7) Living expenses in Germany1 60,610 94,432
(8) Old-age benefits in Poland, PPP5 37,520 37,520
(9) Living expenses in Poland, PPP6 31,763 49,493
(10) Difference in net income (6-7)-(8-9) -5,757 11,973
Source: CESifo
Notes:
1 The standard of living corresponds to a socio-culturally defined subsistence minimum.
In Germany this is defined by the statutory rate for social assistance including subsidies
for housing and heating costs as of July 2005.
2 Private health insurance: 60-year-old man: E 600; 60-year-old woman: E 620
(anonymous data supplied by financial services firm AWD).
3 The cost of living in Poland is calculated on the basis of the cost of living in Germany
(subsistence minimum) adjusted by a conversion factor based on purchasing power
parities. The conversion factor is 1.9081 (OECD, February 2006).
4 Rate of contribution of 11.2 per cent applied to average income of 30,000 zl and
converted to EUR (EU MISSOC 2005; OECD Taxing Wages 2004-2005: 332).
5 Net old-age benefits = 0.516 x average net wages = E 2,616; E 2,616 x 1.9081 = E 4,992.
(OECD, Pensions at a Glance, 2005 Edition: 163; OECD, Taxing Wages 2004-2005: 332).
Contributions to health insurance have been deducted.
6 Amount is without health insurance premiums.
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Different results are obtained if one assumes a 40-year-old, non-
gainfully employed Polish migrant who in the foreseeable future has no
expectations of old-age benefits and in case of need has only an entitle-
ment to basic subsistence as defined in the Polish welfare system. If
such a foreigner migrates to Germany, he or she has an entitlement to
social assistance after five years. If he or she remains in Poland, how-
ever, he or she must exhaust his or her remaining assets amounting to
DE and can claim welfare benefits only after fourteen (or fifteen) years.
The migration decision depends on the income and costs streams de-
picted in the lower panel of Figure 15.3. During the waiting period, ne-
gative income in the form of living costs is incurred amounting to
FHJL in Germany. In Poland these costs come to FGJK. The difference
Figure 15.3 Incentives to migrate with social assistance entitlement*
* The incomes and costs in the graph are those for a single person.
Source: CESifo
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of living expenses is GHKL. Remaining assets must be liquidated to
cover living costs and health insurance premiums before one can claim
social assistance. The initial portfolio of assets is liquidated sooner in
Germany. Starting at the end of five years, the immigrant is entitled to
welfare benefits which are as high as his or her living expenses. Net in-
come becomes zero. In Poland, the person would go on experiencing
negative income. This disparity of access to welfare benefits has the
consequence that migration incentives turn positive relatively early.
This is the case as soon as the area IJMN exceeds the area GHKL. The
difference of net income becomes greater than the difference between
the living expenses incurred in Germany as compared to these expenses
in Poland during the waiting period.
Calculations show that in both cases (single person and couple with-
out children) in year 12, the present value of the differences in income
exceeds the present value of the differences in living expenses. As long
as the citizens considering migration expect to live beyond the age of 52
and to receive social assistance or Unemployment Benefit II in
Germany, then migration from Poland to Germany would be financially
attractive (Ochel 2007).
Illegal migration of ‘inactive persons’ into welfare systems
Up until now, the focus has been on legal migration into the welfare
state. Illegal migration might be an alternative. The conditions linked to
the right of permanent residence can, however, be circumvented only in
part. Establishing residence in the host country and taking out health
insurance are absolutely indispensable requirements. With a view to re-
ducing the costs of living during the waiting period, an EU citizen could
continue to live in his or her land of origin, whilst giving the registra-
tion office of the ‘host’ country pro forma an address of a relative or a
friend. This manoeuvre would, however, only be practicable if travel
costs are not too high. It is in any case illegal and hence involves risks.
The Directive imposes the requirement that the migrant has ade-
quate financial assets. If the EU citizen desiring to migrate has no as-
sets, one can imagine that relatives or friends might be willing to place
the required sum at the migrant’s disposal temporarily in order to show
fulfilment of the requirements. Nonetheless, the migrant will, as a rule,
have to cover his or her own living expenses and health insurance pre-
miums out of his or her own resources. If assets are not present, then
the only way to do this is to work in the informal sector of the economy,
which – it goes without saying – is also illegal.
Figure 15.4 illustrates the migration decision. Initial assets amount to
nil (not shown in the figure). During the waiting period, the EU citizen
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in Germany obtains wages from work in the informal sector, which
amount to living expenses and health insurance premiums so that the
net income is zero. In Poland, the same person receives wages from
regular employment leading to a positive net income (area ABEF). After
the waiting period is expired, the migrant in Germany can expect in-
come from social assistance and from illegal work. In Poland, he or she
goes on working regularly. At the point in time at which DEHI >BCFG,
migration becomes financially attractive.
In Germany, the income from illegal work must cover at least a
socio-culturally defined subsistence minimum (that is to say, must at
least equal social assistance, which is defined by such a standard); in
addition, it must be sufficient to cover health insurance premiums. For
a single person, E 55,489 is sufficient to fulfil this requirement during
the waiting period. The corresponding figures for a couple without chil-
dren are E 98,716. If one assumes that our immigrants would earn an
average wage in Poland, then the difference in net income between
Germany and Poland becomes E -25,644 for the single person and
E -43,152 for the childless couple.
Figure 15.4 Incentives to migrate in the case of illegal work* in the host country
* The incomes and costs in the graph are those for a single person.
Source: CESifo.
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At the end of the waiting period, our immigrant to Germany can ex-
pect to receive social assistance or Unemployment Benefit II. Since wel-
fare benefits minus living expenses in Germany are, on purchasing
power terms, less than the net income of an average Polish employee,
migration to Germany would not be financially attractive, unless the mi-
grant goes on working in the informal sector after the waiting period is
expired. In the latter case the present value of the net income received
in Germany between year 6 and year 15 will be E 47,637 more than in
Poland for the single person and E 88,690 more for a childless couple.
Moving to Germany becomes financially attractive after ten years, not
counting migration costs. However, in the cases examined here, one
must bear in mind risks of not finding work in the informal sector or
of being discovered in an illegal job (Ochel 2007).
Legal migration of self-employed persons into welfare systems
The Directive has broadened the right of residence of self-employed per-
sons. Permanent right of residence after a stay of five years was, up to
2004 according to the Law of Residence of the EEC, only granted if the
applicants had sufficient resources. The Directive has done away with
this restriction. Self-employed EU citizens are granted a right to perma-
nent residence on the sole basis of five years of uninterrupted legal resi-
dence and are entitled to welfare benefits.
As of 1 May 2004, the nationals and enterprises of the new member
countries have the same rights of establishment in other member states
as the nationals and enterprises of the old member countries.
Restrictions on free movement of workers, which may be maintained
for up to seven years, mean, however, that branches of enterprises from
the new member states (excluding Malta and Cyprus) located in other
EU countries are, except for key personnel, not allowed to employ peo-
ple from their own country.
Freedom of establishment is understood as permitting the establish-
ment of permanent economic activity in another member country. It
includes the exercise of an independent economic activity as a self-
employed person or the establishment and conduct of an enterprise.
This independent economic activity may have the character of freelance
professional work or commercial, trade or crafts activity.
With respect to a Polish citizen desiring to become a tradesman in
Germany, one must distinguish between trades requiring special qualifi-
cation (e.g. possession of a master craftsman’s certificate) and trades for
which no special proof of qualification must be presented. Since the be-
ginning of 2004, 41 craft trades (e.g. mason, plumber, joiner, baker)
have been designated as requiring certification of qualification. If the
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Polish migrant has a qualification in Poland equivalent to the German
master craftsman’s qualification, then he or she may enrol in the regis-
ter of qualified craftsmen in Germany. If the Polish migrant has no such
formal qualification, he or she must have worked at least six years as a
self-employed person in the trade or as responsible head of a plant or
workshop in Poland before exercising the craft in Germany. This period
can be shortened to three years if a three-year vocational training in the
relevant craft can be documented or if the migrant has worked for at
least five years as an employee in the relevant area. These periods must
be certified by the competent Polish authorities. Another option for ob-
taining the right to exercise a craft in Germany is by passing a test (Art.
8 of the German Law Regulating the Conduct of Crafts and Trades).
For the 53 trades that may be exercised in Germany without any for-
mal qualification, migrants need not fulfil any requirements. These
trades run from tilers and parquet-layers to building cleaning contrac-
tors or photographers. The same applies for the 57 areas of activity that
are classified as being similar to craft trades.
Figure 15.5 illustrates the migration decision of a 40-year-old Polish ci-
tizen who is self-employed. This person needs to have initial assets
Figure 15.5 Incentives to migrate for a gainfully self-employed person* in the host
country**
Source: CESifo
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sufficient to establish a business in the new location (not treated here as
they may be relevant in Germany and Poland alike); no assets are re-
quired to cover living expenses and health insurance since it is assumed
that the income needed to cover these will be earned in Germany.
During the waiting period, the EU citizen will make a profit (P) from
self-employed activity in Germany; for comparison, the profits to be ex-
pected if the same person had remained in Poland are also shown. After
the waiting period has expired, the individual may wish to continue as a
Table 15.2 Financial incentives for a Polish migrant taking up self-employment in
Germany (in E, year 2005 present values)
Net income during the waiting period (years 1-5) Single person Couple,
no children
(1) Income in Germany1 112,740 175,548
(2) Living expenses in Germany2 37,972 59,162
(3) Net income in Germany (1-2) 74,768 116,386
(4) Income in Poland, PPP1 45,544 74,174
(5) Living expenses in Poland, PPP2 19,900 31,022
(6) Net income in Poland, PPP (4-5) 25,644 43,152
(7) Difference of net income (3-6) 49,124 73,234
Income after the waiting period (years 6-15)
For 45-year-old migrant:
(8) Income in Germany1, or 179,950 278,605
(9) Unemployment Benefit II in Germany3 60,610 94,432
(10) Living expenses in Germany2 60,610 94,432
(11) Income in Poland, PPP1, or 72,695 118,393
(12) Social assistance in Poland, PPP4 18,587 18,587
(13) Living expenses in Poland, PPP2 31,763 49,493
For 65-year-old migrant
(14) Social assistance in Germany (DFM)6 60,610 94,432
(15) Social assistance in Germany (LR)7 0 0
(16) Living expenses in Germany2 60,610 94,432
(17) Old-age benefits in Poland, PPP 37,520 37,520
(18) Living expenses in Poland, PPP2 31,763 49,493
Source: CESifo
Notes:
1 Profits of self-employed (after taxes and deduction of health insurance premiums)
correspond to the average net income of employees (OECD Taxing Wages 2004-2005).
2 See Table 15.1
3 In Germany, self-employed who become unemployed do not receive Unemployment
Benefit I.
4 In Poland, the basic unemployment benefit is E 130. The actual amount paid varies
according to the duration of unemployment (EU MISSOC Tables 2006).
5 In Poland, social assistance is, at most, E 108 per month and household (EU MISSOC
Tables 2006).
6 Under the Directive (DFM)
7 Under the Law of Residence of the EEC (LR)
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gainfully self-employed person. In the event that the business does not
prosper, the individual can in case of need claim Unemployment
Benefit II in Germany; in Poland the corresponding benefit would be so-
cial assistance (SA). The living expenses are shown by LE.
In Table 15.2, the income (in the form of profits) and the welfare ben-
efit entitlements are compared. The comparison shows that a 40-year-
old self-employed Polish citizen will find it attractive to set up a busi-
ness in Germany; this is equally true during the waiting period and
afterwards. The financial incentives to migrate emanate both from bet-
ter earning prospects and from more generous welfare benefits. For a
60-year old, migration is financially attractive too. However, a single
person should return to Poland at the age of 65, whereas a couple
should remain in Germany.
Since April 2004, the German Association of Chamber of Crafts has
collected statistics on the establishment of craft enterprises whose pro-
prietors come from EU-12 acceding countries. On 30 June 2007, there
were 25,519 such enterprises in Germany; this corresponded to 2.7 per
cent of all craft enterprises in Germany (see Table 15.3). A full 97 per
cent of these enterprises are crafts that are not subject to proof of quali-
fication or are quasi-crafts. Crafts requiring qualification equivalent to
Table 15.3 New registrations of craft enterprises since 1 May 2004 where owners are
from EU-12 acceding countries (as of 30 June 2007)
Land Total no. of
enterprises
Enterprises where
owner from EU-12 (%)
Enterprises where
owner from EU-12 (n)
Baden-Württemberg 128,404 1.5 1,880
Bavaria 183,056 2.9 5,383
Berlin 33,203 6.9 2,285
Brandenburg 37,789 1.5 558
Bremen 5,018 2.9 146
Hamburg 14,409 8.9 1,278
Hesse 68,094 7.5 5,091
Lower Saxony 80,110 3.4 2,691
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 19,442 0.5 102
North Rhine-Westphalia 176,011 1.9 3,358
Rhineland Palatinate 48,597 2.8 1,368
Saarland 11,652 0.8 92
Saxony 57,688 1.1 615
Saxony-Anhalt 29,649 0.3 78
Schleswig-Holstein 29,134 1.8 523
Thuringia 31,375 0.2 71
Federal Republic 953,631 2.7 25,519
Source: German Association of Chamber of Crafts, Establishment Registration Statistics;
calculations by CESifo
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that of a master craftsman are, on the other hand, scarcely represented.
Craft enterprises with owners from the acceding countries are concen-
trated in urban centres such as Berlin, Hamburg, Frankfurt and
Munich. In the Länder located near the borders to the new EU coun-
tries, there have been relatively few establishments (Hönekopp 2006).
Conclusions
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the restrictions on the freedom of
movement and choice of residence of EU citizens have been progres-
sively lifted. The Directive that went into force in 2004 laid down new
and more liberal rules for movement across borders and for taking up
residence in another EU country. Access to welfare benefits in host
countries was made easier, although it continued to be tied to certain
requirements (Sinn 2004).
The question arises as to what extent these new regulations will pro-
voke migration within the EU from the less developed countries to the
more developed countries. Since the Directive was not implemented in
the member countries until 2006, it is impossible to provide an answer
to this question based on an ex-post analysis. Instead, calculations have
been made of the financial incentives to migrate in a number of model
cases. The countries studied were Poland as the country of origin of the
migrants and Germany as the host country. Since welfare benefits are
more generous in Germany, migration into German welfare systems is
to be expected. However, the rules and regulations in force impose a
waiting period of five years, which must first be bridged. This, in turn,
means that an inactive Polish citizen seeking access to Germany’s wel-
fare systems must have, at the beginning, considerable financial assets.
Only few Poles are able to fulfil this requirement. Then, too, these per-
sons must be prepared to liquidate these assets during the waiting peri-
od with a goal of later obtaining welfare benefits in Germany. This is
fraught with risks for the migrant, e.g. the risk that he or she will die
during the waiting period, or that there might be a subsequent modifi-
cation of the rules and regulations not in the migrant’s favour.
Apart from the possession of adequate assets, there should be a sur-
plus of net income arising from migration. To the extent that after the
waiting period there is an entitlement to old-age benefits in Poland,
then on a purchasing power parity basis the net income in Poland will
exceed the net income to be expected in Germany: there is no financial
incentive to migrate from Poland to Germany in such a case. If, how-
ever, the Polish citizen is younger and not entitled to old-age benefits,
he or she has to use up existing financial assets before being able to
put in a claim for social assistance in Poland – and this is in all
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likelihood the more general case – then there is indeed a financial in-
centive to migrate to Germany in order to take advantage of the more
generous welfare benefits there. He or she must, however, be unable to
work. Otherwise, he or she would not be covered by the Directive and
would not be entitled to social assistance in Germany. Not many Poles
will fulfil the conditions of having sufficient financial assets and being
unable to work.
If one considers persons who have no financial assets and who are
capable of working, then the calculations show that migration is attrac-
tive assuming that they work in Germany in the informal sector; at the
expiration of five years, they expect to also receive social assistance.
This option is, however, illegal and pursuing it involves considerable
risks.
For those capable of working it is more rewarding to seek employ-
ment in one of the EU countries that is open to migrants. This is de-
monstrated by many Polish citizens working in the UK and Ireland.
There is no need for illegal migration to these countries. However, la-
bour migration to these countries is associated with a demand for social
benefits, too, which might even arise earlier than in Germany, where il-
legal migrants have to pass a five-year waiting period before they can
claim social assistance.
Another option is to exercise an activity as a self-employed person.
This is financially attractive, too. The financial incentives emanate both
from better earning prospects and from more generous welfare bene-
fits. On June 2007, there were 25,519 craft enterprises in Germany
whose proprietors came from the EU-12 acceding countries. That corre-
sponds to nearly 3 per cent of all craft enterprises in Germany.
This analysis focuses on financial incentives. However, the social
sphere, language and cultural differences between the countries under
consideration are also important for the decision to migrate. Then, too,
individual factors such as life expectancy, life plan and the evaluation of
risk influence the individual EU citizen’s migration decision. All these
non-financial factors have to be taken into consideration as well when
future migration flows will be estimated.
A number of years will have to pass before the effects on the migra-
tion into the welfare systems of individual EU member countries aris-
ing from the Directive will be known empirically. That is why it is im-
possible to say at this very moment how the migration flows of inactive
persons will compare to contemporary migration flows which are domi-
nated by temporary labour migration.
But it is already possible to say that in enacting the Directive the
European lawmakers have undergone a considerable risk. Access to wel-
fare systems has not been cut off but only made difficult by imposing
certain conditions. In view of the still rudimentary nature of the
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financial compensation framework within the EU, it is entirely possible
that the freedom of movement that has been accorded will impose ex-
cessive demands on the solidarity of EU citizens in the host countries.
Notes
1 Gratefully acknowledged are comments by the participants of the IMISCOE A2 con-
ference entitled ‘EU enlargement and labour migration within the EU’ that took place
in Warsaw on 23-24 April 2007 and of the 63rd IIPF Congress that took place at the
University of Warwick, UK, from 27-30 August 2007, as well as the support by
Wolfgang Meister and Martin Werding.
2 Temporary absence of up to six months in a year does not affect the continuity of
residence.
3 Nonetheless, Article 14 (1) of the Directive does not fully exclude claiming welfare
benefits.
4 There are no empirical studies on the effects of different standards of welfare benefits
in the EU member countries on internal migration flows. Up until now, only studies
have been carried out on how the generosity of welfare systems in the EU influences
the migratory decisions of immigrants from non-EU countries (willingness to migrate
and choice of host country). Brücker, Epstein, McCormick, Saint-Paul, Venturini and
Zimmermann (2002), who have studied migration from a large number of non-EU
countries, and De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2006), who have examined migration from
the Central and East European countries before they became members of the EU,
come to the conclusion that there is a weak but significant connection between levels
of welfare benefits and the decision to migrate. In addition to financial incentives,
there are many other determinants that influence the migration decision. See e.g.
Fischer, Holm, Malmberg and Straubhaar (2000).
5 Family-oriented retirement migrants, e.g. spouses who leave Poland in order to join
their retired ex-worker husbands in Germany are not taken into account here because
the number of regular Polish workers in Germany is small due to migration restric-
tions up to 2011.
6 The costs of migration are not considered.
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